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Global Whistleblower Hotline Toolkit
How to Launch and Operate a Legally-
Compliant International Workplace
Report Channel
DONALD C. DOWLING, JR.*
As corporate social responsibility and business ethics continue to grab our attention,
evermore-sophisticated “best practices” and compliance strategies emerge.  A key practice
that anchors many corporate social responsibility programs and compliance initiatives is
launching and publicizing an internal whistleblower procedure, report channel, or “hot-
line”1 that entices insiders to denounce colleagues’ misdeeds so management can root out
corporate crimes, corruption, and cover-ups.
Within the United States, workplace whistleblower hotlines are a largely uncontrover-
sial “best practice” to which few ever object.  But tensions rise when a multinational or-
ganization extends report channels abroad.  Overseas, whistleblower hotlines can spark
blowback from staff, employee representatives, and government enforcers and can trigger
confounding legal issues that do not appear in the United States.  To a socially responsible
American, the hurdles impeding foreign whistleblower hotlines look higher than they
should have any right to get.
Workplace whistleblower hotlines take many forms.  Some stand on their own while
others comprise part of a broader corporate code of conduct, code of ethics, or compli-
ance or social responsibility program.  Some run in-house while others are outsourced.
There are single global hotlines and there are aligned but separate report channels across
local affiliates.  Some hotlines are closed to staff in certain countries.  Whatever the form
or reach, the idea behind a workplace hotline is simple: empower insiders who hear about
* International Employment Law Partner, White & Case LLP, New York City.  A.B. University of
Chicago 1982; J.D. University of Florida College of Law 1985; adjunct professor of International
Employment Law at John Marshall Law School, Chicago.  The author thanks Manuel Martinez-Herrera of
White & Case for significant contributions.
1. This article uses “hotline” to mean any report channel or other internal system or procedure designed
to collect whistleblower complaints, regardless of the structure and the medium (media might include, for
example, telephone, email, interactive website, postal mail, social networking, or a combination). See infra
note 21.
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white-collar crime, policy breaches, or other wrongdoing to come forward with allega-
tions so management can investigate, right wrongs, and punish the guilty.
Prison, gangster, and schoolyard cultures revile “snitches,” “stool pigeons,” and “tattle-
tales, and what Melville’s Billy Budd reviled as “the dirty work of a telltale.”2  But corpo-
rate culture in America and many other modern societies reveres company and political
whistleblowers as do-gooders who expose corruption for the benefit of all.  Look at all the
Hollywood movies championing real-life informants.  What was a trickle of based-on-a-
true-story whistleblower-themed film dramas—Serpico, All the President’s Men, The Insider,
Erin Brockovich—is now, in our post-Enron/post-Madoff age of “Occupy Wall Street,” a
steady stream—The Whistleblower, The Informant!, Fair Game, Puncture, Enron: The
Smartest Guys in the Room, and Chasing Madoff.  Americans who watch these movies root
for whistleblowers standing up to white-collar criminals and fighting for corporate ac-
countability.  In the workplace, too, rank-and-file Americans tend to welcome
whistleblowing (and hence company whistleblower hotlines) as a check against abuses of
management.  American executives, meanwhile, champion whistleblowing (and hotlines)
to support compliance and avert scandals and bet-the-company litigation.  Everybody
wins—except criminals brought to justice.
But this accommodating view of corporate whistleblowing (and hotlines) is not univer-
sal.  A cultural component divides some places from the rest.  Whistleblowing-averse soci-
eties from Russia and Latin America to the Middle East and India to parts of Asia and
much of Africa fear reprisals and retaliation so much that they suspect workplace
whistleblower hotlines as tools for entrapment.  In jurisdictions such as Korea, corporate
whistleblowing is taboo,3 and parts of Continental Europe resist anonymous whistleblow-
ing (and hence anonymous hotlines) surprisingly vehemently.4  European workers may see
hotlines as a threat to privacy—their own and that of powerful wrongdoers.  An article in
the New York Times says that in “much of Continental Europe” a “less swashbuckling atti-
tude toward matters of privacy offer[s] the powerful,” such as corporate officers, “a degree
of protection that would be unthinkable in Britain or the United States.”5  The Times
article points out that “French politicians have been able to hide behind some of Europe’s
tightest privacy laws, protected by what amounted to a code of silence about the transgres-
sions of the mighty.”6  An article in the Yale Law Journal explores why Continental
Europeans approach workplace privacy (and, by extension, workplace whistleblowing) so
very differently from our outlook stateside:
2. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR:  (AN INSIDE NARRATIVE) ch. 15, ¶ 5 (1962).
3. See Choe Sang-Hun, Help Wanted:  Korean Busybodies With Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A6,
A11 (Korea is “a country where corporate whistle-blowing is virtually unheard of—such actions are seen as a
betrayal of the company [and] carry a social stigma”).
4. To Americans, facilitating anonymous whistleblowing encourages candid reports from otherwise-reluc-
tant sources.  According to Stephen M. Kohn, Executive Director of the National Whistleblowers Center,
“[a]nonymity gets people to file [denunciations] and gets people with a lot to lose to file.  The ability to be
anonymous is a real game changer in terms of [enhancing potential whistleblowers’] willingness to file.”
Stephen Joyce, SEC Officials:  Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program Has Resulted in Higher Quality Tips, 215 Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), at EE-13 (Nov. 7, 2011).  Europe stands in sharp contrast. See Donald C. Dow-
ling, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines Across Europe: Directions Through the Maze, 42 INT’L LAW. 1,
11-16, 21-28 (2008) [hereinafter Dowling SOX].  As to this article’s operative definition of “workplace
whistleblower hotline,” see supra note 1 and infra note 21.
5. Alan Cowell, Scandals Redefine Rules for the Press in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2011, at A13.
6. Id.
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[W]e are in the midst of significant privacy conflicts between the United States and
the countries of Western Europe—conflicts that reflect unmistakable differences in
sensibilities about what ought to be kept “private.”
. . . .
. . . To people accustomed to the continental way of doing things, American law
seems to tolerate relentless and brutal violations of privacy in [many] areas of law . . . .
. . . .
. . . American privacy law seems, from the European point of view, simply to have
“failed.”
. . . .
. . . Americans and Europeans are, as the Americans would put it, coming from differ-
ent places.  At least as far as the law goes, we do not seem to possess general “human”
intuitions about the “horror” of privacy violations.  We possess something more com-
plicated than that:  We possess American intuitions—or, as the case may be, Dutch,
Italian, French, or German intuitions . . . .
. . . .
. . . Maybe Europeans feel that their personhood is confirmed by the fact that their
bosses are obliged to respect their privacy in the workplace . . . .
. . . Everybody [in Continental Europe] is protected against disrespect, through the
continental law of “insult,” a very old body of law that protects the individual right to
“personal honor.”  Nor does it end there.  Continental law protects the right of work-
ers to respectful treatment by their bosses and coworkers, through what is called the
law of “mobbing” or “moral harassment.”  This is law that protects employees against
being addressed disrespectfully, shunned, or even assigned humiliating tasks like
xeroxing.7
In societies that value personal privacy above corporate compliance, rank-and-file em-
ployees tend to fear workplace whistleblowing, particularly anonymous whistleblowing, as
ruthless worker-on-worker espionage.8  A confidential hotline makes every colleague and
co-worker a potential spy, and facilitates unscrupulous rivals lodging false accusations.
European workforces get especially queasy when an employer accompanies an anonymous
hotline with a mandatory reporting rule—a common provision in multinational codes of
conduct that forces employee witnesses to denounce misconduct or else get fired.9  Conti-
7. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151,
1155-57, 1159-60, 1163-65 (2000) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
8. Some countries outside the common law tradition, such as European regimes that suffered under Nazis,
fascists, and Communists, fear anonymous whistleblowing as potentially treacherous and see anonymous
whistleblowers as untrustworthy and dangerous sneaks who escape accountability for their denunciations.
These cultures fear anonymous hotlines as lures that might tempt a jealous or vindictive grudge holder to
accuse rivals of exaggerated or fabricated misdeeds.  These cultures even seem to distrust corporations’ skill in
conducting unbiased internal investigations into whistleblower allegations.  This is, however, a generaliza-
tion.  Not every Continental European fears whistleblowers and elevates personal privacy above corporate
compliance.  Indeed, corporate governance mavens in parts of Continental Europe may be coming over to
the Anglo view that values even anonymous whistleblowing (and hence corporate whistleblower hotlines) as a
powerful weapon in the fight against corporate wrongdoing. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 11-16.
9. Americans see mandatory reporting rules as a clear best practice. See Holly J. Gregory, Whistleblower
Bounty Rules:  Impact on Corporate Compliance Programs, 2011 PRAC. L. J. 20, 20 (“Corporate codes of conduct
typically provide that employees have an obligation to come forward with information about potential wrong-
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nental Europeans are quick to draw analogies here to anonymous neighbor-on-neighbor
betrayals under the Stasi and Nazis that sparked torture and murder10—a period when the
“sea of denunciations and human meanness” swelled to overwhelm even Adolf Hitler.11
Beyond Europe, many societies fear whistleblowing reprisals, loathe mandatory reporting
rules, and see an employer non-retaliation guarantee as a trap.
Laws exist to resolve conflicts in society.12  In American society, corporate fraud sparks
passionate conflict, so Americans tend to embrace corporate whistleblowing and hotlines
doing . . . . Without [this] direct reporting from employees, the company is hindered in its ability to identify
potential problems, investigate and take timely corrective action.”).  Mandatory reporting rules support em-
ployers’ internal investigations, such the scenario where an internal investigation does not uncover quite
enough evidence to prove all implicated parties actively committed wrongdoing, but where the investigation
confirms that some peripheral conspirators helped cover up malfeasance they demonstrably knew about.
Mandatory reporting rules in international codes of conduct raise delicate issues of international and foreign-
local employment law, issues beyond the scope of this article (which addresses international whistleblower
hotlines).  For a discussion by this author of mandatory reporting rules, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 6,
17, 44-45.  For a discussion by this author of multinationals’ cross-border internal investigations, see Donald
C. Dowling, Jr., Conducting Internal Employee Investigations Outside the United States, in 2010 EMPLOYMENT
LAW UPDATE ch. 2 (Henry H. Perritt ed., 2010), reprinted in 35 N.Y. ST. B.A.  LAB. & EMP. L.J. 4 (2010)
[hereinafter Dowling Investigations].
10. For examples of Europeans drawing this analogy, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 12.  Compare, as
one example of an anonymous denunciation under the Nazis leading to torture, the case of Joseph Schachno,
a U.S.-citizen expatriate doctor practicing medicine in a Berlin suburb during Hitler’s rise to power:
On the night of June 21 [1933], Schachno [was] visited at his home by a squad of uniformed men
responding to an anonymous denunciation of him as a potential enemy of the state.  The men
searched his place, and although they found nothing, they took him to their headquarters.
Schachno was ordered to undress and immediately subjected to a severe and prolonged beating by
two men with a whip.  Afterward, he was released . . . .  He lay in bed for a week.  As soon as he
felt able, he went to the [U.S.] consulate [which] ordered him taken to a hospital . . . .
ERIK LARSON, IN THE GARDEN OF BEASTS: LOVE, TERROR, AND AN AMERICAN FAMILY IN HITLER’S BER-
LIN 4 (2011).  Describing the beating, Larson adds, “From the neck down to the heels he was a mass of raw
flesh,” as “he had been beaten with whips and in every possible way until his flesh was literally raw and
bleeding.” Id. at 3.
Larson adds:
[In 1930’s Germany,] petty jealousies flared into denunciations made to the . . . Storm Troopers—
or to the . . . Gestapo . . . . The Gestapo’s reputation for omniscience and malevolence arose from
. . . the existence of a populace eager . . . to use Nazi sensitivities to satisfy individual needs and
salve jealousies . . . . [O]f a sample of 213 denunciations, 37 percent arose not from heartfelt political
belief but from private conflicts, with the trigger often breathtakingly trivial.  In October 1933, for
example, the clerk at a grocery store turned in a cranky customer who had stubbornly insisted on
receiving three pfennigs in change.  The clerk accused her of failure to pay taxes. Germans de-
nounced one another with such gusto that senior Nazi officials urged the populace to be more discriminating
as to what circumstances might justify a report to the police. Hitler himself acknowledged . . . “we
are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness.”
Id. at 57 (emphasis added). But cf. Whitman, supra note 7, at 1165 (arguing that the “Nazism” explanation for
the Continental Europeans conception of personal privacy generally—but outside the whistleblowing con-
text—is too facile because it ignores pre-Nazi-era history).
11. See LARSON, supra note 10, at 57 (“Germans denounced one another with such gusto that . . . Hitler
himself acknowledged . . . ‘we are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness.’”).
12. Cf. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 263 (William Rehg, trans., MIT Press 2d ed. 1996) (1992) (arguing that demo-
cratic laws are “procedures according to which citizens can, in the exercise of their right to self-determina-
VOL. 45, NO. 4
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
GLOBAL WHISTLEBLOWER HOTLINE TOOLKIT 907
that encourage it.13  U.S. law tends to support, even mandate, workplace hotlines, and
U.S. corporations embrace hotlines in their push for “full compliance.”14  By contrast, an
employer that promotes whistleblowing in whistleblowing-averse societies like Russia,
Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and Africa, causes conflict.  And, be-
cause invading personal privacy sparks conflict among Continental Europeans,15 Euro-
pean legal systems actively block many types of personal data processing16 and interpret
data protection laws to rein in the launch and staffing of hotlines.17  This frustrates U.S.
multinationals that buy into the “best practice” of report channels supporting compli-
ance—especially those multinationals that think U.S. law actively requires offering hot-
lines overseas.18  Many see the United States and European positions here as “seemingly
contradictory regulatory regimes.”19  The Wall Street Journal once quoted someone saying
tion, successfully pursue the cooperative project of establishing just (i.e., relatively more just) conditions of
life.”).
13. Every modern society rejects corporate misconduct, but modern U.S. society seems to be particularly
vigilant in this regard.  As just one example, in August 2011 a U.C.L.A. law professor publicly called for the
U.C.L.A. School of Law to reject a $10 million gift donated by Lowell Milken because, over twenty-five years
before, Milken’s brother had been convicted in junk-bond scandals.  Julie Creswell & Peter Lattman, Milken
Gift Stirs Dispute at U.C.L.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at B1.  The donor himself, Lowell, had never been
convicted and had never “admit[ted] to any wrongdoing.” Id.  Protest notwithstanding, U.C.L.A. took the
money. Id.
14. See infra Part II(A)(1).  On why the U.S. social concept of privacy and U.S. privacy law are compatible
with phenomena like corporate whistleblower hotlines, see generally Whitman, supra note 7.  As to U.S.
corporations’ push for compliance, see generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., U.S.-Based Multinational Employers
and the “Social Contract” Outside the United States, 43 INT’L LAW. 1237, as reprinted in 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 77 (2010).
15. See generally Whitman, supra note 7.  For a discussion on “proportionality,” see Dowling SOX, supra
note 4.
16. See Council Directive 95/46, EU Data Privacy Directive, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).  For analysis
of this directive, see generally Donald C. Dowling & Jeremy M. Mittman, International Privacy Law, in PROS-
KAUER ON PRIVACY:  A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 14-1
(Kristen Mathews ed., 2006); Whitman, supra note 7.
17. See infra Part II(C).
18. For discussion of whether U.S. law actually requires hotlines abroad, see infra Part II(A)(1).  As to U.S.
opinion that it does, see, for example, DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING:
THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 162 (2d ed. 2004) (“it would be prudent to assume [that SOX
enforcers will treat SOX as extending abroad] because foreign issuers whose shares are traded on U.S. stock
exchanges are not exempt from securities filing requirements”).  According to a U.S. law firm newsletter of
August 2011, “[r]egulatory decisions in [Europe] cast doubt on the legality of whistleblowing hotlines within
the EU, and companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges appear to face a difficult choice between two seemingly
contradictory regulatory regimes.”  Heather Egan Sussman & Alison Wetherfield, An Employer’s Guide to
Implementing EU-Compliant Whistleblowing Hotlines, McDermott Newsletter (McDermott Will & Emery)
Aug. 23, 2011, available at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail.  These “two
seemingly contradictory regulatory regimes” refer to a widespread interpretation that Sarbanes Oxley § 301
(cited and discussed infra at Part II(A)(1)) extends extraterritorially—an interpretation that might be inconsis-
tent with the U.S. Supreme Court decision Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
19. Sussman & Wetherfield, supra note 18.  As to the SEC position: in April 2003, the SEC issued an early
release interpreting SOX and saying the SEC declines to take a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulating
whistleblower hotlines and will not “mandat[e] specific [hotline report] procedures” for a number of reasons
including the fact that “large, multi-national [sic] corporations [employ] thousands of employees in many
different jurisdictions,” presumably meaning different nations, as opposed to different U.S. jurisdictions.  Stan-
dards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees Release, Securities Act Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2876 (Apr. 9, 2003) (emphasis added) (SEC release implementing Exchange Act § 10A(m)(1)
as amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 772, § 301).
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the conflict here effectively orders multinationals either to “chop off [their] left hand or
chop off [their] right hand.”20  Beyond Europe, those jurisdictions where workers fear
hotlines as entrapment also impose hotline restrictions.
This article is a toolkit for a compliance-focused multinational that wants to launch a
workplace whistleblower hotline across worldwide operations and therefore needs to com-
ply with hotline restrictions overseas.21  The discussion splits into halves, one conceptual,
and one practical.  Part One, the conceptual part, explores why any legal system would
restrict whistleblower hotlines when no jurisdiction restricts whistleblowing itself and
when few whistleblowers even bother with hotlines.  Part Two, the practical part, analyzes
the six categories of laws that restrict global whistleblower hotlines, focusing on compli-
ance strategy.22
I. Part One:  Why Restrict Whistleblower Hotlines Without Regulating
Whistleblowing Itself, When so Few Whistleblowers even Bother with
Hotlines?
A workplace whistleblower hotline comprises three basic components:  (1) a communica-
tion that (a) encourages (or forces) 23 employees to denounce colleagues suspected of
wrongdoing, (b) explains how to submit a denunciation, and (c) (often) guarantees confi-
dentiality or anonymity and non-retaliation; (2) a medium or media (channel or channels)
for accepting denunciations, such as an email address, web link, postal mail address, tele-
phone number, or some combination; and (3) protocols/procedures and scripts by which a
hotline responder, often a specialist outsourced company,24 processes denunciations and
passes them onto someone at the hotline-sponsor company to investigate.  Internal inves-
tigations into whistleblower denunciations raise tough legal issues of their own, particu-
larly in the cross-border context, but investigations into specific denunciations are
20. David Reilly and Sarah Nassauer, Tip-line Bind:  Follow the Law in U.S. or EU?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
2005, at C1.  For similar analogies in this context, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 3, n. 6.
21. This article addresses workplace-context whistleblower hotlines because most regulations specific to hot-
lines are specific to employee hotlines.  Some corporate hotlines are open to stakeholders like customers, sup-
pliers, contractors, and the general public, in addition to employees.  Opening a hotline to informants other
than staff raises few, if any, legal issues beyond the ones discuss here.  Further, hotlines tend to attract most of
their calls from current and former employees, not from outsiders.
22. In 2008 this author published a study of the legal issues the reach whistleblower hotlines launched in
Europe. See generally Dowling SOX, supra note 4.  The present article updates some of the points in the 2008
piece and takes a global focus—beyond Europe.
23. See Gregory, supra note 9, for a discussion of employer mandatory reporting rules.
24. Hotline-sponsoring multinationals often contract with specialist outsourcer companies to respond to
hotline calls.  Indeed, a mini-industry of niche “hotline outsourcers” has emerged, comprising companies that
respond to hotline calls purportedly in any language. See, e.g., EthicsPoint.com, Beyond Compliance:  Imple-
menting Effective Whistleblower Hotline Reporting Systems, http://www.ethicspoint.com/articles/whitepa-
pers/beyond-compliance-implementing-effective-whistleblower-hotline-reporting-systems (last visited Jan. 1,
2012).  The ability to outsource a cross-border hotline offers a hotline sponsor some distinct advantages—
impartiality, specialized expertise—but also triggers additional legal issues because giving an outsider access
to highly-confidential denunciations necessarily discloses sensitive data outside the company (even though, in
the hotline context, the sensitive transmissions come from individual whistleblowers, not the employer).  Par-
ticularly in Europe, using an outsourcer implicates the data protection/privacy law concepts of “onward trans-
fer” and, where the outsourcer is outside the European Economic Area, “data export.”  See Dowling SOX,
supra note 4, at 24-25, 48; cf. chart, infra Part II(C).
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completely separate from this topic, the pre-investigatory launch, and the operation of a
workplace whistleblower hotline.25
In many societies, distrust of or aversion to whistleblowing26 combines with particularly
protective local privacy and labor laws27 to spawn six distinct legal doctrines28 that restrict
multinational employers’ freedom to launch anonymous whistleblower hotlines across in-
ternational operations.29  But to Americans, the fact that any jurisdiction resists workplace
hotlines seems counterintuitive.  A government should encourage, not frustrate, busi-
nesses policing themselves to comply with the government’s own laws.  Yes, social forces
and public policy in some places seem hostile to whistleblowing, and yes, some societies
aggressively ban hotlines that “disproportionately” invade personal privacy.  But legisla-
tively restricting hotlines raises a paradox: even the most privacy-protective legal systems
on Earth do not dare restrict whistleblowing itself.30  Why restrict channels that merely
facilitate otherwise legal whistleblowing?
As a practical matter, “free-form” whistleblowing—truthful solo denunciations outside
formal report channels—is probably impossible to regulate without prior restraints.
Whistleblowing intrinsically links to speech, secrecy, and human interaction.  In its most
basic form, whistleblowing is ubiquitous—quite literally child’s play: every toddler tattling
on a sibling’s misbehavior to mother and every kindergartner bringing an unruly classmate
to the attention of teacher is a whistleblower.  No free society can prohibit or materially
restrict whistleblowing without imposing intolerable prior restraints on speech.  And dic-
tatorial, repressive, and fascist governments do not want to restrict whistleblowing; they
encourage denunciations to police lawbreakers.  Even the legal systems that are most hos-
tile to hotlines leave free-form whistleblowing—including anonymous whistleblowing—
completely unrestricted.31
With whistleblowing unrestricted, why rein in channels that merely receive otherwise-
legal whistleblower reports?  The historical (and practical) way that governments, free and
authoritarian alike, censor speech is to restrict the speaker, not the listener.  No federal
communications law would restrict radio receivers but leave radio broadcasts unregulated.
Merely crippling hotlines leaves would-be whistleblowers free to denounce colleagues any
other way they want, anonymously or not, by telephone, written note, postal mail, e-mail,
25. Investigating a hotline-received whistleblower denunciation opens its own Pandora’s Box of legal is-
sues—issues that follow after the launch of a company whistleblower hotline.  Not all whistleblower hotline
complaints lead to internal investigations and not all internal investigations are sparked by denunciations
received via hotline.  For analysis and inventory of international internal investigation issues, see generally
Dowling Investigations, supra note 9.
26. See supra notes 1-4, 7-11 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., supra notes 4, 7-11 and accompanying text.
28. This article addresses these six doctrines infra Part II.
29. On workplace hotlines versus hotlines open to non-employee stakeholders, see supra note 21.
30. No known jurisdiction imposes any law that acts as a prior restraint on speech to forbid private citizens
from truthfully reporting others’ misdeeds to private third parties (or to government/police authorities, for
that matter).  Yet legal doctrines could conceivably be triggered under certain narrow whistleblower scena-
rios.  For example, a government employee whistleblower could illegally divulge state secrets; a corporate
officer whistleblower could breach a fiduciary duty; a lawyer whistleblower could breach the attorney-client
privilege; a whistleblower party to a confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement could breach the agreement.
31. This part of the article discusses restrictions against free-form whistleblowing, not laws that promote or
require whistleblowing.  Part II(B), infra, discusses laws that promote denunciations to government
authorities.
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text message, on-line chat room, tweet, social media, web post, letter to the editor, spread-
ing rumors, contacting government authorities, tying a note to a rock thrown through a
window—whatever.  With a smorgasbord of non-hotline channels available, restricting
only hotlines seems futile.
Indeed, it is futile.  Whistleblowers overwhelmingly favor non-hotline channels.  Only a
tiny minority—three percent—of corporate whistleblowers bother with hotlines; a whop-
ping ninety-seven percent of whistleblowing is free form.32  The study that confirms this
ninety-seven percent figure was confined to the United States—abroad, where hotlines
are less common and less accepted, the percentage of non-hotline whistleblower reports is
likely even greater.  Information-age communications make non-hotline whistleblowing
easier now than ever before.  Put aside old, low-tech whistleblowing channels like mailing
a letter, dialing a telephone, slipping a note on someone’s chair or under the door, talking
to a news reporter, talking to government authorities, and spreading a rumor.  Today’s
whistleblower accesses many high-tech channels instantly to transmit denunciations to
anyone—anonymous email accounts, interactive websites, social media, tweets, text
messages, web chat rooms, disposable cell phones, and web-enabled communications.  In
today’s technology-enabled world, who needs a hotline?  Ninety-seven percent of
whistleblowers cannot be wrong.
Historically, hotlines always seem to have been mostly irrelevant.  Whistleblowing
without a hotline is the time-honored way we denounce our fellows.  America’s legendary
whistleblowers—the real-life informants immortalized by Hollywood—submitted their
history-making denunciations without hotlines: take, for example, environmental
whistleblower Erin Brockovich (played by Julia Roberts in Erin Brockovich); New York
police whistleblower Frank Serpico (played by Al Pacino in Serpico); Watergate “Deep
Throat” whistleblower Mark Felt (played by Hal Holbrook in All the President’s Men);
tobacco industry whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand (played by Russell Crow in The Insider);
Archer-Daniels-Midland whistleblower Mark Whitacre (played by Matt Damon in The
Informant!); Dyncorp/U.N. sex trafficking whistleblower Kathryn Bolkovac (derivative
character played by Rachel Weisz in The Whistleblower); Nigeria “Yellowcake”
whistleblower Joseph Wilson, husband of Valerie Plame (played by Sean Penn in Fair
Game); Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins (star of the documentary Enron:  The
Smartest Guys in the Room); Bernie Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolos (star of the
documentary Chasing Madoff)—even Oval Office sex-scandal whistleblower Linda Tripp
(parodied by John Goodman on Saturday Night Live).33  Trailblazing whistleblowers do
not bother with hotlines.
32. “[T]he Ethics Resource Center survey found that only three percent of all reports of wrongdoing come
through hotlines—possibly indicating that employees don’t trust them.  They might be right:  A study by the
University of New Hampshire concluded that corporate officials take anonymous complaints less seriously and
devote fewer resources to them.”  Dori Meinert, Whistle-Blower:  Threat or Asset?, 56 SOC’Y HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. 27, 27 (2011) (emphasis added).  Of course, though, there is no firm correlation between anonymous
whistleblowing and hotline whistleblowing:  anonymous denunciations are submitted all the time through
channels other than hotlines, and self-identifying whistleblowers often call hotlines.
33. Other famous whistleblowers not yet immortalized by Hollywood also made their well-known denunci-
ations free form, without resort to formal corporate hotlines.  Think of Japan nuclear power whistleblower
Kei Sugaoka; Glaxo Smith Klein whistleblower Cheryl Eckard; “Weinergate” (Anthony Weiner “sexting”
whistleblower scandal) whistleblower Andrew Breitbart; and tobacco industry whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand.
Indeed, workplace whistleblowers denounce errant employees every day without resorting to formal company
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To Americans, imposing laws to restrict hotlines seems downright quixotic for two rea-
sons.  First, hotlines exist to support compliance with the government’s own laws.  Sec-
ond, restricting hotline listeners without bothering whistleblower speakers is both
counterintuitive and futile when ninety-seven percent of whistleblowers avoid hotlines
anyway.  But this is just a U.S. perspective.  For whatever reason, jurisdictions worldwide
do regulate workplace whistleblower hotlines, using six separate categories of laws.  Mul-
tinationals launching cross-border report channels need to comply.
II. Part Two:  Complying with the Six Categories of Laws that Restrict
Whistleblower Hotlines Around the World
The raison d’etre of any whistleblower hotline is compliance.  Because hotlines coax wit-
nesses to reveal otherwise-clandestine wrongdoing so an employer can investigate, right
wrongs, and comply with law,34 no hotline can afford to violate applicable law. Reductio ad
absurdum: an informant could contact a non-compliant report channel, announce the hot-
line itself violates some law, and denounce the in-house project team that launched it.  So
every compliant multinational that launches international hotlines needs to start by check-
ing, in each affected jurisdiction, whether the channel might break the law.  Then the
multinational must comply.  Because U.S. domestic laws tend not to restrict whistleblower
hotlines, the issues here seem obscure to U.S. multinationals.  The rest of this article
analyzes the six categories of laws that can restrict whistleblower hotlines abroad, focusing
on compliance.35
A. CATEGORY # 1:  LAWS MANDATING WHISTLEBLOWER PROCEDURES
The first category of hotline-regulating laws comprises mandates that require setting up
whistleblower hotlines in the first place.36  These laws even reach an organization already
hotlines.  One random, recent example appears in a 2011 California court opinion, San Diego Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Comm’n on Prof’l Competence, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1454 (2011).  In that case an anonymous
whistleblower denounced, to police—not using any in-house hotline—a middle-school public teacher who
had posted pornographic photographs of himself, and had solicited sex, on Craigslist. Id.  The California
court upheld the firing of the teacher even though the public-sector employee’s Craigslist advertisement had
been posted off-hours and was unconnected to his classroom job, and even though the denunciation had been
anonymous. Id.
34. A hotline is never necessary for whistleblowing:  any whistleblower can submit even anonymous tips in
plenty of ways without a hotline.  Indeed, only three percent of whistleblowers bother with hotlines. See, e.g.,
Meinert, supra note 32.
35. These six categories are the categories of laws that regulate the launch and operation of a whistleblower
hotline itself.  As such, they do not reach—and this article does not address—legal issues ancillary to hotline
launch and operation.  For example, it does not address either laws regulating the launch of a global code of
conduct or laws regulating a mandatory reporting rule that forces employee witnesses to report wrongdoing.
This author has addressed both of those issues elsewhere.  As to laws regulating the launch of a global code of
conduct, see generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Code of Conduct Toolkit:  Drafting and Launching a Multinational
Employer’s Global Code of Conduct, in GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAW-
YER 563-77 (Andrew P. Morriss & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2010).  For discussion of laws regulating a
mandatory reporting rule that forces employee witnesses to report wrongdoing, see Dowling SOX, supra note
4, at 6, 17, 44-45.
36. For this article’s definition of “hotline,” see supra notes 1, 21.  Hotline-mandating laws promote work-
place hotlines and so these laws exist only in whistleblowing-friendly jurisdictions.
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committed to launch a hotline, because any report channel rolled out where the law re-
quires hotlines must comply with the strictures in the hotline-mandating law.  This sec-
tion first addresses the U.S. hotline mandating law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
[SOX],37 then looks at similar mandates overseas.
1. SOX § 301
For multinationals that raise funds on U.S. stock exchanges, the vital hotline-mandating
law is SOX § 301(4), which forces company board audit committees to offer “employees”
“procedures” for the “confidential, anonymous” submission of “complaints” and “con-
cerns” of “accounting or auditing matters.”38  The Dodd-Frank law of 2010, discussed in
subsection B(2), amends many parts of SOX but does not tweak this particular mandate.39
SOX § 301(4) requires audit committees of SOX-regulated corporations, including so-
called “foreign private issuers” based outside the United States, to:
establish procedures for:  (A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received
by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters;
and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.40
Fortunately, any viable hotline likely complies if only because SOX § 301(4) offers sig-
nificant leeway in structuring “complaints” “procedures.”41  Congress wanted audit com-
mittees to tailor bespoke report “procedures” to fit each company’s own needs, and so the
U.S. SEC refuses to “mandat[e] specific [hotline] procedures.”42  Any robust
whistleblower channel that a SOX-regulated employer communicates to its (at least U.S.)
employees likely complies with SOX § 301(4)(B) as long as employees know about it and
can access it “confidential[ly] and “anonymous[ly].”43  Structuring a SOX-compliant hot-
line is so easy that no one ever seems to have gotten it wrong: as of mid-2011, no SOX
§ 301(4) prosecution had ever been reported.  Compliance may be so simple that most
“complaints” “procedures” comply with SOX § 301(4).
But the concern here is the global context: how can a multinational launch a compliant
hotline for whistleblowers overseas?  The international dimension slams the otherwise-
37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 301 (codified at 15 USC 78j-1)
[hereinafter SOX].  SOX reaches all entities, be they U.S.-based or foreign private issuers, that raise funds on
U.S. stock exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.
38. Id. § 301(4).  This part of the article addresses the SOX hotline mandate that audit committees make
“procedures” available to “employees.”  Separate provisions in SOX impose additional rules as to “reasonably”
“promoting” whistleblowing reports by “senior financial officers” and “attorneys.” See id. §§ 307, 406, 407;
17 C.F.R. § 205.3.  This article does not address those mandates because here the focus is on broad-based
whistleblower hotline procedures available to all employees (and even to non-employee stakeholders).
39. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (whistleblower bounty provision), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 et seq.).
40. SOX, supra note 37, § 301(4) (emphasis added).
41. SOX § 301 does not use the word “hotline.” See id. § 301.  This article’s definition of “hotline” in-
cludes any “complaints” “procedure” that complies with SOX § 301(4). See supra notes 1, 21.
42. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 19. See also Dowling SOX, supra
note 4, at 6, n. 17.
43. SOX, supra note 37, § 301(4).  SOX § 301(4) offers almost no guidance as to what hotline “procedures”
must be, except that the text of § 301(4) requires a report channel be “confidential” and “anonymous.” Id.
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straightforward § 301(4) “procedures” mandate into hotline-restrictive barriers, erected
overseas to hold hotlines back.44  The question might therefore become: to what extent can
a SOX-regulated audit committee modify a § 301(4) hotline protocol to conform to overseas laws
restricting hotlines?  But that question assumes SOX § 301(4) steps beyond U.S. soil and
confronts hotline-restrictive laws abroad.  Notwithstanding a widespread belief and a 2003
statement by the U.S. SEC to the contrary,45 SOX § 301(4) might be a shut-in.  If SOX
§ 301 does not travel overseas, then a hotline launched abroad is free to conform to any
local hotline rules that foreign law might impose.  And so our actual question is: does the
SOX § 301(4) “complaints” “procedures” mandate reach extraterritorially?
Perhaps it does not.  U.S. statutes apply only domestically unless they specify other-
wise.46  Nothing in SOX, nor in any SOX regulation or reported case,47 addresses whether
§ 301(4)(B) reaches “employees” based outside the United States.  This statutory silence
may anchor § 301(4) to U.S. soil.48  In Carnero v. Boston Scientific, the U.S. First Circuit
Court of Appeals (later confirmed with a U.S. Supreme Court denial of certiorari) con-
fined a different SOX whistleblowing provision—SOX § 806, which prohibits
whistleblower retaliation—to the United States, reasoning that the text is silent as to over-
seas reach.49  SOX § 301(4) is also silent on that issue, so the Carnero analysis might com-
pel a similar result and confine § 301(4) to the United States.  Fresh support lies in the
2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank Ltd.,50 which is eight years
newer than SOX. Morrison anchors § 10(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934—
like SOX, also a securities law—to the United States:
It is a “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.” . . .  When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none . . . .  On its face, § 10(b) [U.S. securities law] contains noth-
44. See Chart, infra Part II(C) (summarizing European hotline laws).
45. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 19.
46. The general, long-standing canon of statutory construction, upheld by a number of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, is that U.S. statutes do not apply extraterritorially unless they expressly say they reach
abroad.
47. As of mid-2011, a search revealed no case law or other authority on this point.
48. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 7-11.
49. Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2006). Accord Villanueva v. Core Labs., Docket
No. 09-108 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22, 2011). But cf. O’Mahoney v. Accenture, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10600
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (distinguishing the facts of Carnero).  As to the factual distinction between Carnero and
O’Mahoney, see Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 8-9, n.29.  After Carnero, Dodd-Frank § 929A amended SOX
§ 806 to expand the definition of entity to include “any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is
included in the consolidated financial statement.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. 1841 (2010).  This would seem to include foreign-incorpo-
rated affiliates.  But the Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX § 806 do not say anything about overseas-based
whistleblowers or whistleblowing incidents that occur abroad.  And so the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendments
probably do not affect the rule in Carnero.  But if the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendment is somehow held to
overrule Carnero and extend SOX § 806 abroad, the fact that Dodd-Frank did not similarly amend SOX
§ 301 buttresses the analysis that § 301 does not extend abroad:  Congress could have made a Dodd-Frank
§ 929A-like amendment to SOX § 301, but chose not to.  On the Dodd-Frank § 929A amendment, see gen-
erally OSHA Docket Number OSHA-2011-0126, RIN 1218-AC53, Procedures for the Handling of Retalia-
tion Complaints under Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended, Interim Final Rule,
Request for Comments, at 5-6.
50. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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ing to suggest it applies abroad . . .  In short, there is no affirmative indication in the
[Securities] Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore
conclude that it does not.51
But Morrison is merely the U.S. Supreme Court’s view.  Multinationals reflexively pre-
sume, following an aging 2003 SEC comment with a fleeting reference to § 301 hotlines
in “different jurisdictions,”52 that the SOX hotline “procedures” mandate extends world-
wide.  SOX-regulated multinationals may not even care whether SOX § 301 reaches
abroad—even if it does not, they aspire to the “gold standard” of a SOX-compliant confi-
dential, anonymous hotline across operations worldwide, regardless of whether it sparks a
conflict with hotline-restricting laws abroad.
2. Beyond SOX § 301
Abroad, whistleblower hotlines must comply with strictures in foreign laws that, like
SOX § 301, require employee report channels.53  But these laws are rare.  As of 2011, very
few laws beyond SOX force employers to offer hotlines.  “Whistleblower laws” have pop-
ped up worldwide, but they tend to be mere retaliation prohibitions, stopping employers
from punishing whistleblowers whether they use hotlines or not.54  For example, the UK
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998,55 India’s Limited Liability Partnership Act 2008,56
Japan’s Whistleblower Protection Act,57 and South Africa’s Protected Disclosures Act
2000 contain whistleblower retaliation prohibitions without affirmatively requiring report
channels.58  Anti-fraud securities laws tend not to require hotlines either.  Japan’s Finan-
cial Instruments and Exchange Law (J-SOX) does not require them,59 nor do UK financial
accountability laws or the UK Bribery Act.60  Legislatures in a few jurisdictions recommend
whistleblower hotlines—India’s clause 49 of the Listing Agreement61 and Spain’s Recom-
51. Id. at 2877-78, 2881, 2883 (emphasis added).  After Morrison, Dodd-Frank § 929P, amended part of the
securities law at issue (§ 17 (a) of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933) so that that law now expressly reaches
abroad. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P.  But nothing in Dodd-
Frank or elsewhere extends SOX § 301(4) abroad, and the § 929P amendment does not affect the jurispru-
dence of Morrison.
52. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 19.
53. Just as, for example, SOX § 301 imposes the stricture that report “procedures” be “confidential [and]
anonymous.” See SOX, supra note 37, § 301(4).
54. See infra Part II(E) for discussion of whistleblower retaliation laws.
55. See generally Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23 (Eng.).
56. Limited Liability Partner Act, 2008, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2009 (India), available at http://www.llp.
gov.in/.
57. Act No. 122 of 2004 (Japan).
58. Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (Cape Town) (S. Afr.).  Section 6(2) addresses, but does not
mandate, voluntarily-adopted “procedure[s] authorised by [an] employer.” Id. § 6(2).
59. Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Acts No. 65, 66 of 2006 (Japan).
60. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.).
61. Limited Liability Partner Act, 2008, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2009 (India); Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Bd. of India, Extension of Date of Ensuring Compliance with Revised Clause 49 of the Listing Agree-
ment (Mar. 29, 2005) (establishing an effective date of Dec. 31, 2005 for compliance with clause 49 of the
Limited Liability Partner Act).
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mendation 50.1(d), part II of Codigo Unificado de Buen Gobierno 19 May 2006.62  But com-
panies can and do ignore these.63
A few isolated laws in a handful of places require or have required employers to sponsor
report channels.  Liberia Executive Order # 22 of 2009,64 issued by Liberia’s Nobel Peace
Prize-winning president, required “private entities” to launch procedures for “receiving
and processing” “public interest disclosures” about private company “malpractices.”65  But
that order has now lapsed.  Norway’s Working Environment Act66 grants Norwegians a
right to report “censurable conditions” and urges employers to “establish” some “rou-
tin[e] . . . or . . . other measures” for employee whistleblower reports.67  But this is quali-
fied and little more than a strong recommendation.  Multinationals launching cross-
border whistleblower hotlines must adapt report channels to strictures in local hotline
mandates like the now-lapsed Liberia order and Norway’s Working Environment Act.
But beyond U.S. SOX, few laws yet require hotlines, although this might be an emerging
trend.
B. CATEGORY # 2:  LAWS PROMOTING DENUNCIATIONS TO GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITIES
Requirements of whistleblower procedures aside, our next category of hotline regula-
tion is laws like U.S. Dodd-Frank68 that promote employee/stakeholder denunciations to
government authorities.  These laws do not regulate company hotlines per se, but they steer
employer hotline strategy for two reasons:  first, encouraging whistleblowing to govern-
ment competes with employer hotlines by enticing internal whistleblowers to divert de-
nunciations from company compliance experts and over to outside law enforcers who
indict white-collar criminals.  Second, laws that require (as opposed merely to encourage)
government denunciations rarely except corporate hotline sponsors.  These laws therefore
force hotline sponsors to divulge hotline allegations to law enforcement.  For both rea-
sons, hotline sponsors need strategies accounting for these laws.  We address U.S. Dodd-
Frank first, then similar laws elsewhere.
62. CODIGO UNIFICADO DE BUEN GOBIERNO [REPORT OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE
GOOD GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES] recommendation 50.1(d), part II, CNMV (2006), available at
http://objetivo15.net/doc/CNMV_CodigoBuenGobiernoDeLasSociedadesCotizadas.pdf (Spanish version)
(Spain); see also Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 15, n.48.
63. This part addresses laws mandating general denunciations to government authorities.  In the specific
area of sexual harassment, there are some other laws in some jurisdictions like Costa Rica that require em-
ployers to offer a report channel specifically for sex harassment complaints.  Other countries affirmatively
require employers to investigate specific allegations of sex harassment; those countries include Chile, India,
Japan, South Africa, and Venezuela.  Colombia requires some report channel for “labor” harassment.
64. Exec. Order 22 of 2009 (signed by Liberia President (2011 Nobel Peace Prize winner) Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf in Dec. 2009; order now lapsed) (Liber.).
65. Id.
66. Working Environment Act, No. 10 (2007) (Nor.), available at http://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/binfil/
download2.php?tid=92156; see also Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 15, n.48 (discussing the Working Environ-
ment Act).
67. Norwegian Act, supra note 66.
68. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (whistleblower bounty provision), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 et seq.).
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1. U.S. Dodd-Frank
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 amended
Sarbanes-Oxley in many key respects, but did not touch SOX § 301(4)’s mandate for hot-
line/”complaints” “procedures.”69  Rather, Dodd-Frank took a radically different ap-
proach to whistleblowing that ultimately promotes robust internal company hotlines for a
completely different reason.  Under Dodd-Frank § 92270 and U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission [SEC] implementing rules of May 2011,71 a U.S. government
“bounty” pays cash awards of ten percent to thirty percent of SEC-recovered sanctions
over $1 million to eligible whistleblowers—whether living stateside or abroad72—who
told the SEC “original information” about securities violations leading to an actual money
recovery.73  Even whistleblowers that bypass internal SOX § 301 hotlines are eligible.
Dodd-Frank’s lure of a huge payday may tempt whistleblowers more than even the warm
feeling of doing the right thing by calling an in-house SOX hotline.74  The Wall Street
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Adopting Release, Implementation of Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Rel. No. 34-64545 (May 25, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
72. Cf. Tammy Marzigliano & Jordan A. Thomas, Advocacy & Counsel for the SEC Whistleblower:  A Primer
for Employment Lawyers, 196 DLR I-1, 1-2 (2011):
Any violation of the federal securities laws qualifies for protection under Dodd-Frank.  The re-
ported violation may have occurred anywhere in the world, involving public or private organiza-
tions and domestic or international violators.  In most cases, securities fraud occurs when
manipulative and deceptive practices are employed in connection with the purchase and sale of a
security.  Beyond stocks and bonds, the federal securities laws have interpreted “security” broadly
to include investment contracts, notes, and other nontraditional investments.
(emphasis added).
73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 68, at § 922(a); see also
Adopting Release, supra note 71.  SEC Enforcement Division Associate Director Stephen L. Cohen, speaking
at a conference in November 2011, said that critics of the bounty program “warned,” “individuals [would]
see[k] financial awards under the program, which by statute will be no less than $100,000 and could reach into the
millions of dollars.”  Joyce, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).  The Dodd-Frank bounty is payable only for
disclosing a violation of U.S. securities laws—not, for example, for disclosing bribery that violates the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note
68, at §§ 21F(a)(1), (b)(1).  That said, though, “[s]ome whistleblowers may not distinguish between the securi-
ties laws and [other laws like] the FCPA . . . and once the SEC has received a tip, it can be expected to pass it
on to other law enforcement authorities.”  Larry P. Ellsworth, Blowing the Whistle on Private Cos.?, Employ-
ment Law 360, LAW360.COM (Oct. 26, 2011).  Whistleblowers resident outside the United States who sus-
pect a violation of U.S. securities laws (such as related to accounting fraud occurring overseas) appear to be
fully eligible for the bounty.
74. Cf. Marzigliano & Thomas, supra note 72:
Dodd-Frank not only provides robust whistleblower protection, but it has revived pre-existing
whistleblower claims.  The False Claims Act (FCA), once limited to individuals who were “origi-
nal sources” with “direct and independent knowledge,” has been expanded to cover individuals
with either information or analysis . . . . Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) now appears to
have the teeth it was intended to have.  Dodd-Frank expanded SOX by extending coverage be-
yond just public companies to employees of affiliates and subsidiaries of publicly traded compa-
nies “whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such
publicly traded company.”
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Journal and many others lament the discordant policy message here to would-be
whistleblowers.75
Former Deputy U.S. Attorney General George Terwilliger, now a partner practicing
white-collar criminal law at White & Case LLP in Washington D.C., analyzes the conflict
here in detail and offers strategic advice to corporations caught between SOX and Dodd-
Frank.  Terwilliger’s analysis merits setting out in detail:
Notably omitted from the [SEC Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty] Final Rules are
requirements that were suggested and designed to preserve the effectiveness of [SOX
§ 301-style] corporate internal reporting systems.  The Final Rules provide what the
SEC posits are a number of incentives to encourage potential whistleblowers to util-
ize existing internal reporting systems.  However, an individual with access to a well-
structured, staffed, and responsive internal reporting system can nonetheless forgo reporting
internally, provide information directly to the SEC, and remain eligible for [a bounty] award.
The SEC has downplayed the likelihood that individuals seeking awards will bypass
internal systems, but the program’s first-to-report requirement, enormous potential finan-
cial awards, and lack of an internal reporting requirement represent a significant challenge to
maintaining effective compliance programs [including an effective internal hotline].  Compa-
nies have implemented these very compliance programs, often at great expense, at the
behest of federal authorities and the dictates of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements to ef-
fectively monitor corporate operations for compliance with law.
Companies now need to assess the effect of the whistleblower reward provision of Dodd-Frank
and the SEC’s implementing rules on their compliance programs and consider such program-
matic adjustments and changes as that assessment may suggest.76
75. According to a Wall St. Journal blog article:
Compliance lawyers and general counsel argue that they’ve spent much of the past decade putting
compliance programs into place to deal with whistleblowing complaints; letting every disgruntled
employee run to the SEC would provide huge headaches and little benefit . . . . David Becker, the SEC’s
general counsel, recently told a group . . . that whistleblowers should not have to approach their compa-
nies’ management before they run to the SEC . . . . Becker said the reason is because some compliance
programs “no matter how elaborately conceived and extensively documented, exist only on paper.
Some small number are shams.”
Ashby Jones, Sympathy for the Whistleblower? SEC GC’s Comments Pique Interest, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Feb. 1,
2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/01/sympathy-for-the-whistleblower-sec-gcs-comments-pique-in-
terest/.
Many later commentators offered similar views during 2011. See, e.g., BNA Daily Labor Report, Lawyers
Stress Whistleblower Protections in Dodd-Frank Act and SOX Amendments, 112 DLR C-1 (June 10, 2011);
Corpedia Ask the Experts, What Should a Company’s Response Be to the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
Which Encourage Employees to Report Wrong-Doing to the SEC?, CORNPEDIA ONLINE, Aug. 2, 2011; Ellsworth,
supra note 73; Gregory, supra note 9; Meinert, supra note 32; David Schwartz & Kathiana Aurelien,
Whistleblowing: Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounties and Their Impact on Employers, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS:
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, vol. 5 no. 42, at 14 (Oct. 24, 2011); Sutherland Whistleblower Response Team,
http://www.regulatoryreformtaskforce.com/whistleblowerresponseteam/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2011); George
J. Terwilliger III, SEC Adopts Final Rules to Implement New Whistleblower Program, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS., July 1, 2011.  For the opposite point of view—Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowing scheme as it looks to
counsel for employee whistleblowers—see Marzigliano & Thomas, supra note 72.
76. Terwilliger, supra note 75 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).  Terwilliger adds:
WINTER 2011
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
918 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The final SEC rules implementing the bounty attempted, at least ostensibly, to accom-
modate the critics.  According to Terwilliger:
The SEC’s release accompanying its Final Rules identifies three incentives in the
Final Rules to encourage individuals to report potential misconduct to internal [hot-
line] systems, or at least minimize the incentive for individuals to bypass internal
reporting systems in the hope of qualifying for an award.  First, a whistleblower’s
voluntary participation or interference with a corporate compliance program may in-
crease or decrease the award for that whistleblower.  Second, if an individual reports
information internally that . . . leads to a successful enforcement action, the SEC will
give the whistleblower “full credit” for information disclosed by the corporation for
purposes of determining the individual’s eligibility for and amount of an award.
Third, if a whistleblower reports information internally and within 120 days, reports
that same information to the SEC, the SEC will consider the initial date of internal
disclosure as the effective date for purposes of determining the whistleblower’s eligi-
bility for an award.77
But to Terwilliger, these three would-be “incentives . . . fall short of the rule-making
options available to the SEC that would ensure internal [hotlines] continue to help com-
panies identify misconduct and provide opportunities to investigate and take appropriate
remedial actions:”
It seems apparent that the SEC made a policy choice that places greater importance
on its enforcement interests than on maximizing the continued effectiveness of inter-
nal reporting systems and the compliance programs they support.  For its part, the
SEC “expects that in appropriate cases . . . it will, upon receiving a [bounty-eligible]
whistleblower complaint, contact a company . . . and give the company an opportu-
nity to investigate the matter and report back.”  While one can hope this positive
[SEC] Commissioner Paredes stated:  “singular attention has centered on the extent to which the
[Dodd-Frank] whistleblower [bounty] program, depending on how it is structured, could unduly
erode the value of internal compliance programs in rooting out and preventing wrongdoing.”
Despite the advocacy for an internal reporting requirement as a condition of award eligibility, the
SEC declined to incorporate such a requirement in the final rules.
77. Id. (footnotes omitted).  According to David Schwartz and Kathiana Aurelien of the law firm Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP:
Even though employers do not pay bounties directly to whistleblowers, many employers are
rightly concerned that they will now be subject to unnecessary SEC investigations as employees
start to view bounties as personal “lottery tickets.”  If a few employees “hit it big,” more complaints
to the SEC will follow, whether or not they are well-founded.
Schwartz & Aurelien, supra note 75, at 14 (emphasis added); see also Gregory, supra note 9, at 20-22:
The [Dodd-Frank] rules pose a potential risk to the effectiveness of corporate compliance pro-
grams, which by their nature depend on reports from employees about potential wrongdoing.
The split 3-2 SEC vote adopting the rules underscores the controversy about the potential impact
of the rules on [company compliance] programs . . . . A new Office of the Whistleblower has been
established within the SEC’s Division of Enforcement to administer the rules. . . . [The rules]
address concerns that compliance programs will be undermined if employees go directly to the
SEC with information about potential wrongdoing . . . . The new rules may have a detrimental
effect on existing internal reporting systems.
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policy statement will describe a normative practice excepted only in outlier cases
where the business . . . in question bears hallmarks of a criminal enterprise, the SEC’s
actual practice under its whistleblower rules merits continued attention, including
through congressional oversight.
The new whistleblower program provides good cause for corporations to evaluate
their compliance efforts and take steps to encourage employees to use internal reporting
systems and ensure that companies are made aware of compliance issues as soon as
possible.
The objectives of such reevaluation should include (a) maximizing the effectiveness of
internal reporting systems; (b) ensuring that internal reports are thoroughly evaluated
by a person or group with sufficiently comprehensive knowledge to recognize poten-
tial compliance issues in reports that are misdirected or incomplete; and (c) re-exam-
ining policies and practices concerning the dissemination of information regarding
potential compliance issues within a corporation . . . .
Corporations may also want to consider renewed efforts to inform or remind employ-
ees about the existence and use of internal [hotline] reporting systems and provide
additional training concerning such use.  Employees must believe that reporting in-
ternally will not negatively impact their job status.  Where appropriate, examples of suc-
cessful internal reporting offer the best evidence to employees that internal reporting
is in the best interest of both the employees and the corporation.
Corporations should also evaluate, assess, and update compliance programs to ensure that
internal complaints are handled swiftly and, where appropriate, lead to investigations,
remediation and disciplinary measures.  Such efforts are, of course, necessary to pro-
tect shareholder value and mitigate liability if misconduct does occur, as the SEC will
continue to consider cooperation efforts by companies in accordance with . . . SEC
policies that reward such efforts.78
Despite the stark policy clash between SOX § 301 and the Dodd-Frank bounty, at the
end of the day both laws push company hotline strategy in the very same direction: SOX
requires an employer to offer internal hotline “procedures” while Dodd-Frank motivates
78. Terwilliger, supra note 75 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).  For other analyses broadly consistent
with Terwilliger’s, see citations supra note 75.  According to HR Magazine:
To reduce the risk of an expensive and embarrassing government investigation [following up on a
Dodd Frank whistleblower’s call], company leaders must step up internal reporting procedures
and management training to encourage employees to report their concerns to the company first,
lawyers say. . . . Corporate lawyers argue that the proposed [Dodd-Frank] regulations would
entice disgruntled employees to circumvent internal reporting methods with the goal of getting
hefty rewards.
Meinert, supra note 32, at 28.  According to Skadden, Arps commentators:
The final rules do not require employees to report suspected violations using internal compliance
mechanism to qualify for a bounty.  Although the lack of a requirement to report internally creates
a huge incentive for employees to go directly to the government, the SEC attempted to encourage
compliance with internal reporting systems by counting it as a factor when determining the
amount of the bounty.
Schwartz & Aurelien, supra note 75, at 15 (emphasis added).
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the very same thing—a conspicuous internal report channel robust enough to attract de-
nunciations that informants might otherwise report to government enforcers.79
2. Beyond Dodd-Frank
Laws outside the United States also regulate whistleblower denunciations to local gov-
ernment enforcers.  Any multinational launching a global hotline needs to account for
these if only because they rarely exempt hotline sponsors themselves and require compa-
nies to disclose hotline denunciations over to local law enforcement.  Yet these laws are
rare in the free world.  The Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010, as one
example, encourages whistleblowing with a vague Dodd-Frank-like bounty.80  Now-
lapsed Liberia Executive Order # 22 used to encourage whistleblowing to the government
in a few ways.81  But both these laws and even U.S. Dodd-Frank merely promote denounc-
ing wrongdoers to government.  They pose no compliance challenge to companies
launching and staffing internal hotlines, although they motivate multinationals to promote
report channels robust enough to attract denunciations that might otherwise go to law
enforcers.
The tougher compliance and hotline administration issue here is laws that require di-
vulging evidence of criminal behavior to government enforcers.  Because few, if any,
mandatory-reporting laws exempt hotline sponsors, these laws require divulging credible
hotline reports to law enforcers even before a thorough internal investigation.  Fortunately,
very few free-world jurisdictions impose these laws.  Slovakia’s Criminal Code, as one
example, forces Slovaks (including employers) who reliably learn of illegal behaviour to
denounce wrongdoers to the police.82  Liberia’s now-lapsed Executive Order # 22 forced
employers that received credible criminal allegations through mandatory hotlines to re-
port them to Liberia’s “attorney general.”83  These laws cripple hotline strategy both be-
cause they require organizations to use their hotlines to incriminate themselves and
because they limit organizations’ power to investigate denunciations.84
79. See citations supra note 75.  While to a self-interested whistleblower an internal hotline may not ever
look as attractive as the Dodd-Frank cash bounty, employers are in a special position for keeping their hot-
lines in front of employees worldwide.  The U.S. SEC does not communicate directly with U.S. workforces,
much less overseas workforces.
80. Act 711, effective Dec. 15, 2010, at art. 26 (Malay) (government can pay “rewards” to whistleblowers),
available at http://www.bheuu.gov.my/pdf/Akta/Act%20711.pdf; cf. id. at art. 18(2)(f) (whistleblower can win
“pain and suffering” award).
81. Exec. Order 22 of 2009 (signed by Liberia President (2011 Nobel Peace Prize winner) Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf in Dec. 2009; order now lapsed) (Liber.).
82. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing Law of the National Council of the Slovak Republic
No. 300 (2005) Coll. Penal Code (section 340/failure to report a criminal offense)).
83. Liberia Executive Order # 22 of 2009, supra note 64.
84. See generally Dowling Investigations, supra note 9.  Hotline communications are usually worded to in-
vite reports of violations of both criminal law and of company policy; laws that require reporting to police
obviously affect only whistleblower denunciations of criminals, not denunciations of mere policy violators.
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C. CATEGORY # 3:  LAWS RESTRICTING HOTLINES SPECIFICALLY (EU DATA
PROTECTION LAWS)
Having discussed laws that both require whistleblower hotlines and promote
whistleblowing to government, our next category is hotline mandates that run completely
in the opposite direction and restrict organizations’ freedom to launch and operate report
channels.85  In theory, this category includes all laws that specifically ban or limit
whistleblower hotlines, but no such laws are known to exist anywhere.  Rather, the only
known laws specifically restricting employer whistleblower report procedures are Euro-
pean Union member state guidelines interpreting EU data protection (privacy) laws in the
hotline context.86
Some Continental Europeans distrust whistleblowers and hotlines.87  Over a dozen Eu-
ropean jurisdictions interpret their local domestic data protection laws (either by regula-
tion or at least by data agency pronouncement) specifically to rein in employer hotlines.
In addition, an EU advisory body called the Article 29 Working Party issued a persuasive
but non-binding report that recommends all twenty-seven EU states embrace a particu-
larly restrictive interpretation of EU data law to rein in hotlines.88  Broadly speaking,
Europeans see hotlines as threatening privacy rights of denounced targets and witnesses
when hotlines are not “proportionate” to other report channels in European workplaces.89
85. We do not include here in “Category #3” whistleblower retaliation laws because those laws do not reach
the launch and operation of whistleblower hotlines.  Rather, whistleblower retaliation laws regulate retaliatory
acts against whistleblowers who have already denounced suspected wrongdoers, whether or not they had used
a hotline to do it.  We address whistleblower retaliation laws separately, infra at Part Two, “Category #5.”
86. See EU Data Privacy Directive, directive 95/46/EC (Oct. 1995) (discussing what EU data protection
laws are); see e.g., Dowling & Mittman, supra note 16; and see generally Whitman, supra note 7.
87. Supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
88. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 18-56 (summarizing (far more thoroughly than the discussion infra)
these European hotline restrictions); see also Chart, infra Part III; Daniel Cooper & Helena Marttila, Corporate
Whistleblowing Hotlines and EU Data Protection Laws, PLC ONLINE, http://ipandit.practicallaw.com/1-366-
2987.
89. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 41-42 (on “proportionality” in the hotline context); Continental
Europeans insist that a hotline is not “proportionate” (is redundant, unnecessary, or at least “overkill”) if it
threatens to compromise data rights of denounced targets and others but offers little benefit beyond simply
duplicating alternate, more privacy-protective report channels already in the European workplace.  These so-
called “alternate report channels” are not hotlines, of course, but rather are local employee representatives
(trade unions, works councils, health and safety committees, ombudsmen), local grievance procedures, and
local line managers/chain of command/human resources.  To an American, though, these are not adequate
“alternates” at all.  An American sees local representatives/processors/managers as insiders incompetent to
substitute for a hotline for two reasons:  (1) reporting to local representatives/processors/managers tends to
be neither confidential nor anonymous (although it can be both); and (2) local representatives/processors/
managers are rarely both neutral and able to field potentially-explosive denunciations about their own local
team or their own local office/plant/operation.  An informant making a scandalous accusation to a local repre-
sentative/processor/manager could step into internal company politics or sensitive personal relationships and
the denunciation might go nowhere.  Even a local representative/processor/manager not intending to bury an
allegation might be too distracted to appreciate its gravity or too busy or untrained to ask the right follow-up
questions, or else communication lines might break down.  For many reasons, headquarters might never hear
about the denunciation or might not get an accurate version.  These problems are not just theoretical or
hypothetical; denunciations to local interested insiders are mishandled all the time.  For example, in October
2011 a California jury awarded a Sears employee $5.2 million in a race harassment case that emerged from
this very scenario.  Loretta Kalb, Sears Employee Wins $5.2 Million Jury Award for Racial Harassment, SACRA-
MENTO (CA.) CITY NEWS, Oct. 26, 2011.  The Sears employee had approached his “supervisors” denouncing
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Among the specific hurdles that European jurisdictions erect to frustrate hotlines, perhaps
the four biggest are:  (1) restrictions against hotlines accepting anonymous denunciations;
(2) limits on the universe of “proportionate” infractions on which a hotline accepts denun-
ciations; (3) limits on who can use a hotline and be denounced by hotline; and (4) hotline
registration requirements.  This article discusses each in turn.
1. Restrictions Against Hotlines Accepting Anonymous Denunciations
European hostility toward whistleblowing runs fiercest against anonymous denuncia-
tions90 and hotlines that accept them.  Spain and Portugal ban anonymous hotline denun-
ciations entirely and France may prohibit (or at least has prohibited) employers from
disclosing that a hotline will accept anonymous calls, even if it does in fact take them.91
Hotline communications across the rest of Continental Europe should affirmatively dis-
courage anonymous calls and affirmatively encourage informants to self-identify.  Mul-
tinationals that see SOX § 301(4)’s mandate for “anonymous procedures” as reaching
overseas face an impossible conundrum, at least in Spain and Portugal, and possibly in
France.92
Employers that think they must reconcile U.S.-style SOX hotlines with European ano-
nymity restrictions have four possible choices, not all fully compliant:  (1) violate Spanish,
Portuguese, and maybe French law by offering and communicating a hotline that accepts
anonymous calls; (2) keep hotline communications silent on anonymity but let hotline
staff accept denunciations from informants who refuse to self-identify, even where that
violates local law; (3) issue a hotline communication that discourages but implicitly accepts
anonymous denunciations even where this violates local law; or (4) have hotline staff hang
up on anonymous callers where required under local law, taking the position that the SOX
§ 301 “anonym[ity]” requirement does not reach abroad.
Deciding among these four options forces a multinational to ponder whether to locally
tailor hotline communications abroad or to do what every American multinational would
likely prefer—issue a single global hotline protocol for affiliate employees worldwide, or
at least Europe-wide.  This requires tough decisions.  How can a global intranet send
different messages to employees in different countries?  If a hotline sponsor can post
a racist colleague who happened to be “one of [Sears’s] top sales producers nationally.” Id.  The “supervi-
sors,” “not want[ing] to take action” against the racist sales star, covered up the denunciation and took “subse-
quent acts . . . to avoid being exposed for failing to follow the law.” Id.  A jury awarded $5.2 million to the
victim. Id.  The Sears case shows that what Europeans call “alternate” internal “report channels” do not
really mimic whistleblower hotlines because they are not disinterested.  To Americans, the European “pro-
portionality” argument in the report channel context fundamentally misunderstands what workplace
whistleblower hotlines are designed to do.  A hotline, to an American, gives retaliation-fearing informants a
way around interested local players who might be less concerned with “making it right” than with “making the
numbers”—Americans see a hotline as a detour around, not a duplicate of, local internal “report channels.”
See infra note 95.
90. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.  In the United States, by contrast, champions of corporate
compliance and social responsibility tend to trust anonymous report channels, reasoning that anonymity en-
courages reluctant whistleblowers.
91. See Chart infra Part III (citing to these laws in Spain, Portugal, and France).
92. See supra notes 18, 50-54 (SOX-regulated multinationals widely believe that SOX § 301(4) extends
“extraterritorially” to workforces outside the United States even if the 2010 Morrison U.S. Supreme Court
decision does not support this belief.
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country-tailored hotline protocols on its company intranet, what happens if an employee
based in one-country accesses and follows a protocol for staff in a different country?
What if an informant from a country where the employer purports not to accept anony-
mous calls offers up a huge denunciation but refuses to self-identify—must hotline staff
cut off his report?  At this level of granularity, these are strategy questions; answers de-
pend on circumstances, risk analysis, and HR communication systems specific to each
organization.93
2. Limits on the Universe of “Proportionate” Infractions on Which a Hotline Accepts
Denunciations
Even the most hotline-skeptical jurisdictions in Europe recognize, grudgingly, that U.S.
multinationals feel compelled to offer employee hotlines to collect reports of financial/
audit/accounting fraud and bribery/improper payments, to comply at least with the spirit
of U.S. SOX and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.94  Hotline-skeptical jurisdic-
tions in Europe interpret data protection laws to allow only “proportionate” workplace
hotlines closed off to all but these few infractions.95  But U.S. multinationals see no reason
to restrict hotlines this way.  They prefer to throw open hotlines to most any impropriety.
After all, Americans reason, if we go through the trouble of launching and staffing a hot-
line, we might as well use it to find out about any problem out there, be it an environmen-
tal spill, workplace harassment and bullying, vandalism, corporate espionage, breach of
HR policy, breach of expense reimbursement protocols—even theft of office supplies, and
unsanitary use of toilets.  But to list hotline-reportable infractions is illusory and deceptive
if hotline operators will actually take all calls.  Yet an employer faces logistical problems
confining a hotline to only a few topics.  How does hotline-answering staff field an off-
point call?  Can they even listen?  How does hotline staff divert an off-point denunciation
to another channel, without dropping it?
93. These issues lead to real-world litigation. See Benoist Girard (subsidiary of Stryker) v. CHSCT, Cour
d’Appel Caen 3rd Chamber (23 Sept. 11, released 4 Oct. 11) (Fr.) (Holding illegal the France hotline of
Michigan-based medical technology multinational Stryker, even though the French Data Protection Authority had
previously approved it.  A French whistleblower had gotten past the approved France-specific communications
and accessed a different on-line hotline communication meant for Stryker U.S. employees.); see also Dowling
SOX, supra note 4, at 51-56 (for a deeper discussion of the strategy issues in play here).
94. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. (The FCPA does not expressly mandate in-house hotlines, but
FCPA compliance without a hotline presents tough challenges.  Even EU jurisdictions seem open to hotlines
that accept denunciations of bribery); see also Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 30.
95. In short, European jurisdictions see workplace hotlines as a threat to data privacy tolerable only where
absolutely necessary.  By European standards a hotline is somehow less objectionable if it collects only allega-
tions of audit/accounting fraud and bribery but not allegations of, say, theft, physical violence, and sexual
harassment.  Europeans speak here in terms of “proportionality;” to a European, a hotline that accepts denun-
ciations of thievery, bullying, and sex harassment is not “proportionate” because harassers, bullies, and
thieves, unlike fraudsters and bribers, somehow can be denounced more appropriately via other channels.  To
an American, this “proportionality” analysis in the hotline context seems circular, even bizarre. See supra note
89 (on “proportionality”).
WINTER 2011
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
924 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
3. Limits on Who Can Use a Hotline and be Denounced by It
Some jurisdictions such as Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, and Sweden96 seem oddly
classist and undemocratic because they force employers to reserve hotlines for executives
denouncing misdeeds of upper-level colleagues.  These jurisdictions steer low-level staff
to report channels more “proportionate” for their low rank.97  An employer communica-
tion closing off a hotline to low-ranking whistleblowers and targets must be explicit.  Hot-
line staff must be ready to cut off any low-ranking would-be whistleblower who offers a
compelling denunciation.
4. Hotline Registration Requirements
Many European jurisdictions require hotline sponsors to register hotlines with local
government data-privacy bureaucracies (data protection authorities).  These tend to be
general mandates that in effect require data “processors” to declare to data authorities
many various types of “data processing systems”—including Human Resources Informa-
tion Systems from payroll and attendance to performance evaluation, pension/benefits,
expense reimbursement, travel tracking, milestone anniversary gift programs, and hot-
lines, too.  A few European jurisdictions, such as France,98 go farther and require complex
hotline-specific data agency registrations.  France imposes both a hotline “declaration” pro-
cedure and an alternate hotline “authorization” mandate.99
Beyond these four main types of EU data-law hotline restrictions, Europe’s hotline-
skeptical jurisdictions regulate other aspects of report channels.  Other regulated issues
include:  (5) alignment with “proportionate” alternate report channels in the workplace;100
(6) notices to employees, targets, and witnesses explaining their rights; (7) restrictions
against outsourcing hotlines; (8) communications to targets/witnesses disclosing specific
whistleblower denunciations; (9) complying with “sensitive” (EU Data Directive article 8)
data restrictions as to criminal data received by hotline; (10) rights to access, rectify, block,
or eliminate personal data processed via hotline; (11) restrictions against transferring hot-
line data outside of Europe; and (12) deleting/purging of data in hotline call files.101  The
chart below summarizes hotline laws in Europe on key topics.
III. Whistleblower Hotlines and Data Protection Laws in Europe
This chart summarizes data-protection law pronouncements in those EU member
states that issued data-law mandates or interpretations specific to employee whistleblower
hotlines as of mid-2011.  “Whistleblower hotline” means any channel/system for employ-
ees/stakeholders to submit complaints/concerns/allegations of wrongdoing to
management.
96. See “Sweden” row on Chart and citations therein.
97. See supra notes 89 and 95 (on “proportionality”).
98. See Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 18-56 (summzarizing European hotline restriction laws); see also
Chart, infra pp. 141-61; Cooper & Marttila, supra note 88.
99. See “France” row on Chart and citations therein.
100. See supra notes 89, 95 (on “proportionality”).
101. These twelve issues are discussed at Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 41-51.
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
EU Art. 29 No: opinion of 1 Hotline OK if Yes, but do “not In-house hotline Art. 29 Working
Working Party Feb. 06 is limited to advertise” is favored; Party has no
persuasive, a accounting, anonymity trained in-house opinion;
collective view of internal feature: “The team should disclosure
local Data accounting Working Party oversee depends on
Protection controls, audit, considers that local EU
Agency [DPA] anti-bribery, whistleblowing member state
representatives banking and schemes law
from the EU financial crimes; should . . . not
member states no opinion on encourage
hotlines that anonymous
reach other reporting as the
topics usual way to
make a
complaint . . .
[c]ompanies
should not
advertise the
fact that
anonymous
reports may be
made through
the scheme.  If,
despite this
information
[being assured
of
confidentiality],
the person
reporting . . .
still wants to
remain
anonymous, the
report will be
accepted.”
Austria Largely yes: Four Yes.  A hotline Yes, but Third-party Yes,
hotline-specific must be for a employers are hotline whistleblowing
decisions are legitimate not supposed to outsourcer is systems must be
binding as to purpose, encourage favored; in any notified to the
their specific therefore must anonymous calls event (whether DPA; affirmative
facts and parties be limited to hotline is DPA
only but complaints on answered authorization is
otherwise are topics of internally or required if the
persuasive: “substantial outsourced), an hotline will
K178.274/0010- importance;” independent process sensitive
DSK/2008 of specifically, specially-trained data and/or
5 Dec. 08 Austrian team should other special
K178.301/0003- authority handle reports categories of
DSK/2009 of interprets this to data such as
25 Feb. 09 reach: criminal
K178.305/0004- accounting/ offences
DSK/2009 of internal
24 July 09 accounting
K600.074/0002- controls; audit;
DVR/2010 of severe
20 Jan. 10 misconduct/
severe violations
of internal code
of conduct;
WINTER 2011
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
926 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
money
laundering and
anti-terrorism
might also be
considered
legitimate
Only reports of
misconduct
regarding
executive
managers can be
processed and
transferred to
the US
Belgium No, but Yes, to: criminal Yes, but Outsourcing is Yes
persuasive: DPA offenses and discouraged; disfavored and
recommendation violations of only for maybe not
of 29 Nov. 06 company exceptional cases allowed; need
written rules in-house
and legal independent
regulations point person
(particularly
related to
finance and
accounting)
Denmark Yes, binding as to Yes, to: criminal Not addressed Neither is Yes
notification offenses; issues by guidelines; favored; third-
process with the under US SOX; Danish lawyers party hotline
DPA: Local DPA serious offenses understand outsourcers
Whistleblower important to anonymous calls must be listed in
Guidelines: group/company are OK but notification to
Procedure for or relevant to should not be the DPA as
Notification of life/wellbeing; encouraged processors
Whistleblower economic crimes
Systems (updated (e.g., bribery,
Apr. 10) fraud, forgery);
There are also accounting,
two DPA auditing, bank/
decisions: finance;
2006-42-1061 corruption/
(Vestas) crimes;
2010-42-1941 environmental
(Euprin) issues; serious
DPA decisions work safety
are not directly issues, serious
binding on non- employee issues
parties, but have (e.g., assault or
persuasive sexual abuse)
authority; DPA Hotline should
must treat similar not accept
cases similarly reports about
“less serious
offences,”
expressly
including:
harassment,
“cooperative
difficulties,”
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
incompetence,
absence,
violation of HR
policies
Finland No (local DPA Yes, to: Apparently yes, Neither is No, unless data
guidelines of 27 accounting, but discouraged; favored; hotline transferred
July 10) financial hotline sponsor needs to be outside EU/
matters, should notified to DPA EEA (without
banking, and discourage if outsourced using model
bribery anonymous contractual
Under the calls; targets clauses, safe
Finnish data have a right to harbor or
protection law know the source binding
“necessity” of reports about corporate rules)
requirement, them unless or hotline is
only specifically outsourced to
information restricted by law third party
directly
necessary for an
employee’s
employment
relationship
should be
collected
through a
hotline
France Yes: local DPA Yes, to: Yes, but not Neither is Affirmative
(CNIL) financial, encouraged; favored; if in- permission
guidelines of 10 accounting, DPA orally said house, a trained required under
Nov. 05 and 8 audit and on 2 Mar. 07 team should 10 Nov. 05
Dec. 05 banking issues; that anonymity oversee and hotline
(modified by antitrust/ feature cannot retain guidelines; self-
Resolution no. competition be confidentiality certify
2010-369 of 14 practices; and communicated disclosure
Oct. 2010 as a bribery/ to employees, necessary under
result of Dassault corruption; per but as of 2011 8 Dec. 05
Syste`mes decision Fiche pratique of DPA’s position hotline
[Cour de Cassation 3/11, if serious on this seems to guidelines
8 Dec. 09]), and issues outside the have softened;
clarified by scope  (e.g., per Fiche
CNIL Fiche environmental pratique of 3/11,
pratique of 14 violations; trade “in principle,
Mar. 11; see secret whistleblower
generally Benoist disclosure; data systems are not
Girard breach risks; anonymous” and
(subsidiary of discrimination, whistleblower
Stryker) v. harassment and “must” be
CHSCT, Cour other “risks” to “invited” to self-
d’Appel Caen 3rd employee identify; Benoist
Chamber (23 “integrity”) are Girard decision
Sept. 11, released reported via (supra) says
4 Oct. 11) hotline, the anonymous
report needs to denunciations
be redirected to cannot be
the responsible “accepted except
person (e.g., by exception
financial and surrounded
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
director, HR by certain
director) precautions”
Germany No (opinion of Hotline OK if Yes, but Not clear; third- Yes, but
20 Apr. 07 of limited to: discouraged; party hotline disclosure
Du¨sseldorfer Kreis, criminal only for outsourcers mandate is
a national data offenses (in exceptional cases appear favored general,
agency collective/ particular, fraud, applying to
working group accounting and many data
consisting of auditing processing
local German matters, systems (no
La¨nder [states] corruption, hotline-specific
data agency banking and disclosure
representatives) financial crime, mandate), and
and insider subject to
trading), human exceptions such
rights (e.g., child as where there
labor), and is a company
environmental data protection
violations; other officer
topics may be
OK, but hotline
may not focus
on “conduct
which adversely
affects company
ethics” (e.g.,
vague mandates
such as “to be
friendly when
dealing with
customers”)
Hungary No Limit hotline to Yes; Hungary In-house is If hotline
Local DPA “matters that tracks the Art. favored; if involves
guidance to may cause harm 29 Working outsourced, transferring data
individual parties to or jeopardize Party opinion employees’ beyond the
(like letter public interest” consent is direct employer
ruling): No. 652/ (e.g., abuse of needed and (e.g., intra-group
K/2007 and No. public resources, hotline must be transfers or
295/K/2007 corruption, registered with transfer to
Fair Process Act bribery, health DPA; in both third-party
includes some and safety, cases, access to hotline
limited references criminal data must be provider),
restrictively conduct, restricted to registration (and
authorizing environmental limited group perhaps also
employer issues); if authorized to consent) is
whistleblowing hotline covers handle reports required; if not,
systems other matters no explicit
(not of public registration
concern), obligation, but
employees’ registration is
consent is advisable;
needed processing
Only senior personal data
employees can from a
be targets whistleblowing
call must be
registered with
the DPA
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
Ireland No (guidance No; hotline can Yes, but “not Neither is No, certain data
posted on local cover whatever encouraged” favored controllers are
DPA webpage, 6 violations required to
Mar. 06) company register with
specifically DPA, but
designated in hotlines do not
advance trigger the
registration
obligation
Italy Segnalazione al No position No position No position No position
Parliamento e al
Governo
sull’individuazione,
mediante sistemi di
segnalazione, degli
illecti commessi da
soggetti operanti a
vario titolo
nell’organizzazione
aziendale, 10 Dec.
09 (Italian DPA)
issued per art.
154,1f of 30 June
03, no.196) (DPA
referral of hotline
questions to
Parliament taking
no substantive
positions)
Luxembourg No (guidance of Yes, to: Yes, but Neither is Yes
30 June 06, accounting, anonymity must favored; trained
updated 10 Nov. audit, banking be discouraged; hotline-
07 and 11 May and bribery whistleblowers answering team
09, posted on issues must identify with a
DPA webpage where possible confidentiality
and affirmed in obligation  to
2009 Annual handle reports is
Report of recommended
Activities at
§ 2.2.1.2)
Netherlands No, but Yes, “limi[t]” Yes, but Third-party Yes
persuasive: local scope to organizations hotline
DPA “substantial may not outsourcer is
recommendation abuses;” any encourage favored
to individual forwarding of anonymous
party of 16 Jan. reports to reports and in
06 “parent theory must use
company” can a system by
only involve which identity
“substantial of the informant
abuses” above is established
“subsidiary
level” (mostly
reports of
serious abuses
by upper
management)
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
Portugal No, but Yes, to: Likely no; Third-party Yes: hotline
persuasive (“The accounting, anonymous calls hotline must be
[whistleblowing internal appear to be outsourcers are authorized by
hotline] accounting forbidden: DPA preferred; if in- DPA
authorizations controls, audit, “deliberation” house, only a
granted shall fight against “repudiates” small trained
make direct corruption, anonymous team with a
reference to the banking and hotlines; confidentiality
legal principles financial crimes; Portuguese obligation
included herein”): targets must be practitioners (contractual)
DPA’s individuals differ on should handle
deliberation nº exercising whether this reports
765/2009 of 21 management “repudiation”
Sept. 09 activities in amounts to a
these fields complete ban on
accepting
anonymous calls
Slovenia No, Slovenia No position Yes. No Neither is No; disclose and
Information restrictions favored; no register
Commissioner position investigation
Opinion on files only
Registration of A hotline itself
Whistleblowing is not deemed
Systems, 26 June to process
07 “personal data;”
uninvestigated
third party
allegations are
too speculative
to be deemed
Slovenian
“personal data;”
investigation
files are subject
to Slovenian
data law art.
27(3)
registration as
HR records
Spain No, but very Yes, to: No; Neither is Yes, “it will be
persuasive: report violations of “[m]echanisms favored; necessary to
0128/2007 of 28 internal or guaranteeing whistleblowers notify” to get
May 07 issued by external only the and targets must “inscription” in
DPA legal regulations that acceptance of be duly DPA “Register”
department sets could subject reports in which informed if data and obtain
out DPA’s target to the is sent to a third authorization to
opinion; later discipline; must whistleblower is party to send data
cited in: several specify: what clearly identified investigate the outside of EU/
DPA offenses can be should be reports EEA: this is a
international data denounced; established to general (not
transfer what internal or guarantee the hotline-specific)
authorizations external information’s mandate
(files nº: TI/ regulations the accuracy; not
00035/2007; TI/ offenses violate being adequate
00022/2009; TI/ to establish
00026/2009; TI/ systems
00088/2010; TI/ permitting
00089/2010, etc.), anonymous
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
2007 and 2008 reports” ;
DPA Annual Spain’s DPA
Report, and DPA says (orally) that
Guide to Data anonymous calls
Protection in are not
Labor Relations acceptable(hence
head-on conflict
with SOX § 301,
if § 301 extend
extraterritorially)
Sweden Yes: Swedish Yes, to serious Yet, but cf. Shell Neither is No, if hotline
Data Inspection irregularities case of 29 Mar. favored; Tyco complies with
Board general concerning: 2007: hotline DIFS 2010:1; if
regulations DIFS accounting, proportionality outsourced to not, an
2010:1 decided internal required US held OK; affirmative  § 21
22 Sept. 10 and accounting there must be a exemption is
subsequent controls, audit, written contract required (this
Guidelines for fight against with the article prohibits
companies: bribery, banking outsourcer processing data
Responsibility for and financial about crimes)
personal data crimes, other
processed in serious
whistleblowing irregularities
systems of Oct. concerning vital
2010 partially interests of the
affirming company or
previous holdings group or
in cases: Tyco individuals’ life
Decision of 6 and health (e.g.,
Mar. 08; AON serious
Decision of 26 environmental
Mar. 08; Telef. crimes, major
Decision of 6 workplace safety
Mar. 08 issues, serious
discrimination
or harassment
issues).
Processing
personal data
concerning
crimes may only
involve those in
leading positions
in the co. or
group
Switzerland No: 11th Annual No restriction Unclear; hotline Neither is Yes, but
Report of must collect at favored as notification
Activities 2003/ least neither is seen mandate is
2004 (of Swiss whistlebower’s as a perfect general,
DPA), at § 7.1 untraceable solution; a applying to
(This report is contact proposed many data
very early, 2003/ information “compromise” processing
04, and may not (such as would be to systems (no
reflect current anonymous name a person hotline-specific
Swiss DPA email address or responsible to notification
thinking) drop-box answer the mandate), and
address) and, if hotline in each there are
necessary, subsidiary; exceptions such
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Must confine Is outsourced
hotline to Are anonymous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
Is the authority certain topics whistleblower hotline hotline to data
Jurisdiction binding law? only? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
complete reports made by as where there
identity; a a given is a company
complaint employee of one data protection
should not, in subsidiary would officer; if data
principle, be be answered by are sent abroad,
processed if the the person the local DPA
whistleblower responsible in a might also need
does not different to be notified.
provide this subsidiary, to
contact assure
information impartiality
UK No (local DPA No, but there Yes, but DPA position Likely yes, as
conference paper “should be” a “confidential unclear: legal part of general
of 6 Apr. 06) “clear” list of reporting” is advice in UK mandate to
topics covered preferred recommends disclose data
third-party processing
hotline activities
outsourcers to annually (no
reduce hotline-specific
likelihood of mandate)
conflicts of
interest
In discussing laws that expressly restrict workplace whistleblower hotlines, this article
discussed only the data protection laws of Europe because those are the only known laws
anywhere that specifically speak to, and restrict, employer whistleblower hotlines.  Those
laws present the toughest single compliance challenge to a multinational launching a
cross-border hotline.  In particular, France continues to issue cases, regulations, pro-
nouncements, and private letter rulings that regulate hotlines increasingly minutely.
Spain aggressively prohibits anonymous hotlines, and Portugal seems to as well.102  Ger-
many imposes multi-faceted rules that can differ by Lander (state).103  So many differing
hotline-specific restrictions across Europe both impose compliance challenges and they
create logistical problems of hotline alignment.  Having to tailor disparate local hotlines
frustrates multinationals that invariably would prefer just one single global (or at least one
single European) hotline protocol.104
D. CATEGORY # 4:  LAWS PROHIBITING WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION
Having addressed laws that mandate workplace whistleblower hotlines, which regulate
denunciations to government authorities and restrict hotlines specifically, this article now
turns to a fourth category of whistleblowing law: prohibitions against whistleblower retali-
ation.  These are increasingly common.  U.S. SOX105 and Dodd-Frank106 as well as U.S.
102. See “France,” “Spain,” and “Portugal” rows on Chart and citations therein.
103. See “Germany” row on Chart.
104. Cf. Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 53-54 (exploring alternatives of eschewing hotlines altogether or
implementing one global hotline).
105. SOX § 806 offers whistleblowers an administrative, and ultimately a court, claim for retaliation—cf. the
§ 806 claim in the Carnero case (cited and discussed supra note 49 and accompanying text).  The U.S. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration handles whistleblower claims in the first instance that allege SOX
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state whistleblower retaliation laws107 grant causes of action to stateside whistleblowers
punished for whistleblowing.  Now, more and more overseas jurisdictions, from the
United Kingdom and South Africa to Malaysia, Japan, and beyond have climbed aboard
this bandwagon and prohibited whistleblower retaliation.108  Indeed, freedom from work-
place whistleblower retaliation has actually been declared a human right, at least in Eu-
rope.  In a decision of July 2011 involving Germany, the European Court of Human
Rights allowed all employees to denounce wrongdoing free from the spectre of
retaliation.109
Whistleblower retaliation laws are sometimes colloquially called “whistleblower laws,”
and so they might seem to play a role in the launch of a legally-compliant hotline.  But for
the most part they do not.  These laws are specific to workplace-context whistleblowing,
but in practical effect they have almost nothing to say about hotlines because retaliation is
impossible until after a whistleblower call ends and a follow-up investigatory stage be-
gins.110  Retaliation can become an issue only after an employer responds to a would-be
whistleblower.111
That said there is a big hotline communication issue here.  In whistleblowing-averse
jurisdictions around the world, from Russia to Latin America and the Middle East to India
and parts of Asia and Africa, an employer needs to overcome worker fear of reprisal for
whistleblowing.  This means guaranteeing that no one using the report channel in good
§ 806 violations.  OSHA whistleblower-retaliation-handling rules appear at 29 CFR Part 1980.  These rules
were being revised in 2011 to accommodate the changes of Dodd-Frank, and a draft revision issued Novem-
ber 3, 2011.  OSHA “Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints under Section 806 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended, Interim Final Rule, Request for Comments,” supra note 49.
106. Dodd-Frank, supra note 37 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A),(B)); cf. Final Rule § 240.21F-
2(b)(2).  Dodd-Frank whistleblower retaliation provisions appear at Dodd-Frank § 929, which amends SOX
§ 806 by expanding the statute of limitations significantly, exempting SOX whistleblower claims from
mandatory arbitration, and allowing state court SOX whistleblower retaliation claims to be removed to fed-
eral court and tried before a jury.  Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower retaliation protections are available to em-
ployees who provide information to the SEC in the manner described in the Final Rules and with a
“reasonable belief that the information being provided relates to a possible securities law violation that has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”  Dodd-Frank affords individuals a cause in federal district court to
enforce the new provisions. See also Terwilliger, supra note 75; see SOX § 806, supra note 105.
107. National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13390 (last visited Nov. 21,
2011) (summarizing U.S. state whistleblower retaliation laws).
108. See, e.g., UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998; South Africa Protected Disclosures Act 2000, art. 6,
no. 785; Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010; Japan Whistleblower Protection Act (Act No. 122
of 2004); see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
109. Heinisch v. Germany, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (5th Sec.), app. no. 28274/08 (7/21/11) (citing, at ¶ 37,
Assembly for the Council of Europe, Res. 1729 [2010] on “The Protection of Whistleblowers”), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=888505&portal=hbkm&source=exter-
nalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
110. To the extent that some jurisdictions’ whistleblower retaliation laws separately contains a provision
mandating the launch of a whistleblower hotline, for our purposes that would be a “category #1” law, dis-
cussed supra (Part Two, “Category #1”).  Liberia’s now-lapsed whistleblower executive order (supra note 64) is
an example—a hybrid retaliation/hotline mandate law.  Laws of this type may be emerging, but as of 2011
were extremely rare.
111. An employer that merely structures, communicates, launches, and operates a whistleblower hotline has
not yet arrived at a stage where whistleblower retaliation can possibly come into play.  An act alleged to be
retaliatory can happen only after a would-be whistleblower purports to have made (by hotline or otherwise) a
specific denunciation, and after the employer responds in some way that the whistleblower deems
victimization.
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faith will suffer retaliation.  But globally communicating a non-retaliation commitment
almost surely extends, quasi-contractually, otherwise non-existent anti-retaliation rights to
whistleblowers in jurisdictions without retaliation laws.112  Consider carefully the strategic
and legal implications before making an anti-retaliation commitment across borders.
E. CATEGORY # 5:  LAWS REGULATING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
Probably every jurisdiction imposes some legal doctrines that reach employer investiga-
tions into allegations of employee wrongdoing.  Depending on the country and the allega-
tion investigated, an internal investigation might trigger, for example, local laws on labor/
employment, data privacy/protection, tort, crimes, criminal procedure, private-party due
process, and prohibitions against exporting state secrets.113  But these doctrines only kick
in after an investigation starts.  They have almost no bearing on the launch and staffing of
a global whistleblower hotline because a hotline is a pre-investigatory tool.114
This said there is a hotline communication issue here.  Heavy-handed communications
about a hotline might later support claimants who allege the employer rigged its investiga-
tion process.  For example, imagine a hotline communication that says something to the
effect of “we investigate every report exhaustively, leaving no stone unturned to verify the
truth of reports received.”  Few organizations are likely to convey so blunt a message, but
if one did the statement might turn up later as evidence supporting a victimization claim.
Ensure communications about report channels do not convey an overzealous approach to
complaint-processing and investigations.  Where necessary, such as in Europe, be sure
hotline communications spell out the private due process rights of whistleblowers, wit-
nesses, and targets.
F. CATEGORY # 6:  LAWS SILENT ON, BUT POSSIBLY TRIGGERED BY,
WHISTLEBLOWER HOTLINES
Having addressed five types of laws that in at least some contexts regulate hotline
whistleblowing specifically, our sixth and final category is broader: legal doctrines that
neither explicitly address hotline whistleblowing nor have yet been interpreted in the hot-
line whistleblowing context, but that a hotline might theoretically trigger.  This category
is necessarily vague, and determining which laws fall into it is difficult.  Our two most
likely candidates are data protection laws silent on hotlines and labor laws imposing nego-
tiation duties and work rules obligations.
112. A common, perhaps “best,” practice is for international hotline communications expressly to guarantee
that the employer will not retaliate against those using the hotline in good faith.  Making a no-retaliation
commitment in a global hotline communication almost surely extends non-retaliation rights quasi-contractu-
ally into jurisdictions where local jurisprudence does not specifically protect whistleblowers.  And so an em-
ployer voluntarily issuing a non-retaliation promise across all a company’s global operations has about the
same effect as if each jurisdiction passed a whistleblower retaliation law.
113. This author has analyzed and inventoried international investigation legal issues elsewhere.  Dowling
Investigations, supra note 9.
114. Further, to the extent that ninety-seven percent of whistleblower denunciations come to organizations
outside whistleblowing channels (see supra note 32), most internal company investigations arise outside the
hotline context entirely.
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1. Data Protection Laws Silent on Hotlines
This article already discussed, as “category #3,” data protection law doctrines in Europe
that explicitly address whistleblower hotlines.  Beyond Europe, more and more jurisdic-
tions around the world now impose European-style omnibus data privacy/protection laws.
Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
South Korea, Taiwan, Uruguay, and others as of 2011 had passed or were implementing
comprehensive (as opposed to sectoral) data protection laws.  Some of these are almost as
tough as data laws in Europe.  In the future these laws might be argued to reach
whistleblower hotlines, paralleling the analysis in Continental Europe.115  But as of 2011
none of these data laws was known ever to have been interpreted to reach hotlines.
The way Europeans stretch their data laws to reach hotlines may be exceptional.116
Data privacy/protection laws regulate information about identifiable humans, but the
launch and staffing of an employer whistleblower hotline—before it receives a
whistleblower call that might or might not later morph into an internal investigation—
does not implicate any personal data whatsoever, about anybody.  A hotline standing alone
does not contain or process personal data about any whistleblower, target, or witness.  A
hotline is a mere channel, not a database, and is more analogous to a telephone, computer,
or communications device than to a human resources database warehousing information
about, for example, payroll, attendance, performance management, expense reimburse-
ments, business travel, or benefits/pension/insurance administration.  For that matter,
even when a real-life whistleblower contacts a company hotline to denounce an identified
colleague, the personal data transmitted get sent by the whistleblower, not the company
hotline sponsor.  So even an actual hotline denunciation would not seem to implicate a
hotline sponsor company in processing personal data until the moment the denunciation
ends and hotline staff further processes data received by writing up a report and perhaps
launching an investigation.117  Of course, many but not all118 European jurisdictions reject
this analysis and regulate report channels as if they somehow were databases.  We have no
way yet to know whether non-European jurisdictions with comprehensive data laws will be
so aggressive.
2. Labor Laws Imposing Negotiation Duties and Work Rules Obligations
Labor laws—specifically mandates imposing labor negotiation duties and obligations
regarding work rules—are another type of law that, although silent on and not yet con-
strued as to stand-alone whistleblower hotlines, could reach workplace report channels.119
115. See supra Part Two, “Category #3.”  This interpretation is most likely to emerge in those European
states (like, for example, Italy) that have not yet interpreted their data laws in the hotline context but that
might accept the Article 29 Working Party analysis. See “Article 29 Working Party” row on Chart.
116. Of course, we are speaking here specifically about hotlines/report channels, not about whistleblowing
generally, whistleblower retaliation, or internal investigations.
117. Of course, a hotline operator report and an investigation about a specific incident/allegation differ from
a whistleblower hotline.  Hotline operator reports and internal company investigations are subject to data
laws.
118. Slovenia does not accept the otherwise-common European interpretation on this point. See “Slovenia”
row on Chart.
119. We are speaking here of an employer’s launch and operation of a hotline/report channel, not about
whistleblowing generally, whistleblower retaliation, or internal investigations.
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Labor laws in most every jurisdiction require at least some employers to bargain with
trade unions over certain changes in the workplace.  Some jurisdictions also require in-
forming and consulting about new workplace practices with other employee representa-
tives such as works councils, health and safety committees, and ombudsmen.120  But the
texts of collective labor statutes never address hotlines specifically.  As of 2011, few if any
regulations, court decisions, or administrative rulings had construed bargaining obliga-
tions as to launching a stand-alone whistleblower hotline.121
An employer subject to labor consultation obligations might take the position that
merely offering a new stand-alone hotline does not change anyone’s work conditions and
so is not subject to labor discussions.  Employee representatives might counter that having
to work under a hotline regime poisons the work environment because it turns every co-
worker and colleague into a possible spy.122  In the United States, unionized employers
have to bargain with their unions before implementing new workplace surveillance tech-
nology like email and video monitoring.123  A U.S. labor union inclined to resist a
whistleblower hotline could characterize it as a sort of monitoring/surveillance tool that
triggers this same bargaining obligation.124  This same analysis could apply abroad, as
well.  Whether launching a stand-alone hotline falls under existing bargaining obligations
is rarely settled law.  The answer can depend on the comprehensiveness of the local bar-
gaining obligation, the applicable collective agreement, the workplace bargaining history,
and the local society’s receptivity or aversion to whistleblowing.  Consulting over a stand-
alone hotline will much more likely be held mandatory in Continental Europe and Hong
Kong than in the Middle East, the Americas, much of Asia, Latin America, or Africa.
In launching a stand-alone whistleblower channel outside the United States, check
whether local worker representatives in each jurisdiction could plausibly argue that new
report procedures trigger mandatory bargaining/consultation.  Look into whether existing
collective arrangements address reporting and grievance procedures, whether the society
is whistleblowing-averse, and whether the company’s own worker representatives tend to
obstruct most changes to the workplace.  Where the employer can convince its worker
representatives why the proposed hotline benefits everyone and is not a material adverse
change, bargaining/consultation should present no hurdle.
But resisting worker consultation over a stand-alone hotline is not always a sound strat-
egy.  In whistleblowing-averse societies that suspect hotlines as a form of entrapment,
consultations may make sense to make the hotline effective.  And in certain jurisdictions
an affirmative agreement with worker representatives about a hotline can help surmount
120. A discussion of this topic in the whistleblower hotline context appears at Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at
16-18.
121. We are addressing stand-alone hotlines.  Of course, plenty of labor cases around the world address the
launch of work rules, codes of conduct, and mandatory reporting rules (see supra note 9), and plenty of cases
adjudicate disputes arising out of specific whistleblower denunciations.
122. Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 17.
123. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006); Cal. Newspapers P’ship & N. Cal.
Media Workers’ Guild, 350 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (2007) (email monitoring mandatory subject of bargaining);
Brewers & Maltsters, Local Union No. 6, 414 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 342
N.L.R.B. No. 49 (2004) (surveillance cameras mandatory subject of bargaining). See generally Dowling SOX,
supra note 4, at 16-18.
124. Fighting hotlines, though, seems to rank low on U.S. unions’ agenda.  Indeed, a U.S. union might be
expected to welcome a hotline as a watchdog over abuses of management.
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challenges on grounds beyond labor law.  For example, a labor/management works agree-
ment (Betriebsvereinbarung) in Germany and a “plant bargaining agreement” in Austria
that accept a workplace hotline can rebut claims that report procedures violate data pro-
tection laws.  Bargaining is also necessary where a hotline does not stand alone but com-
prises a piece of a more extensive compliance program inarguably subject to consultation,
such as a new global code of conduct with a mandatory reporting rule that requires
whistleblowing.125
A workplace hotline can also implicate a separate labor law issue: mandatory work rules.
France, Japan, Korea, and other countries require that employers post written work rules
that list prohibited workplace infractions.  A stand-alone whistleblower hotline, as distinct
from a mandatory reporting rule,126 is not a work rule and so should not require changing
already-posted lists of infractions.  But a hotline launch that includes a new mandatory
reporting rule likely requires tweaks to extant rules.
IV. Conclusion
Domestically within the United States, launching new work rules, employee handbooks,
and codes of conduct can trigger legal issues, especially in unionized workplaces.  And in
the United States, a whistleblower’s call to a workplace hotline triggers a cluster of legal
issues, such as internal investigations, employee discipline, and whistleblower retaliation.
But U.S. employers, even unionized ones that make a stand-alone workplace
whistleblower hotline available to U.S. staff, rarely get blowback.127  Indeed, offering em-
ployee report “procedures” stateside affirmatively complies with a mandate in Sarbanes-
Oxley and is a recommended “best practice” response to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
bounty.128
But the U.S. laissez faire approach here can lull multinationals into overlooking or min-
imizing the surprisingly steep compliance hurdles to launching whistleblower procedures
across worldwide affiliates.  Six distinct legal doctrines can restrict hotline whistleblowing
abroad.  Our U.S. point of view sees hotlines as a best practice for nurturing compliance
by rooting out crimes and corruption.  So to us these six restrictions look like technicali-
ties grown bigger and more complex than they should have any right to get.  For that
matter, Americans have a hard time understanding why laws anywhere would restrict
whistleblower hotlines when no jurisdiction bothers to restrict whistleblowing itself and
when the vast majority of whistleblowers—ninety-seven percent—tend to avoid hotlines,
anyway.129
But this policy analysis takes us only so far when legal restrictions already in place
around the world actively restrict employers’ freedom to launch a workplace
125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (on mandatory reporting rules). See, e.g., Wal-Mart, Wuppertal
Labour Court, 5th Div., 5 BV 20/05, June 15, 2005 (Germany), discussed at Dowling SOX, supra note 4, at 17
(code of conduct with mandatory reporting rule held subject to mandatory information, consultation, and co-
determination with works council in Germany).
126. Supra note 125.
127. But cf. supra note 121 and accompanying text (hotline launch as possible mandatory subject of U.S.
labor union bargaining).
128. Supra Part II, “Category #1” and “Category #2.”
129. Ethics Resource Center, supra note 32.
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whistleblower hotline.  Employees in whistleblowing-averse societies like Russia, Latin
America, the Middle East, India, much of Asia, and Africa can fear hotlines as entrapment.
Meanwhile, data protection laws in Europe actively block hotlines, and violations can
spark passionate resistance from European workforces and can trigger punitive sanctions.
So launching an international report channel has become a global compliance project of
its own.  Before making a hotline available to employees worldwide, check which of the six
legal topics arise in each relevant jurisdiction.  Isolate, in each affected country, those
issues the hotline will trigger under local law.  Then take steps to make reporting proto-
cols and employee communications packages comply.
 2011 by Donald C. Dowling, Jr.
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The Reorganization Process Under China’s
Corporate Bankruptcy System
EMILY LEE*
Abstract
The number of enterprises plunging into bankruptcy starting in 2008,1 during which time
China was affected by the global financial crisis, tested the efficacy of the Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law (EBL), which established a statutory-based reorganization process to be followed and which
was seemingly designed for the resurrection of corporate entities caught in financial malaises.  Dur-
ing the global financial crisis, the EBL served its intended purpose—the prevention of a greater
number of small-and medium-sized enterprises in temporary financial difficulties from premature
corporate bankruptcy; but the implementation of the EBL and, by extension, China’s corporate
bankruptcy system was less than ideal.  One of the main tenets of the EBL is the requirement for
any reorganization plan to be approved dually—i.e., sanctioned by both the creditors and the court;
but the EBL fails to prescribe clearly the circumstances under which the court’s discretionary power
in granting its approval should be exercised and, if so done, to what extent those powers should be
kept in check.
The deficiencies of the EBL might impact adversely China’s securities markets because there is a
strong linkage between an effective corporate bankruptcy reorganization system and increased se-
curities trading.  A listed company facing bankruptcy but whose shares remain tradable in China’s
securities market would normally be labeled as an *ST corporation2 first, before being delisted
eventually.  While reorganization can theoretically, if not practically, provide reprieve for a bank-
rupt company by saving it from premature corporate bankruptcy, recent research has indicated that
the number of successful reorganization cases are few and far between.  The paucity of successful
bankruptcy reorganization cases in China suggests the EBL, as it was implemented, may have
inadvertently put restraints in its own application, in contrast to the more efficacious corporate
bankruptcy laws in jurisdictions such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
* LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong; Affiliated
International Scholar, National Centre for Business Law in Canada.
1. Shuguang Li & Zuofa Wang, China’s Bankruptcy Law After Three Years:  The Gaps Between Legislation
Expectancy and Practice and the Future Road—Part One, 7(5) Int’l Corp. Rescue 303, 304 (2010).
2. ST means ‘special treatment.’  Special treatment connotes a distinctive ‘warning system’ that was for-
mulated by the securities exchanges in China to warn investors of listed companies suffering severe losses and
that are at risk of being delisted from the stock exchange(s).  For more details, please refer to infra Part IV
concerning the issue of “*ST” prefixed corporations. See id. at 307.
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each of which provided a model for reorganization legislation.  There are both internal and exter-
nal factors attributive to such lackluster results following the EBL’s implementation.  The internal
factors consist of some judges’ preference in applying the old law (which contains no reorganization
provisions whatsoever) over the newer EBL, as the new law is less familiar to them.  The external
factors comprise local protectionism of preferred enterprises and a lack of qualified bankruptcy pro-
fessionals in China.  This article aims to examine the implementation and practice of China’s
corporate reorganization process, formed and shaped by Chapter 8 of the EBL, immediately before
and throughout the global financial crisis.  Relevant issues in regards to the administrator system
and the expenses associated with the reorganization process will also be addressed.  It is hoped that
this article, if construed properly, may inform of future amendments to China’s EBL.
I. Introduction
China’s corporate bankruptcy3 system is comprised mainly of two parts:  (1) the Enter-
prise Bankruptcy Law of 2006 (the EBL or new law), passed into law by the National
People’s Congress and (2) judicial interpretations,4 made by the Supreme People’s Court
of the People’s Republic of China (the SPC), the highest court of law in China.  The EBL,
consisting of twelve chapters with 136 articles, was promulgated on August 27, 2006 and
came into effect on June 1, 2007.  The five judicial interpretations to date have been
issued at various times in order to facilitate the implementation of the EBL.
At the heart of China’s corporate reorganization process is the independent administra-
tor system.  The EBL distinguishes itself from its predecessor law, the 1986 Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law Trial Implementation (the 1986 Law or old law), with some distinctive
features.  First, the EBL has broader application as it applies to all enterprise legal per-
sons, inclusive of SOEs, non-SOEs, private enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises
(not just state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as in the old law5).  Second, the EBL replaced
the liquidation group system with the independent administrator system.  Inspired by
both the U.S. and the U.K. models, the EBL also provides for a reorganization system by
drawing upon Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code6 (U.S. Chapter 11) and introduces
an independent administrator system by borrowing from the concept of administrator in
the U.K.’s Insolvency Act 1986.7
‘Reorganization’ (i.e., ‘[corporate] bankruptcy reorganization,’ also known as ‘corporate
rescue’ in some jurisdictions) encapsulates a legal procedure that aids the revival of a com-
3. The words ‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ are used interchangeably throughout this article, and refer to
bankruptcy of a corporate nature and not a personal one.
4. With a view to facilitating the implementation the EBL, the Supreme People’s Court has in 2007-2008
issued five judicial interpretations, namely:  (1) Supreme People’s Court Regulation on Law Application of
Cases Still Pending upon the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of People’s Republic of China Coming into Effect
(Fashi (2007) 10, Apr. 23, 2004); (2) Supreme People’s Court Regulation on the Appointment of Administra-
tors (Fashi (2007) 8, Apr. 4, 2007); (3) Supreme People’s Court Regulation on the Compensations of Admin-
istrators (Fashi (2007) 9, Apr. 4, 2007); (4) Supreme People’s Court Regulation on Bankruptcy Cases in which
the Whereabouts of the Debtor or Its Assets are Unclear (Fashi (2008) 10, Aug. 4, 2008); and (5) Supreme
People’s Court Regulation on Time Limits for Hearing Civil Cases (Fashi (2008) 11, Aug. 11, 2008. See Li &
Wang, supra note 1, at 303.
5. Compared to the EBL, the 1986 Law has a narrower scope of application as it concerned merely, and
thus applied only to, the bankruptcy of SOEs.
6. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-74 (1978).
7. United Kingdom Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45.
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pany in current and temporary financial difficulty but with viable business prospects and
whose business operations may be operated continually as a going concern during the
reorganization process.  Reorganization gives the financially distressed company a short
respite or ‘breathing space,’ generally referred to as a ‘moratorium’ (or an ‘automatic stay’
of corporate bankruptcy proceedings) with which the debtor company (i.e., the financially
distressed company) will be free temporarily from its creditors’ debt collection or debt
enforcement actions.  Reorganization cannot be executed effectively without the statutory
protection of a moratorium against the company’s creditors, whose rights of claims will be
suspended temporarily while the company seeks ways to restructure itself and its debts.
For each creditor, if he agrees to the company’s reorganization initiative, his right of
claims under relevant corporate bankruptcy law will be barred temporarily from being
exercised or brought to a halt in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.  A moratorium
thus works as a major intervention, with the overriding purpose of preserving the debtor
company’s employees’ jobs and averting the unnecessary winding-up of the company.
Technically, a reorganization application in China may be commenced by a debtor com-
pany itself, a creditor, or an investor whose capital contribution comprises one-tenth (1/
10th) or more of the debtor company’s registered capital.8  Initially, a debtor or creditor
may apply directly to the People’s Court for the reorganization of the debtor company,
but in circumstances where there is a liquidation application by a creditor, the debtor
company or investor may still apply to the People’s Court for reorganization, provided
that the said court, after accepting the previous bankruptcy application by the creditor, has
not yet declared the debtor company to be bankrupt.9  Reorganization appears to be a
welcome solution for companies listed in stock exchanges in China.  Recent study shows
that over a period of eight years (from March 2000 to March 2008), there were merely
eighteen listed companies that filed for bankruptcy; among which, all but one company
had undergone the reorganization process.  Each of those seventeen listed companies had
been reorganized successfully by reaching a settlement plan with its creditors,10 while the
remaining one company’s bankruptcy application was rejected eventually by the court.11
The EBL is built on the three pillars of (1) liquidation; (2) reorganization; and (3) set-
tlement, whereof the law offers comprehensive options for a bankrupt company to choose
from in order to practically and effectively eliminate its debts and associated liabilities.
Reorganization may potentially predominate over liquidation or settlement as viable op-
tions, at least when and only if financial difficulty arises at an early enough stage that it is
still possible to attempt corporate rescue.  Reorganization can also prevent the bankrupt
company from premature or unnecessary liquidation and, as a result, the employees’ jobs
can be saved.  Reorganization is oftentimes a precondition for settlement, as reorganiza-
tion would inevitably involve the preparation of a settlement agreement.  Thus one can
view that reorganization, if successful, is consummated by reaching a settlement between
8. Qi Ye` Po` Chan Fa (?????) [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law], (promulgated by Standing Comm.,
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 7, 2007), art. 70, translated in http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/
FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020070118609950781519.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2011) (China) [hereinafter The EBL].
9. Id. at art. 70, ¶ 2.
10. QIU BO YANG,???????????????? [Choice of Behavior of Listed Companies and
its Effects on Bankruptcy], Southwestern University Finance & Economics Press (2008), at 139-141. (The book
is printed in Chinese).
11. Id. at 139.
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the debtor company and all its creditors.  It would seem to follow that the pinnacle of the
EBL is reorganization, to be carried out by a court-appointed independent administrator
whose main task is to carry on the debtor company’s business operation as a going concern
over a statutorily prescribed period called a moratorium.  Only when that fails will the
debtor company be wound up and liquidated.
China is a country more accepting of legal transplantation.  A case in point is that
China’s corporate rescue system is a hybrid of the systems used in the United States (the
U.S.) and the United Kingdom (the U.K.)—the former refers to ‘debtor-in-possession’
(DIP) and the latter, ‘administrator replacement.’  Under the U.S. system, the debtor
company’s management is permitted to stay and continue to run the business as a going
concern; under the U.K. system, the management would be replaced by an independent
administrator who would run the business during the reorganization process.  Under the
Chinese system, the administrators must be appointed by the People’s Court12 from the
roster system,13 kept and operated by the said court.  The administrators should be dili-
gent and faithful in the performance of their duties14 and such positions should be held by
professional service firms, such as law firms, accounting firms, liquidation firms, and/or
persons qualified professionally to manage bankruptcy procedures.15  During the pre-
scribed period of moratorium, it is the administrator’s responsibility to deliver a reorgani-
zation plan, essentially a settlement or concession proposal subject to ‘dual approval,’—
first by creditors of all four voting classes16 and then by the court.17  Alternatively, the
existing management (represented by directors of the company) may produce a reorgani-
zation proposal under the DIP model (like the U.S. system).18  Once approved at ‘meet-
ings of the creditors’ by creditors and sanctioned by the court, the reorganization proposal
will have a binding effect on the debtor company and all its creditors.19
Reorganization is arguably the most innovative feature of the EBL, applicable to all
enterprise legal persons.  And yet, reorganization in China can possibly take a long time
and be expensive.  First, reorganization requires the submission of numerous plans:  (1)
the business plan of the debtor company; (2) the classification of debt claims; (3) the plan
for claims adjustment; (4) the plan for claims repayment; (5) the time limit for implement-
ing the reorganization plan; (6) the time limit for supervision over the implementation of
the reorganization plan; and (7) other plans favorable to the debtor company’s reorganiza-
tion.20  Second, the reorganization procedure can spread across a period of almost a year,
comprising the original six months set by the EBL as the ‘reorganization period,’ which is
12. The EBL, art. 13.
13. ???????????????????????????? [Provisions of the Su-
preme People’s Court on the Designation of Administrators during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy
Cases], (promulgated by Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), art. 1
(China) [hereinafter Designation of Administrators].
14. The EBL, art. 27.
15. Id. art. 24.
16. Id. art. 84, ¶ 2.
17. Id. art. 86, ¶ 2.
18. HAIZHENG ZHANG, Corporate Rescue, in CHINA’S NEW ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW–CONTEXT,
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 207, 207 (Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu, and Haizheng Zhang eds.,
2010).
19. Id.
20. The EBL, art. 81.
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extendable for another three months.21  In connection to that, the People’s Court would
have to convene the creditors’ meeting within thirty days from the date of receipt of the
draft reorganization plan to entitle the creditors to vote on the draft reorganization plan.22
By this time, the procedure would have taken up a maximum of ten months already
(6+3+1=10 months).  Because it also requires the court’s approval, the reorganization plan,
once approved, requires a public announcement to be made within thirty days from the
date of the court’s receipt of the application.23  This means that it will take a minimum of
eleven months (6+3+1+1=11 months) for a reorganization plan to be carried out
successfully.
Needless to say, due to the ‘dual approval’ requirement, where the reorganization plan
fails to obtain approval either by the creditors or the court, the undergoing of an entire
procedure will most likely exceed one year.  It may drag even longer because the EBL
does not set a time limit for the court to approve a reorganization plan that has survived
initially in the creditors’ meeting.  There also seems no prescribed time limit for the court
to exercise discretion to ‘cram-down’ an unsuccessful reorganization plan that the dissent-
ing creditors failed to approve.
That said, one should be mindful about the strict time limits set by the EBL for the
court to handle expeditiously corporate bankruptcy applications.  For example, in a credi-
tor’s bankruptcy petition, the court has five days from the date of receipt of the application
to notify the debtor, who is given seven days from the date of receipt of the notification
from the court to object to the creditor’s application.  The court shall also make an order
whether or not to accept the bankruptcy application within ten days from the date of
expiration of the time limit for the debtor to file with the court objections against the
creditor’s application.24  Conversely, in a debtor’s bankruptcy petition, the court normally
would have fifteen days in which to decide whether or not to accept a bankruptcy applica-
tion, although in special circumstances, it might be necessary for the court to extend the
time period, usually for a further fifteen days upon approval by the court at the next
higher level.25  Once an application has been accepted by the court, it has twenty-five days
from the date on which it makes an order to accept a bankruptcy application to notify
known creditors and to make a public announcement of its decision.26  In addition to
Articles 10-14 of the EBL as aforementioned, the timeliness requirement can also be
found in other parts of the EBL, such as in Article 111 of the EBL that involves the timely
realization and distribution of the debtor company’s assets.
The role, appointment, and remuneration of administrators have been set and provided
with some detail as a result of the SPC’s issuance and adoption of (1) the “Provisions of
the Supreme People’s Court on the Designation of Administrators During the Trial of
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases” and (2) the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Determination of the Administrator’s Remunerations” (collectively, the SPC Provi-
21. Id. art. 79.
22. Id. art. 84.  The adoption of the reorganization plan requires the approval of a (simple) majority of
creditors in each voting group who are present at the meeting, and that the majority represents claims
amounting to at least 2/3rd (two-thirds) of the total amount of the outstanding claims.
23. Id. art. 86.
24. Id. art. 10.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 14.
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sions)—both were issued on April 12, 2007 in supplement to the EBL.  A report by The
World Bank suggested that in the past fifteen years, some countries have moved towards
devising a particular set of rules for regulating administrators, reflecting not only the need
for protecting both individual and public economic interests, but also an increased aware-
ness of the complexity involving corporate bankruptcy issues and hence its potentially far-
reaching impact.27  Whether bankruptcy reorganization can be carried out successfully
depends a lot on the ability, qualification, and professionalism exhibited by the administra-
tors; hence it has been suggested that the study of administrator systems is conducive to
the successful development of a reorganization process within a corporate bankruptcy
system.
To this end, the commentator referred to the INSOL International 2005 Global Mar-
ketplace Survey,28 suggesting that bankruptcy services, implied to include bankruptcy re-
organization, are executed principally by professional (bankruptcy) administrators, of
whose professional qualification can be divided into two categories: licensed and unli-
censed.  In England, Canada, and Australia, a strict licensing system is adopted for qualify-
ing administrators; whereas, in the United States, where a ‘private trustee’ system is
adopted, it does not require strict licensing but is nonetheless guided by a de facto licens-
ing system due to the stringent performance standards required of trustees in the United
States.29  In China, the administrators must be appointed by the court, and such position
should be held by either ‘individual administrators’ (e.g., lawyers or accountants) or by
‘institutional administrators’ (i.e., ‘social intermediary institutions,’ which are law firms,
accounting firms, and/or liquidation firms).30  It is suggested that pursuant to the SPC
Provisions, jurisdictions in China are authorized and thus have been busy creating ‘Ad-
ministrators Lists;’ and those that have been placed on the list will be the first to enter into
the market of bankruptcy practice following the recent bankruptcy reform.31
In preparing the ‘Administrators List,’ the High Court of Chongqing City developed
the “Chongqing Model” to limit the court’s unchecked, wide discretionary power and to
restrain corruption because most of the information used in the five categories (details will
be expounded further below) is both verifiable and available for public scrutiny.  As such,
it is easier for failed applicants to challenge the court’s selection process if they feel they
were unfairly treated.  The Chongqing Model is commendable and has been followed by
jurisdictions in Beijing and Tianjin, with only small variations.32  By juxtaposing the
Chongqing Model and the SPC Provisions, it is clear that the model was not far from the
existing regulations.33
27. Peter Joyce, World Bank Global Forum on Insolvency Risk Management Standards and Strategies, Jan.
28-29, 2003, The Regulatory Gap:  The Cost of Capacity Building, available at http://www.insolvencyreg.org/sub_
publications/docs/Paper%20Gordon%20Johnson%20World%20Bank.doc.
28. The Survey was released by INSOL International in 2006. See WEI-GUANG LIU, RESEARCH ON THE
DESIGN OF CHINESE INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATOR SYSTEM—DOCTORAL FORUM OF PROMISING AC-
COUNTING STARS (The book is printed in Chinese with an English title) (Dalian: Dalian Publishing House)
(2009), at 4.
29. Id.
30. The EBL, art. 24.
31. Lawrence (Lixin) Yang, Administrator in China’s New Bankruptcy Law:  Objective Standards to Limit Dis-
cretion and Expand Market Controls, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 533 (2008).
32. Id. at 540-41.
33. Designation of Administrators, arts. 6-7.
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The court’s discretion needs to be guided properly or restrained, or it will likely be
subject to abuse or misconstruction.  First, the EBL simply uses the ‘negative conditions’
to disqualify those who wish to be qualified as administrators.34  Second, the SPC Provi-
sions were designed to keep the door wide open for lawyers/accountants and their associ-
ated social intermediaries to apply to be included in the ‘Administrators List,’ as long as
they have ‘professional knowledge and adequate practicing qualifications.’35  The selection
decisions thus will be left with a court with higher level jurisdiction than the People’s
Court (or the intermediary People’s Court within its jurisdiction), “according to the num-
ber of law firms, accounting firms, bankruptcy liquidation firms and other social interme-
diary agencies, number of full-time practitioners, and number of enterprise bankruptcy
cases within its jurisdiction,” all defined loosely.  Therefore, none of these terms should be
treated as objective criteria whereby the court can apply easily such vague terms to decide
who may be named to the ‘Administrators List.’
To address this problem, the Chongqing Model adopts a one hundred point scoring
system for evaluating law firms, using five categories:36  (1) achievement in practice (up to
thirty-five points);37 (2) firm size (up to twenty-five points);38 (3) experience in handling
bankruptcy cases (up to twenty points);39 (4) competency (up to ten points);40 and (5) level
of specialty (up to ten points).41  The fourteen law firms with the top overall scores will be
named to the Preliminary Administrators List,42 which must be published on the Court’s
website to solicit public comment or objection.43  The list is finalized within ten days if
there are no objections.44
For evaluating accounting and liquidation firms, the criteria are similar to those for law
firms—the above-mentioned five categories are still applicable, but with a higher qualifi-
cation threshold for annual income, hired employees, number of cases handled, etc.  The
accounting firms with the top five scores are named to the Preliminary Administrators
List for public comment and objection in the same fashion as law firms.  In the evaluation
of liquidation firms, because they account for a small number of the total number of insti-
tutional administrators, their assessment criteria have not attracted much attention.45
34. For example, pursuant to Article 24 of the EBL, “individuals or organizations that have been convicted
of intentional crimes, whose license has been revoked, are an interested party in the case, or otherwise
deemed unfit by the court are disqualified from serving as an administrator.”  The EBL, art. 24.
35. Designation of Administrators, arts. 2-4.
36. Yang, supra note 31, at 535-40.
37. Id. at 536 (the first criterion concerns the firm’s annual gross income or the award or praise it received
from the tax or other relevant government departments).
38. Id. (the second criterion looks at the firm’s number of employees and its leased office space).
39. Id. (the third criterion refers to the number of full-time lawyers hired to handle for each bankruptcy
case).
40. Id. (the fourth criterion focuses on the speed at which a certain number of civil cases have been handled
annually).
41. Id. at 536-37 (the fifth criterion helps prove for the law firm’s specialty, based on the number of journal
articles that have been published on civil cases).
42. Id. at 537.
43. This is according to Article 5 of The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Designation of
Administrators during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases, which prescribes that “the people’s court
shall, through the most influential media within its jurisdiction, make an announcement about the matters
relevant to the preparation of roster of administrators . . . . ”  Designation of Administrators, art. 5.
44. Yang, supra note 31, at 537.
45. Id. at 538.
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In addition to law firms, accounting firms, and liquidation firms (that can be named to
the Administrators List as ‘institutional administrators’), individuals who work for them
can be qualified as ‘individual administrators,’ and are kept on a separate Administrators
List.  It needs to be emphasized that individual administrators will have to be selected
from among lawyers and accountants whose firms have been named to the Administrators
List.46  For such individuals, their time in practice, achievements, level of specialty, and
experience in handling bankruptcy cases will score points47 for them;48 the ten lawyers and
ten accountants with the most accumulated points may be named to the first Preliminary
Administrators List, which also needs to be published on the court’s website for a period
of ten days so the public may provide its comments and objections.49
Because corruption and guanxi (the latter refers to the favoritism extended to those
associated with the network of influence)50 have played a notorious role in China’s historic
and modern politics for government intervention, the objective criteria suggested by the
Chongqing Model should limit the broad (and thus potentially flawed) discretionary
power accredited to the court in appointing administrators.  Despite the improvement, the
EBL and SPC Provisions are silent about when, if there is a timeframe at all, the new
names can be added to the Administrators List.51  It is also unclear why an individual
administrator must be selected from the institutional administrators that are already on
the Administrators List.52  It is particularly intriguing given the EBL already requires
practitioners to have effective malpractice insurance to administer a case as an individual
administrator.53
As a matter of practice, the administrators are established by the EBL to replace
the liquidation group in almost all types of bankruptcy enterprises (?????? ,
in Chinese), especially special private and non-publicly owned enterprises
(?????????? , in Chinese).  But the liquidation group is not out of the picture
entirely yet, as its main function is to supervise the reorganization of all SOEs or State-
owned Holding Companies (????????? , in Chinese) and Collective Enterprises
(???? , in Chinese).54  The remuneration of an administrator is likely to be much
higher than what the members of the liquidation committee (or liquidation group) can be
remunerated.  The high level of administrator’s fees explains why, in actual practice, reor-
ganization is adopted mainly by large enterprises, and reconciliation by small-and-me-
dium sized enterprises (SMEs), as is so indicated by the Superior Provincial Court in An
Hui Province (????????? , in Chinese).55  Theoretically, however, reorganiza-
46. Designation of Administrators, art. 3.
47. The numbers of points required may vary, as there are different grades (Grade 1-4) of lawyers.  Addi-
tional points may be gained for those holding a position as a professional committee member of Chongqing
Registered Accountants Association.
48. Yang, supra note 31, at 535-40.
49. Id. at 539.
50. Id. at 541.
51. Id. at 536.
52. Id. at 539.
53. The EBL, art. 24, ¶ 4.
54. MING HUA WANG, ?????????<<?????>>??????  [Review of the Application of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law by the People’s Court in An Hui Province] in POCHANFA LUNTAN (????? , in
Chinese) (2009), vol. 3, at 340.
55. Id. at 341-42.
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tion can be applied to all types of ‘enterprise legal persons,’56 regardless of the size and
scale of the individual enterprise.
II. Bankruptcy Statistics
Bankruptcy statistics are essential, especially those concerning the numbers of bank-
ruptcy (including reorganization) applications made every quarter or year because they
help identify the means by which such debt claims are ultimately resolved, whether it be
through liquidation, reorganization, or settlement.  Stakeholders, most importantly
lawmakers but also including debtors and creditors, will inevitably need to draw upon
bankruptcy statistics to make data-informed discussions before attempting any resolution
options.  As far as legislative proposals or reforms are concerned, statistical data can attest
to or, conversely, cast doubts on the efficacy of China’s statutory bankruptcy system.  For
creditors, quantitative and evaluative data may help assuage their concerns, if questions
arise as to whether the number of administrators in a local jurisdiction is desirable57 or
whether the court-appointed administrators in China are qualified sufficiently in accor-
dance with internationally accepted guidelines (i.e., the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law).58  While the U.S. courts took pains to publish on a regular basis the
bankruptcy statistics,59 information of a similar nature is not easily accessible in China.
The PRC courts have unofficially attributed the scanty information to the need for pro-
tecting the interested parties’ privacy.  There is presumably no subterfuge implied in the
courts’ (in)action unless it is taken to conceal the EBL’s implementation problem under
the existing political and legal culture in China.  Worse still, recent research has suggested
that some government officials have interfered actively with the SOEs’ bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in an attempt to boost local gross domestic product (GDP) by allowing only a
small number of enterprises to declare bankruptcy.60  By analyzing twenty-five corporate
reorganization cases in China, the underlying research led to the conclusion that the cur-
rent bankruptcy reorganization system, embodied in Chapter 8 of the EBL, has not oper-
56. The EBL, arts. 2, 7.  The term ‘enterprise legal persons’ refers to both state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and enterprises that are not state-owned.  Enterprise legal persons include (1) limited liability companies; (2)
companies limited by shares; (3) private enterprises; and (4) foreign-invested enterprises, but exclude partner-
ships and individual-owned businesses.  The reason is because partnerships and individual-owned businesses
have unlimited liabilities. See WEIGUO WANG, THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (Peking:
Law Press China) (2007), at 4 (Chinese book with English title).
57. See Designating the Administrator, art. 2, where it stipulates that “a higher people’s court shall, accord-
ing to the number of law firms, accounting firms, bankruptcy liquidation firms and other social intermediary
agencies, number of full-time practitioners, and number of enterprise bankruptcy cases within its jurisdiction,
decide to prepare a roster of administrator by itself or by the intermediary people’s court within its
jurisdiction.”
58. In ¶ 39 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, it is stated expressly that the administrator should be
qualified appropriately, with knowledge of insolvency, commercial, finance, and business laws, as well as with
adequate experience in commercial, financial, and accounting matters. U.N. COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, Sales No. E.05.V.1 (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html [hereinafter The UN-
CITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE].
59. See News Releases, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/index.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2011).
60. Li & Wang, supra note 1, at 308-10.
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ated fully to the legislative design of preserving the bankrupt company’s going concern
value.61
Chart 1 Number of Bankruptcy Cases Accepted to be Heard by the PRC
Courts from 1989-2008
1989
98 32 117
428
710
1625
2583
5875
5376
N/A N/A N/A
9110 9200
6380
4593
3419
4300
3810
3139
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source:  The Supreme People’s Court and the Bankruptcy Law & Restructuring Research Center, The
China University of Political Science and Law
*N/A Not available
Chart 2 Number of Bankruptcy Cases Accepted to be Heard by the U.S.
Courts from 1999-2006
1999
895,394
1,002,098 982,931
1,064,631
1,176,595 1,164,233
1,352,838
839,150
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source:  U.S. Courts series of annual reports62
61. Id. at 309.
62. By the categorization of original U.S. Courts of annual reports, bankruptcy cases in the United States
fall into either one of the two sub-categories:  liquidation or reorganization, from which either one of the two
means bankruptcy cases will be resolved.  Hence the total number of bankruptcy cases in the United States
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To better balance the rights of debtors and creditors, the EBL was designed for the
administrator to take over the role and function discharged previously by the liquidation
group under the old 1986 Law.  The liquidation group mainly consisted of government
agencies or governmental institutions, among which were the Administration for Industry
and Commerce, Public Security Agency, Land Administration Agency, and the manage-
ment team of the SOE facing bankruptcy.63  Because so many government departments
and agencies were members of the liquidation group, the government therefore orches-
trated the direction and decisions.  Government intervention was not uncommon, espe-
cially for earmarked SOEs whose bankruptcy applications could not be filed with the court
without having first obtained the approval from their supervising government depart-
ment(s).  This may explain why the number of bankruptcy cases in China is dwarfed im-
mensely by those in the United States for the same period from 1999-2006, as seen in
Charts 1 and 2 above.
Chart 1 shows that the number of bankruptcy cases in China has increased dramatically
since 1996 and reached their peaks in 2001 and 2002, nearly fourteen years after the old
law was issued in 1986.  Since the peak years, the number has since then been reduced
significantly—by 2008, only two years after the old law was replaced by the EBL, the
number dropped to 3,139, much lower than a year ago at 3,810 when the EBL first came
into effect.  It is observed that the number of bankruptcy cases recorded was higher in
2006 (at 4,300) than in 2007-2008.  The reason is believed to be that a larger number of
bankrupt enterprises preferred to file for bankruptcy in 2006 while the old law was still
applicable because they were more familiar with that law than the EBL.
Professor Shuguang Li,64 of The China University of Political Science and Law in his
joint article examining the EBL three years after its implementation, suggested that there
are gaps between legislation expectancy and actual practice.65  Since the EBL came into
effect on June 1, 2007, immediate revision of the law is suggested to be rather doubtful.
Speaking at the annual meeting of China INSOL in 2009, Professor Li, as a member of
the drafting group for the EBL, attributed the problem to a couple of what he labeled as
“abnormities.”66  First, the number of bankruptcy cases heard by the People’s Court has
dropped significantly since the enactment of the EBL.67  Second, over the past two years,
hundreds of thousands of enterprises stepped out of the market, not by way of proper
bankruptcy procedure but by having their licenses deregistered (zhuxiao, ??  in Chinese)
over the period from 1999-2006 (as shown in Chart 2) have actually combined both numbers for liquidation
and reorganization. See also LIU, supra note 28, at 6.
63. Emily Lee & Karen Ho, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law—A Great Leap Forward, but Just How
Far?, 19 INT. INSOLV. REV. 145, 156 (2010).
64. Professor Shuguang Li is the Director of Bankruptcy Law and Restructuring Research Center, housed
at The China University of Political Science and Law located in Beijing.  He was also a member of the
drafting group for the EBL.
65. Li & Wang, supra note 1, at 303.
66. China INSOL is the China chapter of INSOL International.  INSOL International, headquartered in
London, United Kingdom, promotes itself as “a federation of national associations for accountants and law-
yers who specialize in turnaround and insolvency.” See INT’L ASS’N OF RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY &
BANKR. PROF’LS, http://www.insol.org/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2011).  Currently, there are forty Member As-
sociations in worldwide locations with over 10,000 professionals participating as Members of INSOL Inter-
national. Id.
67. SHUGUANG LI & ZHOFA WANG, REVIEW OF THE PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 2009,” INSOL Interna-
tional Technical Series Issue No. 11, at 1-2 (2010).
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or cancelled (diaoxiao, ??  in Chinese).68  In Li’s article, he highlighted the lack of use of
the EBL after it was implemented:
There were 3,139 enterprise bankruptcy cases in 2008 while there were 780 thousand
[780,000] enterprises stepped out of the market in the same year.  Among the 780
thousand [780,000] enterprises 380 thousand [380,000] exited the market through the
path of deregistration (zhuxiao) and 400 thousand [400,000] through the path of li-
cense cancellation (diaoxiao)69
The statistics above mean that in 2008 alone, the rate for bankruptcy applications (by
making use of the EBL) accounted for only 4.02% of all business closures, quite an insig-
nificant ratio compared to deregistration (48.71%) and license cancellation (51.28%).  If
numbers can talk, the EBL may have been viewed by many corporate debtors as too cum-
bersome70 to be acted on; hence they resorted to administrative procedures for a quick fix.
This could potentially leave their creditors with little or even no assets for recourse.
Worse still, the weak position of the administrators, compared to the strong position en-
joyed by the liquidation group in disposing SOEs under the old law, leaves them with few
bankruptcy fees.71  To top it off, unless the creditor, administrator, capital contributor of
the debtor company, or any other interested party is willing to make advanced payments,72
when and where the bankruptcy fees fall short, the bankruptcy procedure will be termi-
nated early, leaving the EBL with no way to be applied and creditors stuck in limbo.
Last but not least, bankruptcy reorganization is reportedly used more frequently by
non-listed companies than listed companies.  A more recent book publication, of which
Professor Li was a co-author, indicated that over a period of three years (since June 1,
2007, when the EBL came into effect, and up until May 31, 2010), there were in total 142
enterprises that entered into reorganization processes, of which 116 were non-listed com-
panies and the remaining twenty-six were listed companies; of these twenty-six listed com-
panies, fifteen of them have been reorganized successfully.73  In terms of the registered
capital or residual company assets before reorganization, it ranges from CN¥218 million
to CN¥2.291 billion (equivalent to approximately US$33.7 million to US$354.1 million)
for listed companies and from US$40 million to US$431 million dollars for non-listed
companies.74  This suggests that for reorganization to be successful, either the listed com-
panies or non-listed companies must have maintained a certain level of assets, which shall
attest to its viability as a company.  Compared to the U.S. bankruptcy statistics, relatively
68. MEMBER OF CHINA INT’L INSOLVENCY ASS’N ANNUAL MEETING, http://www.chinainsol.org/show.
aspx?id=556&cid=37 (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
69. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 2.
70. For example, due to the ‘dual approval’ requirement, as manifested in Article 86 of the EBL, the reor-
ganization plan submitted by the debtor company must be approved by creditors of all four voting classes and
by the court.  This arguably may render the approval more difficult to obtain.
71. See MEMBER OF CHINA INT’L INSOLVENCY ASS’N ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 68.
72. ??????????????????????????  [Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Determination of the Administrator’s Remunerations], (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct.,
Apr. 12, 2007, effective June 1, 2007) art. 12 (China).
73. SHUGUANG LI & ZHI BIN ZHEN, ????????  [LAW REVIEW OF CORPORATE REORGANI-
ZATION & RESTRUCTURING] (Peking: Law Press China) (2011), vol. 1, at 73. (The book is printed in
Chinese.)
74. Id.
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large companies, indicated by having generated an annual revenue of over US$100 mil-
lion, maintain a reorganization rate of sixty-nine percent (by undergoing successfully U.S.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures), compared to smaller companies with only US$25
million in revenue, whose success rate in coming out of bankruptcy proceedings as a viable
company has decreased to only thirty percent.75
III. The EBL’s Outstanding Issues
Listed below are some outstanding issues that merit a further assessment for considera-
tions of future amendments to the EBL.  The list is meant for practical discussions only
and cannot be deemed as exhaustive.
A. DOMICILE
The reluctance of judges to accept bankruptcy or reorganization applications also poses
a threat to the evocation of the EBL—“some judges may not be willing to accept applica-
tions until they can find out whose local toes will get trodden on.”76  The problem lies in
Article 3 of the EBL, which stipulates that the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy case shall be
reserved exclusively for the People’s Court of the place where the debtor company is
domiciled.77  Article 3 appears to be overly restrictive, considering that China is a vast
country.  The creditors and the assets of the debtor may be located throughout the coun-
try and the creditors may not be aware where the debtor’s principle place of business is,
thus the ‘domicile’ issue can but should not bar the court from accepting bankruptcy peti-
tions.  A suggestion might be for the domicile requirement to be tempered so that it will
enhance the likelihood for best preservation of the debtor’s going concern value.  In light
of this, Article 3 perhaps should be included in the future amendment of the EBL.  Inspi-
ration can possibly be drawn from the domicile regulation in the U.S. Chapter 11, which
upholds a multiple-list of possible domiciles from which the creditors and courts can
choose in order to determine the debtor company’s domicile.
Article 3 excludes the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy case to the People’s Court of the
place where the debtor is domiciled.  Supplementary to that provision, the SPC inter-
preted that the debtor’s domicile refers to its principle place of business.78  Article 3 ap-
parently supplies little or no choice about where to file a bankruptcy case.79  In contrast,
the law in the United States is very different as “it permits a considerable amount of
choice about where an enterprise may file its U.S. Chapter 11 case . . . the case could be
filed where the debtor has its principal place of business, where its assets have been located
75. Id.
76. New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law Faces Severe Test, CHINA L. & PRAC., Dec. 19, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 27711718.
77. The EBL applies only to ‘enterprise legal persons’ and not natural persons; therefore, where ‘the
debtor’ is used in the EBL or mentioned in this article, it refers to ‘the debtor company.’
78. See ???????????????????????  [Provisions for Several Issues on
Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases (No. 23)], (promulgated by Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong.,
July 30, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002), art. 1.
79. William J. Woodward, Jr., Control in Reorganization Law and Practice in China and the United States:  An
Essay on the Study of Contrast, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 141, 148 (2008).
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for the 180 days prior to the filing, or where it is domiciled.”80  Concerning domicile, the
U.S. cases have upheld that domicile includes, among other options, the place where the
corporation is incorporated.81  Using various attributes to link jurisdiction, the U.S. law
enables the debtors and creditors to choose in which venue and over which asset that
bankruptcy proceeding can be filed.  Such flexibility is desirable for a vast country like
China, especially in circumstances where the creditors and the debtor’s assets may be lo-
cated throughout the country, so that bankruptcy proceedings may commence sufficiently
early and thereby preserving the debtor company’s remaining value.  One should also be
aware of the problem inherent in making the domicile as the only linkage to the jurisdic-
tion of a bankruptcy case, which can be a serious problem in China where ‘local protec-
tionism’ runs rampant (at least that is still the case in some areas) and thus makes
bankruptcy filings against the preferred enterprises difficult to be accepted by the local
courts under pressure of the local governments.
On the ground of domicile, some judges might refuse to get the bankruptcy proceed-
ings commenced early for a lack of jurisdiction power.  The U.S. law may again provide
some inspiration for future amendment of the EBL.  It may, however, be likely to create
another problem known as ‘venue shopping.’
In the business bankruptcy area, venue shopping in the United States has become a
focus of heated debate.  In the United States’ largely voluntary business bankruptcy
system, it is clear from the empirical data that those who control the corporate debtor
are choosing where to file for strategic reasons.  The debate concerns why they are
doing so and whether this is a good thing.82
For now though it is safe to say that venue shopping is possible in the United States in a
way that is not in China.83  A public hearing to instigate the debate of venue shopping is
advisable, before the legislators in China decide whether China should follow suit of the
United States to expand the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy case beyond the point of the
debtor’s domicile.
B. NON-OBLIGING ATTITUDE BY COURT JUDGES AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITIES
REGULATIONS
Relevant to the last point, as indicated by a judge working in the People’s Court in An
Hui Province, some courts have decided to hold off accepting bankruptcy applications on
the grounds that relevant SPC interpretations are still pending.  This led to a slip of bank-
ruptcy cases in An Hui Province from 175 to 169 cases, over the one-year period after the
EBL was promulgated.84  The numbers were supposed to have gone up instead in the
midst of financial crisis in 2007-2008.  Also to be inferred from the judge’s report pub-
lished in 2009, some judges simply preferred to apply the old law (i.e., the 1986 Law) over
the new law (i.e., the EBL), for the sake of their own convenience, even though the new
law had already come into effect on June 1, 2007 and thus should be implemented.  This
80. Id. at 149; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1408.
81. Woodward, supra note 79, at 149.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. MING HUA WANG, supra note 54, at 336.
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anomaly in practice may be linked to the paucity of bankruptcy reorganization cases as the
old law contains no reorganization provisions whatsoever; in contrast, the new law dedi-
cates an entire chapter (Chapter 8) to that effect.  Judges’ negation to apply the EBL
deprives the creditors or other stakeholders (such as employees of the debtor company) of
the benefits and protection of rights, as intended by the new, and thus the more recent or
current, law.  It also implicates that there may not be enough competent judges capable of
handling complex bankruptcy cases that generally require adequate expertise in commer-
cial, financial, and accounting matters.  A longer trial period and even delay in bankruptcy
proceedings may also arise due to a lack of professional training among concerned judges
who either are not familiar with the EBL where time is of great essence or do not possess
sufficient knowledge in commercial, financial, and accounting to handle bankruptcy cases.
In light of this, the courts should streamline their human resources in order to handle the
growing number of bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization cases as can be foreseen rea-
sonably.  This is especially true given that the EBL has expanded its scope of application
to all ‘enterprise legal persons,’ compared to the 1986 Law that applied only to SOEs.
Moreover, the EBL has also removed previous restrictions for bankruptcy filing—SOEs
no longer need to obtain permission/approval from their supervisory government bodies
to file for bankruptcy.
Presumably the non-obliging attitudes by some judges who refuse to apply the EBL also
make foreign investors in China query “how the bankruptcy process will actually work for
them—many are likely to decide to avoid using the [EBL] altogether, as it may not meet
their needs.”85  The aversion to the EBL allegedly led more companies to adopt the ‘con-
sensual methods,’ in lieu of the legislatively-prescribed reorganization procedure, in deal-
ing with their financial problems, so as to avoid a “formal and public process.”86
Consensual methods are often seen by foreign investors as more desirable, even though
the legislators’ aim was to provide unified legislation (i.e., the EBL) to facilitate the reor-
ganization of both Chinese and foreign enterprises based in China.  Needless to say, the
EBL’s supplementary legislations will not be put to use if the EBL is not invoked.  “There
is more prospect of foreign companies taking the view [that] the value will come out in
consensual discussions, rather than through reorganization proceedings under the EBL or
relying on the EBL as an absentee stakeholder.”87  Wherever the EBL fails to be invoked,
it would inevitably put relevant securities regulations under pressure for non-compliance,
which include:
(1) “Supplementary Provisions on Pricing Shares Issued in Significant Assets Reor-
ganization of Bankrupt  Listed Companies for Restructuring,”88
( ??????????????????????????? , in Chinese), which pre-
scribes that during the bankruptcy restructuring of a listed company, if the company
intends to carry out major asset reorganization through the issue of shares for
purchasing new assets, the price for the shares to be issued shall, after consultation by
each relevant parties, be submitted to the general meeting of shareholders for a reso-
85. New Bankruptcy Law Faces Severe Test, supra note 76, at 1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. ???????????????????????????  [Supplementary Provision on Pricing
Shares Issued in Significant Assets Reorganization of Bankrupt Listed Companies for Restructuring],
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Nov. 11, 2008, effective Nov. 12, 2008) (China).
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lution.89  The resolution shall be subject to adoption by two-thirds or more of the
voting rights of shareholders that are present at the meeting, and shall be subject to
adoption by two-thirds or more of the voting rights of public shareholders that are
present at the meeting.90
(2) “No. 2 Rules on Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies
for Publicly Issuing of Securities—Content and Format of Annual Reports”91
(?????????????????????2?— — ?????????? , in
Chinese), which mandates that companies shall disclose such relevant issues as bank-
ruptcy and reorganization that occurred within the reporting period, including appli-
cation to courts for reorganization, reconciliation, bankruptcy, or liquidation, any
courts’ rulings concerning said reorganization, reconciliation, bankruptcy, or liquida-
tion, and that being handed down during the reorganization of companies, and other
material issues.92  Companies that have implemented reorganization shall state the
specific content and implementation of such reorganization plans.93
By the name of it, it may be needless to say that the above-mentioned regulations (that
are supplementary to the EBL) are applicable only to and thus have a particular focus on
listed companies.
The reason for the declining number of bankruptcy cases is not the result only of
judges’ shirking their duties to apply the EBL.  Another major reason is the cost-prohibi-
tiveness of the EBL.  The large amount of expenses associated with undertaking a reor-
ganization process has forced SMEs to reconsider reorganization.  Reorganization costs
include, among others, (1) general expenses; (2) evaluation costs; (3) administration costs;
(4) other professional fees; and (5) administrative costs.  All of these costs will be ex-
pounded further below.  Understandably, these costs all together will likely be too high
for the average SMEs to absorb, considering they had come into financial difficulty in the
first place.
C. REORGANIZATION COSTS
Reorganization costs can be immense, within one or several of the following categories.
1. General Expenses
The EBL requires that the administrator or debtor company submit a draft reorganiza-
tion plan within six months (which is extendable for another three months) of the date on
which the People’s Court makes an order for the reorganization of the debtor company.94
To facilitate that requirement, the administrator must call for the holding of the creditors’
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. ?????????????????????2?— ??????????  [No. 2 Rules on
Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies for Publicly Issuing of Securities—Content
and Format of Annual Reports] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 17, 2007, effective
Dec. 17, 2007) (China).
92. Id.
93. Id. art 41.
94. The EBL, art. 79.
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meeting, which entails not only a thorough investigation and confirmation of debts but
also a variety of other expenses for the purposes of producing creditors’ lists and printing
and mailing said lists to (or calling) the creditors to inform them of the said meeting.
Moreover, Article 81 of the EBL provides that the proposed reorganization plan shall
contain the following contents, among others:
(i) the business plan of the debtor company; (ii) the classification of the claims; (iii)
the adjustment mechanism of the claims; and (iv) the repayment schedule of the
claims; (v) the time limit for implementation of the reorganization plan and (vi) the
time limit for supervision (by the administrator) over implementation of the reorgan-
ization plan.
All of the content requirements are highly technical and, in the making of a reorganization
plan, will require a great deal of secretarial assistance in making and tabling the reorgani-
zation plan.
2. Professional Services Costs
Professional services in commercial/financial trading will also likely be sought, in order
to transform illiquid assets into liquid cash to be distributed fairly to creditors of different
classes.  Remunerations for these professionals who are service providers will add more
charges to the overall expenses towards reorganization.
3. Evaluation (or Financial Advisory) Costs
Evaluation costs stem from analyses for both the debtor company’s business and assets.
The purpose for evaluating the business is for creditors to determine the debtor com-
pany’s viability to operate as a going concern, while the purpose for evaluating the asset is
to “estimate the discount rate implicit in creditors’ reorganization plan decisions.”95  Value
for the discount rate is essentially an assumption in evaluating the ‘best-interests test.’
The best-interests test is embodied in paragraph (3) of Article 87 of the EBL, borrowing
from § 1129(a)(7)(A) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which states that a U.S. Chapter 11
plan cannot be confirmed unless creditors receive as much under the plan as under liqui-
dation,96 or put another way, unless the reorganization plan is calculated to benefit the
general body of the creditors.97  In China, the EBL requires that a reorganization plan be
approved not only by the creditors, but also the court—this is known as ‘double approval.’
Influenced by the U.S. practice, whereof court-supervised reorganization procedures typi-
cally require judges to apply the best-interests test, the EBL shall require the bankruptcy
judges to undertake the same test.  A successful reorganization plan entails a discount rate
acceptable to the creditors for agreeing to a ‘haircut.’98  Creditors can also agree to ex-
95. Fabrice Barthe´le´my et al., What Discount Rate Should Bankruptcy Judges Use? Estimates from Canadian
Reorganization Data, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 67, 67 (2009).
96. Id.
97. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, art. 59(2) (Can.).
98. ’Haircut’ connotes the creditor’s concession to a “certain percentage of the debt owed to them in full,
complete, and final satisfaction of their claims against the debtor.” See THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28, ¶ 27.  In doing so, the debtor becomes solvent and may continue to trade,
because its debts are reduced. Id.
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change debt for equity in the reorganized entity; thereby reorganization entails a change
in the debtor company’s capital structure.  Proper value analysis is material in assessing
the feasibility of the debt-credit swap.
4. Administration Costs
Administration costs are the fees payable to an independent administrator appointed by
the People’s Court.  The EBL adopts partially from the U.K. model for administrator
replacement, which was not seen in its predecessor law (the 1986 EBL) as the latter did
not establish an administrator system, but rather provided that the (bankruptcy) liquida-
tion group be responsible and report to the court.99  Administrators in China must be
designated by the People’s Court,100 and once appointed, the EBL allows the administra-
tors to engage in a wide range of activities and responsibilities.101  The administrator’s job
consists mainly of checking, investigating, and confirming bankruptcy claims,102 for which
remuneration must be paid.  The administrator’s remunerations are to be paid out of the
debtor company’s assets.  In this respect, an administrator would “nearly always be an add-
on expense, or at least until the ranks of management were trimmed,”103 said one com-
mentator who proposes “[s]ubstituting the DIP104 for the [administrator] saves money for
the estate [of the debtor company].”105  This is, strictly speaking, not the practice in
China, considering the EBL is essentially a hybrid of both the U.K. and U.S. systems—
the role of an administrator in the U.K. system is introduced to the EBL, but instead of
assuming ‘management replacement’ as in the U.K. model, the EBL adopts DIP as in the
U.S. model.  Last but not the least, the remuneration of administrators in China will be
borne from the debtor’s unsecured assets, pursuant to the respective percentage charges as
99. The EBL, art. 24.  The same provision was reiterated in (1) Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Law,
????????????  [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) art. 201 (China); (2) Article 249 of the Opinions of
the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China,
???????????????????????????????  [Opinions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., July 14, 1992, effective July 14, 1992) art.
249 (China); and (3) Article 51 of the ‘Regulation on Several Issues Concerning Hearing Enterprise Bank-
ruptcy Cases’ ?????????????????????????  [Regulation on Several Is-
sues Concerning Hearing Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases], (promulgated July 30, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002)
art. 51 (China). See also JIANHUA XIAO, Bankruptcy Administrator:  Status, Powers and Duties, in CHINA’S NEW
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW:  CONTEXT, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 89, 99 (2010).
100. The EBL, art. 13.
101. Id. art. 25.
102. Bingkun Ye, Filing of Claims, in CHINA’S NEW ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW:  CONTEXT, INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION 163, 178-82 (2010).
103. Woodward, supra note 79, at 147.
104. The debtor-in-possession (DIP) principle is central to the U.S. system, where the incumbent manage-
ment of the debtor company remains in place to continue to operate its business and manage its assets during
the reorganization process.
105. Woodward, supra note 79, at 147.
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stipulated in the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Determination of the
Administrator’s Remunerations.”106
5. Other Professional Services Fees
According to Article Two of the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Designating the Administrator during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases,” the po-
sition of administrator should be held by professional services firms (e.g., law firms, ac-
counting firms, or bankruptcy liquidation firms) or individuals (including lawyers or
certified public accountants).107  Each of them understandably possesses a distinctive set of
skills and, as such, it is not uncommon that an administrator would need to engage other
professionals to carry out a complex reorganization plan.  For example, a lawyer appointed
as an administrator would have knowledge in law, but not likely in accounting or finance;
thus he would likely have to engage financial services firms for value analysis of the debtor
company, especially if such efforts involve the bankruptcy restructuring of a listed com-
pany with a major asset reorganization plan.  In that case, on top of the administration
costs payable to the lawyer, other professional fees will also be incurred for the financial
services firms in consideration of their provision of services, inclusive of setting the price
for those shares to be issued by the debtor company, which would then form a newly-
acquired fund for the debtor company to purchase assets.
Professional fees are likely to be charged to the debtor on either a percentage basis or a
time-cost basis; the former refers to the estimation of fees being based on a certain per-
centage (usually agreed upon beforehand, between parties) of the debtor’s estate and the
latter, on the actual time spent multiplied by the professional’s hourly rate in rendering
the services described above.  Professional fees could be high, especially for those financial
services that are highly technical and strategically complex.
6. Administrative Costs
Under the EBL’s framework, there is a high degree of court involvement (hence the
legal fees payable to the court) throughout the reorganization procedure.  For example:
(i) the debtor company or its creditor shall apply to the People’s Court for entering
into bankruptcy proceedings;108
(ii) the administrator shall report his work to the People’s Court, during the reorgani-
zation procedure;109
(iii) the administrator or debtor company shall submit a draft reorganization plan to
the People’s Court;110
106. ??????????????????????????  [Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Determination of the Administrator’s Remunerations], (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct.,
Apr. 12, 2007, effective June 1, 2007) art. 2 (China).
107. Designation of Administrators, art. 2.
108. The EBL, arts. 2, 7.
109. Id. art. 23.
110. Id. art. 79.
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(iv) the People’s Court shall convene the creditor’s meeting for the creditors (of four
voting classes) to vote on the reorganization plan;111
(v) the administrator or debtor company shall submit an application to the People’s
Court for approval of the reorganization plan;112
(vi) the administrator or debtor company may apply to the People’s Court to cram
down the objection of the dissenting group(s) of creditors and, in so doing, ap-
prove the reorganization plan.113
Reorganization cannot commence without petitioning to the People’s Court in the loca-
tion where the debtor is domiciled.114  Once the bankruptcy petition is approved and
filed,115 the administrator must call for the holding of the creditors’ meetings, participate
in any lawsuit, arbitration, or other legal proceedings on behalf of the debtor, and report
his work to the People’s Court.116  Within six months of the commencement of the reor-
ganization period, the administrator or the debtor company is to prepare a draft reorgani-
zation plan.117  The EBL requires the reorganization plan to be approved by the creditors
as well as by the court.118  To that end, where the reorganization plan is not passed at the
creditor’s meeting, the administrator or the debtor company may negotiate with the dis-
senting groups and a second vote may be convened after negotiation.119  Where the draft
plan is still not adopted by the second vote after negotiation, the administrator or the
debtor company may apply to the court for approval of the reorganization plan over the
objection of the dissident group(s).120  For any stage of work required under the EBL, a
potentially substantial amount of fees will be borne due to this complicated reorganization
procedure.121
While the legal fees are most likely to be paid only to the People’s Court, if the debtor
company is involved with a third party (which is also bankrupt and to which the debtor
company is a creditor), then in order to receive the collectable debts, the legal fees will
also include those that are payable to a foreign court.122  More specifically, in instances of
cross-border corporate bankruptcy, it is possible that the administrator (of the debtor
company in China) will have to file a petition in a foreign court for accessing the assets
located outside China that belong to the third party.123  The administrator has the duty to
collect any receivable debts to be included in the debtor company’s estate, from which the
reorganization expenses will be paid out.
111. Id. arts. 82, 84.
112. Id. art. 86.
113. Id. art. 87.
114. Id. art. 3.
115. The filing can be made either by the debtor, the creditor, or the investor with capital contribution of
one-tenth or more of the debtor company’s registered capital. See id. art. 70.
116. Id. art. 25.
117. Id. art. 79.
118. Id. art 86.
119. Id. art 87.
120. Id.
121. Eu Jin Chua, China’s New Bankruptcy Law:  A Legislative Innovation, 20 CHINA L. & PRAC. 17, 20 (Oct.
2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 23.
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IV. The EBL’s Deficiencies & Remaining Issues
A. REORGANIZATION USED RARELY IN CHINA
1. Low Number of Reorganization Cases
The low number of reorganization cases has been described in an earlier section titled
“Bankruptcy Statistics” above.  Despite the EBL’s modest success, certain bankruptcy ex-
perts in China seem rather optimistic about its achievements so far.  In a joint article
published by Professor Li and Zhofa Wang in 2009, as noted above, it was indicated that:
[T]he newly introduced reorganization system seems to be working well.  There ap-
pear to have some reorganization cases since the enactment of the new law [EBL],
especially that of some large listed corporations.  There have been 16 reorganization
cases adopted by the courts of listed corporations [until] June 2009.  There are also
some reorganization cases of close corporations.124
It is necessary to note that the number of cases (sixteen) herein is slightly less than the
number of cases (twenty-three) reported at the meeting of China INSOL mentioned
above—where Professor Li spoke in his capacity as the Director of Bankruptcy Law and
Restructuring Research Centre of China University of Political Science and Law.  The
discrepancy in the two figures was a result of Professor Li’s article being written before
the said meeting that took place on November 29, 2009.125  As mentioned before, a more
recent book publication co-authored by Professor Li further indicated that there are
twenty-six listed companies that have begun the reorganization process.126
Despite these slight discrepancies, reorganization is not used widely in China compared
to other jurisdictions.  The number of Chinese reorganization cases over a period of three
to four years (since the EBL’s promulgation in August 2006) is significantly less than those
recorded in Australia and the United Kingdom, following the respective promulgation of
their reorganization laws,127 namely the Insolvency Act of 1986 (in the U.K.) and the
Corporations Act of 2001 (in Australia).128  Contrary to China’s slow acceptance of its new
statutory corporate reorganization system, reorganization under the Australian shelter re-
gime (voluntary administration) was used widely from its genesis.  In Australia in 2003,
“40.3 per cent of all companies entering formal corporate bankruptcy went into voluntary
administration.”129  Although the actual number of companies having been reorganized
was not available, the ratio stood at a relatively high level, considering it was then only two
years following Australia’s Corporations Act of 2001.130  In the United Kingdom in 1987,
one year after the U.K.’s Insolvency Act of 1986, there were 131 companies undergoing
124. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 3.
125. See MEMBER OF CHINA INT’L INSOLVENCY ASS’N ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 68.
126. LI & ZHEN, supra note 73, at 73.
127. Reorganization in the United States is conducted under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Correspondingly, the Insolvency Act 1986 is the central piece of U.K. legislation while the central piece of
Australian legislation is the Corporations Act 2001.
128. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Insolvency Act, 1986 (Eng.).
129. ANDREW KEAY, A Comparative Analysis of Admin. Regimes in Aus. and the U.K., in INT’L INSOLVENCY
LAW:  THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES, ch. 5 (2008).
130. Id.
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administration procedures.131  Note that reorganization, as the shelter regime, has been
introduced in the United Kingdom as simply “administration” and in Australia as “volun-
tary administration.”  China adopted the U.K. system, with the administrator replacing
the management of the debtor company in (bankruptcy) reorganization.  In terms of ac-
tual acceptance and adoption of the reorganization system, the ratio or number in Austra-
lia and the United Kingdom, respectively, far exceeded the numbers recorded in China.
In the United States, a recent study by Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Univer-
sity suggested that reorganization is very well received in the United States, as evidenced
by nearly all troubled companies having chosen U.S. Chapter 11 restructuring over U.S.
Chapter 7 liquidation; among those, seventy percent resulted in confirmed plans of reor-
ganization.132  Professor Warren’s research was premised on data collected from large
samples of U.S. Chapter 11 cases filed in 1994 and 2002, against which she identified that
“almost half the unsuccessful cases were jettisoned within six months and almost eighty
percent were gone within a year.”133
To this end, Professor Warren concluded that the reorganization system under U.S.
Chapter 11 serves as a critical screening function to eliminate hopeless cases relatively
quickly.134  As such, she challenged the conventional wisdom that U.S. Chapter 11 is char-
acterized by a relatively low success rate and endless delay.135  Unfortunately, the same
conclusion does not apply in China just yet.  It has been known that reorganization can
take much longer in China, well over one year or beyond.136  Although a sufficient period
of adjustment may be required before the new reorganization legislation becomes widely
accepted, Australia’s “immediately engaging” experience proved that it does not always
have to be the case.  It thus merits further assessment to determine whether China’s low
number of reorganization cases is any indication of its administration process being less
efficient and too costly.137  While it is an important issue, it is beyond the scope of this
article.
On the other hand, in terms of the cost of corporate bankruptcy, a World Bank report
conducted in 2010138 indicated that undergoing a bankruptcy process in China is esti-
mated to cost about twenty-two percent of the estate value in each year of the period from
2006-2009, which is about sixty-two percent more than the OECD average.139  To mini-
mize the cost, commentary in favor of DIP argues that substituting the DIP for the ad-
131. Id. at 108 (Table 5.1 Administrative Procedures).
132. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11:  A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 603, 603 (2009).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See World Bank, Wash. D.C., Doing Bus. 2007:  How to Reform: Comparing Regulation in 175 Econs., at
105; World Bank, Wash. D.C., Doing Bus. 2008:  Comparing Regulation in 178 Econs., at 113; World Bank,
Wash D.C., Doing Bus. 2009:  Comparing Regulation in 181 Econs, at 97 (finding that closing a bankrupted
business in China took an average of 2.4 years in 2007, longer than the 1.7 years in 2008 and 2009); for more
details, see Lee & Ho, supra note 63.
137. For more details, see id. at 155-59.
138. World Bank, Wash. D.C., Doing Bus. 2010: Comparing 183 Econs., at 104, available at http//www.doing
business.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=42 (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).  For more details, see also Lee &
Ho, supra note 63.
139. OECD stands for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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ministrator saves money for the debtor company’s estate.140  In connection to this,
Professor Li suggested that even though the DIP mode is embedded in China’s EBL,
“[a]mong the 16 reorganized listed corporations [as mentioned above], there are only 3
DIP cases.”141
The deficiencies of the EBL impel one to probe into the many hurdles to this law.  In
addition to the relatively small number of reorganization cases approved in China,142 a
meeting at China INSOL mentioned above also noted that reorganization is undertaken
increasingly by more “Special Treatment” (*ST) companies than regular companies want-
ing to restructure themselves.143  Special treatment connotes a distinctive “warning sys-
tem” that was formulated by the securities exchanges in China to warn investors of listed
companies suffering severe losses and that are at risk of being delisted from the stock
exchange(s).  If a listed company accumulates losses for some consecutive years, varied
slightly from each and every stock exchange in China, that company’s shares will be sus-
pended from trading; and during the period of suspension, if the company’s finance fails
to improve, then its business license will be revoked and the company’s shares will be
delisted from the stock exchange(s).  For example,
[A]ccording to the rules of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange[s], listed cor-
porations suffering losses for two continuous years shall be [branded with the prefix]
*ST . . . [e.g., a fictitious company known as “ABC Company Limited” prior to the
branding thus becomes, after the branding, “*ST ABC Company Limited”] to warn
investors of the potential risk that the corporation may be de-listed if the losses con-
tinue.  If the *ST corporation continues to lose money for two years, it will [then be
further branded with the prefix] “S*ST” in the third year.  If the company is still
unable to recover by the end of the third year, its shares will be de-listed.144
It is worthwhile to note that “[s]ince the [listing cost] in China’s securities market is quite
high, the *ST corporations still possess considerable ‘shell value.’  *ST corporations be-
come attractive targets of acquisition for outside financial or strategic investors.”145  In
2009 alone, there were reportedly at least ten *ST companies that began the reorganiza-
tion process, including among others *ST Xia Xin (*ST?? , in Chinese), *ST Dan Hua
(*ST?? , in Chinese), and S*ST Guang Ming (S*ST?? , in Chinese).146  Among them,
unofficial statistics suggested that following the EBL’s coming into effect on June 1, 2007,
almost all *ST companies applying for bankruptcy reorganization have been successfully
restructured, after which their share prices have soared.147  This makes restructuring of
*ST companies a highly profitable investment in China, considering that reorganization
will generally only take about seventeen months to complete.148  For *ST companies, nor-
mally on the twentieth trading day after the People’s Court accepted their applications for
140. Details will be further explained in the section titled “Reorganization Cost.”
141. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 4.
142. See MEMBER OF CHINA INT’L INSOLVENCY ASS’N ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 68.
143. Id.
144. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 4.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Da Jun Wang, ????”?????? [Bankruptcy Reorganization:  How Many Black Horses Have Left],
21ST CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD, Jan. 25, 2010. [The news story was printed in Chinese].
147. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 4-8.
148. Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 146.
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entering into a bankruptcy reorganization procedure, the *ST company will be suspended
from trading for a period of six months; then, it will take a further ten months for formu-
lating a reorganization plan, which will then need to be approved by the *ST company’s
creditors and the court before its ultimate implementation.149  Once reorganization be-
comes successful, the *ST companies’ shares, as the historical track records of such events
show, quickly soar and become highly profitable for speculators trading in the stock
market.150
Restructuring of *ST companies is arguably the most peculiar side of reorganization
business in China.  In common cases, the *ST company has minimal or no value (other
than shell value), and even so, reorganization application can surprisingly be accepted by
the court.151  Had the same type of cases been applied in other countries, bankruptcy
liquidation would likely be the one and only option to resolve the debtor company’s debts,
as it lacked a viable business prospect at the time of bankruptcy application, a prerequisite
to applying for reorganization in most jurisdictions.152  An extreme example for this is *ST
Guangxia (*ST??? , in Chinese), which was bankrupt with no assets, no operating capi-
tal, and even no fixed business premise, and yet with its remaining shell value, CITIC
Bank entered into a debt transfer agreement with one of the debtor company’s creditors,
“Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang” (????? , in Chinese), from which CITIC Bank reportedly
took on debt of more than CN¥100 million.153  It was reported that Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang
was preparing to file a bankruptcy reorganization application in court, on the basis that
the debtor company’s debts exceeded its assets.154  Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang sought to maxi-
mize its gains from the debt buy-out by getting priority claims against other creditors.155
Had the *ST Guangxia ended in bankruptcy liquidation (instead of bankruptcy reorgani-
zation as the case was proceeding toward), the creditors’ financial loss (including that of
Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang) would have been enormous.156  While reorganization is the pre-
ferred option for Beijing Jiu Zhi Hang, it remains to be seen whether it can be carried out
successfully due to the conflict of interests between the *ST company’s (*ST Guangxia)
original shareholders and creditors.157  As such, the case has been reported widely as
highly skeptical and controversial.158
2. Application of the EBL by the Provincial Court
As with a majority of PRC legislation, the EBL’s effectiveness will depend on how it is
implemented and enforced at the provincial level.159  Despite the difficulty facing the Peo-
ple’s Courts in adjusting to the EBL, they have demonstrated good intentions in making
the transition from the old system to the new one.160  As evidence of the courts making
149. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 4-8.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Yuqing Kuang, Daily Perspective—Reorganization of Listed Companies, BEIJING DAILY, July 7, 2010, at 6.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Eu Jin Chua, supra note 121, at 1.
160. Id.
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the transition to the new system, one may witness the recent acts of the Superior Provin-
cial Court in An Hui Province (?????????, in Chinese).  That court maintains
and operates a roster of administrators comprised of fifty law firms, twenty-six accounting
firms, and two bankruptcy liquidation firms.161  The administrator is appointed by the
People’s Court through a transparent process of random methods such as rotation, draw-
ing lots, or machine-controlled lottery (roster system).162  Alternatively, the court may
even hold a competitive bidding process in its selection of an administrator who is to
handle a complex case (such as the bankruptcy of a commercial bank, securities company,
insurance company, or any other financial institution).163  By way of legislative design, the
‘administrator’ under the EBL is to replace the ‘liquidation group’ under the old law, so as
to provide fairness and transparency to the creditors.  In that connection, the court’s role
has become less dominant, shifting from “administrating” the bankruptcy procedure (as in
the old law) to mainly “facilitating and supervising” it (as in the EBL).  But to facilitate the
matter, the People’s Court shall first convene the creditors’ meeting164 (so as to take a
vote on the draft reorganization plan) and then approve the reorganization plan, if a ma-
jority of creditors has passed it.165  From a legislative viewpoint, the administrator is de-
signed by the EBL to lead the reorganization plan, and with the benefit of the
administrator’s professional expertise and training, this is a move in the right direction.166
As more evidence of the courts making the transition to the new system, one may wit-
ness the recent acts of the Supreme People’s Court in An Hui Province whereby the court
has convened three training sessions for 380 civil and commercial law judges and seventy-
eight (bankruptcy) administrators to apply and implement the EBL.167  Such efforts are
also evidenced in its presiding of various symposiums for the discussion of key issues aris-
ing from the EBL.168  This is yet another move in the right direction.
B. THE EBL’S COMPATIBILITY ISSUES
While implementing the EBL, some judges expressed the challenges they felt in dealing
with ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘responsibility of proof,’ highlighting the issue of the EBL’s com-
patibility with pre-existing laws that are still in effect.  For example, Article 3 of the EBL
sets out that the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy reorganization case lies in the People’s Court
of the place where the debtor company is domiciled.  The very same provision can poten-
tially create a conflict with the civil procedural law wherein certain types of cases (bank-
ruptcy being one of them) may be reserved for jurisdiction by a specific level of court
(???? , in Chinese) or special court (???? , in Chinese).169  ‘Reserved jurisdiction’
is arguably a familiar practice for many courts in China, at least before the EBL came into
161. MING HUA WANG, supra note 54, at 336.
162. See Designation of Administrators, art. 20.
163. Id. art 21.
164. The EBL, art. 84.
165. Id. art. 86.
166. DERYCK PALMER, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY LAW IN CHINA, 2010 WL 3650157, at
*1 (2010).
167. MING HUA WANG, supra note 54, at 336.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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being, to sort out and further delegate to the specific division of the courts the cases filed
with them based on their internal management rules.170
Another compatibility issue involves Article 7 of the EBL, which allows the creditors to
file for the bankruptcy of the debtor company as long as the latter is generally unable to
pay its debt as and when they fall due.171  To prove the debtor’s inability to pay, the court
relies on information provided by and accessible usually only to the debtor company and
not the creditor; thus, it creates a limitation on ascertaining the true state of the debtor
company’s financial affairs.172  Problems may arise where the debtor company does not
cooperate or fails to provide true accounts of its financial situation.173  This problem is
further exacerbated as the EBL does not specify whether the onus of responsibility to
prove insolvency rests on the debtor company, creditors, or elsewhere.174  This legal la-
cuna will need to be filled for better creditors’ rights protection.175  It is applicable equally
for instances where the creditors files for reorganization of or bankruptcy against the
debtor company.
C. DIP PROCEEDINGS
Under the EBL, a debtor, creditor, or substantial investor is eligible to apply to the
court for reorganization of the debtor company.176  Generally speaking, once the reorgan-
ization application is accepted by the court, an administrator will be appointed by the
court to take over and manage the debtor’s business and assets.177  Accordingly, once the
reorganization application is accepted by the court, the managing power of the existing
board will be suspended,178 unless and until the debtor applies to the court for the admin-
istrator proceedings to be converted into DIP proceedings under the supervision of the
previously appointed administrator during the reorganization period.179  From this angle,
the EBL offers a hybrid of the U.S. and the U.K. systems, the former being the DIP and
the latter being management replacement.180  What remains unclear by the EBL is that it
does not provide instructions as to “who is entitled to make such an application—whether
it is the general meeting of shareholders or the board of directors.”181  This legislative
lacuna could “impede the implementation and effectiveness of the Chinese-modified DIP”
concept, as suggested by one commentator who viewed that given the limited manage-
ment power of the board of directors accorded to them under Chinese company law, the
board of directors, without the authority of the shareholders’ meeting, should not be al-
lowed to petition the court for applying to convert the administrator proceedings to DIP
170. Id.
171. The EBL, art. 3.
172. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 46, ¶ 25.
173. Id. at 46; The EBL, art. 8.
174. See generally The EBL.
175. Steven Arsenault, The Westernization of Chinese Bankruptcy:  An Examination of China’s New Corporate
Bankruptcy Law Through the Lens of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L.
REV. 45, 85 (2008).
176. The EBL, art. 70.
177. Id. art. 13.
178. ZHANG, supra note 18, at 215.
179. See id.; The EBL, art. 73(1).
180. ZHANG, supra note 18, at 214-15.
181. Id. at 215.
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proceedings.182  In relation to this, the EBL also failed to account for what considerations
the court ought to make before granting a DIP application, which again as suggested by
the commentator creates yet another legislative lacuna.183  Some suggested that the court
should investigate the root problem for causing the corporate distress and, if poor man-
agement and decision making is responsible for the company’s bankruptcy, the court
should accordingly dismiss the DIP application.184  Likewise, the “judges need to assess
whether or not the existing directors” are competent “to manage the ailing company” and
to continue “trading during the reorganization process.”185  To this end, the judges would
be expected to “evaluate the directors’ experience and ability to deal with the balance of
risk and return, to negotiate and produce a reasonable and practicable rescue proposal
during the reorganization.”186  By doing so, it is suggested that the debtor company
should submit to the court “the management records and board minutes along with the
DIP application for the consideration of the court;” on the other hand, the court should
also consult the opinions of the creditors and the representatives of the labor union(s) who
are familiar with the management’s competence, governance style, and decision-mak-
ing.187  While all attempts for eliminating the legislative lacuna are commendable, the
questions remain as to whether the judges would be given too much discretionary power
in making relevant decisions and whether all the necessary investigations to be carried out
by the judges who decide on such matters could be completed within the prescribed reor-
ganization period of six months.188  If that time period is exceeded the unpaid employees
and creditors would suffer from the prolonged reorganization procedure and, which, if
unsuccessful, could lead eventually to and end with the corporate bankruptcy procedure
for the failing/failed company.  Given that the EBL is silent on the amount of time before
which judges are required to make DIP decisions, it raises another layer of concern for the
law’s effectiveness and application.189  It should be noted that, once the DIP application is
accepted by the court, the administrator who has taken over the business affairs and assets
of the debtor company shall hand over those back to the debtor company’s management,
and the administrator’s functions and powers provided for in the EBL should be exercised
by the debtor company’s management.190
D. REQUIREMENTS FOR REORGANIZATION APPLICATION—TWO-LIMB OR ONE-LIMB
TEST?
The persons eligible for applying for reorganization are set out in Article 70 of the
EBL, being the debtor company itself, a creditor, or investors whose capital contribution
comprises one-tenth (1/10th) or more of the debtor company’s registered capital.  Then,
the next task is to identify the requirements for commencing a reorganization process.191
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 215-16
185. Id. at 216.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The EBL, art. 79.
189. ZHANG, supra note 18, at 216.
190. The EBL, art. 73.
191. Id. art. 71.
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The EBL appears to provide the same requirements for the debtor company to resolve its
debt, either through bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization process.192
Article 2 of the EBL states that:
“Where an enterprise is unable to pay off a debt that is due and its assets are insuffi-
cient to pay off all of its debtors . . . it shall clear off its debts in accordance with the
provision of this Law.”193
Article 7 of the EBL further states that:
“A debtor who comes under the circumstances described in Article 2 of this Law may
submit an application to the people’s court for reorganization . . . or bankruptcy
liquidation.”194
Considering these two articles together, it can be reasonably construed that, for a
debtor company to apply for either liquidation or reorganization, it must satisfy both the
‘liquidity test’ and the ‘balance sheet test’ (i.e., the two-limb test).195  The ‘liquidity test’
(also known as the ‘cash flow test’) assesses the debtor’s ability to pay off a debt that is due,
while the ‘balance sheet test’ gauges the debtor’s total assets and total liabilities.196  In
contrast, a creditor can apply for the debtor’s liquidation or reorganization by meeting
only the liquidity test.197
For a debtor to apply for reorganization, the stricter two-limb test shall apply, but it re-
mains unclear whether a lower threshold test can come into play.  That is because Article
2 of the EBL also provides that:
“Where an enterprise with the status of legal entity comes under the circumstances
described in the preceding paragraph, or [emphasis added] is facing the possibility [em-
phasis added] to lose the ability to pay off a debt apparently [emphasis added], the
enterprise may be reorganized . . . ”198
Whether the legislators had ever intended for it to mitigate the strictness of the two-
limb test is unknown.  Moreover, the debtor’s burden of proof for the application of reor-
ganization is also unclear.  At the risk of mincing words, the very word ‘possibility’ points
to a lower standard, but the [paring] word ‘apparently’ points the other way.  The issue for
consideration is whether the provision, “[the debtor is] facing the possibility to lose the
ability to pay off a debt apparently,” constitutes as a separate test, apart from the “two-
limb” test.199  On the one hand, this particular provision may be construed as evidence
that the EBL encourages reorganization by toning down the stricter two-limb test—as
long as there is “possibility” that the debtor would lose the ability to pay off to debt, the
192. See id. arts. 2, 7.
193. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
194. Id. art. 7, ¶ 1.
195. KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, CHINA’S NEW ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW 2 (2006). http://www.kirk
land.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2272/Document1/Chinas_New_Enterprise_Bankruptcy_Law.pdf
(last visited Jan. 24, 2012)
196. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 45-46.
197. The EBL, arts. 2, 7.
198. Id. art. 2, ¶ 2.
199. See id. arts. 2, 7.
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debtor can apply reorganization to the People’s Court.  On the other hand, as one com-
mentator suggested, this provision is not a separate test but rather an element inherent in
the meaning of the general cessation of payment.200  The commentator goes on to say that
this provision is not meant to mitigate the strictness of the two-limb test.  The commenta-
tor’s view is justifiable so as to eliminate potential uncertainties in the application of law.
Otherwise, due to the absence of objective standards, in defining the degree of which the
“possibility” (of the debtor’s inability to pay off a debt) would become so ‘apparent’ that it
would amount to the debtor’s inability to pay, the debtor could effectively be disqualified
to apply for reorganization under the EBL than it would otherwise be allowed to do so.
To assist effectively debtors with financial difficulties at an early stage, the commence-
ment standard for reorganization must be one that is less onerous than that for liquida-
tion.  By extension, the reorganization requirement must not require the debtor to wait
until it is actually unable to meet its debt before making an application.
The liquidity test is seen as a preferred measure, as suggested by both the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank.  First, the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, adopted by the UNCITRAL in 2004, suggests that the
liquidity test serves to discover early in the period of the debtor company’s financial dis-
tress, hence minimizing dissipation of assets and avoiding the ‘asset-grab’ that would cause
the dismemberment of the debtor company to the collective disadvantage of all credi-
tors.201  Although the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests that the balance sheet test
suffers from a number of disadvantages and thus should not be used as the single test, it
does not object to a standard that contains both the liquidity and balance sheet tests.202  It
states only that if a single test for assessing corporate bankruptcy is adopted, it should be
the liquidity test, as in this case of the cessation of payments test, which provides an effec-
tive trigger for access to corporate bankruptcy proceedings.203  Second, the World Bank’s
“Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems” in 2001
also suggests that “the preferred test for insolvency should be the debtor’s inability to pay
debts as they come due—known as the liquidity test.  A balance sheet test may be used as
an alternative secondary test, but should not replace the liquidity test.”204
E. DUAL APPROVAL FOR REORGANIZATION PLAN
Relevant provisions governing the reorganization system under the EBL are contained
in Chapter 8.  The EBL dedicates an entire chapter for the initiation of reorganization
period and the approval of a reorganization plan.  Essentially, reorganization in China is a
court-supervised three-stage procedure, namely (1) application to the court; (2) com-
200. ZHANG HAIYAN, An Analysis of Cause of Bankruptcy in the New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, in ZHENG FA
LUN CONG (???? , in Chinese), Issue No. 2, Apr. 10, 2007).
201. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 46, ¶ 23.
202. Id.  The balance sheet test is seen as problematic because it relies on information provided by and
accessible usually only to the debtor, not the creditor; this creates a practical limitation on ascertaining the
true state of the debtor’s financial affairs.  In addition, the balance sheet test subjects insolvency determina-
tion to accounting principles and standards, whose adoption and interpretation vary across countries or even
different subparts of the same country.
203. Id. at 48, ¶ 29.
204. The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems,” principle 9,
at 8, (Apr. 2001).
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mencement of reorganization period; and (3) ‘double approval.’  Double approval alludes
to the fact that the reorganization plan has to be approved not only by creditors of the
debtor but also by the court.205  Where the double approval procedure is concerned, the
first approval must be obtained from creditors, who will be divided into separate voting
classes (such as secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and employment-related creditors)
for purposes of approving a reorganization plan.206  It is important to note that approval
from each voting class is necessary for the reorganization plan to be adopted.207  The
second approval must be obtained from the court whereby the debtor or administrator
shall, within ten days from the date of first approval, submit an application to the People’s
Court for approving the reorganization plan.208
To examine whether the dual approval requirement would pose any difficulty to the
implementation of the corporate reorganization system in China, it is helpful to see what
the international benchmark is.  The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide states that, through-
out the world, most corporate bankruptcy systems require only the creditors’ approval of
the reorganization plan and not the court’s approval; those foreign courts often approve
subsequently the plan that has already been approved by the creditors.209  Where the reor-
ganization system requires only ‘single approval’ by the creditors for adopting the plan,
even though there is no court supervision of the plan, the corporate bankruptcy laws usu-
ally provide for the plan to be challenged in the court.210  Common grounds for the
court’s challenge include reorganization approval implicated by:
(1) fraud;
(2) “irregularity in the voting procedure;”
(3) “irregularity in the organization or conduct of the meeting at which the vote was
taken;”
(4) inadequate opportunity for voting classes to participate in relevant proceedings;
(5) no access or lack of access to information necessary for voting classes to make an
informed decision to reject or accept the proposed reorganization plan; and
(6) unfair prejudice against the interest of dissenting classes of creditors.211
In contrast, where the corporate bankruptcy law requires the court to confirm a plan, the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests that the court’s duty is to “ensure that the ap-
proval of the plan was properly obtained” and the stipulated conditions were satisfied.212
In relation to ‘stipulated conditions,’ the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests that
such conditions shall include:  (1) dissenting creditors of the plan would share the eco-
nomic benefits of the said plan; (2) dissenting creditors would receive “as much under the
plan as they would have received in liquidation;” (3) “no creditor would receive more than
the full value of its claim;” (4) normal ranking of claims under the corporate bankruptcy
law is observed by the plan; (5) “similarly ranked creditors are treated equally;” (6) the
205. The EBL, arts. 84, 86.
206. Id. arts. 82, 84, 86.
207. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 226.
208. The EBL, art. 86, ¶ 2.
209. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 226.
210. Id. at 227.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 228, ¶ 60.
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plan can be considered to be fair in respect of those classes of creditors “whose interests
are modified or affected by the plan but which nevertheless have voted to approve the
plan;”213 and (7) the plan is feasible from a practical point of view.214  Such stipulated
provisions, on the surface, are similar to the ‘cram-down’215 provisions in the EBL except
that the EBL does not provide any guidelines for the court’s scrutiny.216  From one’s
viewpoint, where the court’s approval (i.e., second approval of the reorganization plan) is
required, the provisions should not be open to the court’s wide discretion so as to prevent
undue judicial influence.  Essentially, the court’s approval should be constrained only to
legal formality.  Likewise, the court cannot investigate into the merits of the reorganiza-
tion plan as it is not up to the court to make commercial decisions.  The court should not
be expected to examine the economic and commercial basis of the decision of the creditors
either.
F. FORMS OF REORGANIZATION
The EBL focuses mainly on procedural matters and is silent on the substantial matters
such as the forms of transactions that qualify for restructuring.217  In this regard, lessons
may be drawn from the “Circular on Several Issues on Corporate Income Tax Treatment
of Corporate Restructuring Transactions,” which is the tax implementation rules for cor-
porate restructuring.  Under the rules, the forms of transactions that qualify for restruc-
turing are:
(1) changes in legal form (such as registered name, address or entity type);
(2) debt restructuring;
(3) equity acquisition;
(4) asset acquisition;
(5) merger; and
(6) spin-off (or splitting and transferring an enterprise’s partial or entire assets (spun-
off [assets]) to other existing or new enterprises (spin-off enterprise) whereby share-
holders of the spun-off enterprise receive equity or non-equity payment of the spin-
off enterprise in return).218
One needs to be aware of the distinction between the ordinary ‘corporate restructuring’
and ‘bankruptcy reorganization.’  In the former case, the company most likely has not yet
entered into the bankruptcy process, but for various business reasons the company has
213. Id. ¶ 61.
214. Id. ¶ 62.
215. Generally, a reorganization plan will be approved only if (1) an affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3rd) of
the total amount of claims in each class and a majority of the same group present at the creditor’s meeting and
(2) approval is obtained from all voting classes and the court.  The EBL, art. 84.  But, a court can “cram
down” a dissenting class and approve the reorganization plan once these four tests are met:  (i) fair and
equitable test; (ii) best-interest test; (iii) no unfair discrimination and absolute priority; and (iv) feasibility test.
See id. art. 87.
216. Id.
217. The words “reorganization” and “restructuring” are used almost interchangeably in most bankruptcy
literature to refer to the rescue of a company approaching insolvency.
218. CIRCULAR OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND THE STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION ON SEV-
ERAL ISSUES ON CORPORATE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING TRANSAC-
TIONS, n. 59 (Cai Shui 2009).
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sought to augment its revenue; whereas, in the latter case (which the article is focused on),
because the bankruptcy proceeding has already commenced, the mainstay of the reorgani-
zation will rest on debt-repayment.  The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide conveys that
reorganization can take a number of different forms, including (i) a ‘composition,’ refer-
ring to a simple agreement concerning debts, where the creditor agrees to take a ‘hair-
cut;’219 or (ii) a complex reorganization, where debts are restructured; or (iii) a conversion
of debt to equity, together with a reduction or even cancellation of existing equity.220  The
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide sets the international benchmark for corporate bank-
ruptcy law, which is accepted by many countries including China, as the EBL conforms
largely to the recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and is therefore on
par with international standards of corporate bankruptcy law.221  Deduced from the differ-
ent context that provides for China’s tax implementation rules for corporate restructuring,
such rules should not be understood to supplement the EBL without proper adjustment.
Where the implementation of the rules will impinge on the creditors’ rights, especially
those expressly protected under the EBL, they shall cease to apply.
G. DISCLOSURE
For the draft reorganization to be acceptable, Article 84 of the EBL states that the
People’s Court shall convene the creditors’ meeting within thirty days from the date of
receipt of the draft reorganization plan so as to allow for the creditors to vote on the draft
reorganization plan.222  Then, the draft reorganization plan will have to be adopted by
each voting group (or class) of creditors before it can be submitted to the People’s Court
for its approval.223  Because the creditors’ approval is fundamental and prerequisite to the
court’s final approval, one might suggest that, for future amendment of the EBL, provi-
sions should be made to give creditors reasonable access to information pertaining to the
debtor company’s business operations, financial state of affairs, and assets.  Information of
truth and reliability is absolutely crucial and indispensable for an ultimately successful
implementation of the reorganization plan; without these elements, the creditors would
not be able to vote with confidence and may instead decide later to bring individual law-
suits against the company through the corporate bankruptcy system, once the reorganiza-
tion plan fails to be adopted.  In light of this lack of disclosure, the creditors would be
deprived of the chance to make an informed decision and may debilitate the voting mech-
anism provided in Article 84 of the EBL, rendering it a mere formality with little or no
substance.
H. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Reorganization has priority over bankruptcy liquidation, as emphasized by Professor Li:
“The new law [EBL] encourages insolvent businesses to choose restructuring methods as
first choice.  Only when there is no business viability should the bankruptcy liquidation
219. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28, ¶ 27. See also Lee & Ho, supra note 63.
220. The methods for debt restructuring are exemplified in THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra
note 58, at 28, ¶ 27. See also Lee & Ho, supra note 63.
221. Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 149.
222. The EBL, art. 84.
223. Id. art. 86.
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process be adopted as the last resort.”224  While Professor Li’s efforts are commendable in
reviewing the EBL in 2009, he seemed to have left unanswered a lot of intriguing ques-
tions that could help in assessing the practical application of the EBL, such as:
(1) What was the scale and size of these sixteen listed corporations (as mentioned by
him);
(2) What was the jurisdiction of these sixteen reorganization cases;
(3) What was the reorganization cost;
(4) Whether those petitions were filed by the debtor companies themselves, their
creditors, or their investors whose capital contribution comprise one-tenth (1/
10th) or more of the debtor company’s registered capital; and
(5) Whether the courts that accepted the bankruptcy petitions have exercised, at their
discretion, the cram-down discretionary power to approve the reorganization plan,
pursuant to the cram-down provisions embedded in Article 87 of the EBL.
One should consider these questions crucial as they would help in assessing whether reor-
ganization is expensive in China and thus accessible only to sizeable listed corporations.
Instinctively, there is a correlation between the reorganization cost and the size and scale
of the debtor company, given that reorganization cost will be paid off from the debtor
company’s assets.
The jurisdiction of the reorganization cases might well be linked to the types of enter-
prises that are being rescued.  In the midst of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009,
there were many reports of the successful reorganizations of private enterprises;225 it is
worth noting that there were very few reorganization cases reported for SOEs in China
during that same period.226  This is somewhat perplexing as a review in 2007 suggested
that there were 2,100 financially distressed SOEs exempted from the EBL’s application
until the end of 2008,227 not to mention that it is a well-known fact that many SOEs have
suffered economic loss for a long time and therefore were in need of being liquidated or
restructured.228  Why would there be so little reporting on SOEs’ reorganizations?  There
are several possible reasons to consider.  First, recent economic reforms in China have led
to a large number of SOEs being converted to corporatized enterprises,229 stemming from
China’s transition from a planned economic system to a market economic system.  Sec-
ond, amid the financial crisis in 2008-2009, there were tremendous losses suffered by
many SOEs such as Air China, China Eastern Airlines, and China Southern Airlines, “re-
sulting from their entering into (often complicated) financial derivatives transactions;”230
but because they were experiencing only temporary business downturns, there required no
bankruptcy liquidations or bankruptcy reorganizations.  Third, for those SOEs earmarked
for ‘administrative bankruptcy,’ whose insolvencies are to proceed according to the ‘policy
bankruptcy’ framework administered by the government and under State Council regula-
224. LI & WANG, supra note 67, at 3.
225. For more details, see Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 167.
226. Id. at 156.
227. Steven T. Kargman, Solving the Insolvency Puzzle, 30 CHINA BUS. REV. 44, 45 (2007).
228. Lee & Ho, supra note 63, at 155.
229. The State-owned Assets Law is an Imperfect Guardian, CHINA L. & PRAC. (Nov. 2009).
230. Tighter Control of SOEs Engaging in Financial Derivative Transactions, CHINA L. & PRAC. (May 2009).
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tions,231 the EBL (hence the bankruptcy reorganization) were rendered inapplicable.  All
such reasons catered to the reduced opportunities for us to examine the reorganization of
SOEs.  Suffice it to say that if SOEs have any chance of survival, the Chinese government
or State Assets Management System (SAMS)232 is likely to resuscitate them, by either
providing them with financial support or entering them into corporate restructuring
before the underlying SOEs go into bankruptcy.
Although this article aims to examine the practical application of the EBL from a
broader perspective, focusing especially on the reorganizations of all legal enterprises
under the EBL, the research result is inevitably restrained by the limited bankruptcy in-
formation available for public consumption in China.  The article draws its conclusions
confined by visible research limits, but ideally the research should be examined on a larger
scale and on a more quantitative basis.  One can only hope that the research horizon will
be significantly broadened so that the assessment may explore the issues in greater depth,
if and when more case law is accumulated over time and the bankruptcy statistical data—
kept by the People’s Court (at the various levels) as well as by only a handful of bank-
ruptcy research centers in China—can be released for public information in general or for
creditor’s protection in particular.
V. Conclusion
Bankruptcy reorganization is arguably the most cost-effective scheme in restoring a fi-
nancially distressed company back to a state of financial viability.  Because the company
was in financial difficulty in the first place, for restructuring purposes it relies not only on
rearranging (or adjusting) debts but also, and perhaps more effectively, on acquiring new
quality assets in backing up a reorganization plan.  Debt rearrangement (???? , in
Chinese) can be flexible, and includes options such as (1) taking a “haircut” by the credi-
tors; (2) extending the period for repayment; (3) deferring payment of interest by the
debtor; (4) changing the identity of the lenders (meaning another lender steps into the
shoe of the original lender); and (5) swapping debt for equity.233  Once the reorganization
process begins, the restructuring will rely greatly on the sale of assets to obtain the neces-
sary cash to repay creditors.  As such, a true and reliable assets valuation is essential in
controlling reorganization cost, which needs to be kept in check at all times.  There are
other benefits arising from the bankruptcy reorganization.  First, all debts of the debtor
company can be resolved fully once and for all, as the court will be supervising and presid-
ing over the reorganization case.  The EBL requires the creditors who enjoy claims
against the debtor company to declare their claims within a period set forth by the court
for doing so, which shall not be less than thirty days at least and not more than three
months at most, calculated from the date on which the People’s Court makes a public
231. The EBL, art. 133.
232. In China, a state assets management system (SAMS) was established in 2003 to manage the SOEs being
converted to corporatized enterprises.  The SAMS, reflecting the state supervision system (on state assets),
has resulted in a new regulatory process set out in the PRC Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprises (the
SOAE law), which was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Oct.
28, 2008 and became effective on May 1, 2009. The State-owned Assets Law is an Imperfect Guardian, supra note
229.
233. THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 58, at 28, ¶ 27.
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announcement on the acceptance of the bankruptcy application.234  It can be inferred that
most creditors would oblige to declare their claims within that period, as deliberate non-
compliance would likely render their claims unrecoverable.  As provided, where a creditor
fails to declare its claims in accordance with the provisions of the EBL, it shall not exercise
its right in the implementation of the reorganization plan.235  Second, shall the adminis-
trator work at his best in raising the recovery rate, it is often conducive to the creditors’
approval of the reorganization plan.  And an acceptable plan (by the creditors) is also a
workable reorganization plan, likely to be implemented successfully.  Third, debts that fail
to be recovered will be treated as being foregone by the creditors.  This reorganization
and especially the restructuring of debt will benefit greatly the debtor company.  More
often than not, as soon as reorganization is completed, the company’s share price in the
stock market starts to soar, as a result of having restored investors’ confidence in the
company.  This provides one good reason why many financially distressed companies
chose bankruptcy reorganization over bankruptcy liquidation.
Despite the EBL’s deliberate design to encourage and facilitate reorganization for com-
panies facing bankruptcy, the number of successful reorganization cases is quite slim.  At-
tributive to this are a number of factors such as local protectionism, lack of qualified
bankruptcy professionals in China, and certain judges’ inclination to apply the more famil-
iar old bankruptcy law over the EBL.  Inadequate knowledge possessed by judges in rele-
vant areas can bring down sufficiently any reorganization attempts or efforts.  This is a
radical problem in China where judges are sometimes Communist Party members and
appointed by the government; hence they often lack the qualifications, professional train-
ing, or legal knowledge as well as the required expertise in economic, financial, or ac-
counting matters.  Considering that there is only one specialized bankruptcy court in
China, established by the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court (???????? , in
Chinese) in December 1993, its undertaking of bankruptcy cases can be rather over-
whelming; reportedly, there are only eight to ten specialized bankruptcy judges in this
court in recent years.236  Shenzhen is a pioneer city in China, being one of the first five
economic zones in Southern China; until the end of 2000, its bankruptcy court had ac-
cepted 486 cases and closed 373 of them, or averaged sixty-nine accepted cases and fifty-
three closed cases per year.237  Professor Weiguo Wang of The China University of Politi-
cal Science and Law suggests that about 5,000 bankruptcy cases were filed in economic
trial courts, accounting for only 0.3% of the total of 1.5 million economic cases per
year.238  In addition to the few number of bankruptcy judges, there is also a lack of exper-
ienced bankruptcy professionals in China to implement the EBL in a consistent manner.
Various levels of People’s Courts in China are aware of this problem and it is commenda-
ble that the educational responsibility is carried out not only by the courts but also profes-
234. The EBL, art. 45.
235. Id. art. 92.
236. Weiguo Wang, Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform—An Assessment of the Recent Developments and
the Role of Judiciary, Strengthening Judicial Expertise in Bankruptcy Proceedings in China 3 (Feb. 7-8, 2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/24/1874188.pdf.  According to an anonymous judge in the
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, the number of insolvency judges working in this court remains the
same today.
237. Id. at 3-4.
238. Id. at 1.
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sional bodies (e.g., China INSOL) and discussion forums (e.g., Pochanfa Luntan,
?????, in Chinese).
SOEs are another inherent problem in China’s reorganization system.  In these cases,
government interference is likely to complicate the reorganization plan or process.  For
example, the debtor company may be an SOE that may not have objectively healthy finan-
cial prospects or significant continuing operational purposes, and yet the debtor company,
essentially the state because it is both the main stakeholder and managing authority, might
subjectively decide to commence a reorganization application.  This problem can be exac-
erbated under the EBL (in Article 87), where the SOE, as DIP, can continue to manage
the SOE as a going concern.239  In light of this, the state will likely to have extensive
control of reorganization, notwithstanding the supervision by a court-appointed adminis-
trator.  Not to mention that at this juncture, the appointment, qualification, compensa-
tion, and availability of the court-appointed administrator might appear dubious.240  On
the contrary, for those SOEs that are known to be subject to the pressure of the command
economy, they might otherwise find the judiciary predisposed against accepting their re-
organization application.  From a third-party perspective, threatened by local protection-
ism, political interference, and rampant corruption, it remains uncertain whether the
courts would accept reorganization application from creditors or investors against those
enterprises (especially SOEs) that are important locally or politically well connected.241
It has been suggested that the Supreme People’s Court is drafting “a comprehensive
judicial interpretation on the [EBL] based on the problems accumulated and experience
gained during the recent four year implementation of the EBL.  The existing draft of this
judicial interpretation contains about 300 articles, which is far more than the 136 articles
contained in the [EBL].  It is expected to be published within three years.  A smaller-sized
judicial interpretation directing the insolvency of listed companies is expected to be issued
before this comprehensive one.”242  In light of this, it is hopeful that all the outstanding
issues as discussed in this article can be clarified by upcoming Supreme People’s Court’s
judicial interpretations.
239. The EBL, art. 87.
240. Lijie Qi, The Corporate Reorganization Regime under China’s New Bankruptcy Law, 17 INT. INSOLVENCY
REV. 13, 28 (2008).
241. Eu Jin Chau, supra note 121, at 1.
242. Li & Wang, supra note 1, at 303.
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Cartel Regulation in Three Emerging BRICS
Economies: Cartel and Competition Policies
in South Africa, Brazil, and India—
A Comparative Overview
SASHA-LEE AFRIKA AND SASCHA-DOMINIK BACHMANN*
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Charta of
free enterprise.  They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamen-
tal personal freedoms.  And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no mat-
ter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination,
devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.1
Abstract
This article argues that only increased cross-border cooperation through bilateral agreements
between domestic competition authorities in the developed world can regulate anti-competitive car-
tel activities effectively.  To discuss this argument, the competition policies and laws of three emerg-
ing economies, namely South Africa, India, and Brazil are compared with the competition law of
the European Union.  The benefits of bilateral agreements concerning international cartels appear
to be clear: only a synchronized and international approach will help developing nations in protect-
ing their markets from unfair competition practices.  This article will discuss the state of anti-cartel
policies and legislation in the selected jurisdictions, the present state of coordination of competition
policies through promotion and cooperation at the bi-national and international level, and high-
light some examples of more publicized anti-competition cases.  The article also provides an insight
into cartel activities in these three emerging economies and poses the question about which of the
existing methods of cooperation is the most effective one for addressing cartel activities.  It provides a
short overview of the existing international institutions and enforcement bodies that promote and
* BA (Law), LLB, LLM (all Stellenbosch), Attorney at Law (High Court of South Africa).  Sashalee
worked as a Lecturer in Mercantile Law in the Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch, and is now a part
time lecturer with Portsmouth University while undertaking a PhD with Stellenbosch in competition law Ass.
Jur (Ludwig Maximilians Universitaet Muenchen), LL.M (Stellenbosch), LL.D (Johannesburg), PGCHE
(Portsmouth).  Sascha-Dominik teaches international and European law at Portsmouth University, School of
Law. Contact:  sascha.bachmann@port.ac.uk.
1. United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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coordinate international competition policies and anti-cartel initiatives.  The cooperation methods
identified and utilized by the International Competition Network will be briefly analyzed in order
to support the authors’ view on the relevance and importance of bilateral cooperation agreements
for the conclusion of successful cartel investigations.  The article concludes with the observation that
more could be done by the developing “Newly Industrialized Nations” (NIC) to increase the collabo-
rative ties of their anti-competition policies and organizations as well as ensure that they fall under
the wider umbrella of regional competition regimes such as in the case of South Africa and the
European Union.  Time will tell whether the emerging economies will be able to balance competi-
tion policy and consumer welfare in an effective and progressive way without affecting their trade
and investment policies.
I. Introduction
This 1972 dictum of the U.S. Supreme Court, read in conjunction with sections 1 and 2
of the U.S. Sherman Act,2 stresses the importance3 of balancing the demands of a free
market economy with the necessity to promote consumer welfare by limiting anti-com-
petitive corporate market distortion.  In the developing world, many states, including
South Africa, have made some measurable progress in enacting competition legislation, or
antitrust laws as they are known in the United States.  South Africa is a developing coun-
try with a very recently established competition regime.  The majority of the population is
plagued by poverty and lack of services.4  Consequently, anti-competitive business activi-
ties by corporations severely affect the poor of society: it is the poor who bear the heaviest
burden of anti-competitive behavior such as price fixing, price discrimination, and market
distortion leading to a market without sufficient competition.  Cartel activity prevents
consumers and other market stakeholders from enjoying the benefits of a free and fair
market.  Thus, the existence of cartels in an economy such as South Africa can have an
overall negative impact on the formation of a competitive and prosperous market econ-
omy.  South Africa depends on direct foreign investment and thus has an interest in dem-
onstrating to a prospective investor that it takes a proactive stand on fair competition and
the “preservation of economic freedom.”5  In general, cartels, the “supreme evil of anti-
trust,”6 whose activities constitute one of the “most egregious offence(s) under competi-
tion law,”7 particularly those involving Multinational Corporations (MNCs), often have a
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states  “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal.”  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).  Section 2 extends this prohibition on monopolies.  See § 2.
3. The mission statement of the European Commission stresses the need to align these two interests. See,
e.g., Mission of Directorate General for Competition, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competi-
tion/mission/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).  Part One, Article 2 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community stresses the need for such a balance based on balanced economic
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social
progress, and “a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.”
4. See South Africa Country Profile, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/coun-
tries/profiles/ZAF.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012), which ranks South Africa’s Human Development Index at
123, compared with the U.K.’s rank of twenty-eight.
5. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. at 610.
6. Verizon Commc’n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004), cited in
KIRSTY MIDDLETON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON UK AND EC COMPETITION LAW 325, n.1 ( 2009).
7. Mondi Ltd. and Kohler Cores and Tubes [2002] ZACT (LM) at 27 ¶ 87 (S. Afr.).
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particularly negative impact on developing market economies: market dominance, its dis-
tortion, and an absence of consumer welfare are just some possible consequences.
This article argues that increased cross-border cooperation through bilateral agree-
ments between domestic competition authorities in the developed world can regulate anti-
competitive cartel activities effectively.  To discuss this argument, the competition policies
and laws of three emerging economies, namely South Africa, India, and Brazil, are com-
pared with the competition law of the European Union.  This country selection was made
based on their shared category as emerging and developing, as well as Newly Industrial-
ized Countries (NICs)8 reflecting on their similarities in terms of market nature, eco-
nomic impact, and potential market challenges.  Brazil and India are members of the so-
called BRICS group.9  South Africa is the youngest member of the (former) BRIC group
and the strongest single emerging economy on the African continent.10  Another similar-
ity is the fact that all three states are member parties to the International Competition
Network (ICN)11 but not to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), whose members are mostly developed nations.12  These organizations, to-
gether with organizations such as the European Union and other regional anti-
competition bodies, play an important role to ensure that cartels are identified, investi-
gated, and subsequently regulated in terms of international and domestic competition leg-
islation and policies of the countries affected.  Subsequently, the role and functions of
these two organizations regarding limiting anti-competitive activities, especially cartels,
are scrutinized within the scope of the chosen domestic jurisdictions.
The article also provides an insight into cartel activities in these three emerging econo-
mies and poses the question as to which of the existing methods of cooperation is the most
effective one for addressing cartel activities.  It provides a short overview of the existing
international institutions and enforcement bodies, which promote and coordinate interna-
tional competition policies and anti-cartel initiatives.  The cooperation methods identified
and utilized by the ICN13 will be briefly analyzed in order to support the authors’ view on
8. See PAWEL BOZYK, GLOBALIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
164 (2006), for an overview of these newly industrialized countries.  Go to World Economic Outlook FAQ,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q4b (last visited Jan.
15, 2012) for an overview of criteria used by the IMF to distinguish different categories of market economies.
9. BRICS, named after its members Brazil, Russia, India, China and since April 2011, South Africa, re-
semble a group of “countries considered economically significant . . . who view themselves as an emerging
centre of gravity in the global economy.”  Mzukisi Qobo, The BRIC Pitfalls and South Africa’s Place in the
World, SUNDAY INDEPENDENT (Apr. 17, 2010), available at http://www.saiia.org.za/great-powers-africa-opin-
ion/the-bric-pitfalls-and-south-africa-s-place-in-the-world.html. See also BRIC Invite:  Sign of China’s African
Ambitions, AFRICA MONITOR:  SOUTHERN AFRICA (BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL), Mar. 1, 2011
[hereinafter BRIC Invite], in which the BRIC group was described as “a group of leading emerging markets
that will become increasingly important in the global economy over the long term.  The nations are broadly
characterized by fast economic growth, rapid reforms, and business-friendly environments.”
10. South Africa joined the BRIC group in April 2011, see BRIC Becomes BRICS—South Africa as a Gateway
to the Continent, MONEY WATCH AFRICA, May 12, 2011, http://www.moneywatchafrica.com/2011/05/bric-
becomes-brics-south-africa-as.html; see also BRIC Invite, supra note 9.
11. For more information on the ICN, go to http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/.
12. See List of OECD Member Countries, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_2011
85_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012), for a list of the OECD member states.
13. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AGENCIES IN CAR-
TEL INVESTIGATIONS (2006), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc348.pdf, submitted at the ICN annual conference held in Moscow in May 2007.
WINTER 2011
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
978 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the relevance and importance of bilateral cooperation agreements for the conclusion of
successful cartel investigations.
II. Competition Law and the Concentration of Market Power in Cartels
and Multinational Corporations:  A Legislative Overview
A. CARTELS AND ANTI-CARTEL LEGISLATION
The following four legislative examples stress the common aim of regulating competi-
tion law, maximizing consumer welfare, and preventing market distortion by means of
anti-trust applications.
Cartels constitute an association of manufacturers or suppliers that aims to maintain
high prices and restrict competition:  the European Union’s competition commission de-
fines cartels as “a group of similar, independent companies which join together to fix
prices, to limit production or to share markets or customers between them . . . As a conse-
quence, their clients (consumers or other businesses) end up paying more for less
quality.”14
The OECD regards anti-trust measures as a way of ensuring consumer welfare, the
“individual benefit derived from the consumption of goods and services,” by maximizing
consumer surplus of such consumption while also ensuring the well-being of the produc-
ers of such services.15  The organization explicitly warns of the negative impact that so
called “hard core cartels” can have and warns of their negative impact on market equity:
“They injure consumers in many countries by raising prices and restricting supply, thus
making goods and services completely unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily
expensive for others.”16
Under South African competition legislation, cartel activities are prohibited under sec-
tion 4 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended17 (the Act): any involvement in such
cartel activities may lead to administrative18 as well as possible criminal sanctions against
the companies and the directors involved.19  South African competition legislation does
not provide a concise definition of the term cartel.  Instead, the Act lists examples of
corporate activities that could qualify as cartel activity.  Section 4(1) stipulates that:
An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association
of firms, is prohibited if—(a) it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if it
14. European Commission’s competition overview at Overview:  Cartels, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
15. See OECD, GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 29, 53,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf.
16. OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD
CORE CARTELS 1 (1988), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf.
17. See Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, § 3(1-2) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/
num_act/ca1998149.pdf, where the South African legislative framework is discussed in more detail.
18. See id. §§ 59-61.
19. Criminal prosecution against directors or management who cause a firm to engage in a prohibited
practice will soon be possible in South Africa after this Act comes into effect.  Competition Amendment Act
No. 1 of 2009, § 12 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/Competition-Amendment-
Act.pdf.
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has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market [. . .] or
(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices.20
This definition of collusive anti-competition activity is reiterated in India’s anti-cartel
legislation, with section 1 of the Indian Competition Act21 defining a cartel as:  “an associ-
ation of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement
amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale
or price of, or, trade in goods or provision of services.”22
The Brazilian Act23 (hereinafter Federal Law), like the South African statute, lacks a
clear definition of a cartel.  Section 20 of the Federal Law only contains a rather wide
definition of collusive actions qualifying as anti-competitive in order to include any anti-
competitive practices between competitors: “any act in any way intended or otherwise able
to produce the effects listed below, even if any such effects are not achieved, shall be
deemed an infringement of the economic order.”
Section 20 then provides a catalogue of generally infringing “prohibited” activities such
as distortion of competition or free enterprise, control of the relevant product market, and
profiteering and abusing a company’s market dominance.24  Section 21 of the Federal Law
lists certain acts that generally constitute a violation of the “economic order,” including
price fixing,25 concerted practices,26 and the practice of “apportion[ing] markets for fin-
ished or semi-finished products or services, or for supply sources of raw materials or inter-
mediary products,”27 which is of a particular relevance for a state of the developing world
due to its economic ramifications.28
These three legal definitions and regulations of cartel activities in South Africa, Brazil,
and India follow the overall rationale and formula of prohibited cartel activities of the
European Union.  Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European Union
(TFEU) (former Article 81 of the EC Treaty) defines anti-competitive cartel activities as,
“all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market.”29
Anti-competitive cartel agreements, decisions, and concerted practices deemed incom-
patible with the internal market resemble “prohibited” practices listed in Article
20. Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, § 4(1)(a-b).  Section 4(1)(b) concerns anticompetitive practices such
as price fixing, market sharing/division, or collusive tendering.
21. Competition Act of 2002, 2003, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb_ncl_India_en.pdf.
22. Id. § 2.
23. See Brazilian Antitrust Law, Decreto No. 8884/94, de 11 de junho de 1994, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O
[D.O.U.] de 13.6.1994 (Braz.).
24. Id. § 20.
25. Id. § 21(I).
26. Id. § 21(II).
27. Id. § 21(III).
28. For more violations of the Federal Law, see id. § 21
29. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 101(1) Mar. 20,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/47) [hereinafter TFEU].
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101(1)(a)–(e) TFEU, including “price fixing,” exclusive distribution and purchasing agree-
ments, and selective distribution and franchise agreements.30
B. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET DOMINANCE AND ANTI CARTEL
COOPERATION
Globalization has seen the rise of so-called multi-national corporations (MNCs) or
multi-national enterprises (MNEs).  The OECD defines MNCs as “companies or other
entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate
their operations in various ways”.31  The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Tri-
partite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
defines MNCs as “Multinational enterprises include enterprises, whether they are of pub-
lic, mixed or private ownership, which own or control production, distribution, services or
other facilities outside the country in which they are based.”32
The economic impact of MNCs is quite significant and increasing:  U.S. scholar
Blumberg describes the impact of such MNC/MNEs on global trade and business:
In the modern global economy, the largest corporations conduct worldwide opera-
tions.  They operate in the form of multinational corporate groups organized in “in-
credibly complex” multi-tiered corporate structures consisting of a dominant parent
corporation, sub holding companies, and scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiar-
ies scattered around the world.  The 1999 World Investment Report estimated that
there are almost 60,000 multinational corporate groups with more than 500,000 for-
eign subsidiaries and affiliates.33
Business activities of MNCs with their headquarters registered in the developed world
are often subject to strict competition or antitrust laws.  The spatial dimension of such
limitations (which limits such governance to the boundaries of the nations of the devel-
oped world) does seldom extend to the many group subsidiaries that carry out the business
in the developing world where they are registered for the actual business operation.
MNCs operate in different states, including emerging economies through subsidiaries,
branches, and alliances.  These subsidiaries, branches, or alliances might get involved in
cartel activities in the developing host country where standards of competition or antitrust
legislation and regulations are often underdeveloped or even absent.  The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice addresses this absence of corporate accountability:  “We observe that firms
in some cartels compete in the U.S. while conspiring elsewhere.”34
30. Id. art. 101(1)(a-e).
31. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ¶ 3, at 14 (2008), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
32. INT’L LABOUR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 6 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-
ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—-multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf.
33. Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under United States Law:
Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 493 (2002).
34. J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., What Do You Know?, Remarks to the British Inst. of
Int’l Comparative Law Sixth Annual Trans-Atlantic Antitrust Dialogue (July 6, 2006), available at 2006 WL
4422979.
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The International Commission of Jurists reflects on such shortcomings of corporate
accountability and governance in a 2008 report, when it states that:
Throughout different jurisdictions the basic principle is that the conduct of a subsidi-
ary will not be identified with its parent for the purposes of assigning legal responsi-
bility.  This means that a parent company will not generally be held vicariously liable
for its subsidiary’s conduct, even in situations where it holds 100% of its subsidiary’s
shares.35
Consequently, effective international multi-lateral anti-cartel competition policy is
needed to close this “accountability” gap.  Such a step, however, requires close coopera-
tion between the competition authorities of the state where the holding company is regis-
tered and the state where the subsidiary is operating.  Parisi emphasizes the need for more
cooperation regarding competition matters:
As business concerns have increasingly pursued foreign trade and investment oppor-
tunities, antitrust compliance issues have arisen which transcend national borders
and, thus, have led antitrust authorities in the affected jurisdictions to communicate,
cooperate, and coordinate their efforts to achieve compatible enforcement results.36
Greater international cooperation can lead to a speedy and effective investigation of
such cartel activities.  As a consequence, corporate accountability in general will be
achieved and with it future corporate perpetrators deterred.  An overall facilitation of the
enforcement of competition law and policies will eventually benefit the MNC affected,
which can concentrate on its core business instead of facing a dragged out competition
investigation by multiple completion organizations.
C. PROMOTION AND COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES
1. The Promotion of International Competition Policies
Multilateral cooperation in competition matters takes place by international organiza-
tions that aim at promoting cooperation between competition authorities and harmoniza-
tion of existing competition frameworks.  This article looks at the role of the International
Competition Network, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Trade Organ-
ization.  These bodies exist alongside other regional arrangements and mechanisms re-
sponsible for creating and enforcing competition policies such as the European
Commission of the European Union.37
35. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 47 (2008), available
at http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/Volume3-ElecDist.pdf.
36. John J. Parisi, Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities, 20(3) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
133, 133 (1999).
37. The European Commission oversees competition policy within the European Union. See About the
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/about/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
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a. The International Competition Network
The International Competition Network (ICN) was launched on October 25, 2001 by
fourteen states including the United States, European Union, Australia, and South Af-
rica.38  Budzinski describes the ICN as “a network of competition agencies from around
the world, with close interaction of other public and private players who are concerned
with international competition issues.”39  Ugarte identifies a general lack of international
collaboration as a key reason for the establishment of the ICN:  “[t]he ICN was born out
of the recognition by many jurisdictions that multilateral efforts are necessary to ensure
convergence and coordination within and between the growing numbers of competition
enforcement systems around the world.”40  The ICN provides domestic competition au-
thorities throughout the world with a specialized but informal platform to maintain con-
tact and address competition concerns.41  It assists domestic competition authorities in the
enforcement of competition laws and other competition policies.  The ICN operates
through specialized working groups and one of these is the working group for cartels.  It
helps in addressing and governing cartel activities inside and outside the jurisdiction of the
member states.  The cartel working group is responsible for addressing particular chal-
lenges faced by competition authorities when acting against so called “hardcore” cartels.
Aims and objectives of the ICN are summarized by Budzinski, who sees the main goal of
the ICN as “the promotion of convergence in competition policies, primarily concerning
procedural issues but, in the long run, also concerning substantive issues.”42
b. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been in
existence since 1961.43  Its predecessor, the Organization for European Economic Coop-
eration (OEEC) was established in 1947 with the aim to administer economic and devel-
opment aid in Europe received from the United States and Canada under the Marshall
Plan for the reconstruction of post war Europe.44  The OECD, in its current form, pro-
vides a discussion forum for states which are “committed to democracy and market econ-
omy” in order to “support sustainable economic growth, boost employment, raise living
standards, maintain financial stability, assists other countries’ economic development and
contribute to growth in the world trade.”45  At present it has thirty-four member states
with most of the industrialized nations as members of the organization.46  The OECD’s
38. Cf. Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and Limits on the Road Towards
International Competition Governance, 8(3) COMPETITION & CHANGE 223, 227 (2004).
39. Id.
40. Fernando S. Ugarte, The Int’l Competition Network:  Achievements So Far, 22(10) INT’L FIN. L. REV. 1, 5
(2003).
41. About the ICN, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
42. Budzinski, supra note 38, at 223-42.
43. See About the ICN, supra note 41.
44. See History of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.
html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012); see also OECD COLUMBIA ELEC. ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2011).
45. About OECD, CORP. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING, http://www.reportingcsr.org/oecd-p-41.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2012).
46. Chile, Slovenia, Israel, and Estonia joined as its latest members in 2010. See OECD Members & Part-
ners, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2012).
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Competition Committee is responsible for competition or antitrust matters.47  One of the
Committee’s recent reports highlighted the high priority the organization places on com-
petition law.48  It publishes annual peer-reviewed reports of states and their competition
policy structure.  These reports provide other competition agencies with a detailed over-
view on the progress of the competition policies and laws of countries that were reviewed.
These reports are then released to the states that were subject to these reports and a
further summary of the report is made available to the wider public by the Secretary Gen-
eral of the OECD.49
c. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) took
place in 1964.50  It “provided a new forum, for the comprehensive review of trade, aid, and
financial question related to development.”51  “It undertakes research, policy analysis, and
[economic] data collection.”52  It further “provides technical assistance . . . [to] developing
countries” that intend to develop and implement competition law and policy.53  The so-
called Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy meets on an
annual basis to consult on matters of interest regarding competition laws and policy.54  It
offers a voluntary peer-review mechanism for competition law and policy to developing
countries that is undertaken by UNCTAD competition policy experts.55
d. World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO), which regulates global trade, provides the fo-
rum for countries for the initiation of trade negotiations.56  A Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) was established in 1996
after a Ministerial Conference in Singapore.57  Under the more recent Doha Declaration
of 2001, the WGTCP “focus[es] on the clarification of core principles, including trans-
parency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness; provisions on hardcore cartels; mo-
dalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building.”58
47. Id.
48. See OECD COMPETITION COMM., BEST PRACTICES FOR THE FORMAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN HARD CORE CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS 2 (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/35590548.pdf.
49. OECD, COMPETITION POLICY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1993-1994, at 3 (1997).
50. Isaiah Frank, Aid, Trade and Economic Development:  Issues Before the U.N. Conference, 42 (2) FOREIGN
AFF. 210 (1964).
51. Richard N. Gardner, United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, 22 (1) INT’L ORG. 120 (1968).
52. About UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=1 (last visited Jan.
15, 2012).
53. Id.
54. See UNCTAD Competition Law & Policy, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=22
39&lang=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
55. Id.
56. See generally Ed Brown, Jonathan Cloke & Mansoor Ali, How We Got Here:  The Road to GATS, 8(1)
PROGRESS IN DEV. STUDIES 7-22 (2008).
57. See World Trade Organization, Interaction Between Trade & Competition Policy, http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
58. Id.  At present the WGTCP is dormant due to the present limitations during the Doha round.
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e. European Union
Competition policy in the European Union (EU) is supervised and enforced by the
European Commission, Directorate General for Competition, as the chief EU organ for
competition policies and law:
The mission of the Directorate-General for Competition [of the European Commis-
sion] is to enforce the competition rules of the Community [Union] Treaties, in order
to ensure that competition in the EU market is not distorted and that markets oper-
ate as efficiently as possible[, thereby] contribut[ing] to the welfare of consumers and
to the competitiveness of the European economy.59
Other competition institutions within the EU are the European Courts, the General
Court, and the European Court of Justice under Article 19(1) Treaty of the European
Union (TEU), which serve as judiciary instance in cases of appeal under Article 263 of the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
(ex. Article 230 EC Treaty pre Lisbon) and referral by the courts of individual member
states under Article 267 TFEU (ex. Article 234).60  Under Article 3 of Regulation 1/
2003,61 implementation and enforcement of EU competition law takes place in a decen-
tralized form by means of cooperation between the European Commission and the na-
tional competition authorities established under domestic competition laws.62
Additionally, there exist bilateral antitrust agreements between the EU and selected
other states with the explicit goal of harmonizing enforcement actions and avoiding en-
forcement clashes between the EU and other jurisdictions.  Currently, the EU has such
bilateral agreements with Canada, Japan, and the United States, as well as further country-
specific agreements.63
Such bilateral agreements are necessary for overall compliance with EU competition
law and its extraterritorial application:  “One of the reasons why Europe and the USA
entered [into] these agreements was the importance of addressing anti-competitive activi-
ties that occur beyond the effective reach of a jurisdiction, but affect it nonetheless be-
cause of the internationalisation of today’s markets.”64
2. Coordinating Cooperation Between Competition Agencies
“One aspect of cooperation in the field of competition is related to law enforcement
issues but there is also a fair amount of cooperation on broader issues such as competition
59. See DG Competition Mission Statement, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission (last visited Jan. 15,
2012).
60. See SYLVIA HARGREAVES, EU LAW CONCENTRATE 62-63 (2d ed. 2011).
61. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 is a regulation on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in (former) Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102
TFEU). See Antitrust Regulations, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/regulations.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2012).
62. See KJ Cseres, The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States, 6(2) COMPETITION L. REV.
145, 147 (2010).
63. See Bilateral Relations on Competition Issues, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral (last
visited Jan. 15, 2012).  The 1991 bilateral agreement with the United States is the most developed one.
64. Markus Muller, The European Commission’s Decision Against Microsoft:  A Violation of the Antitrust Agree-
ments Between the United States and the European Union?, 26(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 309 (2005).
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advocacy or the proper design of competition laws and competition law enforcement insti-
tutions.”65  The impact of such collaboration on competition issues increases when cou-
pled with additional efforts to achieve harmonization of commercial practice:
The review of commercial practices involves considerable work and costs, both for
competition authorities and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review.  If the
same commercial practice falls within several jurisdictions the costs increase accordingly.
Greater cooperation and the elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort, can reduce
costs to competition authorities and business alike.66
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) like South Africa have experienced an increase
of—mostly foreign—MNC and MNE business activities.  Consequently, they identified
international trans-border competition cooperation as a way of completing investigations
into cartel and anti-competitive activities in a time-efficient and effective way.67  Success-
ful trans-border competition cooperation may deter companies from committing cartel
offences.  Noting the absence of an established and operational system of cooperation in
cartel cases, the Cartel Working Group of the ICN investigated possibilities of closer
cooperation between the competition authorities of multiple jurisdictions in a report sub-
mitted to the ICN’s annual conference in Moscow in 2007.68  The report analyzed differ-
ent methods that might ensure greater cooperation, including those discussed below.
a. Informal Cooperation69
This method is based on the 1995 OECD Recommendation on Cooperation.  The
OECD recommendations provide a broad outline on how member states should deal with
“exchanges of information, co-operation in investigations and proceedings, consultations
and conciliation of anticompetitive practices affecting international trade.”70  The ICN
points out that there is an overall lack of precedence where this method of cooperation
was used during cartel investigations.71
65. Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition:  Myth, Reality and Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST
BULL. 973, 974 (2003).
66. Leon Brittan & Karel van Miert, Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, 24 INT’L BUS.
LAW. 454, 455 (1996).
67. See generally SALLY VAN SICLEN, SOUTH AFRICA—PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
47 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/58/34823812.pdf (The peer reviewed OECD report
stated that “South Africa has no formal co-operation agreements with other competition agencies.  But even
without formal arrangements, the Commission has worked with the European Commission, Canada, Austra-
lia, and the US in merger matters.”).  Such trans-border cooperation takes place in connection to merger as
well as cartel activities.
68. See ICN CENTRAL WORKING GROUP, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AGENCIES IN CAR-
TEL INVESTIGATIONS (hereinafter ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT) 5 (May 2007), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc348.pdf; see also Jenny, supra note 65, at
974, 978 (discusses the importance of international cooperation in competition matters and the various “tools
of cooperation”); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The International Dimension of Competition Policy, 17 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 833, 835-37 (1993) (the successful use of bilateral agreements in situations where uncompetitive
practices have extraterritorial effects).
69. See ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 9; Jenny, supra note 65, at 978.
70. See OECD, REVISED RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN
MEMBER COUNTRIES ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 6 (1995),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/42/21570317.pdf.
71. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 9.
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The authors submit that voluntary cooperation by competition authorities needs overall
willingness and commitment by each participant—something that might often not be the
case.
b. Cooperation Based on Waiver72
This method applies in cases where a transnational company involved in a cartel applies
for immunity or leniency73 in more than one competition jurisdiction.  The company ef-
fectively authorizes the respective domestic competition authorities to exchange sensitive
information on a particular competition case.  This method can only be successful if the
competition legislation or policies of the competition jurisdictions involved contain im-
munity or leniency provisions that are comparable.74  South Africa, Brazil,75 and India76
have similar leniency programs under which a corporation under investigation for alleged
cartel activities may apply for immunity from prosecution.77  Consequently, any competi-
tion cooperation between these states should not be problematic in such an instance.  In
South Africa, the Corporate Leniency Policy was “developed . . . to facilitate the process
through which firms participating in a cartel are encouraged to disclose information on
the cartel conduct in return for immunity from prosecution.”78
The authors submit if one of the jurisdictions in which the cartel operates lacks such a
leniency program, this model of cooperative leniency might fail.
c. Cooperation Based on National Laws
Domestic competition legislation and policies may contain provisions that authorize
competition agencies to establish collaborative arrangements with agencies from other
jurisdictions.79  Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Aus-
tralia are among the countries with legislation containing provisions of such bilateral ef-
fect.80  As an example, section 82(4) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998
provides for such cooperation agreements with other competition agencies:  “The Presi-
dent may assign to the Competition Commission any duty of the Republic, in terms of an
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id.  This ensures that the company will not be prosecuted if it provides the investigative competition
authorities with all the necessary information it will need to prosecute participants of the cartel. Id.
74. Id.
75. SDE, FIGHTING CARTELS:  BRAZIL’S LENIENCY PROGRAM 17, 20 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/52/22/43619651.pdf.  The publication states that “the SDE is the antitrust agency with power
to negotiate the leniency agreement” and further states the requirements that an applicant has to comply with
before the SDE will consider to enter into a leniency agreement. Id.
76. Section 46 of the Competition Act provides that “[t]he [Competition] Commission [of India] may, if it
is satisfied that any producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in any cartel, which is
alleged to have violated section 3, has made a full and true disclosure in respect of the alleged violations and
such disclosure is vital, impose upon such producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider a lesser
penalty as it may deem fit, than leviable under this Act or the rules or the regulations.”  The Competition
(Amendment) Act, 2007, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2007, § 46 (India).  However, this possibility is subjected
to certain provisos. Id.
77. See id.; SDE, supra note 75, at 17; Corporate Leniency Policy §§ 3.1, 3.5 (S. Afr.).
78. Corporate Leniency Policy § 2.5 (S. Afr.).
79. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 11.
80. Id. at 13.
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international agreement relating to the purpose of this Act, to exchange information with a
similar foreign agency.”81
Considering the fact that such cooperation is only limited to a few states, is voluntary,
and takes place on an ad hoc basis, it might still lack the necessary impact.
d. Cooperation Based on Non-Competition Specific Agreements Between
Jurisdictions82
So-called Mutual Assistance Agreements can be invoked if states need mutual assistance
in regard to combating cartel activities.83  Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are
mostly entered into by countries to cooperate in criminal cartel matters.84  However, the
ICN states that there is no automatic need for a “dual criminality” element when coopera-
tion is sought: the criminality of cartels in one jurisdiction does not necessarily prevent
cooperation on cartels by a Mutual Assistance Agreement if no such criminal status is
given to cartels in the other jurisdiction.  It may, however, lead to limited or no coopera-
tion at all if one jurisdiction gives criminal status to cartels and the other one does not.85
The South African Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 grants criminal status to car-
tels in South Africa86 and therefore it is possible for South Africa to enter into such
MLATs with other countries that have the same criminal approach to cartels.
e. Regional Cooperation Instrument:  The European Union Cooperation Network
All member states of the European Union belong to the European Competition Net-
work (ECN).87  Its key guardian is the European Commission, which is responsible for
ensuring the compliance of all EU member states with its competition policies.  Regula-
tion (EC) 1/200388 of December 16, 2002, introduced a system of decentralized enforce-
ment executed by domestic enforcement bodies—the so-called national competition
authorities (NCAs).  The ICN regards the EU enforcement network as an example for a
successful regional cooperation regime.89  When the Lisbon Treaty came into force in
December 2009, it gave legal personality to the European Union under Article 46A Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union; but we have yet to see whether this new
capacity to enter into international treaties will further strengthen the EU competition
network.
81. Id. at 13-14.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id.  (the ICN describes Mutual Assistance Agreements as “treaties on co-operation in criminal matters
which create hard law obligations on signatories.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 § 12 (S. Afr.).
87. P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 228 (2004).
88. Regulation 1/2003 introduced a system of decentralized enforcement executed by domestic enforce-
ment bodies, the so called national competition authorities (NCAs).
89. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 19; OECD REPORT, supra note 70.
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f. Cooperation Based on Competition-Specific Agreements Between Jurisdictions or
Bilateral Agreements on Competition Matters
The common purpose of these agreements is to promote cooperation between competi-
tion authorities.90  The ICN reports that the first bilateral agreement was concluded be-
tween Germany and the United States of America in 1976.91  Since then, many such
bilateral agreements followed:  the United States of America and Brazil,92 Canada and
Brazil,93 Chile and Brazil,94 and Russia and Brazil95 have all entered into such bilateral
agreements.
Considering the above methods of coordinating cooperation between competition au-
thorities, cooperation based on competition-specific agreements between jurisdictions or
bilateral agreements on competition matters seems to be by far the most promising
method.  Not only do the participating parties retain a high amount of flexibility in terms
of identifying anti-competitive practices on which they want to cooperate, but they also
have the guarantee that if a competition matter arose they would be able to rely on the
cooperation of the country with which the bilateral agreement was concluded.  This ob-
servation reiterates the earlier ascertainment of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
whereas “[c]o-operation among antitrust authorities facilitates the effective and efficient enforce-
ment of antitrust laws and thus the maintenance of competition in markets.  That is not an expres-
sion of economic theory, but rather a fact of life.”96
D. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, SOUTH AFRICA, BRAZIL, AND INDIA
1. Overview
The following overview introduces and compares the competition policy and laws in
South Africa, Brazil, and India with those of the European Union.  It highlights the au-
thors’ view that only binding bilateral agreements that synchronize domestic cartel laws
and policies—and not only informal cooperation agreements—are necessary to protect
90. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 17.
91. See id.
92. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation Between their Competition Authorities in the Enforce-
ment of their Competition Laws, U.S.-Braz., Oct. 26, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,068.
93. Cooperation Arrangement Between the Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau of the
Government of Canada, and the Council for Economic Defense, the Secretariat of Economic Law of the
Ministry of Justice, and the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the Govern-
ment of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Can.-Braz.,
Apr. 25, 2008, competitionbureau.gc.ca.
94. Cooperation Arrangement Between the Fiscalı´a Nacional Econo´mica of Chile and the Council for
Economic Defense, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the Government
of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Chile-Braz., Oct.
2008, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/AB%20Ingle´s.pdf.
95. Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Competition Policy Between the Government of the Fed-
erative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Russian Federation, Russ.-Braz., Dec. 12, 2001, www.
oecd.org.
96. John J. Parisi, Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities, 20(3) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
133, 133 (1999).
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emerging economies from the threat of market distortion posed by cartels.  Cross-border
cooperation established by bilateral agreements might speed up any investigation into car-
tel activities by MNCs.  The outcomes of an investigation of an alleged transnational car-
tel activity undertaken by the anti-competition authorities of one jurisdiction can be
utilized by the competition authorities of other jurisdictions affected by such cartel activi-
ties, instead of having to conduct time-consuming investigations on their own.
2. European Union
As the main supervisory organ, the European Commission, together with its domestic
counterparts at the Member State level,97 functions as the ‘gatekeeper’ for fair competi-
tion and is responsible for the regulation and prevention of anti-competitive cartel activi-
ties under Article 101 TFEU (ex. Article 81 EC Treaty),98 the abuse of dominant positions
by dominating undertakings under Article 102 TFEU (ex. Article 82),99 and the regulation
of mergers under the Merger Regulation 139/2004.100  In addition, it oversees the fair use
of state aid by its Member States under Articles 107—109 TFEU (ex. Articles 87–89).101
The Commission has the power to adopt a decision, to conduct investigations, and to
impose penalties when following a complaint or on its own initiative if it finds in a given
case that there has been a violation of Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty.102  The latter is
the measure that has the potential of deterring potential corporate offenders.  Under Reg-
ulation 1/2003, the Commission has the power to impose fines on undertakings and as-
sociations of undertakings not exceeding ten percent of the total turnover realized in the
preceding business year by each of the undertakings that participated in the infringement
under Article 23 Regulation 1/2003103 and under Article 24 1/2003 periodic penalty pay-
ments not exceeding five percent of their average daily turnover in the preceding business
year per day in order to compel undertakings to put an end to an infringement or to
comply with a decision ordering interim measures.104
Penalties can be in the billions of euros—as two fines of 2009 exemplify.  Two gas prov-
iders, E.ON and GDF Suez, were fined C= 553,000,000 each for their collusion in dominat-
ing the Franco-German gas market and the computer chip giant, Intel, was fined an
impressive C= 1,060,000,000 for its exclusion of other competitors from the computer chip
market.105
A major competition matter that made evident the positive effects of international co-
operation between competition authorities occurred in 1994, when Microsoft Corpora-
tion made a declaration to the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Competition
97. Council Regulation 1/2003, Preamble ¶¶ 3, 4, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC).
98. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Sept. 5, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 88-89 [hereinafter TFEU].
99. See id. art. 102.
100. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) (EC).
101. See TFEU, supra note 98, arts. 107-09.
102. See id. art. 105.
103. Reg 1/2003, art. 23.
104. Id. art. 24.
105. Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust:  Commission Action Against Cartels (July 8, 2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/faqs_en.html.
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Commission (ECC) to change their licensing practices.106  This undertaking was made
after negotiations with these authorities, following an allegation by Novell against
Microsoft that the latter had kept competitors out of the market for PC-operating
browser system software by illegally tying Windows and Internet Explorer107 and bun-
dling Windows Media Player with the Microsoft operating system.108  The ECC allegedly
started its investigations in 2000 independently from the U.S. competition proceedings
that had already started in the early 1990s.109  While investigations were ongoing,
Microsoft gave its consent for the exchange of information between the U.S. Department
of Justice and the ECC.  It waived its right to secrecy regarding both the U.S. Department
of Justice and the ECC.110  This cooperation was greeted as a success for international
cooperation:
[T]he negotiation of the undertaking was a historic and unprecedented piece of co-
operation between the EC Commission and the United States Department of Justice.
It serves as an important model for the future, as it shows how the two authorities can
combine their efforts to deal effectively with giant multinational companies.  The
success of this joint approach sends a strong signal to all multinational companies,
including those in other sectors.111
III. Republic of South Africa
A. LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
At present, the only available action against cartel activity in South Africa is the admin-
istrative penalty as provided by the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Act).112  It promotes
and protects fair competition in South Africa and came into force October 20, 1998.113
The Preamble of the Act states that competition law and structures to enforce those laws
will “provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the
quality and variety of goods and services they desire” and it is also intended to “restrain
trade practices which undermine a competitive economy.”114  It repealed the Maintenance
and Promotion of Competition Act of 1979 (the old Act), which regulated competition
among corporations.115  Chapter 2 of the Act prohibits uncompetitive practices that, inter
alia, include price fixing and price discrimination.116  Under section 61 of the Act, corpo-
rations involved in cartel activities may be penalized by an administrative fine of up to ten
percent of the annual turnover in South Africa or their exports from South Africa during
106. Press Release, European Commission, Following an Undertaking by Microsoft to Change its Licensing
Practices, the European Commission Suspends its Action for Breach of the Competition Rules (Sept. 17,
2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/94/653.
107. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
108. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft (EC).
109. See id. ¶ 4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (S. Afr.)
113. See id. Preamble.
114. See id.
115. See id. Schedule 2.
116. See id. ch. 2.
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the firm’s preceding financial year.117  When determining the penalty, the Competition
Tribunal shall look upon various factors, which include “the nature, duration, gravity, and
extent of the contravention, any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention,
and the behavior of the respondent.”118
The scope of available sanctions will change when the Competition Amendment Act 1
of 2009 (the Amendment Act) comes into force.  Corporate and company directors, such
as CEOs and CFOs, who are responsible for their undertakings’ involvement in cartel
activities can now face personal criminal responsibility.119  South African legislators made
a bold move when drafting the Amendment Act.  The then president of the Republic of
South Africa, Kgalema Mothathle, refused to sign the Competition Amendment Bill of
2008 (the Bill), as the Amendment Act then was called, questioning the constitutionality of
certain provisions.120  Firstly, there was the question of whether evidence obtained during
the hearing in front of the competition authorities could be used in a subsequent criminal
court case against directors.121  Secondly, the amendment takes away the burden of proof
from the South African prosecuting authorities under which they have to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that an offense was committed, in terms of the competition laws, by
stating that a person may be prosecuted for an offense if there is proof of or acknowledge-
ment by a firm that it engaged in a prohibited practice.122  Despite these concerns,123
Jacob Zuma, the present South African president, signed and assented to the Bill, which
became the Competition Amendment Act (Act No 1 of 2009), on August 26, 2009.124
Section 73A will be inserted into the Act, allowing the prosecution of a “[company] direc-
tor of a firm or while engaged or purporting to be engaged by a firm in a position having
management authority within the firm”125 causing “the firm to engage in a prohibited
practice”126 or having “knowingly acquiesced”127to such activity.
It has yet to been seen whether the new Competition Amendment Act will create
enough deterrence to stop such anti-competitive activities.
B. ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
In South Africa, the Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal, and the
Competition Appeal Court were established by the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Act)
117. See id. § 61(2).
118. See id. § 61(3).
119. See Segoane L. Monnye & Sasha-Lee Afrika, Prison Beckons Directors Involved in Cartels, 16 JUTA’S BUS.
L. 13, 13 (2008).
120. Luke Kelly, The Introduction of a Cartel Offence into South African Law, 21 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 321
(2010).
121. The issue was also discussed at a joint meeting of the Law Society of South Africa’s Competition Law
Committee and the Constitutional and Human Rights Committee, 8 De Rebus—SA Attorneys’ Journal (2008).
122. Competition Amendment Bill, § 12 (2008); see also Kelly, supra note 120, at 331.
123. These concerns were not addressed as the Bill was assented to with exactly the same content.  It is
therefore possible to expect future litigation after the commencement of the Amendment Act.
124. Competition Amendment Act (Act No. 1, 2009).  It was assented to on August 26, 2009 while the date
of its entry into force has still not been proclaimed.
125. Id. § 12.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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and are responsible for enforcing competition legislation, policies, and domestic
compliance.
The Commission consists of a Commissioner and at least one Deputy Commissioner
who is appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry.128  The Commission has jurisdic-
tion throughout the Republic of South Africa, is independent, and is only subject to the
South African Constitution and the law of South Africa.129  It functions independently
from any interference by any executive organ of state and “each organ of state must assist
the Commission to maintain its independence and impartiality, and to effectively carry out
its powers and duties.”130  The Commission has a wide range of implementation and en-
forcement powers131 designed to protect the individual consumer’s right to a fair market:
[T]he Commission is representing the public interest and acts as ‘claimant cum pros-
ecutor’.  The public interest is that interest that all South Africans have in open and
unfettered competition in our economy.  The Commission is assigned to this task
because of the difficulties facing ordinary citizens in pursuing anti-competitive con-
duct through normal court channels.132
The Tribunal has jurisdiction throughout the Republic, and consists of a chairman who
is appointed by the President and at least three, but no more than ten, other members.
Under section 27(1), the Tribunal has the responsibility to adjudicate any matter that is
prohibited under the Act, which may be considered by it, and review any decision of the
Commission that gets referred to in terms of the Act.
Section 36 of the Act establishes the Competition Appeal Court, which has a similar
status as a High Court in South Africa.  It consists of three judges, of whom one is desig-
nated to be the Judge President.  The court is responsible for reviewing any decisions of
the Competition Tribunal referred to it in terms of the Act and for considering any appeal
arising from a decision of the Tribunal.
Overall, the three enforcement bodies have been successful in safeguarding corporate
compliance with South Africa’s competition legislation as the case overview below shows.
C. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF SELECTED CARTEL CASES IN SOUTH AFRICA
In recent times, many corporations were under investigation for alleged cartel activities
by the Competition Commission.  Such cartel activities include collaborations between
international MNCs and domestic South African companies, which affect the domestic
market; one good example was the well-publicized milk cartel case, involving corporations
such as Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd., Clover SA (Pty) Ltd., and Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd.133  These
and other cartel activities, many which have not yet been discovered, prompt questions.
128. Id. § 19(2).
129. Id. § 20(1)(a).
130. Id. § 20(3).
131. Id. § 21.
132. Competition Comm’n v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd. 2010 (91/CAC/Feb10) ZACAC 2 (S. Afr.).
133. See Amanda Visser, Appeal Lodged in Milk Cartel Case, FIN24 (Sept. 19, 2008, 07:32), http://www.fin24.
com/BusBusin/Appeal-lodged-in-milk-cartel-case-20080919; see also S Africa:  Regulator Upbeat on “Milk Car-
tel” Case, JUST-FOOD (Jan. 19, 2009), http://www.just-food.com/news/regulator-upbeat-on-milk-cartel-case_
id105093.aspx.
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Are MNCs that operate in developing nations more likely to commit prohibited practices?
Do the respective national competition authorities, unlike their counterparts in developed
member states of the OECD, suffer from a general lack of formal cooperation in their
fight against cartels?
Cartel cases that the Commission has investigated include, inter alia, an alleged cartel in
the bread industry, a cartel operating in the pipe products and construction industry134 in
which two subsidiaries of Murray and Roberts and Aveng were involved,135and an alleged
milk cartel.136
1. The Bread Cartel:  Competition Commission v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd.137
In the so-called “bread cartel” case, the Competition Commission of South Africa re-
ferred to the Competition Tribunal for a decision on two complaints against Pioneer
Foods (Pty) Ltd.; the Western Cape complaint and the National complaint concerned
alleged bread cartel activities at the regional and national level.  In the Western Cape
complaint, the Commission received information about an alleged cartel between the
bread producers Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd., and Pioneer Food.
These prohibited horizontal agreements138 between the cartel members aimed at dividing
the market by allocating certain areas for business operations to each participant and fix-
ing bread prices, thus contravening §§ 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii)139 of the Competition Act.  Dur-
ing the investigation, Premier Foods decided to cooperate fully with the Commission in
order to qualify for immunity under the leniency policy of the Commission.  During the
early stages of the investigation, Tiger Brands successfully entered into a consent order
agreement with the Commission after it provided evidence against the bread cartel.  Tiger
Brands received an administrative fine of ZAR98.784.869.90.  Foodcorp was fined an ad-
ministrative fine of ZAR45.406.359.82.  Only the case of Pioneer Food—with the com-
pany denying involvement in any cartel—was referred to the Tribunal.  The Tribunal
found that Pioneer Foods had indeed contravened § 4 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act140 and
was punished with a rather robust penalty of ZAR195.718.614 for its involvement in both
the Western Cape and national bread cartel.
134. Competition Comm’n v. S. Pipeline Contractors Conrite Walls (Pty) Ltd. [2010] (23/CFR/Feb09) (S.
Afr.); see also Media Release, Competition Commission, Competition Commission Busts Pipe Products Cartel
(Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.compcom.co.zz/assets/Uploads/AttacheAttach/MyDocuments/30-Jan-09-Com-
petition-Commission-busts-pipe-products-cartel.pdf.
135. Amanda Visser, Cartel Firms Get Off Scot-Free, FIN24 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.fin24.com/Business/
Cartel-firms-get-off-scot-free-20090302.
136. Competition Comm’n v. Clover Indus. Ltd. [2008] (103/CR/Dec06) (S. Afr.).
137. Competition Comm’n v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd. 2010 (15/CR/Feb07) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Bread
Case].
138. Section 1 of the Competition Act defines a horizontal relationship as a relationship between competi-
tors and an agreement, when used in the context of prohibited practices, includes a contract, arrangement or
understanding, whether or not it is legally enforceable.  Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 § 1(xi) (S. Afr.).
139. Id. § 4(1)(b)(i)-(ii) (S. Afr.).
140. Bread Case, supra note 137, at ¶ 131, namely “direct and indirect fixing of a selling price and other
trading conditions in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i)and(ii) of the Act.”
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2. Pipes and Construction Cartel: Competition Commission v. Cape Concrete Works
(Pty) Ltd.141
In this 2009 case, the Commission found that corporations that operated in the pipe
products industry had formed a cartel and were responsible for bid rigging, price fixing,
and allocating markets or customers.  In December, Rocla (Pty) Ltd. (Rocla) applied for
leniency to the Commission in terms of its Corporate Leniency Policy.142  It was involved
in a cartel with other corporations in the precast industry.143  Rocla informed the Com-
mission that, together with the other corporations, they “[fixed] the selling price of pipes,
culverts and manholes[;] [divided] the markets of the production and distribution of pipes,
culverts and manholes; and [collusively tendered] in respect of the supply of precast con-
crete products and precast concrete sleepers to certain suppliers.”144  The Commission
subsequently started an investigation into the cartel.  Cape Concrete Works (Pty) Ltd.
admitted its involvement in the cartel and agreed, in a plea bargain with the Commission,
to pay a fine of ZAR 4.371.386.
3. The Milk Cartel: Competition Commission v. Clover Industries Limited, Clover SA (Pty)
Ltd., Parmalat (Pty) Ltd, Ladismith Cheese (Pty) Ltd., Woodlands Dairy (Pty)
Ltd., Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd., and Milkwood Dairy (Pty) Ltd.145
In the milk cartel case, the companies Clover Industries Ltd., Clover SA (Pty) Ltd.,
Parmalat (Pty) Ltd., Ladismith Cheese (Pty) Ltd, Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd., Nestle SA
(Pty) Ltd., and Milkwood Dairy (Pty) Ltd. were accused of fixing the prices of raw and
processed milk and manipulating the market to restrict competition.146  It was alleged that
price information was exchanged between the management of the corporations via tele-
phone and email.147  It was further alleged that price data were circulated and synchro-
nized by making use of a combination of fictitious and actual scenarios where each
participant would then provide the price it would charge for the provided scenario.148
During January 2009, the Commission issued a media statement in which it confirmed a
settlement with one of the participants in the milk cartel.149  Lancewood (Pty) Ltd. admit-
141. Competition Comm’n v. Cobro Concrete 2009 (23) CR 1 (CT) ¶ 2.1 (S. Afr.).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Competition Comm’n v. Clover Indus. Ltd. et. al. 2006 (103) CR 1 (CT) ¶ 3-4 (S. Afr.); Clover
Indus. Ltd. v. Competition Comm’n et. al. 2008 (78) ZACAC 1 (CAC) (S. Afr.); and Ladismith Cheese Ltd. v.
Competition Comm’n 2008 (81) ZACAC 1 (CAC) (S. Afr.) for the Competition Appeal Court’s decision after
some of the dairy companies, including Clover Industries Limited, Clover SA (Pty) Ltd., and Ladismith
Cheese (Pty) Ltd. appealed against three in limine points.  The first point was whether the letter that was
submitted to the Commission, informing the Commission of the possibility of a cartel amongst dairy
companies, qualified as an official complaint or only as providing the Commission with information.  The
second and third in limine points were based on a corporate leniency agreement concluded between the
Commission and Clover Industries Limited and Clover (SA) Pty Ltd. on Feb. 3, 2006.  The appeal, however,
failed on all three points in limine.
146. Media Statement, S. Afr. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Settles with Milk Cartel
Participant (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http//www.compcom.co.za.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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ted to the Commission that it was involved in the activities as alleged by the Commission
and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of ZAR100,000.00.150
But the Commission recently withdrew its case against Clover Industries Limited and
Clover SA (Pty) Ltd., Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd., Parmalat (Pty) Ltd., and Ladismith Cheese
(Pty) Ltd.—the remaining respondents in its long running case.151  The withdrawal is due
to a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in which it sets aside the
complaints initiated by the Competition Commission against the applicants during 2006
and refers the December 7, 2006 Competition Commission complaints to the Competi-
tion Tribunal of South Africa.152
These cases highlight the important role South Africa’s competition authority plays in
their quest to ensure fair and healthy competition in order to preserve economic
freedom.153
D. SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
At the moment the Act provides for administrative penalties against corporations, which
can amount to a total of ten percent of the annual turnover made during the business year
in which the corporation was involved in the cartel activity.154  The amended Act will
establish personal accountability of directors and other officers of the company by
criminalizing certain acts amounting to prohibited practices of their corporations.155
With this latter legislation in place, the South African competition penalty system will
finally become more in line with the examples of the United States,156 Canada,157 and the
United Kingdom158 that all make provisions for custodial sentences for directors who al-
low the corporation to get involved in cartels.
150. Id.
151. See Media Release, S. Afr. Competition Comm’n, Commission Withdraws Case against Clover, Ladis-
mith, Nestle, and Parmalat (Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/At-
tachedFiles/MyDocuments/final-media-release-on-the-milk-case.pdf.
152. Woodlands Dairy v. Milkwood Dairy 2010 (105) SA 1 (ZASCA) (S. Afr.); see also Ann Crotty, Milk
Cartel Ruling ‘Terrible’, SA TIME (Sept. 15, 2010), www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/milk-cartel-ruling-
terrible-1.692687.
153. There are more examples of cartel cases.  In Competition Comm’n. v. New Reclamation Group 2008
(37) CR 1 (CT) (S. Afr.), the New Reclamation Group confessed to the Commission of its involvement in
fixing the price of scrap metal.  It was punished with an administration fine of R145.972.065.  In Competition
Comm’n. v. Adcock Ingram Critical Care & Tiger Brands Ltd. 2008 (20) CR 1 (CT) (S. Afr.), the Commis-
sion alleged “that the respondents allocated customers and specific types of goods and services during 2001
and 2002 and engaged in collusive tendering for the supply of large volume parenterals (intravenous medical
products) to State Hospitals during 1999 to 2007.”  Adcock Ingram admitted liability to the Commission
during the investigation and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of R53 502 800.  This amount repre-
sented eight percent of Adcock Ingram’s turnover for the financial year ending in 2007. See also Monnye &
Afrika, supra note 119.
154. Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 61(2) (S. Afr.).
155. See Monnye & Afrika, supra note 119.
156. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
157. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 § 45(2) (Can.).
158. Enterprise Act, (2002) § 188, 1 CURRENT LAW.
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E. CONCLUDING REMARKS
South Africa has an Agreement on Trade, Development, and Cooperation with the Eu-
ropean Union,159 which extends to competition-related matters.160  Article 35 of the
Agreement lists corporate agreements and concerted practices that are incompatible with
the validity of the Agreement and that could affect trade between the European Union
and South Africa, and where pro-competitive effects do not outweigh such anti-competi-
tive behavior.161
An infringement of the anti-competitive provisions of this agreement might lead to
direct assistance by the European Union in cases where the South African competition
authorities discover a cartel that might affect trade with the European Union or a cartel
that has operation in both South Africa and the European Union, thus having effect in the
European Union.
IV. Brazil
As a dynamic emerging market economy, Brazil has become the host country to many
MNCs.  In the past, the Brazilian economy was largely centralized and the state took
responsibility for regulating and fixing prices.162  When this system was abolished in the
1990s, corporations enjoyed more economic operative freedom.163  Consequently, the
need for more stringent competition regulation arose to ensure that corporations did not
abuse their new position of economic freedom.164  Changes to the competition legislation
formed part of many responses by the Brazilian government to high inflation.165  In 1994
a new competition law was enacted.166  Brazil has many cooperation agreements with
other countries’ competition agencies.  These include, inter alia, agreements with Canada,
the United States, Chile, the European Union, and Russia.167
159. Agreement on Trade Development and Cooperation, E.C.-S. Afr., Jul. 29, 1999, 142 O.L.J. 311.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 35, ¶ 1(a) includes “agreements and concerted practices between firms in horizontal relation-
ships . . . which have the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in the territory of the
Community or of South Africa, unless the firms can demonstrate that the anti-competitive effects are out-
weighed by pro-competitive ones . . . . ”
162. See GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS (2009), available at
http//www.globalcompetitionreview.com); see also John W. Clark, Competition Policy and Regulatory Re-
form in Brazil:  A Progress Report, 2 OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 1 (2000) for a comprehensive
summary on the competition law developments in Brazil.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZ. 10
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/45154362.pdf.
166. Decreto No. 8884, de Junho de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 11.6.1994 (Braz.).
167. All these agreements are retrievable from http://www.mj.gov.br/sde.
VOL. 45, NO. 4
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THREE EMERGING BRICS ECONOMIES 997
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PROHIBITED PRACTICES
Brazil has various statutes that are intended to prevent anti-competitive activities such
as cartels.168  Law No. 8,884/94, the Federal Competition Act (hereafter Federal Law),
Law No. 8,137/90; the Brazilian Economic Crimes Law, which criminalizes certain cartel
conduct;169 Law No. 10.446/02, which allows for investigations into cartels with interstate
or international impact; and the Presidential Decree of October 7, 2008, which designated
October 8 of each year as the annual Anti-Cartel Enforcement Day in Brazil.170  It is no
coincidence that the first leniency agreement,171 in terms of the Brazilian Leniency Pro-
gram, came into effect on October 8, 2008.  The subsequent proclamation of this day as
the official Anti-Cartel Day serves as a further indication of the Brazilian authority’s com-
mitment to curb hardcore cartels.172
The Federal Law promotes free competition and consumer protection.173  It has juris-
diction over “individuals, private or public companies, as well as any individual or corpo-
rate associations, established de facto and de jure [on the territory of Brazil]174—even on a
provisional basis —”irrespective of a separate legal nature, and notwithstanding the exer-
cise of activities” considered legal monopolies.175  It further provides that the “company
and each of its managers of officers shall be jointly liable to the various forms of infringe-
ment of the economic order.”176  Articles 20 and 21 of the Federal Law define which
corporate behaviors qualify as a violation of the economic order.177
168. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE, SUBGROUP 2:  EN-
FORCEMENT TECHNIQUES 2 (2009), http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/Brazil_ICN%20Cartel%20Template_
April%202009.pdf.
169. Brazilian Economic Crimes Law, No. 8,137/90, § 4.
170. SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC LAW, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRAZIL’S ANTI-CARTEL PROGRAM, availa-
ble at http//www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
171. In terms of the Brazilian Leniency Program, which was launched in 2000, an agreement might be
negotiated by the SDE and an applicant for leniency if (i) the applicant is the first to come forward and
confesses his participation in the unlawful practice; (ii) the applicant ceases its involvement in the anticompe-
titive practice; (iii) the applicant was not the leader of the activity being reported; (iv) the applicant agrees to
fully cooperate with the investigation; (v) the cooperation results in the identification of other members of the
conspiracy, and in the obtaining of documents that evidence the anticompetitive practice; (vi) at the time the
company comes forward, the SDE has not received sufficient information about the illegal activity to ensure
the condemnation of the applicant.  Secretariat of Economic Law et al., Fighting Cartels:  Brazil’s Leniency
Program, BRASI´LIA-DF, CEP 70064-900, 17, 20 (3rd ed. 2009)
172. See ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE, supra note 168.
173. Federal Law, Decreto No. 8884: 1, de Junho de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
11.6.1994 (Braz.).
174. Id. art. 15 (“[A] foreign company is deemed resident in the Brazilian territory if it operates or has a
branch, affiliate, subsidiary, office or place of business, agent or representative in Brazil.”); id. art. 2.
175. Id. art. 15.
176. Id. art. 16.
177. Id. art. 20.  This includes any act that in any way intended or otherwise is able to limit, restrain or in
any way injure open competition or free enterprise; to control a relevant market of a certain product or
service; to increase profits on a discretionary basis; and to abuse one’s market control.
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B. ENFORCEMENT BODIES
The Brazilian Competition Policy System has three bodies178 for the enforcement of
the antitrust legislation:179 the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (Secretaria de Acom-
panhamento Econoˆmico), which is part of the Finance Ministry; the Administrative
Council for Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econoˆmica); and the
Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement (Secretaria de Direito Econoˆmico), which is
part of the Justice Ministry.
The Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE) is a governmental investigative
agency.  Its main responsibilities include certain investigative and advisory duties under
the competition laws of Brazil, providing economic analysis for economic regulator pro-
grams and monitoring market conditions in Brazil.180  The SEAE may issue non-binding
economic opinions in merger reviews and anti-competitive activities.181
The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) was created under Law
No. 4137 of September 1962.182  In terms of the Federal Law, CADE became a federal
independent agency with the responsibility to ensure compliance with the Federal Law
and its regulations.183  CADE’s board consists of a president and six other board mem-
bers.184  Its duties include, inter alia, the task of resolving “purported violations of the
economic order” and applying the penalties provided by law, resolving “proceedings insti-
tuted by the Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement,” and ordering action to counter
possible violations of the economic order.185
The Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement (SDE) seems to be the Brazilian
equivalent to the South African Competition Commission and thus the chief investigative
body regarding anticompetitive activities186  It is headed by a secretary who is appointed
by the Minister of Justice.187  SDE’s duties include, among others, the enforcement of
market compliance with Brazil’s Federal Law by monitoring and following up on market
practices.188
178. CADE, THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM OF COMPETITION POLICY, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/
upload/WTOgenevaSBDCtradepolicy2.pdf.
179. OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZIL: A PEER REVIEW 11 (2010), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/45154362.pdf.
180. See generally id. (discussing the various roles of the SEAE).
181. Id. at 29.
182. Federal Law, art. 3; PEER REVIEW, supra note 179, at 10.
183. Federal Law, art. 7.
184. Id. art. 4. These members are chosen from among citizens older than thirty years of age reputed for
their legal or economic knowledge and unblemished reputation, duly appointed by the President of the Re-
public of Brazil after their approval by the Senate.
185. Id. art. 7.
186. See Defensa da Concorrencia, http://www.mj.gov.br/sde (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
187. Federal Law, art. 13.
188. Id. art. 14(1) (“to ensure compliance with the Federal Law by monitoring and following up on market
practices”) and art. 14(2) ( to “provide for ongoing follow-up on business activities”).
VOL. 45, NO. 4
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THREE EMERGING BRICS ECONOMIES 999
C. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CARTEL CASES IN RECENT YEARS
1. The Rio de Janeiro – Sa˜o Paulo Airline Case189
In this case, newspapers started the investigation into an affair, which became known as
the Sa˜o Paulo Airline Case.  It was alleged that presidents of certain domestic airlines
colluded in price fixing ticket prices for the Rio de Janeiro-Sa˜o Paulo route, because all
the ticket prices were going up by ten percent.  CADE found the airlines guilty of collu-
sion to increase prices and each airline was fined an amount equivalent to one percent of
their revenue on that route.190
2. The Rio de Janeiro Newspaper Case191
In this case, four newspapers in Rio de Janeiro increased their prices by the same price
and percentage rates.  CADE investigated the matter and found the newspapers guilty of
anti-competitive behavior.  Each paper was fined one percent of its annual revenue.192
3. The Flat Steel Cartel Case193
This case concerned an agreement between competitors in the steel industry in which
the parties planned to increase the prices of flat-rolled steel products.  SEAE discovered
that certain companies, which were members of the Brazilian Steel Institute, planned to
increase the price of flat steel simultaneously.  SEAE informed the companies that their
plans could lead to a possible disturbance of the economic order; nonetheless, the compa-
nies proceeded with the increase.  Reasons for the price adjustment, as provided by the
relevant companies, were considered unconvincing and the companies were found guilty
of price fixing.  CADE fined each company one percent of their annual revenue before the
proceedings against them were filed.194
D. PENALTIES
Article 23 of the Federal Law determines the applicable penalties for anticompetitive
behavior that violates the economic order.  Companies shall be fined one to thirty percent
of the gross, pre-tax revenue of the company in its latest financial year.  The fine shall not
be lower than the actual competition advantage gained from the infringement.  Managers
or other officers shall be fined ten to fifty percent of the fine imposed on the company,
and the manager will be personally liable for paying this fine.  For other individuals and
public or private entities, as well as any de facto or de jure associations of entities or
persons, even temporary ones, with or without legal identity, the fine can total anywhere
189. See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION’S ROUNDTABLE ON PROSECUTING CARTELS
WITHOUT DIRECT EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT:  A CONTRIBUTION BY BRAZIL 3-5 (2006), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/28/36063750.pdf.
190. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA:  PEER
REVIEWS OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILI, MEXICO AND PERU 76 (2006).
191. See A CONTRIBUTION BY BRAZIL, supra note 189, at 82.
192. Id.
193. See Clark, supra note 162, at 193, for a summary of the case.
194. See A CONTRIBUTION BY BRAZIL, supra note 189, at 82.
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between six thousand and six million Brazilian real.  In case of a repetition of such an
infringement, such fines can be doubled.195
V. India
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court of India stated the primary purpose of competition law is “to rem-
edy some of those situations where the activities of one firm or two lead to the breakdown
of the free market system, or, to prevent such a breakdown by laying down rules by which
rival businesses can compete with each other.”196  The first competition legislation in In-
dia was the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 (MRTP Act), which
came into force in June 1970.197  The aim of the MRTP Act was to “provide that the
operation of the economic system did not result in the concentration of economic power
to the common detriment, for the control of monopolies, for the control of monopolistic
and restrictive trade practices and for matter connected therewith or incidental
thereto.”198  Indian authorities felt the need to keep competition policies in line with in-
ternational economic developments.199  In 1999, the Indian government appointed the
Raghavan Committee, a committee on Competition Policy and Law.200  In light of India’s
growing role as a global economic player, the task of the Raghavan Committee was to
oversee Indian competition policies in order to ensure compliance with international com-
petition law developments.201  Upon submitting the committee’s report, the new Compe-
tition Act of 2002 (Competition Act) was enacted.  The Competition Act came into effect
on September 1, 2009.202  The overall aim of the act is to “prevent practices that would
have an adverse effect on the development of fair competition, to promote and sustain
competition in the markets, to protect the interest of consumers and to ensure freedom of
trade carried on by other participants in markets in India.”203  Section 3 of the Competi-
tion Act prohibits cartel activity in India “in respect of production, supply, distribution,
storage, acquisition or control or goods or provision of services which causes or is likely to
cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition.”204  The Competition Act makes pro-
visions for the Competition Committee of India (CCI) to enter into any memorandum or
arrangement with any agency of any foreign country “for the purpose of discharging its
duties or performing its functions under this Act.”205  This may be done with the prior
195. See Federal Law, art. 23.
196. Competition Comm’n of India v. Steel Authority of India, (2010) 10 S.C.C. 744, 744-45 (India).
197. ANURAG K. AGARWAL, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA:  NEED TO GO SLOW AND STEADY 3 (2005)
available at http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/publications/data/2005-10-05anurag.pdf.
198. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, No. 54 of 1969, INDIA CODE (1969).
199. See ARGARWAL, supra note 197.
200. Debashree Dutta, New Competition Regime in India, LEGALSERVICEINDIA, http://www.legalserviceindia.
com/articles/neew.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
201. Id.
202. GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, THE ASIA-PACIFIC ANTITRUST REVIEW (2010), available at http//
www.globalcompetitionreview.com.
203. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
204. Id. § 3(1).
205. Id. § 18.
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approval of the Central Government of India.206  Consequently if the Indian competition
authorities feel that cartels will be addressed more efficiently through cooperation, it has
the possibility to cooperate with other countries.  This intention of Indian authorities was
already noticeable during a BRIC international competition conference held in Kazan,
Russia.207  The CCI issued a statement saying that “the (BRIC nations) resolved to take
effective measures to tackle cartels and anti-competitive agreements . . . they also stressed
upon the need of co-operation and exchange of views and experiences on the matters
relating to competition policy development.”208
B. ENFORCEMENT
The CCI was established under the Competition Act209 and became operational on
October 14, 2003.210  It “consist[s] of a Chairperson and not less than two and not more
than ten other Members [who are all] appointed by the Central Government [of In-
dia].”211  The CCI has “the duty . . . to eliminate practices that have an adverse effect on
competition, promote and sustain competition, protect the interest of consumers and en-
sure freedom of trade carried on by other participants, in markets in India.”212  It has the
power to start inquiries into any alleged contravention of the Competition Act.213  The
Commission can make any order it deems fit should there be a contravention of the
Act.214  The Competition Amendment Act of 2007 amended the Competition Act.  The
amendment makes provisions for the establishment of a Competition Appellate Tribunal
(CAT).  The CAT may “hear and dispose of appeals against any direction issued or deci-
sion made or order passed by the [CCI].”215  The CAT “shall consist of a Chairperson and
not more than two other Members who will be appointed by the Central Government [of
India].”216  Any decision or order of the CAT may be challenged in the Supreme Court of
India.217
The revamp of the Indian competition regime also had implications for old cases, inves-
tigations, and proceedings started under the auspices of previous competition authorities.
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MTRPC) was allowed two
years to complete open pending matters after the commencement of the Competition Act
in September 2009.218  From September 2011 on, open cases will be transferred to the
Appellate Tribunal for further adjudication.219  Therefore, because the MTRPC was go-
206. Id.
207. BRIC Nations to Tackle Cartels Together, INDIANEXPRESS (Sept. 4, 2009, 1:23 AM), http://www.indian
express.com/news/bric-nations-to-tackle-cartels-together/512603.
208. Id.
209. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 § 7(1), Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
210. Dep’t of Co. Affairs, The Establishment of the Competition Commission of India, F. No. 1/10/2003-CL. V
(Oct. 14, 2003).
211. The 2002 Competition Act, § 8(1).
212. Id. § 18.
213. Id. § 19(1).
214. Id. § 27.
215. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, No. 70 § 53A(1)(a), Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
216. Id. § 53C.
217. Id. § 53T.
218. Id. cl. 50.
219. The 2002 Competition Act, § 66(3).
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ing to dissolve as current matters were taken care of, no new cases were taken by the
commission.  All of the cases dealing with unfair trade practices, with a few exceptions,220
were transferred to the National Commission, which was established in terms of the Con-
sumer Protection Act 68 of 1986 (Consumer Act).  These cases will be adjudicated as if the
cases were filed under the Consumer Act.221
C. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF CARTEL INQUIRIES BEFORE THE CCI IN RECENT YEARS
1. The Glass Bottles Manufacturers’ Inquiry222
In this case, a complaint was filed with the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission (MTRPC)223 and the complaint was transferred to the Competition Com-
mission after it started operating as India’s competition enforcement body .  The com-
plainant, All Indian Distillers’ Association, alleged that four of India’s major glass bottle
manufacturers had formed a cartel and were increasing the sale price of the glass bottles
arbitrarily on the pretext of the increase in raw material such as soda ash.  The Competi-
tion Commission dismissed the case as being based on unsubstantiated rumors, thus not
confirming the existence of a cartel between the four glass bottles manufacturers because
as far as the allegation of cartelization by the respondent glass manufacturers is con-
cerned, no reliable material has been placed on record which can lend support to such
assertion.  Definitely something more than bare allegations is needed to show con-
certed action on the part of the respondents to fix the prices of glass bottles.224
2. The Hard Disk Drive Industry Inquiry225
Here, a complaint was lodged against a multinational company that had its head office
in the Cayman Islands.  The complaint alleged that the company, besides other competi-
tion law transgressions such as abusing its dominance, was involved in cartel activities with
other manufacturers of hard disk drives to increase the prices of hard disk drives as a
whole in India.  However, the CCI in this case also found that the existence of the alleged
cartel was not sufficiently proven by the complainant after scrutiny of the complainant’s
documentation.
While it is too soon to make a judgment on whether the CCI will ensure the fair en-
forcement of the competition legislation of India and apply sanctions provided under the
Competition Act, the just mentioned cases give rise to some optimism.
220. Those cases on unfair practices referred to in clause (x) of sub-section(1) of 36A of the MRTP Act
which will be transferred to the CAT.
221. The 2002 Competition Act, § 66(4).
222. All India Distillers’ Ass’n, New Delhi v. Haldyn Glass Gujarat Ltd. Baroda & Ors., UTPE Case No.
30(146)/ 2008, (Competition Comm’n of India 2010).
223. The MRTPC is a quasi-judicial organ which is tasked to prevent unfair trade practice from happening
and works closely with the Central Government of India. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
(MRTPC), MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/
mrtpc.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
224. Id. at 4.
225. Suresh Goel v. Seagate Singapore International Headquarter Pvt. Ltd., File No. C- 35/2008/DGIR
(Competition Comm’n of India 2010).
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D. CONCLUSION
The benefits of bilateral agreements regarding international cartels are clear—only a
synchronized and international approach will help the developing nations in protecting
their markets from unfair competition practices.  This article has shown the state of anti-
cartel policies and legislation in selected jurisdictions, the present state of the coordination
of competition policies through cooperation at the bi-national and international level, and
highlighted some examples of more publicized anti-competition cases.  One observation is
that more could be done by the developing NIC nations to increase the collaborative ties
of their anti-competition policies and organs as well as ensure that they fall under the
wider umbrella of regional competition regimes, such as in the case of South Africa and
the European Union.  The necessity of safeguarding consumer welfare through effective
domestic anti-competition frameworks was highlighted in the discussed cartel cases.  Time
will tell whether the emerging economies will be able to balance competition policy and
consumer welfare in an effective and progressive way without affecting their trade and
investment policies.
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Abstract
International forum shopping is a controversial issue.  While some legal scholars view this prac-
tice as a legitimate pursuit of the client’s best interest, the existence of doctrines such as forum non
conveniens suggests that, at least in some jurisdictions, forum shopping is considered an undesirable
and abusive tactic.  If the prevailing view is critical of forum shopping practices, no serious attempt
to determine the nature and extent of the presumed detrimental impact of those practices has been
made to date.  This article offers an analysis of the various aspects of the potentially adverse effect of
forum shopping on the fairness and efficiency of international dispute resolution.  This article will
show that such adverse impact is more limited than most critical authors seem to believe.  It also
highlights the existence of several incentives for litigants not to engage in forum shopping behavior.
Introduction
Forum shopping, both domestic and international, remains a controversial subject.1
There are, in fact, at least three distinct scholarly positions concerning the appropriate-
ness or legitimacy of forum shopping.2  The prevailing view seems to be that forum shop-
ping is necessarily “bad” and should thus be avoided or prohibited.3  For instance, several
authors deplore that uniform law conventions have been unable to “eliminate” forum
shopping opportunities,4 implying that such practice is undesirable.  A number of other
1. Domestic forum shopping usually involves choices between courts of different territorial subdivisions
and, where applicable, between federal and state courts.  To a lesser extent, it may involve a choice between
different “types” of courts (e.g. between a civil and a criminal court).  In some countries (and notably the
United States), domestic forum shopping receives significantly more attention than its international counter-
part.  For contributions that address both types of forum shopping from an essentially U.S. perspective, see,
e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 553 (1989); Ralph
U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 559, 559 (2002).
2. Every categorization of doctrinal viewpoints is necessarily simplistic and fails to reflect the complexity
and specificities of the opinions of the various authors.  However, it is useful to highlight the basic differences
between their respective approaches.
3. That the traditionally prevailing opinion is critical of forum shopping is notably illustrated by the
various attempts to refute this point of view. See infra notes 7-9.  A number of authors have questioned the
basic assumption that forum shopping is undesirable. See, e.g., Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s
Wrong With That?, 24 QLR 25, 25 (2005) (objecting to the “rhetoric [which] simply proclaim[s], almost ipse
dixit, that forum shopping [is] wrong, without the slightest explanation as to why.”) (internal quotation
omitted).
4. See Franco Ferrari, ‘Forum Shopping’ Despite International Uniform Contract Law Conventions, 51 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 689, 689 (2002) (stating that “[o]ne of the asserted advantages and goals of the unification of
substantive law lies in the prevention of ‘forum shopping’” and that “the entry into force of international
uniform contract law conventions . . . cannot prevent ‘forum shopping’”).  However, Professor Ferrari does
not himself express a final opinion on whether forum shopping is problematic or undesirable.  Instead, he
acknowledges that, “instead of criticising and condemning ‘forum shopping’”, it would be more useful to
study “the reasons underlying the policy against ‘forum shopping’”. Id. at 707; see also Franco Ferrari, Inter-
national Sales Law and the Inevitability of Forum Shopping:  A Comment on Tribunale di Rimini, 26 November
2002, 23 J.L & COM. 169, 169 (2003-2004); Ste´phanie Grignon-Dumoulin, Forum shopping—Article 31 de la
CMR, 11 UNIF. L. REV. 609, 609-10 (2006) (deploring the fact that, under the CMR Convention, a funda-
mental question such as the determination of default “considered as equivalent to willful misconduct” is
governed by the domestic law of the court seized, rather than by uniform rules and stating that the availability
of a variety of forums inevitably leads to forum shopping and, therefore, inequalities and lack of legal
security).
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writers implicitly condemn forum shopping through their approval of the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens,5 allegedly the principal tool to combat forum shopping.6
A second group of scholars takes issue with this traditional perception and argues that
there is nothing “wrong”7 with forum shopping because litigants merely avail themselves
of legal options that arise from the relevant jurisdictional rules.8  Any lack of decisional
uniformity that may result from forum shopping is not only unavoidable, but even “desira-
ble.”9  For lawyers, helping their clients locate the most favorable forum is not unethical;
on the contrary, they would not be fulfilling their legal duties towards their clients if they
failed to make use of jurisdictional options.10
A third category of writers, not always easily distinguishable from the second,11 is less
unconditional in their approval of forum shopping.  Those authors argue that, depending
on the particular circumstances, forum shopping may be either “good” or “bad.”12  They
attempt to define at what point forum selection can be considered as “unfair” or inappro-
priate in order to distinguish permissible from impermissible forum shopping.13  To this
end, they rely on a number of judicial precedents where courts have either allowed or
disallowed particular instances of forum shopping.14
What these diverging opinions reveal is that, first of all, there seems to be no agreement
on the exact meaning of the concept of forum shopping.  Some authors suggest that forum
shopping consists of “the parties attempting to bring the case in a forum that will be
5. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 467, 467 (2002); C. G. J. Morse, Not in the Public Interest? Lubbe v. Cape
PLC, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 541, 541 (2002); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non
Conveniens in International Litigation:  Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 501, 501 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Maloy, supra note 3, at 55 (referring to Botello v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 809 N.E.2d 197, 208 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004)).
7. Professor Juenger explicitly poses the question: what is wrong with forum shopping?  His rather cate-
gorical answer is that there is nothing wrong with this practice. See Friedrich K. Juenger, What’s Wrong with
Forum Shopping?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 13 (1994) (“[T]here must be a stop put to the customary, almost
ritualistic, condemnation of forum shopping”); see also Maloy, supra note 3, at 25.
8. See Juenger, supra note 7, at 9.
9. Id. at 10-11 (considering that the quest for decisional uniformity is “futile” and that it fails to produce
good results because the “application of choice-of-law rules that are blind to substantive values” leads to a
“massive influx of substandard foreign substantive rules”).
10. See Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping:  A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L.
REV. 79, 81 (1999) (observing that, if an attorney does not seek the most advantageous venue for his client, he
could face a malpractice claim).
11. It is not always clear to what extent individual writers tolerate or support the practice of forum shop-
ping.  Even a fervent advocate of forum shopping such as Professor Juenger accepts the idea that, “[i]n egre-
gious cases . . . the forum non conveniens doctrine or injunctions to restrain foreign proceedings offer redress
to those seriously inconvenienced”. See Juenger, supra note 7, at 13.
12. See, e.g., Maloy, supra note 3, at 25 (stating that, “like cholesterol and trolls, forum shopping can be
good, and forum shopping can be bad”).
13. Id. at 33-44 (discussing permissible forum shopping) and 44-50 (discussing impermissible forum shop-
ping).  Professor Dowling distinguishes between “forum selection” and “forum shopping.” See Donald C.
Dowling, Jr., Forum Shopping and Other Reflections on Litigation Involving U.S. and European Businesses, 7 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 465, 467 (1995).  However, his distinction is not based on whether a particular practice can be
considered as fair or appropriate, but rather on the idea that what a plaintiff regards as legitimate forum
selection may be perceived as “forum shopping” by the defendant.
14. See, e.g., Maloy, supra note 3, at 33-50.
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advantageous to them”15 or “the act of seeking the most advantageous venue in which to
try a case.”16  Though sensible, those definitions are inappropriately broad because they
hardly leave any room for a distinction between forum “shopping” and mere forum “selec-
tion.”  In fact, any plaintiff who has a choice between two or several forums, will—nor-
mally—opt for the “most advantageous” one.
Other scholars take the view that, in order for a practice to be considered as forum
shopping, it must involve some element of “unfairness.”  Professor Juenger, for example,
observes that “counsel, judges and academicians employ the term ‘forum shopping’ to
reproach a litigant who, in their opinion, unfairly [emphasis added] exploits jurisdictional
or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit.”17  Similarly, Professor Maloy submits
that “forum shopping is the taking of an unfair [emphasis added] advantage of a party in
litigation.”18
This article takes the position that the more adequate definition of forum shopping is
the second, more restrictive one.  If forum shopping is to be a useful concept, it must have
a meaning that is different from mere “forum selection.”  Assuming that certain practices
of forum selection are indeed “bad” (for example, because they are “unfair”, as Professors
Juenger and Maloy suggest), then the term “forum shopping” would adequately apply as a
concept that characterizes only specific forms of forum selection.  If there were no such
thing as “bad” forum selection, then the term forum shopping simply would have no legit-
imacy and should be avoided.  In other words, either forum shopping is different from
forum selection, or it does not exist at all.
The second lesson to be learned from the discrepancies between scholarly opinions on
forum shopping is that there seems to be no clear, agreed upon answer to the question:
“what, if anything, is wrong with forum shopping?”19  The opponents of forum shopping
are unable or unwilling to point out what exactly it is that makes this practice undesirable
or “bad.”  The argument put forward by its advocates that forum shopping cannot possi-
bly be “bad” because law authorizes it is simplistic and notably fails to explain the contra-
diction that exists between the apparent authorization of forum shopping and doctrines
aimed at curtailing such practice.20  The authors of the “golden middle” have shown that
courts tolerate certain types of forum shopping (more appropriately, forum selection) and
15. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529,
530 (2010).
16. See Algero, supra note 10, at 79.  Courts have sometimes adopted similar definitions.  A California
court, for example, has defined forum shopping as “the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction
. . . in which a claim might be heard”. See California v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 774 n.12 (Cal. 2004) (quoting
BLACK LAW DICTIONARY 666 (7th ed. 1999)).
17. Juenger, supra note 1, at 553.
18. Maloy, supra note3, at 28.
19. This is, it is recalled, the question posed by Professors Juenger and Maloy in their respective articles.
See supra notes 3 and 7.
20. The principal doctrine aimed at rendering attempts to forum shop ineffective is the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.  In very simplistic terms, this doctrine allows a court, in certain circumstances, to decline to
exercise jurisdiction if a more “convenient” or “appropriate” forum exists.  For basic commentary on this
doctrine, see, e.g., Brand, supra note 5.  For an excellent critical examination of forum non conveniens, see Hu
Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens:  An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 143 (2001).
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not others,21 but have not (yet) offered a test, let alone a theory, allowing to separate
forum selection from forum shopping.
This article, bearing in mind Professor Ferrari’s proposal for further inquiry,22 intends
to make a step forward in understanding why and how forum selection can be “bad.”  A
better and more profound understanding of this question is indeed vital, as it is necessary
not only in order to design appropriate policies to address forum shopping (if at all neces-
sary), but also in order to assess current practices.  While this article is primarily con-
cerned with international forum shopping, references are made to decisions and
commentary relating to domestic forum shopping (especially in the United States), to the
extent that those can adequately be transposed to the international level.
The first part of this article attempts to identify the ‘criteria’ by which the potentially
detrimental impact of forum selection can be measured.  Other writers have addressed
some of those criteria, generally in an isolated fashion, but none have provided an all-
encompassing analysis or conceptualization of the potential problems caused by forum
selection.  Based on this determination of potential problem areas, this article analyzes the
nature and extent of the possible adverse effect of forum selection.  The latter is more
limited than most critical writers habitually think, and some traditional criticisms are fun-
damentally ill conceived.
The second part of this article explores how significant or “real” the potentially adverse
impact of forum selection is as a matter of practice.  To this effect, this article discusses
two factors that contribute to limiting the actual detrimental effect of forum shopping.
First, the article shows that the very raison d’eˆtre of forum shopping opportunities,
namely the availability of jurisdictional alternatives, is beneficial to the international dis-
pute resolution “system.”  In other words, the existence of opportunities to forum shop is
deliberate and, in this sense, unavoidable.  Second, this article explains that, from the
point of view of prospective plaintiffs, there are incentives to refrain from forum shop-
ping—for them, forum shopping frequently represents a “Damocles sword.”
I. An Analysis of the Potentially Detrimental Impact of Forum Selection
When attempting to determine the potentially adverse consequences of forum selec-
tion, it is helpful to consult the writings of scholars who have discussed the issue of forum
shopping.23  In addition, useful insights can be gained from judicial applications of the
21. Unfortunately, courts use the term forum shopping not only when they disapprove of a particular
forum selection (which generally causes them to dismiss the case), but also when they consider that a plain-
tiff’s choice of forum should be tolerated. See, e.g. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 520 (1990).  In
this case, a farmer who was injured while working on his farm in Pennsylvania failed to bring a claim in
Pennsylvania within the two-year statutory time limit and thus filed negligence and product liability claims in
a Mississippi federal district court.  In addition, he moved for the case to be transferred to Pennsylvania on
forum non conveniens grounds.  Although the court found that such behavior constituted “forum shopping,” it
nevertheless granted the request.
22. See Ferrari, Forum Shopping, supra note 4, at 707.  Professor Ferrari calls for “a study of the reasons
underlying the policy against ‘forum shopping’,” as well as for an examination of whether those reasons are
“valid ones.”  This article undertakes the analysis contemplated by Professor Ferrari.  It also examines
whether, in addition to the problems he lists, there may be other factors that would justify a policy prohibit-
ing forum shopping.
23. See supra notes 1, 3, 4, and accompanying text.
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doctrine of forum non conveniens, as well as from scholarly discussions of this principle.24
In fact, as this article has already mentioned, the doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a
court to dismiss a case even though it would “normally” have jurisdiction because of the
“inconvenience”25 (or inappropriateness) of the chosen forum.  This inconvenience is, in
fact, identical to what this article refers to as the detrimental impact of forum shopping.
A combined reading of the writings on forum shopping and those on forum non con-
veniens suggests that the two principal problems that forum selection may cause are (i)
unfairness and (ii) lack of efficiency.  This article will define the exact meaning of these
fundamental notions hereinafter.26  In addition, one cannot avoid discussing the issue of
lack of decisional uniformity that is probably the most commonly mentioned drawback of
forum shopping.27  Even though lack of uniformity is partly related to the issue of fairness,
it is a more complex issue, and this article will thus examine it separately.28
One may, of course, identify additional problems that forum shopping may cause.  Two
related issues that have been identified are: (i) that forum shopping may “overburden cer-
tain courts,” and (ii) that forum shopping “creates unnecessary expenses” (ultimately born
by the taxpayers) because cases may not be brought before the courts that are most closely
connected to the facts of the dispute.29  While this article does not deny the relevance of
these issues, it will not address them because they reflect essentially public interests that
are not the most vital ones when it comes to international litigation.
A. UNFAIRNESS OF FORUM SELECTION
Very few people would disagree with the idea that international litigation should be fair
and that the plaintiff’s selection of a forum should not contravene this basic objective.30
Professor Maloy considers that unfairness is the distinguishing feature of forum shopping
(as opposed to mere forum selection).31  U.S. courts addressing the question of forum
24. See supra note 5; see also Christopher Bougen, Conflicting Approaches to Conflicts of Jurisdiction:  The Brus-
sels Convention and Forum Non Conveniens, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 261, 261 (2002); Gilles
Cuniberti, Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 973, 973 (2005); Rich-
ard G. Fentiman, Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 59, 59 (1993);
Edwin Peel, Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area—Introductory Report, Research Paper in University
of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, OXFORD LAW (Sept. 2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/Abstract=927198.
25. The term “inconvenience” does probably not constitute the most accurate description of situations that
may trigger the application of forum non conveniens.  On this point, see, e.g., Spiliada Mar. Corp. v. Cansulex
Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460 at 474 (Eng.) (opinion of Lord Goff expressing “doubt whether the Latin tag forum
non conveniens is apt to describe this principle.  For the question is not one of convenience, but of the
suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction”).
26. See infra Part I.A and I.B.
27. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 314 (1980) (discussing how forum shopping can “threaten . . . attempts to apply
policy uniformly”).
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See, e.g., Ferrari, Forum Shopping, supra note 4, at 707.
30. See David J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of Mul-
tinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 141, 151-52 (1998) (stating
that the “most obvious problem with forum shopping is that it allows plaintiffs to exploit [unfair] loopholes in
the system”).
31. Maloy, supra note 3, at 28.
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shopping have similarly recognized that this practice may lead to unfair results, in particu-
lar because it undermines equal protection of the law.32 Forum non conveniens decisions
also suggest that forum selection may be unfair.33  In its first decision expressly dealing
with this matter, the U.S. Supreme Court considered that a plaintiff’s choice of forum
“may not . . . ‘vex’, ‘harass’, or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting . . . expense or trouble
not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.”34  Courts in the United Kingdom35
and Australia36 have applied, and to some extent continue to apply,37 similar standards.
Although forum shopping is regularly linked to the concept of “unfairness,” neither
court rulings nor academic discussions have clarified what exactly this means.  To better
understand how forum selection may “unfairly” disadvantage the defendant and what kind
of unfairness may be at stake, it is necessary to start from the basic idea that fairness
requires equal treatment of the parties to a dispute.  Two aspects of such equal treatment
can be distinguished.  First, the parties should be equal with regard to the applicable laws
(both substantive and procedural).  Second, they should also be equal with regard to a
number of other factors that may cause a particular forum selection to be, from a more
practical point of view, more or less “convenient.”
1. Unfairness as Far as the Applicable (Substantive and Procedural) Laws are Concerned
Let us first examine unfairness as far as the applicable laws are concerned.  In forum
shopping debates, it is generally acknowledged that forum selection may unduly favor the
plaintiff, and thus disadvantage the defendant, when it comes to governing laws.38  In fact,
divergences between conflict of laws norms of possible forums (which lead to the applica-
tion of different substantive laws),39 as well the “advantageousness” of the procedural rules
32. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (dealing with domestic forum shopping).  In this case, the
Court departed from the principle established in Swift v. Tyson (41 U.S. 1 (1842)), according to which federal
diversity suits are governed by federal common law, which had led to a situation where outcomes varied
within a single state depending on whether the case was brought in a state or a federal court.  According to
the Court, the Swift doctrine “had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the state” and,
thus, “rendered impossible equal protection of the law.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
33. See Dorward, supra note 30, at 158.
34. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).  However, today, forum non conveniens dismissals in
the United States no longer require a showing that the plaintiff’s forum selection was vexatious or oppressive.
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
35. This was the traditional approach in the United Kingdom.  For early decisions affirming this rule, see,
e.g., Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B. 141 (A.C.) (Eng.); St. Pierre v. S. Am. Stores (Gath & Chaves)
Ltd., [1936] K.B.  382 (A.C.) at 398 (Eng.) (holding that in order for a forum non conveniens plea to be success-
ful the defendant must notably prove that “the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it
would be oppressive or vexatious to him”).
36. Brand states “Australian courts have chosen to stay with the traditional theory of forum non conveniens
requiring proof of process that is oppressive, vexatious, or abusive, rather than the more modern approach in
other common law countries that focuses on the concept of the appropriate forum.” See Brand, supra note 5,
at 486.
37. However, in the United Kingdom, more recent decisions do not seem to require that the plaintiff’s
forum selection be oppressive or vexatious. See Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
38. See, e.g., Juenger, supra note 1, at 571.
39. See Borchers, supra note 15, at 529-30 (arguing that plaintiffs “forum shop” in order to be awarded
punitive damages and that they therefore examine whether the conflict norms of potential forums designate a
substantive law which authorizes the allocation of such damages); see also Juenger, supra note 1, at 558 (stating
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of particular jurisdictions,40 are commonly regarded as the reasons underlying a significant
portion of forum shopping cases.
Thus, there may be instances where the result achieved by a particular forum selection
may, at first sight, appear to be unfair.  This may be the case, for example, where a resi-
dent of state A, who was injured in state A, files a lawsuit in state B because he did not
bring a claim within the time limit stipulated under the laws of state A.41  One may react
in a similar way to a case where, in the aftermath of an airplane crash that occurred in
country A and that involved a plane owned by an airline of country B, the heirs of the
victims brought product liability cases in country C, notably in order to escape the other-
wise applicable damages ceiling.42  But what exactly makes (or could make) the behavior of
these plaintiffs unfair?43
The first, most immediate, answer to this question is: nothing, really.  In both cases, the
basic question is whether a particular procedural (statute of limitations) or substantive
(amount of damages) rule is unfair.  This requires a comparative analysis of the outcomes
produced by the rule applied by the court and those that may be applied by other courts
potentially having jurisdiction.  And, in reality, any statement suggesting that a law or rule
of country A is fairer than a law or rule of country B is highly problematic.  In particular,
simplistic views equating the availability of a remedy with superior fairness are largely
unjustified,44 because they are generally based on an undue preference for one’s domestic
laws.
More fundamentally, both from a public international law and a conflict of laws point of
view, the affirmation that a specific law of country A is “fairer” than, or superior to, a law
of country B is hardly tenable.  It would be incompatible with the basic notion that all
states (and hence their laws) must be regarded as equal.  More importantly, it would also
run counter to the classical understanding of the conflict of laws that the most appropriate
law governing an international relationship is not determined by reference to the actual
that “[c]hoice-of-law doctrines present yet another incentive to the forum shopper”); Whitten, supra note 1
(agreeing with Professor Juenger’s views).
40. At least in the United States, most writers concur that the differences between procedural rules are a
more significant factor causing forum shopping than discrepancies between conflict norms. See Juenger,
supra note 1, at 573; Whitten, supra note 1, at 564 (stating that “U.S. conflicts law is not the dominant
incentive in domestic forum shopping”); Silberman, supra note 5, at 502 (observing that “[c]ourts in the
United States attract plaintiffs . . . because they offer procedural advantages beyond those of foreign forums”).
On the procedural law reasons causing forum shopping more generally, see ANDREW BELL, FORUM SHOP-
PING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 26-36 (2003).
41. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1990).
42. These were the relevant facts of a number of lawsuits filed in relation to a crash of a DC-10 owned by a
Turkish airline that occurred near Paris, France. See S. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 420-69 (1980).
43. Both Ferens and the airplane crash case are usually cited as examples of forum shopping.  However, the
relevant courts did not find that such forum shopping was unfair or unacceptable.
44. However, such views are sometimes expressed by courts, notably in the United States and England.
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (stating that, “if the remedy provided by the
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change
in law may be given substantial weight”); Lubbe v. Cape PLC, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545 (H.L.) at 1554 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (observing that a stay on the basis of forum non conveniens will be granted if “the plaintiff can
establish that substantial justice will not be done in the appropriate forum”).  It should be noted that, in both
cases, the question was not whether the plaintiff’s choice of forum was fair, but rather whether dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds would be unfair.  However, it nevertheless usefully illustrates how the question
of the applicable substantive law may be perceived as affecting the fairness of the outcome.
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substance or “quality” of the laws concerned, but based on considerations of “spatial”
justice.45  The conflict of laws knows, of course, exceptions whereby foreign laws that are
considered contrary to fundamental notions of justice or “public policy” may be disre-
garded.46  However, this public policy exception assesses a law’s unfairness from the per-
spective of the legal system of the forum, whereas the question here is whether it is
possible to assert that a particular law may be unfair in “absolute terms.”  It is difficult to
see how an affirmative answer can be given to this question.
There may, however, be a way to argue that a particular law of country A is unfair.  One
could, indeed, rely on the idea of “international standards” and assert that, where a partic-
ular law deviates from accepted international standards, such law may be considered as
“unfair.”  If, for example, the law of country A allows a plaintiff to receive full compensa-
tion even though he has contributed to his damage by his own negligence, while all (or the
vast majority of) other laws either exclude or limit recovery, then this law of country A
may, under such an approach, be regarded as unfair.
However, in reality, such an analysis is flawed, mainly because it does not actually over-
come the above-mentioned public and private international law obstacles.  Though im-
plicit in numerous writings,47 allegations of unfairness of the applicable substantive or
procedural rules are thus unjustified or, at the very least, highly controversial.  Interest-
ingly, this conclusion is in conformity with the way in which the courts of several coun-
tries apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  Unfairness, under this doctrine, is
essentially equated with practical inconvenience, rather than unfairness of the applicable
laws.  Quite to the contrary, courts usually tolerate a certain degree of substantive unfair-
ness, i.e. that a plaintiff derives “a legitimate personal or juridical [emphasis added] advan-
tage”48 from his forum selection.  More generally, courts are usually reluctant to attach
great significance to a change of the applicable substantive law when examining forum non
conveniens pleas.49
A last issue that should be looked at when examining whether the application of a par-
ticular substantive or procedural law may be unfair is predictability. Asahi Metal Industry
v. Superior Court can notably illustrate this.50  In this case, a motorcyclist suffered damage
as a result of a collision with a tractor in California.  He filed claims against various par-
ties, including the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube.  The latter filed a claim for
indemnification against several codefendants and joined Asahi, the Japanese manufacturer
of the tube’s valve assembly.  Could Asahi reasonably predict that it would face a lawsuit in
45. As is well known, this traditional approach has been challenged by a number of U.S. writers during the
so-called “conflict revolution” of the 1950s and 60s.  Those authors advocated a variety of outcome-based
conflict approaches.  For a recent discussion of their theories, see, e.g., Markus A. Petsche, International Com-
mercial Arbitration and the Transformation of the Conflict of Laws Theory, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 453, 466-69
(2010).
46. See id. at 462.
47. See Algero, supra note 10, at 79-80; Juenger, supra note 1, at 553.  The respective authors define forum
shopping as an unfair manipulation of the outcome and the taking of an unfair advantage, thus implying that
the application of particular laws (obtained precisely by the act of forum shopping) may be “unfair.”
48. MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., [1978] A.C. 795 (H.L.) at 812 (appeal taken from Eng.) (empha-
sis added).
49. See, e.g., Piper, 454 U.S. at 247 (holding that “[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should
ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.”).
50. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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California and that California law would govern?  If not, is the application of California
law unfair?51
The answer to this question is, once again, negative.  In fact, if one argues that the
application of the law of country A is unfair because it could not be reasonably predicted
by the defendant (either because he could not predict the forum in which the plaintiff
would bring his case or because he could not foresee the choice-of-law determination of
the court seized), the issue is not the substantive unfairness of the said law.  Rather, the
perceived “problem” will generally stem from the fact that the selected court is not the
“natural” forum (which was the case in Asahi)52 or that the conflict norms applied are
“unusual.”  The fairness of the applicable laws is not directly at stake.
2. Unfairness in Terms of Unequal Convenience
Having concluded that forum selection does not cause any fairness problems in terms of
the applicable substantive and procedural laws, we can now turn to the second aspect of
potential unfairness, i.e. the inconvenience caused by the plaintiff’s choice of forum.  It is
undeniable that, in certain circumstances, the selected forum may be less convenient for
the defendant than for the plaintiff.  This may occur, for example, when the plaintiff sues a
foreign defendant in his (i.e. the plaintiff’s) home jurisdiction or, more generally, when the
forum selection causes considerable expense or practical difficulties (such as the difficulty
to obtain the necessary visas to travel to the forum country).
That forum selection may unfairly inconvenience the defendant has been recognized by
a number of courts examining forum non conveniens claims.  Those courts have held that a
case may be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds when the forum selection by the
plaintiff is vexatious or oppressive to the defendant.53  However, it is not always clear
whether, in a particular case, the dismissal is based on such unfair inconvenience or,
rather, on considerations of efficiency.54
More generally, the basic evolution of the forum non conveniens doctrine (in the coun-
tries that apply this principle) indicates that an even significant imbalance in terms of the
relative convenience of a forum for the parties only plays a very limited role.  In the
51. The issue in Asahi was not whether the case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, but
whether the relevant California court at all had jurisdiction over Asahi.  The Supreme Court held that it was
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional to require a Japanese defendant who did not market a product directly
in the United States to defend a claim brought by another foreign manufacturer. Id. at 113-116.
52. In fact, a California court can hardly be considered as the “natural” forum for a claim filed by a
Taiwanese plaintiff against a Japanese defendant, merely because the claimant himself is a defendant in a
connected lawsuit brought in that court.  On the emergence and the meaning of the concept of “natural”
forum, see BELL, supra note 40, at 86-129.
53. See Brand, supra note 5; Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B. 141 (A.C.) (Eng.); St. Pierre v. S. Am.
Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd., [1936] K.B.  382 (A.C.) at 398 (Eng.).
54. In Gulf Oil, for example, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, alleged that the defendant, a Pennsylvania
corporation doing business in Virginia, had negligently caused the destruction of a warehouse owned by the
plaintiff in Virginia.  Rather than bringing his case before a court in Virginia or Pennsylvania, he filed suit in a
New York district court.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the claim on forum non conveniens
grounds.  However, it can reasonably be argued that the Court’s decision may not have been based on the
practical inconvenience that litigating in New York represented for the defendant, but rather on the overall
“inappropriateness” of that forum, notably in light of the multiple ties with the state of Virginia.  Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502 (1947).
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United Kingdom and Canada, for example, the “vexatious and oppressive” test has been
expressly abandoned.55  Significantly, in the United States, Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of
the U.S. Code, which codifies the forum non conveniens doctrine for domestic purposes,
refers to the “convenience of parties,” rather than to an inconvenience caused to the
defendant.56
This trend suggests that the possibility of unfair inconvenience may have been overesti-
mated in the past and that it does not pose a significant problem in current international
litigation.  There may be a number of reasons for this.  Generally, it is unrealistic, in any
international litigation, to expect that the forum will be equally convenient for the parties
because many cases are brought either in the defendant’s or plaintiff’s home jurisdiction.
Also, improved international judicial cooperation (notably regarding the taking of evi-
dence abroad)57 and the use of modern technologies help reducing the cost and inconve-
nience of litigating in foreign forums.
B. LACK OF EFFICIENCY ENSUING FROM THE PLAINTIFF’S FORUM SELECTION
A plaintiff’s forum selection may potentially have an adverse impact on “efficiency.”
This term refers, in the first place, to the efficiency of the proceedings.  What is meant is
that the proceedings are, or ought to be, conducted in such way as to avoid unnecessary
cost and delay.  It also implies that the court is enabled to render a “correct” decision.  As
can easily be understood, forum selection may affect the efficiency of the proceedings.
For example, if the trial takes place in a jurisdiction only loosely connected to the material
facts, this may generate a variety of additional costs58 and slow down the proceedings.59
Difficulties in obtaining and examining relevant evidence may complicate the fact-finding
task of the court and ultimately affect the accuracy of its decision.
There are a number of specific reasons that may cause a plaintiff’s forum selection det-
rimentally to impact efficiency.  First and foremost, a plaintiff will frequently seek the
most advantageous forum in terms of the governing substantive and procedural law.
Hence, considerations of efficiency may only play a secondary role in his choice.  As the
55. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, see Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C.
460 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  As regards Canada, see, e.g., 472900 B.C. Ltd. v. Thrifty Can. Ltd.,
(1998) 168 D.L.R. 4th 602, para. 32 (Can. B.C. C.A.) (stating that “[t]here is now no burden on the applicant
to establish that the action would be vexatious, oppressive and/or an abuse of the process of the court.”).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1996) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought
. . . . ”).
57. Among the international instruments that have facilitated such judicial cooperation one should mention
the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters and, at the
European level, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member
States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters.  Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231; Council Regula-
tion 1206/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC).
58. Those costs may include inter alia travel and accommodation expenses for both parties, their legal
representatives, experts, and witnesses; translation and interpretation costs (if the language of the forum is
different from the language of the contract and/or other relevant documents); costs flowing from the need to
locate and compensate foreign counsel; and costs associated with the need to familiarize oneself with the rules
and procedures of the foreign forum.
59. Litigating in a foreign forum renders the process more complex, which may ultimately lead to an in-
crease in the duration of the proceedings.
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Paris airplane crash case illustrates,60 a plaintiff may be attracted to a particular forum
because it offers the best chances of recovery (and higher amounts of compensation) and
may thus attach limited importance to choosing a forum closer connected to the facts
underlying the dispute.
Lack of efficiency constitutes probably the most significant issue for the purposes of the
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine.  Classical examples include (i) the dismis-
sal of a claim brought in a U.S. court by a Danish seaman against a Danish sea captain for
back wages;61 (ii) the dismissal of a claim brought in a federal district court in New York
by a Virginia resident against a Pennsylvania corporation for damage suffered as a result of
the destruction of a warehouse in Virginia;62 and (iii) the dismissal of a wrongful death
action filed in a California state court by Scottish plaintiffs against defendants from Penn-
sylvania and Ohio arising from an airplane crash in Scotland.63
The second aspect of efficiency relates to the enforceability of the decision.  Enforce-
ment may in fact be an issue where the decision is rendered by a court of a jurisdiction in
which the defendant does not own assets.  In this case, it will be necessary to seek enforce-
ment of the decision abroad.  A plaintiff’s forum selection may potentially complicate such
enforcement because, as has already been mentioned, other considerations relating to the
applicable procedural and substantive rules may receive more attention.  Plaintiffs may
thus not always contemplate enforcement issues when initiating proceedings and may no-
tably fail to examine the applicable legal framework(s) to possible enforcement actions.
Also, there are two specific reasons why the pursuit of strategic advantages through
forum selection may lead to enforcement problems.  First of all, if a plaintiff chooses a
particular forum (forum A) in order to obtain a more favorable decision, then there is a
possibility that such decision may be considered as substantively “unfair” in potential en-
forcement forums (forums B and C).  Under the laws of most countries, foreign decisions
may in fact be refused (recognition and enforcement) if they violate the enforcement fo-
rum’s public policy.64  In other words, if the plaintiff succeeds in securing the expected
advantage and if this advantage is “excessive,” then this may ultimately work to the plain-
tiff’s detriment.65
The second reason relates to the fact that, when choosing a favorable forum, plaintiffs
may (intentionally) fail to take into account efficiency, i.e. the closeness with the material
facts of the dispute.  If, in addition, the plaintiffs rely on very “liberal” jurisdictional
grounds of the chosen forum, then this may ultimately cause the decision to be denied
enforcement by foreign courts.  In fact, under the laws of a number of countries, foreign
60. See SPEISER, supra note 42, at 420-69.
61. Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283, 1284 (D. Pa. 1801) (No. 17,682).
62. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 301 U.S. at 502-03.
63. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 235, 261 (1981).
64. As far as the United States is concerned, see, e.g., Cedric C. Chao and Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement
and Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 147, 157-
59 (2001-2002).  For European perspectives, see Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 34(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
(EC).
65. A good example would be a case involving two parties from civil law countries (which oppose the
granting of punitive damages as a matter of public policy) which the plaintiff decides to bring before a U.S.
court, precisely in order to be awarded punitive, in addition to compensatory, damages.  Such a decision (or at
least the punitive damages award) would not be enforceable in most countries, including the defendant’s
home jurisdiction. See also infra Part II.B.1.
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decisions will only be enforced if the court that rendered the decision had jurisdiction
under the rules of the enforcement court.66  If, for example, the jurisdiction of country A
is based on the mere fact that the defendant was temporarily present in country A and
served with a notice during this time (“service-jurisdiction”),67 and if such jurisdictional
basis is not recognized in country B, then it is possible or likely that the decision rendered
in country A will not be enforced in country B.
C. LACK OF UNIFORMITY OF DECISIONS
A number of writers recognize that forum shopping may lead to an undesirable lack of
decisional uniformity.  Without taking a final position on its “undesirability,” Professor
Ferrari acknowledges that forum shopping “goes against the principle of consistency of
outcomes, apparently a fundamental tenet of virtually any legal system”.68  In his article
defending the practice of forum shopping, Professor Juenger exclusively focuses on the
issue of “decisional harmony,”69 thus implying that this is its only (or, at the very least,
main) adverse consequence. Grignon-Dumoulin associates decisional variations with “ine-
qualities” and “a threat to legal security.”70
Before attempting to examine why lack of uniformity may be detrimental, i.e. what
interests may be affected, it is necessary to clarify the nature of the situations concerned.
Lack of decisional uniformity must not be (mis)understood as the existence of two con-
trasting decisions regarding the same (or rather a substantially identical) lawsuit.  In fact, a
forum shopper generally chooses the most favorable forum and litigates in that forum
only.  Practices that consist of initiating proceedings in several countries (with the hope to
prevail at least somewhere) are rather exceptional and not, as such, an integral part of the
basic concept of forum shopping.71
Hence, the lack of decisional harmony here only exists at the level of the domestic or
international legal order (depending on whether it is domestic or international forum
shopping).  At the party level, it is merely “hypothetical.”  If a plaintiff brings his claim in
66. See, as far as the United States is concerned, Chao and Neuhoff, supra note 64, at 156 (stating that
“[w]hen a defendant asserts that the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction, United States courts generally
inquire whether the foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction conformed to standards of due process as
recognized in the United States”).  In France, as far as non-EU judgments are concerned, enforcement simi-
larly requires that the foreign court had jurisdiction in accordance with the views of the French enforcement
court. See the decision of the French Cour de cassation of January 7, 1964 in Munzer.  Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 7, 1964, Bull. civ. I, No. 15 (Fr.).
67. Service-jurisdiction is notably recognized in a number of U.S. states.  In Wisconsin, for example, Sec-
tion 801.05 affirms the personal jurisdiction of the local courts vis-a`-vis defendants who were “present within
this state [i.e. Wisconsin] when served.”  However, Professor Juenger has pointed out that service-jurisdiction
may no longer be compatible with constitutional requirements. See Juenger, supra note 1, at 557 (discussing
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and observing that Justice Marshall’s opinion “suggests that jurisdic-
tion premised solely on personal service within the state is no longer proper”).
68. Ferrari, Forum Shopping, supra note 4, at 707 (internal footnote omitted).
69. Juenger, supra note 7, at 6-12.
70. Grignon-Dumoulin, supra note 4, at 610.
71. In fact, such practices would be highly problematic for the plaintiffs concerned.  Amongst other things,
they are excessively onerous (the plaintiff bears the cost not of one, but of two or several trials) and create
enforcement problems when a court dismisses the plaintiff’s case and when such decision is then either (i)
sought to be recognized in the enforcement jurisdiction or (ii) relied upon to object to the enforcement of
another judgment which is favorable to the plaintiff.
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forum A and achieves result A, while he would have obtained result B in forum B, then
there is no actual lack of uniformity because only one decision exists.  However, if another
plaintiff, in a comparable case, decides to sue in forum B, then there will be a situation in
which the same (or a similar) matter will have been decided differently, simply because the
plaintiffs chose different forums.  At the level of the relevant legal order, it results in
inequalities between parties, and especially defendants, who are essentially in the same
situation.
Lack of uniformity understood in this sense potentially raises two issues.  The first one
is precisely the question of the lack of fairness arising from the dissimilar treatment of
similar parties.  Is it unfair if similar defendants will be subjected to varying obligations to
compensate, depending on the particular forum in which the respective plaintiffs have
brought their cases?  Is it unfair if the claims of some plaintiffs are successful, while those
of similar plaintiffs are not, merely because the former plaintiffs’ choice-of-forum was
“wiser?”
This is a difficult question.  Common sense would suggest that it should be preferable
to avoid situations where legal subjects who are in similar situations receive different treat-
ment.  But, ultimately, this may not be a valid proposition at the international level.  It
does make sense to argue that, within a given domestic legal order, there should be uni-
formity of decisions and thus equal application of the law.72  However, is this reasonable at
the international level?  Is it unfair if, in purely domestic cases, a defendant in Germany
pays X damages for certain tortious conduct, while another defendant in the United States
pays X plus a significantly higher amount in punitive damages?  The answer to this ques-
tion is no because the relevant laws reflect notions of justice and fairness of the respective
communities and because, as this article has highlighted above, it is highly problematic to
assert that the laws of country A are fairer than those of country B.
Of course, forum shopping does not involve purely domestic cases that are brought
before the respective domestic courts, but international (or inter-state) cases that may be
heard in the courts of several countries (or states).  However, the analysis is the same.  If
we agree that neither the application of law A by court A, nor the application of law B by
court B is, as a matter of principle, unfair, then differences in treatment between similar
defendants cannot be regarded as unfair either.
The second issue raised by lack of decisional uniformity is probably the more pressing
one.  It is the issue of predictability.  The basic argument is that, because the eventual
outcome of a given dispute may depend on the plaintiff’s forum selection (which is un-
known to the defendant), such outcome is not reasonably predictable for the defendant.
At first sight, this seems to be a very plausible argument.  It is frequently referred to as a
problem affecting “legal security” or “security of transactions.”73
However, a closer look reveals that the equation forum shopping (or forum selection)
equals unpredictability of outcome is debatable, if not misleading.  First of all, forum se-
72. There are two reasons why decisional uniformity should be a greater concern at the domestic level.
First of all, from a practical point of view, decisional uniformity can much more easily be achieved at the
domestic than at the international level.  In fact, domestic laws are presumably applied in a uniform fashion
within any given domestic legal system (leaving the problems caused by federalism aside).  Second, from a
purely legal point of view, it should be noted that, in many countries, the principle of “equality before the
law” constitutes a constitutional norm.
73. See Grignon-Dumoulin, supra note 4, at 610.
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lection only makes predictability more difficult; it does not necessarily undermine it.  In
fact, for any international dispute, more than one forum is generally available74 and, de-
pending on the specific connections of the transaction (or event giving rise to the dispute)
with different countries, those alternative forums may be identified without too much
hassle.  Similarly, gaining basic information pertaining to the applicable conflict norms in
those forums, as well as to peculiarities of the respective substantive laws, does not neces-
sarily require excessive efforts.
More importantly, the assumption that, in the absence of forum shopping, defendants
can perfectly predict the outcome is unrealistic.  This view implies that each case has only
one “natural” forum, which is not generally the case in international litigation.  Also, it
assumes that parties are perfectly familiar with the conflict and substantive norms of this
“natural” forum (or their home forum, if the comparison is with domestic litigation),
which, again, is questionable.  Moreover, perceived unpredictability frequently stems not
so much from the plaintiff’s choice of a particular forum, but rather from the unpredict-
ability of the facts or incident giving rise to the dispute.75  Lastly, though there may be
several other relevant factors, predictability issues can, as far as contractual disputes are
concerned, easily be solved through the conclusion of choice-of-law or forum selection
clauses.
None of the above arguments should be understood as suggesting that it is not desirable
to achieve greater harmonization of conflict and substantive norms at the international
level, especially as far as the law governing business transactions is concerned.76  However,
as this article has shown, the problems of unfairness and unpredictability that the absence
of uniformity may cause are far less severe than is often assumed.  In fact, the very exis-
tence of such problems is questionable.
II. The Reality of the Detrimental Impact of Forum Selection
The first part of this article has examined the adverse “potential” of forum selection in
international litigation, i.e. the question of whether, as a matter of principle, forum selec-
tion can have a detrimental impact.  It has identified the various criteria by which such
impact may be measured and concluded (i) that unfairness is not a “real” issue as far as the
applicable laws are concerned; (ii) that, however, unfairness in terms of unequal conve-
nience may potentially be a (rather minor) problem; (iii) that lack of uniformity is merely
hypothetical at the level of the parties to a given dispute and thus not significant as a factor
reducing (again) fairness and predictability; and (iv) that lack of efficiency may be the most
serious “danger” of forum selection.
This second part analyzes the extent to which the potentially detrimental impact of
forum selection affects the actual practice of international litigation.  Rather than focusing
74. This is largely due to the fact that most countries recognize that a court’s jurisdiction in international
cases may be based on a plurality of grounds.  For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see infra Part II.A.1.
75. How can a manufacturer know where a consumer – with whom he has no contractual relationship –
will be injured by one of his products?  How can parties know where tortious conduct will occur, or where the
effects of such conduct will be produced?
76. Thus, while this article agrees with Professor Juenger that the international unification of conflict
norms is unrealistic, it respectfully disagree with his view that it is also undesirable or “futile.” See Juenger,
supra note 7, at 10.
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on empirical data (which would be hard to find and interpret77), this article discusses two
factors that suggest that the already limited “detrimental potential” of forum selection is
not generally fully “exploitable” in practice.  Those factors are (1) that the availability of
alternative forums (the reason why we have forum shopping) is generally conducive to the
achievement of fairness and efficiency and (2) the existence of incentives for plaintiffs to
refrain from engaging in forum shopping practices.
A. THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE FORUMS: FORUM SHOPPING OPPORTUNITIES
AS A “NECESSARY EVIL”
Forum shopping would not be a practical and academic issue if litigants did not have the
possibility to choose between two or several alternative forums.  It is sometimes argued
that the availability of more than one forum is caused by the “alternative” nature of the
relevant jurisdictional rules.  At the international level, this is not entirely accurate because
the availability of alternatives does not stem from the jurisdictional rules of a given coun-
try, but from the interplay between the jurisdictional rules of several countries.78  If, for
example, a French plaintiff is entitled to sue a German defendant in Germany (the place of
residence of the defendant) and France (the place where the defendant’s tortious conduct
occurred), then this is the combined result of German and French jurisdictional rules.79
While the existence of alternative jurisdictional rules is not a necessary prerequisite for
options at the international level (divergences between the various domestic rules would
suffice), evidently, it significantly enhances their likelihood and number.
When a legal system applies alternative jurisdictional rules in the domestic sphere, it
generally recognizes that, at the international level, its courts’ jurisdiction may similarly be
based on a plurality of connecting factors (such as, for example, the domicile or nationality
of the defendant, the place of the conclusion or performance of the contract etc.).80  There
is, of course, a reason behind this.  In fact, alternative jurisdictional rules, both at the
domestic and at the international level, are aimed at contributing to the fairness and effi-
ciency of the litigation process.  In other words, alternative rules pursue precisely those
objectives that may be undermined by the practice of forum shopping.  Overall, as this
article shall explain, the potentially negative effect of alternative rules (i.e., of jurisdictional
options) is outweighed by their advantages.  Moreover, any alternative system that would
77. Indeed, it is difficult to locate decisions involving forum shopping because courts may not necessarily
employ that expression and because it is generally difficult to distinguish between forum shopping and mere
forum selection.  Also, the exact impact that a plaintiff’s choice in a given case has on the achievement of
fairness and efficiency is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy.
78. Only where an international instrument establishes common norms for States parties does it make
sense to use the term “alternative rules.”  With regard to EC Council Regulation 44/2001, it is thus appropri-
ate to state that it establishes a system based on alternative rules of jurisdiction.
79. In this specific case, both the German and the French rules would be found in Regulation 44/2001,
which is directly applicable in all member states and takes precedence over any other domestic norms pertain-
ing to matters falling within the scope of the Regulation.  The jurisdictional options in this hypothetical case
would thus derive from the application of Articles 2(1) and 5(3) of the Regulation.
80. In France, for example, absent an international agreement governing the issue, the jurisdiction of
French courts in international disputes is determined by way of a “transposition” of the domestic jurisdic-
tional rules contained in Articles 46-48 of the Code de Proce´dure Civile.  Code de Proce´dure Civile (C.P.C.) art.
46-48 (Fr.).
VOL. 45, NO. 4
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
WHAT’S WRONG WITH FORUM SHOPPING? 1021
be based on exclusive jurisdictional rules would not only be unrealistic, but also a source of
problems.
1. Fairness and Efficiency of Alternative Jurisdictional Rules
Virtually all legal systems recognize that, in international disputes, the jurisdiction of
their courts may be based on a plurality of connecting factors.  As far as specific types of
disputes are concerned, however, exclusive jurisdictional rules may exceptionally apply.81
The real differences between the various countries only relate to the question of how
many such alternative factors are recognized.  Those not based on a significant connection
with the parties or the facts underlying the dispute (and are not widely applied) are habitu-
ally referred to as “exorbitant” grounds.82  Overall, however, there is rather widespread
agreement on basic jurisdictional principles.
Within the European Union, for example, EU Council Regulation 44/2001 transforms
the Brussels-Lugano Convention into a piece of EU legislation and governs all disputes
involving a defendant who resides or is domiciled in a member state of the European
Union.83  Under this Regulation, the plaintiff is required to bring his claim before the
courts of the defendant’s domicile.84  In addition, the Regulation provides for a number of
rules of “special jurisdiction” that plaintiffs have the right to rely upon.
In contractual matters, for example, the Regulation allows a plaintiff to bring his claim
before the courts “for the place of the performance of the obligation in question,” i.e., the
obligation that the plaintiff alleges has been violated.85  In tort cases, claims may be
brought in the courts “for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.”86
Where the defendant’s tortious conduct occurred in state A and the plaintiff suffered dam-
age in state B, the action may be brought before the courts of both countries.87
In the United States, the basic approach is not dissimilar.  U.S. courts generally have no
difficulty asserting jurisdiction over local defendants.88  Hence, they recognize that the
defendant’s domicile or residence constitutes a proper jurisdictional basis.89  A wide range
of cases involving foreign (or non-resident) defendants illustrates that other jurisdictional
81. See infra Part II.A.2.
82. For a recent discussion of such exorbitant grounds, see Guiditta Cordero Moss, Between Private and
Public International Law: Exorbitant Jurisdiction as Illustrated by the Yukos Case, 32 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 1, 1
(2007).
83. For an examination of the ways in which the Regulation modified the legal regime established under
the Brussels-Lugano Conventions, see Astrid Stadler, From the Brussels Convention to Regulation 44/2001:  Cor-
nerstones of a European Law of Civil Procedure, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2005).
84. See Article 2(1) of the Regulation: “ . . . . persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their
nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.”
85. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 64, art. 5(1).
86. Id. art. 5(3).
87. Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735, ¶ 19.
88. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 516 (“Formal jurisdiction over these defendants [American or other
multinational manufacturers] in some United States court almost always exists . . . . ”).
89. However, U.S. courts sometimes dismiss cases brought against domestic corporations based on forum
non conveniens.  For critical views on such judicial practice, see, for example, Jacqueline Duval-Major, One-Way
Ticket Home:  The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
650, 670 (1992) (“[F]orum non conveniens may unjustifiably protect MNCs [multinational corporations]
from any liability.”) and David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens:  “An Object Lesson
in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 TEX. INT’L L. J. 353, 371-75 (1994).
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grounds are acknowledged.  In those cases, the courts focus on whether they have personal
jurisdiction over the foreign entity or individual.  In most states, this question is governed
by so-called long-arm statutes, which, generally, either provide for a number of specific
bases for jurisdiction (not unlike Regulation 44/2001)90 or incorporate the requirements
of the constitutional Due Process Clause.91
The meaning of those requirements, which apply throughout the United States, has
been clarified by a number of Supreme Court decisions in which the Court established
two tests to determine whether, in a given case, a U.S. court may validly exercise jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident or foreign defendant.  Under the first such test, the minimum
contacts requirement established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington92 (and developed
further in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall93 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Supe-
rior Court of California),94 a U.S. court may have jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if (i)
he conducts a certain threshold of activities in the relevant state, or (ii) the cause of action
arises from an activity of the defendant in that state, even if it merely constitutes an iso-
lated activity.  Under the second test, the reasonableness requirement laid down in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,95 the exercise of jurisdiction must be “reasonable” in
light of the relationship between the defendant and the forum.96
This very basic overview of U.S. jurisdictional rules illustrates that U.S. courts recog-
nize a variety of factors as grounds upholding their jurisdiction in international cases.  As
this article has already mentioned, the domicile or place of business of the defendant is
one such factor, and U.S. courts therefore generally hold that they have jurisdiction over
cases brought against defendants who are domiciled or reside in the United States.  In
cases involving foreign defendants, courts take into account a number of different aspects
relating to the defendant’s presence in, or connection with, the United States.  Not unlike
90. See Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention:  The Lessons of the Due Process Clause
and the Brussels Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 125, 132 (1998) (“The process of applying a list-type
longarm statute is not unlike the application of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Convention [which has
been adopted, with minor changes, by Regulation 44/2001].”).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . . ”).
92. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313-16 (1946).  The Court ruled that the Washington
state courts had jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in St. Louis,
Missouri because it employed between eleven and thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington.  The Court
held that “due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair-play and substantial justice.’” (citing Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
93. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 408 (1984) (denying jurisdiction of the
Texas state courts over a claim brought against a Colombian corporation on the basis of a helicopter crash in
Peru).
94. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 102 (1987) (denying jurisdiction
of California courts over a Japanese manufacturer in a product liability case involving an allegedly defective
valve stem sold to a Taiwanese tire manufacturer and ultimately incorporated into a motorcycle sold and used
in California).
95. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
96. Id. at 292 (“The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is ‘reasonable
. . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.,
326 U.S. at 317) and holding that the Oklahoma courts do not have jurisdiction over a product liability suit
brought by New York residents who had purchased a car in New York from a New York corporation merely
because the accident occurred while the plaintiffs were driving through Oklahoma).
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Regulation 44/2001, the U.S. legal system embraces the idea of alternative rules of
jurisdiction.
By recognizing alternative jurisdictional bases, legal systems (and notably the U.S. and
European legal systems) promote fairness (especially equality between the parties) and
efficiency of international litigation.  Alternative jurisdictional rules are fair because they
achieve an adequate balance between the interests of the parties.  On the one hand, the
rule allocating jurisdiction to the defendant’s home courts, a principle of virtually univer-
sal application,97 protects interests of defendants.98  On the other hand, alternative rules
also take into account the interests of plaintiffs by offering them the possibility to choose
between two or several options.
In order for those options not to create an imbalance that would disadvantage the de-
fendant, the relevant rules must be crafted carefully.  Importantly, save for exceptional
circumstances,99 the plaintiff’s domicile or residence (or nationality) should not constitute
a connecting factor.  If it did, plaintiffs would systematically bring most lawsuits in their
home courts, which would clearly disfavor defendants.  Therefore, alternatives to the de-
fendant’s home court should bear a material connection with the dispute because this
ensures both (a certain degree of) predictability for the defendant and overall efficiency.
If jurisdictional rules do indeed limit alternative forums to those that are connected to
the dispute, then they also help to ensure a certain degree of efficiency.  As this article has
discussed earlier, the closeness of the forum to the relevant facts underlying the dispute
enhances speed and cost-effectiveness of the process.  In addition, it must not be forgotten
that the basic rule allocating jurisdiction to the defendant’s home court also benefits one
particular aspect of efficiency, namely the enforceability of the prospective decision.100
Finally, the fact that alternative jurisdictional rules are inherently flexible probably also
constitutes an advantage.  Flexibility is, of course, not per se objective, but it enables the
plaintiff to avoid solutions that would be particularly unfair or inefficient.  Where, for
example, an exclusive jurisdictional rule would lead to allocating jurisdiction to the courts
of a country whose judicial system is particularly inefficient (and where trials are exces-
sively long), alternative rules provide a remedy.  Similarly, where such rule would lead to
the courts of country A deciding a dispute under the laws of country B (which may be
inconvenient), an alternative rule providing for the jurisdiction of the courts of country B
may be in the common interest of the parties.
97. See Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Must Plaintiffs Seek Out Defendants?  The Contemporary Standing of Actor
Sequitur Forum Rei, 8 KING’S COLLEGE LAW JOURNAL 23, 23 (1997-1998) (quoting J. SCHRO¨DER, INTERNA-
TIONALE ZUSTA¨NDIGKEIT 229, 229 (1971)).
98. Id. at 29 (acknowledging that litigating in the defendant’s forum favors the defendant, at least as far as
“accessibility and familiarity” is concerned).  However, this author also rightly emphasizes that such general
statements are inappropriate as far as substantive and procedural matters are concerned.  He observes that,
“[t]he defendant’s domicile may well turn out to favour . . . plaintiffs while the plaintiff’s domicile favours
defendants.” Id.
99. Exceptional circumstances that may warrant allocating jurisdiction to the plaintiff’s home courts may
consist of contractual relationships involving parties with unequal bargaining powers. See, e.g., Council Regu-
lation 44/2001, art. 16(1), 2000 O.J. (L 012) (EC) (authorizing a consumer to bring claims before the courts
of his domicile).
100. In fact, if the plaintiff obtains a favorable decision from a court of the defendant’s domicile/residence,
then it will not be necessary to seek enforcement abroad.
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2. Exclusive Jurisdictional Rules: An Unrealistic and Problematic Alternative
The alternative to the current legal regime that is based on jurisdictional options for
plaintiffs would be a system that removes those options and establishes rules of exclusive
jurisdiction.  At present, most legal systems actually apply exclusive jurisdictional rules,
but only with regard to specific categories or types of disputes.101  Those exceptional rules
reflect the existence of exclusive jurisdiction of specialized public law bodies in certain
matters102 and the public interests involved in others.103
The system contemplated here is very different.  It is based on a general application of
exclusive jurisdictional rules for all possible disputes (and on their uniform application at
the international level).  Such a system would certainly present some advantages.  For one,
it would ensure a high degree of predictability and limit, or even exclude, litigation relat-
ing to jurisdictional issues.  Second, it would—at least in theory—produce the best results
in terms of efficiency because all rules of jurisdiction could be formulated with a view to
achieving this particular objective.
But such a system seems difficult, if not impossible, to establish.  In fact, it requires
general agreement at the international level on what those exclusive jurisdictional rules
should be.  In the absence of such international uniformity, jurisdictional conflicts would
be inevitable.  There would be, first of all, positive conflicts, i.e., situations where the
courts of two or several countries would assert jurisdiction over a particular claim—a situ-
ation that constitutes a return to alternative rules.  Second, and this may be more prob-
lematic, a non-uniform system of exclusive jurisdictional rules may lead to negative
conflicts, i.e., scenarios where no court considers that it has jurisdiction over a particular
dispute.
The effectiveness of such a model thus depends on international consensus regarding
the precise contents of the various rules of (exclusive) jurisdiction.  That the achievement
of international agreement on jurisdictional rules is generally problematic, to say the least,
is notably illustrated by the negotiations conducted under the auspices of the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law in relation to the drafting of a multilateral conven-
tion on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.104  As Brand
predicted, basic differences between U.S. and European approaches, as well as mutual lack
of understanding, have proven to be an insurmountable stumbling block in this context.105
Moreover, many countries may be opposed to the very idea of exclusive jurisdiction.
The adoption of rules of exclusive jurisdiction would mean that, as a practical matter,
101. See, e.g., Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 64, at art. 22.
102. See, e.g., id. at art. 22(4) (providing that disputes concerning the validity of intellectual property rights
can only be heard by the courts of the place where the relevant rights have been deposited or registered).
103. The vitality of those interests notably explains why disputes regarding rights pertaining to immovable
property are generally considered to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the place where the
relevant property is located. See, e.g., id. at art. 22(1).
104. The drafting of such a convention was initially proposed by the United States back in 1992 and notably
led to the adoption of a first draft in 1999.  Due to irreconcilable differences between the negotiating parties,
the project was eventually narrowed down to cover only the issue of choice-of-court agreements. See generally
SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDG-
MENTS, TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003).
105. Brand, supra note 90, at 127 (“The successful negotiation of a multilateral treaty on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments will not be an easy task.”).
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many claims brought against defendants domiciled in country A may not be heard in the
courts of country A (provided that one adopts a closest-connection approach).  This, how-
ever, stands in contrast with a deeply-rooted tradition according to which states allege to
have an interest in having their domestic courts hear claims involving their nationals.  In
some countries, this has historically led to the recognition of “jurisdictional privileges,”106
affording nationals systematic access to their home courts.  While this may no longer be a
prevalent approach,107 remnants of this philosophy may create obstacles to the acceptance
of rules of exclusive jurisdiction.
Assuming that an international system based on exclusive jurisdictional rules is achieva-
ble, it would not, however, be the best solution.  First of all, the benefits mentioned above
(predictability and efficiency) are only relative.  Even if a rule provides for the exclusive
jurisdiction of a particular court, the formulation of the connecting factor that the rule is
based upon may create options.  If, for example, the rule provides that tort claims must be
brought in the courts of the country “where the harmful event occurred,” this may include
both the place of the causal event and the place where the actual damage is suffered.108
Moreover, both the causal event and the damage may occur in more than one country,
which again creates additional jurisdictional options.  Hence, exclusive rules seem unable
to prevent alternatives that are the result of factually complex situations.
Also, the achievement of efficiency via exclusive jurisdictional rules may be questionable
in individual cases.  In fact, it may be difficult to elaborate a rule that ensures the greatest
possible efficiency in a large majority of cases.  Again, the hypothetical rule stated in the
preceding paragraph (jurisdiction of the courts of the place where the harmful event oc-
curred) is illustrative.  While, as a general rule, relevant evidentiary documents and wit-
nesses are likely to be located in the country “where the harmful event occurred,” this may
not always be true.  For example, in a case where one German tourist negligently causes
physical harm to another German tourist while on a trip in Arizona, and where all wit-
nesses are also German tourists, the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Arizona would
not be the most efficient solution.109
The adoption of an internationally uniform set of rules of exclusive jurisdiction is thus
not only highly unrealistic, but probably even undesirable.  Undeniably, it is appropriate
to limit the number of grounds (or connecting factors) upon which a court’s jurisdiction
106. In France, for example, those “privile`ges de juridiction” are found in Articles 14 and 15 of the Code
civil, which provide for the right of both French plaintiffs and French defendants to have their cases heard by
French courts. See Code civil [C. civ.] art. 14-15 (Fr.); see also BELL, supra note 40, at 10 (discussing Article
14).
107. Jurisdictional privileges are hardly compatible with international comity and practical necessities.
Thus, in France, for example, courts have recognized the possibility to “waive” these privileges.  Moreover,
Articles 14 and 15 do not apply where international law obligations provide otherwise. See Code civil [C. civ.]
art. 14-15 (Fr.).  Most notably, as far as disputes involving defendants domiciled in the European Union are
concerned, those provisions are superseded by the regime established under EC Council Regulation 44/2001.
See generally Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 64.
108. Id.
109. This example is borrowed from Martine Stu¨ckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the
Hague Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 949, 949 (2000).  Admittedly, this is a rather exceptional scenario.
Also, this article does not deny the possibility for an exclusive jurisdictional rule to take such exceptional
circumstances into account.  The hypothetical rule on jurisdiction over tort matters could thus allocate juris-
diction to the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred (or where the effects are produced), unless
both the plaintiff and the defendant are domiciled in the same foreign state.
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may be based in an international case.  In this respect, the exclusion of exorbitant rules is
particularly helpful.  However, the availability of alternatives to the defendant’s home
court, provided that those are based on considerations of efficiency, is the better solution.
B. INCENTIVES FOR PLAINTIFFS NOT TO FORUM SHOP
As has certainly become evident by now, in international (but also domestic) disputes, a
plaintiff’s forum selection is frequently based on the pursuit of specific strategic interests.
However, this pursuit of advantages may turn out to be counter-productive and have un-
desired side effects.  In fact, for a number of reasons, the plaintiff may ultimately be de-
prived of the benefits of a favorable decision when he seeks to have that decision enforced
abroad.  Inasmuch as it may complicate enforcement of the decision, forum shopping thus
plays the role of a Damocles sword hanging over the plaintiff’s head.
This Damocles sword creates an incentive for the plaintiff to refrain from attempting to
obtain results that would be considered grossly unfair in the likely enforcement jurisdic-
tion.  It also prompts the plaintiff to select a forum whose jurisdiction will be recognized
by the enforcement court.  In other words, it creates an incentive for the plaintiff not to
forum shop.  In addition, the plaintiff has an evident personal interest in selecting an effi-
cient forum, which contributes to limiting actual forum shopping practices.
1. Incentive to Avoid Outcomes That Would be Considered Grossly Unfair in Potential
Enforcement Jurisdictions
The logic of this Damocles sword is simple.  The plaintiff selects a forum that is, a
priori, not the most appropriate one, but the one that allows him to obtain a particularly
favorable decision.  He sues the defendant in a country other than the latter’s home coun-
try and will ultimately need to have the decision enforced in the defendant’s home juris-
diction.  If the decision handed down is perceived to be grossly unfair or inadequate by the
enforcement court, then enforcement may be denied based on a violation of the enforce-
ment court’s public policy.110
A classic example of such situations is provided by punitive damages cases.111  A Euro-
pean plaintiff sues a European defendant in a U.S. court because of the prospect of being
awarded punitive damages.  The facts of the case are not directly linked to the United
States, but the court decides that it has jurisdiction, rules in favor of the plaintiff, and
awards punitive damages.  When the plaintiff attempts to have the decision enforced in
the defendant’s home jurisdiction, the competent court refuses enforcement on the
grounds that punitive damages are contrary to its domestic public policy.112
Hence, in such cases, rational plaintiffs will refrain from seeking the advantage of puni-
tive damages, as they will only incur additional cost without any actual benefit.  As this
example illustrates, plaintiffs have an incentive not to seek particularly favorable outcomes
if such outcomes would be contrary to the basic notions of fairness and justice of probable
110. See Chao & Neuhoff, supra note 64, at 157-59.
111. See generally Borchers, supra note 15.
112. Virtually all European States consider punitive damages awards to be contrary to public policy.  For an
insightful discussion of this position, see Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages—A European Perspective, 68 LA. L.
REV. 741, 741-64 (2008).
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enforcement jurisdictions.  This incentive will be particularly effective if the defendant
does not own any assets in jurisdictions other than his home jurisdiction.113
2. Incentive to Select a Court Whose Jurisdiction is Based on International Standards
As this article has already pointed out, the pursuit of strategic interests may prompt a
plaintiff to consider a large number of potential courts and to select a forum that is only
loosely connected to the parties or the facts underlying the dispute.  Sometimes, the juris-
diction of the chosen court may be based on an exorbitant ground of jurisdiction such as
the presence of defendant-owned assets114 or the temporary presence of the defendant
himself115 that allowed him to be served in the jurisdiction concerned.
Here, again, this may lead to enforcement problems.  In fact, under the laws of many
countries, one of the requirements that must be met in order for a foreign court decision
to be enforced is that the jurisdictional basis relied upon by that court is recognized in the
enforcement jurisdiction.116  In other words, country A will only enforce judgments ren-
dered in country B if the exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant court of country B is in
accordance with country A’s own rules on international jurisdiction.  If, for example, the
jurisdiction of a court is only based on the presence of assets owned by the defendant, then
the judgments rendered by this court may not be enforced in those countries that do not
recognize this particular jurisdictional ground.
These potential enforcement problems constitute an incentive for plaintiffs to refrain
from bringing claims in courts whose jurisdiction would be based on unusual or exorbitant
grounds.  Thus, they contribute to narrowing the scope of jurisdictions in which a plaintiff
can reasonably be expected to initiate proceedings.  By limiting the number of practical
options, this incentive helps limiting forum-shopping strategies.
3. Plantiffs’ Interest in Efficiency
As this article has explained, one of the potential detrimental consequences of forum
selection is lack of, or limited, procedural efficiency.  But the achievement of such effi-
ciency is, obviously, in the interest of the plaintiff.  Therefore, he will only choose an
inefficient forum if the loss of efficiency is compensated by advantages pertaining to the
actual outcome, to practical convenience, or to the ease of enforcement.  The interest that
the plaintiff has in an efficient conduct of the proceedings thus constitutes another factor
that limits recourse to forum-shopping tactics.
Conclusion
This article has shown that the concept of forum shopping can only be useful if distin-
guished from the broader term forum “selection.”  Accordingly, forum shopping can ade-
quately define those instances of forum selection where the actual choice made by the
113. If, in the above example, the defendant also owns assets in the United States (or more generally in any
country that enforces punitive damages awards), then the incentive for the plaintiff not to forum shop will be
(much) more limited.
114. See Juenger, supra note 1, at 554 (discussing attachment-jurisdiction).
115. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff adversely affects the legitimate objectives pursued by rules on international juris-
diction.  In essence, those objectives are fairness and efficiency (as defined earlier).
The basic conclusion of this article is that the potentially detrimental impact of forum
selection is limited.  Contrary to what numerous writers argue, tactics aimed at benefiting
from favorable procedural or substantive laws are not detrimental to the achievement of
fairness and should not, therefore, be considered as forum shopping.  Also, the lack of
decisional uniformity caused by the practice of forum selection is not, as such, problem-
atic—not because of the reasons put forward by Professor Juenger (essentially the desira-
bility of applying the substantively superior lex fori), but because lack of uniformity does
not directly impact the equality between the parties (fairness).  Thus, the real issues that
forum selection may cause are issues of efficiency and, to a more limited extent, issues of
unequal convenience.
Importantly, this article has also shown that, at the international level, forum shopping
is inevitable as long as litigants are offered jurisdictional options or alternatives.  This
article has also shown that the availability of such alternatives, though it generates forum
shopping opportunities, is ultimately beneficial to the interests of international litigation
inasmuch as it strikes a reasonable balance between efficiency and fairness, on the one
hand, and the interests of the plaintiff and those of the defendant, on the other.  Finally,
this article has also emphasized that, as a practical matter, litigants have incentives to
refrain from forum shopping, which contributes to limiting the practical significance of
this problem.
The identification of potential problems caused by forum selection, as well as the over-
all conclusion that the magnitude of such problems is limited, should be borne in mind
when elaborating policies addressing forum shopping, or when assessing current ap-
proaches.  In particular, it may usefully inform the rather controversial debate surround-
ing the objectives pursued by the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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Abstract
Chinese investments overseas have seen strong growth rates in recent years.  This has caused
much interest, but also some concerns.  Taking recently published official data as a starting point,
this article first recalls how overseas investments of Chinese enterprises have evolved in the past and
discusses what the current trend is.  It then summarizes the main features of China’s outward
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investment regime and discusses practical consequences of related rules and regulations.  In its main
part, this article explores the broader implications of China’s increasing outbound investments by
analyzing possible future scenarios and consequential risks, as well as available legal reactions.
I. Introduction
China’s1 economy recovered quickly from the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.
During the first quarter of 2011, China’s economy grew 9.7%, which is an impressive,
although slightly lower, growth rate compared to the 10.3% of the first quarter of 2010.2
It is believed that “China has surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in
the world.”3  Some commentators expect China to take the number one spot from the
United States of America soon.4
In line with these developments, Chinese multi-nationals, in particular Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs),5 are pushing across the borders. Consequently, Chinese over-
seas investments have seen strong growth rates in recent years.  This has caused much
interest, but also some concerns.  Taking statistical data recently published by the PRC
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),6 this article first recalls how overseas investments of
Chinese enterprises have evolved in the past and discusses what the current trend is.
China controls foreign inward investments by way of a variety of regulatory tools,7 and the
same is true for outward investments of Chinese enterprises.  Section three, therefore,
summarizes the main features of China’s outward investment regime.8  Section four dis-
cusses practical consequences of related rules and regulations.  It also explores the broader
implications of China’s increasing outbound investments.  Based on possible future scena-
rios, it identifies risks and possible legal reactions.
1. Here and in the following “China” stands for the Chinese mainland excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwan.  After more than 150 years under colonial rule, Hong Kong and Macau became part of the People’s
Republic of China and obtained the status of Special Administrative Regions on July 1, 1997 and on Dec. 20,
1999 respectively.  Based on the “one country, two systems-doctrine,” invented by the late Deng Xiaoping,
the legal systems of Hong Kong and Macau will remain unchanged for a period of fifty years from the date of
the so-called hand-over.  Lutz-Christian Wolff, China’s Private International Investment Law: One-Way Street
into PRC Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1039, 1047-048 (2008).  The situation of Taiwan is less settled, because
both the central government in Beijing and Taiwan’s government officially claim to be the legitimate repre-
sentative for all of China. Id. at 1048.
2. Cary Huang, Foreigners Put Focus on China Services Sector, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 18,
2011, at B6.
3. Frances L. Woo, Malcolm Moller & Tiffany Chan, China Outbound:  To Infinity and Beyond–Offshore,
CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENT GUIDE, 2011, at 55, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2836570/
Channel/193438/China-Outbound-To-infinity-and-beyondOffshore.html.
4. John Gong, A Lot of Hot Air, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 23, 2011, at A15.
5. LUTZ-CHRISTIAN WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS:  A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 4
(2011).
6. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, 2010 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DI-
RECT INVESTMENT (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/13160696586
09.pdf.
7. LUTZ-CHRISTIAN WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA:  LAW AND PRACTICE 5-12 (4th ed.
2010).
8. Section 3 is an updated summary of a comprehensive study that was published in May 2011. See
WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5.
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II. Chinese Investments Overseas in Numbers9
A. INWARD VS. OUTWARD VOLUME
In the past, the focus of investment projects related to China was always on inward
projects conducted by foreign entities on the Chinese mainland.  The huge potential of
the Chinese market and the relatively low labor costs suggested chances and opportunities
that were not to be missed.  Recent data indicate that this trend will continue.  For exam-
ple, between January and July 2011, the contracted foreign investment volume amounted
to 140,276 billion U.S.D., marking an increase of 20.71% year on year.10  The volume of
actual used foreign investment was 69,187 billion U.S.D., which was an increase of
18.57% compared to 2010.11
Overseas investments of Chinese enterprises have seen similar impressive growth rates
only in recent times.  Between 1990 and 2000, China’s outward investment volume was
less than three billion U.S.D. per year.12  China’s outward investment volume has, how-
ever, increased considerably since the beginning of the new millennium.13  The Chinese
government pushed this development with the initiation of its so-called “going-out pol-
icy,” which was driven, in part, by the goal to convert China’s huge foreign exchange
reserves of over two trillion U.S.D. into less risky tangible assets.14  After a temporary
slowdown resulting from the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, China’s economy recov-
ered quickly, finally yet importantly due to a government stimulus package worth four
trillion RMB.15  The volume of Chinese investment projects overseas has rebounded
accordingly.16
In 2009 China ranked sixth worldwide in terms of its overseas investments,17 contribut-
ing 5.1% to the aggregate global outward investment volume.18  In 2010 China’s overseas
investment volume was, for the first time, bigger than Japan’s.  China now ranks fifth
9. Id. at 1-6.
10. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS OF JANUARY–JULY 2011 ON NATIONAL ABSORPTION OF
FDI (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestment/201109/
20110907723320.html.
11. Compare id., and Jane Cai, FDI Tapers Off Amid Global Turbulence, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
20, 2011, at B3 (reporting that foreign direct investment in mainland China grew 7.88% in Sept. 2011,
marking a decrease from the 11.1% growth in Aug. 2011), with Denise Tsang, Rising Costs to Hit China’s FDI
Rate, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 17, 2011, at B1-2.
12. Mellisa Murphy, Freeman Briefing:  Issue in Focus: China’s “Going Out” Investment Policy, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., May 27, 2008, at 1, available at http://csis.org/publication/freeman-briefing-
may-27-2008.
13. See PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 82.
14. A Brave New World:  The Climate of Chinese M&A Abroad, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 2010, at
7; Mark O’Neill, China’s Western Front, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST MAGAZINES, Sept. 19, 2011, at 16,
available at http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.1d923702d0f3d4b2b5326b10cba0a0a0/?vg
nextoid=05071ad157d52310VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=mag&issue=20110919&ss=
Money&s=Magazines.
15. Wang Weidong & Geoffrey Mullen, China’s Stimulus Package and the Infrastructure Sector, ASIAN-
COUNSEL, Mar. 2009, at 32-34.
16. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010, 6, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
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worldwide19 and has reached a total outflow volume of 68,811.31 billion U.S.D., of which
12.5% was financial and 87.5% was non-financial in nature.20  As of the end of 2010, more
than 13,000 Chinese outward investors had invested in 16,000 foreign enterprises located
in 178 countries and regions.21  During the first half of 2011, Chinese companies invested
in 2,169 foreign enterprises in 117 countries and regions.22  There is broad consensus that
China’s overseas investment volume will continue to grow with force in the future.23
B. TARGET COUNTRIES
According to official statistics,24 in 2010, Chinese overseas direct investments were
spread in terms of the cumulative volume among different target regions as follows:25
• Asia: 65.24%
• Latin America: 15.31%
• Europe: 9.82%
• North America: 3.81%
• Africa: 3.07%
• Oceania: 2.75%
China’s investments in Asia have slightly decreased since 2010, mirrored by a modest
increase of investments in Europe, Latin America, and North America.  In 2010, the fol-
lowing countries were ranked the top twenty-five destinations for Chinese investments
overseas (the 2009 top destinations are indicated in parenthesis):26
(1) Hong Kong (Hong Kong) (14) Brazil (South Korea)
(2) British Virgin Islands (Cayman Islands) (15) Cambodia (Algeria)
(3) Cayman Islands (Australia) (16) Turkmenistan (Congo)
(4) Luxembourg (Luxembourg) (17) Germany (Indonesia)
(5) Australia (British Virgin Islands) (18) South Africa (Cambodia)
(6) Sweden (Singapore) (19) Hungary (Laos)
(7) USA (USA) (20) United Arab Emirates (UK)
(8) Canada (Canada) (21) Japan (Germany)
(9) Singapore (Macau) (22) Pakistan (Nigeria)
(10) Myanmar (Myanmar) (23) UK (Kyrgyzstan)
(11) Thailand (Russia) (24) Laos (Egypt)
(12) Russia (Turkey) (25) Vietnam (Iran)
(13) Iran (Mongolia)
19. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2011, 9, 47, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2011 (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2011_embargoed
_en.pdf.
20. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 79.
21. Id.
22. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS OF CHINA’S NON-FINANCIAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2010 (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/date/2011
07/20110707660092.html.
23. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 56.
24. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 83-87.
25. For 2009 see WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 2-3.
26. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 83-87; for 2009 see WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND IN-
VESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 2.
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For tax structuring reasons, it is common practice for Chinese inward and outward
investors to take advantage of special purpose offshore companies.  Special purpose com-
panies are normally located in low or zero tax jurisdictions and are used only to hold
investments onshore, sometimes through additional layers of other special purpose com-
panies.  It is therefore not surprising to find Hong Kong, Luxembourg, the Cayman Is-
lands,27 and the British Virgin Islands28 among the top destinations for Chinese
investments.  In particular, more than fifty-five percent of China’s investments overseas
were “channeled” through Hong Kong in past years.29
In 2010, Chinese acquisitions of Canadian and U.S. companies increased by eighty-one
percent to 6.8 billion U.S.D.30  This is seen as only the “beginning of a tidal wave” as
another one trillion to two trillion U.S.D. of Chinese investments in U.S. targets alone is
envisaged this decade.31  Commentators expect that Chinese investments in Europe will
also see a substantial increase in the years to come.32  At the same time, Chinese invest-
ments in African countries have dropped proportionally from 3.8% of China’s total over-
seas investment volume in 2009 to 3.07% in 2010.33
III. China’s Outward Investment Regime
A. GENERAL
China’s overseas investment regime is laid out in a variety of rules and regulations cov-
ering a number of subject areas, with different authorities in charge of their enactment,
interpretation, and enforcement.  The existing legislative diversity, as well as the power
structure of the concerned government authorities, often makes it difficult to understand
the precise procedure to be followed by a Chinese enterprise planning to invest abroad.
Additional problems arise from the fact that laws and regulations are partly unclear,
inconsistent, or incomplete.34
The main features of China’s outward investment regime are summarized in the
following.35
27. For investments in Africa via the Cayman Islands, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, see Woo, Moller &
Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
28. See Naomi Rovnick, Caribbean Tax Haven Adds Heat to China’s Hot Money, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, May 19, 2011, at A1, A4.
29. Enoch Yiu, Rules Hamper Use of Yuan for Overseas Investment, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 14,
2011, at B3.  For the practice of “round-tripping” see infra, Section 3, Part D.
30. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55; James Flanigan, Ailing U.S. Firms Survive with a Helping
Hand from China, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 8, 2011, at 16 (in 2010, the value of Chinese
investments in U.S. companies was U.S. $5 billion); Eric Ng, PetroChina Quits Deal for Canada Gas Firm
Stake, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 23, 2011, at B4 (withdrawing from a Canadian $5.4 billion stake
in a natural gas project “has not affected PetroChina’s overseas development plan and business strategy in
North America.”).
31. Flanigan, supra note 30, at 16.
32. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 58.
33. Cf. WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 2.
34. Cf. WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 16.
35. Cf. WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 13-27 (discussing approval and regis-
tration requirements); id. at 81-105 (discussing China’s outbound investment tax aspects).
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B. NDRC APPROVAL
First, overseas investments in the form of direct investments, or M&A transactions,
conducted directly or indirectly through offshore subsidiaries by Chinese individuals, legal
persons, or other entities36 require the approval of the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC).37  The NDRC approval requirement is meant to ensure: (1) com-
pliance with Chinese laws and regulations; (2) compliance with industrial policies; (3) non-
violation of the sovereignty, security and public interest of the Chinese state and of inter-
national law; (4) general compliance with the overall economic and financial state plan-
ning and development; (5) financial viability; and (6) technical feasibility of Chinese
overseas investment projects.38
Chinese outward investors are not allowed to sign any legally binding documents before
obtaining a NDRC Approval Certificate or a Filing Certificate.39  The Approval or Filing
Certificate issued by the NDRC, or the State Council, is required for Chinese outward
investors to go through mandatory foreign exchange, customs, immigration, and tax pro-
cedures.40  In principle, the NDRC decides whether approval is granted within twenty
working days from the acceptance of the project application report.41
The power of different NDRC levels to approve outward investment projects differs
depending on the size of a project, the target industry, and the target country or region.42
Generally speaking, central level NDRC approval—in special cases with State Council
endorsement—is necessary for big or strategically important projects.43  Less important
projects are within the approval power of provincial-level NDRC branches or NDRC
branches at the level of municipalities directly under the central government, autonomous
36. Notice on Issues Concerning the Improvement of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects
(promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, June 8, 2009, effective June 8, 2009), art. 2 (China).
37. Compare Notice on Issues Concerning the Improvement of the Administration of Overseas Investment
Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, June 8, 2009, effective June 8, 2009) (China),
and Notice on Record-Filing Certification for Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev.
& Reform Comm’n Gen. Office, May 30, 2007, effective May 30, 2007) (China), with Notice on Relevant
Issues Concerning the Establishment of Risk Guarantee Mechanism for Key Overseas Investment Projects
(promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n and the China Export & Credit Ins. Corp., Jan. 25, 2005,
effective Jan. 25, 2005) (China).
38. Interim Measures for the Administration of Verification and Approval of Overseas Investment Projects
(promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Oct. 9, 2004, effective Oct. 9, 2004), art. 18 (China)
[hereinafter Interim Measures].
39. Id. art. 20 (supplemented by  Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Establishment of Risk Guaran-
tee Mechanism for Key Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n
and the China Export & Credit Ins. Corp., Jan. 25, 2005, effective Jan. 25, 2005)) (China);  Notice on Re-
cord-Filing Certification for Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm.
Gen. Office, May 30, 2007, effective May 30, 2007) (China);  Notice on Issues Concerning the Improvement
of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n,
June 8, 2009, effective June 8, 2009) (China); Notice on Delegating Powers on Approval of Overseas Invest-
ment Projects to Authorities at Lower Levels (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Feb. 14,
2011, effective Feb. 14, 2011) (China)).
40. Interim Measures, supra note 38, arts. 19-20.
41. Id. art. 11.
42. Notice on Delegating Powers on Approval of Overseas Investment Projects to Authorities at Lower
Levels (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Feb. 14, 2011, effective Feb. 14, 2011) at 1-4,
(China).
43. Interim Measures, supra note 38, arts. 4, 7.
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regions, cities under separate state planning, and the Xinjiang Production and Reform
Commission.44
C. MOFCOM APPROVAL
Non-financial overseas investments by Chinese entities with legal person status45 also
require the approval of MOFCOM.46  The MOFCOM approval requirement applies
whether an investment is direct or via the M&A mode, as well as in relation to the acquisi-
tion of control over foreign targets through other means.47  An “Enterprise Overseas In-
vestment Certificate” issued by MOFCOM upon approval48 enables a Chinese overseas
investor to handle foreign exchange, bank, customs, and other formalities.49  In addition,
offshore investments of subsidiaries controlled by Chinese outward investors are subject to
a MOFCOM filing requirement.50
Central-level MOFCOM approval is required for relatively large projects and projects
that are politically sensitive or that are conducted through special purpose companies.51
Projects with an investment volume between ten million and one hundred million U.S.D.,
projects in the field of energy and minerals, and projects needing to raise funds within
China, require provincial level MOFCOM approval.52  For projects that are not within
the approval power of central level MOFCOM or of provincial level MOFCOM, a stan-
dardized Application Form for Overseas Investment53 must be submitted online.54  Ac-
cording to MOFCOM, about eighty-five percent of all Chinese overseas investment
projects should fall within this category.55
D. INDUSTRY-RELATED REQUIREMENTS
Special restrictions apply to Chinese overseas investments in regulated industry sectors.
Overseas investments by financial institutions are subject to the approval of the China
44. Id. art. 5.
45. Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investments (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
May 1, 2009, effective May 1, 2009), art. 2 [hereinafter Administrative Measures].  Overseas investments by
individuals and by China Investment Corporation (China’s sovereign wealth fund company) are not covered
by the Administrative Measures.  Neal Stender, Lin Lawrence Zhou & Yan Zeng, Outbound unbound?,
CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 15, 2009, at 18-19.
46. See Administrative Measures, supra note 45, and  Notice on Joint Annual Inspection of Overseas Invest-
ments (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce and the State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Dec. 28, 2009,
effective Dec. 28, 2009) (China); WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 17 (for special
rules enacted at provincial and municipal level).  Overseas investments are prohibited if they endanger
China’s sovereignty, national security or public interest, if they violate Chinese law, damage the relationships
with a foreign country, or involve technology or goods that are prohibited from being exported.  Administra-
tive Measures, supra note 45, art. 9.
47. Administrative Measures, supra note 45, art. 38.
48. Id. arts. 5, 15.
49. Id. arts. 29, 30.
50. Id. art. 39.
51. Id. art. 6; id. art. 37 (for the term ‘special purpose company’).
52. Id. arts. 7, 14.
53. Id. art. 8.
54. Foreign Investment Management System, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, http://femhzs.mofcom.gov.cn/
fecpmvc/pages/fem/LoginedHome.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
55. Michael Tan, Chinese Overseas Investment Summarized, CHINA L. & PRAC. Feb. 3, 2010, at 24-25.
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Banking Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE).56  The China Insurance Regulatory Commission must approve overseas invest-
ments in the insurance sector.57  Overseas investment projects of securities companies are
subjected to the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).58 Sim-
ilarly, overseas investments by companies listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock ex-
change, as well as investments into foreign listed target companies, also require CSRC
approval.  Finally, involvement of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) may be required for the state-owned sector.59
E. ROUND-TRIPPING
It has long been common practice for Chinese companies to engage in so-called round-
tripping practices.60  Round-tripping entails the establishment of a special purpose com-
pany abroad that then re-invests in China by establishing (artificial) foreign investment
enterprises (FIEs).61  The main goal of these structures was originally tax-related, as FIEs
enjoyed special tax holidays in China.62  China’s corporate income tax reform in 2008 and
the recent steps to prevent tax evasion have made the use of round-trip investments for
legal tax optimization more difficult.63  According to anecdotal evidence round-tripping,
however, is still widely used for tax avoidance purposes.  Round-tripping also offers access
to overseas debt financing through the special purpose company,64 and it allows circum-
venting onshore regulatory as well as practical problems related to listings on one of the
56. Law of the People’s Republic of China of Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Feb. 1, 2007), art.
2; Certain Provisions on Financial Management of Financial Holding Companies (promulgated by the Minis-
try of Finance, Sept. 1, 2009, effective Sept. 1, 2009), art. 13 (China); Financial Rules for Financial Enter-
prises (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Dec. 7, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), arts. 24, 27 ¶ 4 (China);
Notice on Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange Administration for Overseas Direct Investment of Domestic
Banks (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exch., June 30, 2010, effective Sept. 1, 2010) (discussing
SAFE involvement).
57. Measures for the Administration of the Establishment of Overseas Insurance Institutions by Insurance
Companies (promulgated by the China Ins. Regulatory Comm’n, July 31, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), art.
14 (China); Provisions on the Administration of Insurance Companies (promulgated by the China Ins. Regu-
latory Comm’n, Sept. 25, 2009, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 74 (China); Administrative Measures Regarding
Investment of Non-Insurance Institutions in Overseas Insurance Enterprises (promulgated by the China Ins.
Regulatory Comm’n, July 31, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), art. 6 (China); Measures for the Administration
of Insurance Conglomerates (Interim) (promulgated by the China Ins. Regulatory Comm’n, Mar. 12, 2010,
effective Mar. 12, 2010), arts. 9, 15 (China); Joel H. Rothstein, Insurance as a Transforming Force for China Real
Estate, CHINA L. & PRAC. Dec. 9, 2009, at 20-23; Zhan Hao, Ruling the Expanding Insurance Group Kingdom,
CHINA L. & PRAC. May 12, 2010, at 20-21.
58. Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Securities Companies (promulgated by the State
Council, Apr. 23, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), art. 13 (China).
59. Interim Measures for Administration of Overseas State-owned Property Rights of Central Enterprises
(promulgated by the State-owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n of the State Council, June 14, 2011,
effective July 1, 2011), arts. 2, 8 (China).
60. Also called:  “outbound-inbound investments.”
61. See WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA supra note 7, at 202 (providing a historical
background).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Robert Cookson, Investors Warned of Chinese Debt Danger, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at 35.
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Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai or Beijing65 by listing the special purpose company
offshore.  Offshore special purpose companies established by mainland entities for round-
tripping purposes have also been popular targets of investments by foreign private equity
funds.66
Since 2005, Chinese legislators have taken a tougher stance against round-tripping.67  A
SAFE registration and MOFCOM approval system for all outward foreign currency trans-
fers was created.68  The SAFE registration requires not only a prior issuance of the
MOFCOM approval document,69 but also a track record of at least three years for domes-
tic enterprises using offshore special purpose companies for round-trip investments as well
for the special purpose company itself.70  Furthermore, if any round-trip transaction en-
tails the acquisition of an onshore domestic enterprise, such enterprise will in principle
not enjoy FIE status71 and will be subject to central MOFCOM approval.72  Finally, the
overseas listing of an entity owned by mainland shareholders and established as a special
purpose company for such listing purpose is subject to CSRC approval, MOFCOM ap-
proval, NDRC verification, and SAFE approval and must comply with certain other
preconditions.73
F. FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL
China still operates a rather strict foreign exchange control system.74  As a matter of
principle, foreign exchange (FOREX) cannot be used for payment purposes in China.75
65. Lu Haitian et al., Venture Capital and the Law in China, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 229, 251 (2007).
66. Marcia Ellis & Auria Styles, Rethinking M&A in China, 34 CHINA BUS. REV. 36, 36 (2007).
67. See WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 202-204.
68. See Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange from Domestic
Residents’ Financing Through Overseas Special Purpose Vehicles and for Round-trip Investments (Circular
75), (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange Oct. 21, 2005, effective Nov. 1, 2005) (LEXIS
China Online) (China); Neil Stender & Zeng Yan, It’s SAFE Again for China Venture Capital Round-trip & Red-
chip Listings, CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 2005, at  15–18; Neil Stender et al., SAFE Plugs Holes for China/
Offshore Round-trip Investments, CHINA L. & PRAC., July 2007, at 58–60; see also Operation Rules on Relevant
Issues regarding Foreign Exchange Control over the Financing and Return of Investment of Domestic Re-
sidents through Overseas Special Purpose Companies, (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Ex-
change, May 20, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online).
69. Stender, supra note 68, at 58-60.
70. WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 23; see now the SAFE Rules of Operation
for the FOREX Administration of Financing and Round-trip Investments of Chinese Citizens through Spe-
cial Purpose Companies (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 20, 2011, effective July
1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China) (relating to individual round trip investors).
71. Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors Provisions (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce, effective June 22, 2009), art. 9, ¶ 3 (LEXIS China Online) (China).
72. Id. art. 11.
73. Id. arts. 40–47; Ellis, supra note 66, at 36; Jonathan Zhou, Little Red Chips Get an Overseas Opening,
CHINA L. & PRAC., May 2009, at 18.
74. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration (promulgated by
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, effective Aug. 5, 2008) (LEXIS China Online) (China)
[hereinafter PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration] (supplemented by a large number of
Circulars on specific topics).
75. Id. art. 8.
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SAFE approval is required for the provision of security to foreign parties76 and the grant-
ing of commercial loans to foreign parties by domestic non-banking institutions.77
Only designated financial institutions78 are allowed to engage in FOREX business and
have to operate special FOREX accounts for this purpose.79  All incoming and outgoing
FOREX payments have to be reported.80  SAFE registration is required before foreign
investors can open FOREX accounts.81  SAFE has the right to inspect and examine
FOREX transactions at any time.82  SAFE can also impose penalties in case of violations.83
In response to the difficulties caused by the global financial crisis, China’s foreign ex-
change control system saw some liberalization in 2009.84  Amongst other measures,85 the
FOREX management system related to overseas investments was improved.86  Chinese
enterprises are now allowed to make overseas investments with their own foreign ex-
change funds, domestic foreign exchange loans, foreign exchange purchased with RMB
funds, tangible assets, intangible assets, and other FOREX sources,87 subject to SAFE
registration and approval.88  Chinese entities and individuals no longer need to convert
current account FOREX receipts into RMB.89  Moreover, Chinese individuals and  enti-
ties may now keep offshore current account FOREX receipts offshore, i.e. these receipts
76. Id. art. 19.
77. Id. art. 20.
78. Id. art. 24.
79. Id. art. 24.
80. Id. arts. 6–7.
81. Id. art. 16.
82. Id. arts. 12, 33; Amy Chen & Jonathan Selvadoray, PRC Foreign Exchange Administration Regulations
Revised, CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct. 2008, at 27.
83. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, arts. 39–49 (LEXIS China Online).
84. See, e.g., Notice on Questions Regarding the Administration of Onshore FOREX Accounts of Foreign
Institutions (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, July 13, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009)
(LEXIS China Online) (China).
85. WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 226–228.
86. See, e.g., Provisions on Foreign Exchange Administration for Overseas Direct Investments by Domestic
Institutions (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, July 13, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009)
(LEXIS China Online) (China); see also Notice Regarding Foreign Exchange Administration of Overseas
Direct Investment by Domestic Banks (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, June 30,
2010, effective Sept. 1, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Measures for the Assessment of the Implemen-
tation of Foreign Exchange Regulations by Banks (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange,
effective Aug. 1, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
87. Provisions on Foreign Exchange Administration for Overseas Direct Investments by Domestic Institu-
tions (LEXIS China Online).
88. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, art. 9 (LEXIS China Online); Notice on Can-
celling and Adjusting the Examination and Approval Power and Administration Policies for Some Foreign
Exchange Businesses under Capital Accounts (promulgated by State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 23,
2011, effective June 1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Circular on Several Issues Regarding the Sub-
mission of Tax Certificates for Overseas Payments in the Service Industry (jointly promulgated by the State
Admin. of Foreign Exchange & the State Admin. of Tax’n, Nov. 25, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) (LEXIS
China Online) (China) (providing that tax certificates need to be submitted to competent tax authorities when
domestic entities and individuals make overseas payments of more than 30,000 U.S.D.).
89. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, art. 13 (LEXIS China Online); Notice on Is-
sues Regarding the Administration of Foreign Exchange for Foreign Lending by Domestic Enterprises
(promulgated by State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, June 9, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009) (LEXIS China
Online) (China); Liu Yi & Philip Zhengyu Ding, Shareholder Loans Permitted to Overseas Subsidiaries, CHINA L.
& PRAC., July 2009, at 40.
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do not have to be repatriated.90  Even RMB investments overseas are now possible under
measures introduced in early 2011,91 although Chinese outward investors still seem to
prefer using FOREX for overseas investment purposes supposedly due to the much easier
approval procedure.
G. FINANCING92
Since December 6, 2008, qualified commercial Chinese banks are allowed to grant
loans for M&A purposes to domestic purchasers of target companies and their offshore
special purpose companies.93  In this regard, certain preconditions must be fulfilled, e.g.
banks must establish suitable risk-management systems and meet a high capital adequacy
ratio of at least ten percent and maintain a specific loan loss reserve adequacy ratio of at
least one hundred percent.94  FOREX debt financing of overseas investment projects has
been possible since August 2009.95  Upon fulfillment of certain preconditions, domestic
enterprises can provide loans to their offshore subsidiaries by making use of their foreign
exchange funds, purchased foreign exchange funds, or currency sourced from foreign cur-
rency pools of their group companies.96
H. MERGER CONTROL
China’s rather new merger control regime is developing fast and has generated a lot of
interest in recent years.  China’s merger control rules apply to transactions inside and
outside mainland China, provided that they affect competition within the Chinese mar-
kets.97  Chinese outward investments may consequently fall within the scope of
applicability.98
90. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, art. 9 (LEXIS China Online); Chen, supra note
82, at 26; Operation Rules on Relevant Issues Regarding Foreign Exchange Control over the Financing and
Return of Investment of Domestic Residents through Overseas Special Purpose Companies (promulgated by
the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 20, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
91. Administrative Measures for the Pilot RMB Settlement of Outbound Direct Investment (promulgated
by the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 6, 2011, effective Jan. 6, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
92. See Jun Dai, Financing of China Outbound Investments, in WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS,
supra note 5, at 9–70; see also Xi Chao, Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors, in WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND
INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 71–79.
93. Guidelines for Risk Management of the Merger Loans of Commercial Banks (promulgated by the
China Banking Regulatory Commission, Dec. 6, 2008, effective Dec. 6, 2008) (LEXIS China Online)
(China).
94. Id. § 1.
95. Notice on Issues Regarding the Administration of Foreign Exchange for Foreign Lending by Domestic
Enterprises (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, June 9, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009)
(LEXIS China Online) (China).
96. Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Foreign Exchange Administration of Overseas Loans
Granted by Domestic Enterprises, arts. 1, 6, and 7 (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange,
June 9, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009); Regulator Makes Outbound Investment Easier, CHINA L. & PRAC., July
2009, at 9.
97. People’s Republic of China Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 2 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (LEXIS China Online) (China) [hereinafter PRC Anti-
Monopoly Law]; Marc Williams, The Impact of the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS,
supra note 5, at 43–58 (2011).
98. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 2 (LEXIS China Online).
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China’s current merger control regime is based on the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, which
became effective on August 1, 2008.99  The merger control rules of the PRC Anti-Monopoly
Law are supplemented by a large number of implementation rules and regulations100 en-
acted after August 2008 and to be enacted in the future.  Supervision and enforcement of
China’s merger control rules are within the scope of authority of MOFCOM.101
MOFCOM must be notified102 and specific documents must be submitted if a transaction
meets one of the following thresholds:103
(1) the aggregate global turnover104 of all the concerned enterprises exceeded RMB 10
billion in the previous financial year and the turnover within China105 of at least two of
the parties exceeded RMB 400 million in the previous financial year; or
(2) the aggregate turnover within China of all the concerned parties exceeded RMB 2
billion in the previous financial year, and the turnover within China of at least two con-
cerned parties exceeded RMB 400 million in the same period.106
99. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law; supra note 97, art. 57; Williams, supra note 97; WOLFF, MERGERS & AC-
QUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 247–71.
100. See, e.g., Regulations Concerning Thresholds for the Notification of Concentrations of Business Oper-
ators (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 3, 2008, effective Aug. 3,
2008) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Guidelines for Conducting Anti-Monopoly Examinations Regarding
Concentrations of Business Operators (Jan. 1, 2009); Guidelines for the Notification of Concentrations of
Business Operators (promulgated by the Anti-Trust Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 5, 2009, effec-
tive Jan. 5, 2009) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Guidelines for the Documents and Materials for the Notifi-
cation of Concentrations of Business Operators (promulgated by the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the Ministry
of Commerce, Jan. 5, 2009, effective Jan. 5, 2009) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Guidelines of the Anti-
Monopoly Commission Under the State Council Concerning the Definition of Relevant Markets (promul-
gated by Anti-Monopoly Comm’n of the State Council, May 24, 2009, effective, May 24, 2009); Measures for
the Examination of the Concentrations Between Undertakings, (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
Nov. 21, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Measures for the Reporting of Concen-
trations of Business Operators (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Nov. 21, 2009, effective Jan. 1,
2010 China) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Tentative Provisions on Implementing Divestiture of Assets or
Business in Concentration of Undertakings (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, July 5, 2010, effec-
tive July 5, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Measures for the Calculation of Turnover for the Consoli-
dated Declaration of the Business Operators in Financial Industry (promulgated jointly by the Ministry of
Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, China Securities Regulatory
Comm’n, and China Insurance Regulatory Comm’n, July 15, 2009, effective Aug. 15, 2009) (LEXIS China
Online) (China).
101. WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 251.  MOFCOM has established an
Anti-Monopoly Bureau. See MOFCOM, Anti-Monopoly Bureau, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn (last visited on
Nov. 18, 2011).  The Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council is in charge of strategic and coordina-
tion work.  PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 97, art. 9 ¶ 1; see also Susan Ning, Overview of the Anti-
Monopoly Law, CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct. 2007, at 23–25; Sharon Mann, Competition Law and Policy Develop-
ments in China: the New Anti-Monopoly Law, ASIAN COUNSEL, June 2008, at 42-46.
102. For details of the notification requirements, see Measures for the Reporting of Concentrations of Busi-
ness Operators (LEXIS China Online).
103. Regulations Concerning Thresholds for the Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators, art.
3 (LEXIS China Online); Alexander Vincent, Notification Thresholds for Merger Control, CHINA L. & PRACT.,
Sept. 2008, at 42–43.
104. For a definition of “turnover,” see Measures for the Reporting of Concentrations of Business Operators,
arts. 4–7 (LEXIS China Online).
105. “In China” is defined in Measures for the Reporting of Concentrations of Business Operators, art. 4, ¶
2 (LEXIS China Online).
106. For transactions conducted within the finance industry by banks, securities companies, futures compa-
nies, and other financial institutions, the turnover that triggers the notification requirement shall be calcu-
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MOFCOM can allow transactions subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions.107
MOFCOM should reach a final decision within ninety days.108  Between 2008 and the end
of 2010, MOFCOM cleared over 207 transactions, subjected six transactions to condi-
tions, and disallowed one transaction.109  Until mid-December 2011, an additional 194
notifications had been received of which 160 have been reviewed and closed.110  Four
cases were granted conditional approval and five cases were withdrawn.111  None of the
published MOFCOM decisions involve any Chinese overseas investment project or re-
lates to purely Chinese transactions without foreign involvement.112
I. INVESTMENTS IN HONG KONG, MACAU, AND TAIWAN
In line with the concept “one country, two systems,”113 investments by mainland enter-
prises in Hong Kong and Macau are treated like investments in foreign countries.114  Spe-
cial rules apply in relation to investments by mainland enterprises in Taiwan.115  These
rules have been enacted against the background of the conclusion of an Economic Coopera-
tion Framework Agreement (ECFA), which was signed by mainland and Taiwan representa-
tives in June 2010 and became effective on September 12, 2010.116  Investments by
mainland entities in Taiwan, including investments via offshore vehicles, require NDRC
and MOFCOM approval.117  In addition, the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office has to
be involved in the approval process.118  Preferential treatment under the ECFA as well as
special government support, e.g. in the form of special consultancy services, are available
lated on the basis of only ten percent of the turnover.  Measures for the Calculation of Turnover for the
Consolidated Declaration of the Business Operators in Financial Industry (LEXIS China Online).
107. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 97, art. 23.
108. For the possibility to extend this period see id. art. 26, ¶ 2.
109. Susan Ning & Huang Jing, MOFCOM Revealed Yearly Merger Control Statistics, CHINA LAW INSIGHT,
Sept. 26, 2011, http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/09/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/mofcom-
revealed-yearly-merger-control-statistics.
110. Susan Ning, Liwei Wang & Hazel Yin, AMB Director Shang Ming Speaks on Merger Enforcement in
2011, CHINA LAW INSIGHT, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.kingandwood.com/practice.aspx?id=antitrust-competi-
tion&language=en.
111. Id.
112. WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 261–62.
113. Wolff, supra note 1.
114. This is because regulations such as the “Administrative Measures on Matters to be Verified for Invest-
ments in and Establishment of Enterprises in the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions by
Mainland Enterprises,” originally effective Aug. 31, 2004, are no longer in force.
115. Measures for the Administration of Investments of Mainland Enterprises in Taiwan (promulgated by
the National Development and Reform Comm’n, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Taiwan Affairs Office
of the State Council, Nov. 9, 2010, effective Nov. 9, 2010) (CHINA L. & PRACT.) (China); Yujing Shu et al.,
New Regulations Governing Investment in Taiwan by Mainland Enterprises, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENT
GUIDE 2011, at 87-89, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2836629/Channel/193438/New-regulations-
governing-investment-in-Taiwan-by-mainland-enterprises.html; Wolff, Approval and Registration Require-
ments, in WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 13–27.
116. Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China,
http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40&news_id=19723 (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011).
117. Administrative Measures for Mainland Enterprises Investing in the Taiwan Region, arts. 4–6.  (promul-
gated by the Ministry of Commerce, the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the
State Council, Nov. 9, 2010, effective Nov. 9, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
118. Id. art. 7.
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subject to the fulfillment of certain criteria.119  NDRC examination and MOFCOM ex-
amination of Taiwan investment projects are to be conducted in line with the Interim
Measures and the Administrative Measures.120  The completion as well as any amendment of
the investment formalities in Taiwan must be registered with the NDRC, MOFCOM, and
the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office within fifteen working days.121
IV. Status Quo and Possible Future Developments:  Is Action Required?
A. DELAYS OF ONSHORE APPROVALS
As set out in the previous sections, Chinese enterprises are facing a number of restric-
tions when investing overseas.  China’s outward investment regime is diversified and com-
plex.122  Consequently, it is often difficult in practice to find out what precisely the legal
requirements are in a particular case to obtain clearance for an overseas investment pro-
ject.123  Furthermore, in some cases it was troublesome to obtain the necessary approvals
at all.  It has even been suggested that delays of over one year may have to be expected
depending on the facts of a particular case despite the existing statutory timelines.  In
many other cases, however, the process apparently did not create any difficulties and the
necessary approvals were obtained without many problems after some negotiations with
the relevant authorities.124
Chinese outward investors and their foreign counterparts can of course be adversely
affected by any delay.  The fact that it cannot be predicted precisely at what point in time
the Chinese approval authorities may clear a project creates uncertainties, which require
close attention.125  As the required approvals are de facto closing conditions for overseas
investment projects, China’s overseas investment rules need to be considered with great
care when planning and structuring Chinese outward transactions as well as when drafting
underlying documentation.  Statutory timelines and the possibility of delays beyond those
timelines must be taken into account.126  Moreover, it has been reported that the approval
requirements may have, in some cases, jeopardized the chances of Chinese outward inves-
tors by delaying the finalization of investment decisions and giving other non-Chinese
investors a competitive advantage in terms of timing when it came to bid for lucrative
targets.127
119. Id. art. 14.
120. Id. arts. 7, 9.
121. Id. art. 11.
122. See supra section III.
123. Id.
124. See Jason Chan, Restructuring First for Outbound Chinese M&A, CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 2011, at 15.
125. For a similar problem in relation to inward investments, see Lutz-Christian Wolff, International M&A
and the Problem of the Effective Date under Chinese Law, 33 COMMON LAW WORLD REV. 283, 283-94 (2004).
126. Benesh, Friedlaender, Coplan & Aranoff, LLP, China Goes Global: Examining China’s Outbound Invest-
ment, CHINA INSIGHTS, Jan. 2010, at 5; Stender, supra note 45, at 18-19.
127. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 14, at 198.
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B. IS CHINA TAKING CONTROL OF THE WORLD’S MARKETS?
While its rapidly increasing outward investment volume evidences China’s economic
strength, many other parts of the world are struggling to overcome ongoing economic
problems.  In particular, it became clear in the summer of 2011 that the global economic
problems, which had been thought to be solved in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis,
continue to exist.  The crisis is ongoing and may have even deepened.  All of a sudden,
China is seen not only as being strong enough to come to the aid of failing European
economies, but also as “a potential savior of the global economy.”128
At the same time, enterprises, particularly in the West and in Japan, have become cheap
targets for Chinese investments.129  This provokes the question of whether many parts of
the world’s economies will soon be controlled by Chinese enterprises, and, if so, whether
this should give rise to concerns and whether any action is required.  Cases in which pro-
posed Chinese investments have been blocked by competent state authorities, in particular
in the United States and Australia for state security reasons,130 seem to confirm fears along
these lines.131  In this regard, it must also be considered that Chinese SOEs are the driving
force behind China’s overseas investments.132  Even more than other Chinese enterprises
SOEs are said to be ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.133  Is it con-
sequently necessary to assume that the Chinese Communist Party will soon be in charge
of a rapidly growing number of non-Chinese multi-nationals and, thus, greater portions of
128. Cary Huang, World’s Banker of Choice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1, 2011, at A7, available at http:/
/topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/Worlds-banker-of-choice.
129. See Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 14, at 4; Takahiko Hyuga, Japan Says “Ni Hao” as Brands
Trump Diplomatic Tensions in China Takeovers, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2010, 1:12 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2010-12-15/japan-says-ni-hao-as-brands-trump-diplomacy-for-china-deals.html; Woo, Moller &
Chan, supra note 3, at 56.
130. See Susan Ning, Yin Ranran & Huang Jing, List of Outbound Investments by Chinese Companies Scrutinized
for National Security Concerns, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (Mar. 11, 2011, 6:37 PM), http://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2011/03/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/list-of-outbound-investments-by-chinese-companies-
scrutinized-for-national-security-concerns/; Bien Perez, Huawei Calls US’ Bluff on Security Threat Claims, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 26, 2011, at A1, A6; see also UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010, supra
note 16, at 76-81 (reporting that recent developments at the level of national investment regimes are to a
certain extent ambivalent.  On the one hand, there is a trend to increasing liberalization.  On the other hand,
domestic regimes, as well as the attitude of those bodies in charge of the implementation of these regimes,
show signs of new protectionism.).
131. In light of national security systems in other countries and the increasing foreign investment volume in
China via the M&A route, China has, in the meantime, established its own national security system based on
article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China. See generally Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in 2008 China Law LEXIS 1761. See also generally Circular of the
General Office of State Council on Establishment of the Security Review System for Merger and Acquisition
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the General Office of the State Council, Feb.
3, 2011, effective Mar. 4, 2011), translated in 2011 China Law LEXIS 118; Provisions of the Ministry of
Commerce on the Implementation of the Safety Review System for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 25, 2011, effective Sept.
1, 2011), translated in 2011 China Law LEXIS 573.
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. See RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 54
(2010).
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foreign markets?134  Do potential target countries have to tighten controls of Chinese
inward investments via their national security control systems?
A closer look reveals that related fears are unsubstantiated, at least at this point in time.
First, it appears to be a natural consequence of China’s new economic strength and the
liberalization of the Chinese economic system over the past three decades that Chinese
enterprises are globalizing their operations.135  There is no hard evidence suggesting that
Chinese outward investors are not behaving like any other multi-national enterprise with
headquarters in other countries.  In particular, it cannot be argued that Chinese outward
investors are following a more aggressive investment policy than other countries.  There is
also no evidence that Chinese investments overseas are aimed at conquering foreign mar-
kets in order to increase China’s political power.136  In particular, China’s overseas invest-
ment regime, as outlined above, appears to be more restrictive than those in most Western
countries.  Furthermore, UNCTAD has drawn attention to the fact that while most of
China’s outward investors are SOEs, it appears that the number of Chinese SOEs that
have invested abroad is still comparatively small.137  Finally, despite China’s impressive
growth rates, its overseas investment volume is still rather moderate compared with the
size of the country and its population in relation to its gross domestic product (GDP).138
Also, as already mentioned, in 2010 China’s portion of global foreign direct investment
(FDI) outflows reached only approximately 5.1%.139
C. GLOBAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ONSHORE PROBLEMS
While China’s economic development in the past years was impressive, as outlined in
the previous sections, it cannot be ignored that there are actual and potential problems
and risks.  In fact, some commentators have argued that China’s fast economic growth is
unbalanced and unsustainable:
One worry is that the first wave of bad loans from China’s huge 2008-2009 stimulus
is about to hit.  The bigger concern is how growth in recent years left the domestic
financial system less resilient.  China’s expansion relies on various counterproductive
policies: an undervalued, nonconvertible currency, off-balance-sheet arrangements to
mask debt and ample credit to politically connected firms that don’t necessarily make
the most productive use of capital.140
In this regard, China’s economic growth over the past decades in absolute numbers
does not say much about the economic competitiveness and the sustainability of its econ-
134. Id.
135. WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 197.
136. Id.
137. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011, supra note 19, at 31.
138. Compare Gong, supra note 4, at A15 (describing China’s GDP and GDP per capita) with supra Part II.A
(describing China’s overseas investment volume).
139. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 79; PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 79.
140. William Pesek, John Paulson, Subprime God, Flees Muddy Waters, BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/john-paulson-subprime-god-flees-muddy-waters-william-
pesek.html. See also David Barboza, Threat Lurking Under China’s Explosive Growth, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
July 8, 2011, at 1, 17; MCGREGOR, supra note 133, at 269.
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omy.141  In 2011, China’s current GDP does not even reach one-tenth of the per-capita
level of that of the United States.142  While some commentators have argued that “there is
no imminent threat of an economy-collapsing banking crisis,”143 China’s finance industry
has been said to carry huge risks due to bad loans.144  Moreover, the rising off-balance
sheet exposure of Chinese banks145 could at any time trigger a chain reaction within the
Chinese economy that may be difficult to control.146
In addition, debt-financing strategies through offshore special purpose companies147
could lead to considerable risk exposure of inward investors.148  If money borrowed by a
special purpose company is—as usual—used for investments in China, then foreign credi-
tors have no direct entitlement to the assets of the onshore investee company if the com-
pany encounters economic difficulties.149  In addition, under mainland China’s foreign
exchange control rules, the investee company would, in such a case, be able to remit only
after-tax profits abroad to service the offshore debt via the special purpose company.150
Commentators have drawn attention to the fact that these profits—if any—may be insuffi-
cient under the current market conditions to pay off offshore debts leading to refinancing
needs in due course.151
The lack of transparency due to insufficient corporate governance structures of Chinese
companies, as recently exposed in relation to Chinese companies listed overseas, adds to
the problems and a declining confidence in the Chinese economy.152  It must also be
considered that China can no longer automatically be regarded as a low-cost country.153
In contrast, China must compete globally, i.e., based on technological innovation and su-
perior market expertise.154  If and how China will be able to meet this challenge remains
to be seen.
141. Gong, supra note 4.
142. Id. Gong also points out that immediately before the downfall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, China held
the top GDP spot worldwide, at 241 billion U.S.D.
143. Barboza, supra note 140, at 17; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, People’s Republic of China:  Financial
System Stability Assessment: IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 11/321 7 (2011) [hereinafter IMF REPORT], available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25350.0.
144. See Pesek, supra note 140; IMF REPORT, supra note 143, at 28.
145. See IMF REPORT, supra note 143, at 25; Barboza, supra note 140, at 1; Lulu Chen, Fitch Sees Growing
Risk on Mainland, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 23, 2011, at B3; Pesek, supra note 140, at B10.
146. See IMF REPORT, supra note 143, at 35.
147. See supra Part III.E.
148. Cookson, supra note 64, at 23.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Pesek, supra note 140, at B10 (observing that “China’s prospects are becoming as murky as the
governance of its companies”); Sophie Yu, Mainland Net Stocks Fall on U.S. Fraud Allegations, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 1, 2011, at B1.
153. Gong, supra note 4.
154. See id.
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Moreover, China’s dramatic income disparity has caused concern.155  About 150 million
Chinese live on less than one U.S.D. per day.156  Human rights violations, struggles over
land rights, management-labour problems,157 economic problems, and social unrest are
reported almost on a daily basis,158 although one must assume that only a very small per-
centage of what is actually happening is being published.
Considering all of this from the viewpoint of Chinese investments overseas, it is obvious
that the more interwoven China’s economy is with foreign economies, the greater the risk
that onshore problems could also have a considerable impact abroad.159  At this point in
time, one can, of course, only speculate how severe these onshore problems are and pre-
cisely what their impact may be.  Despite the pessimistic comments reported above, it
seems unlikely that China’s national economy will, in the short and medium term, run
into large-scale problems triggering a global crisis.  It is, however, prudent not to ignore
the situation altogether, but to assume that it is possible that Chinese overseas investors
may encounter economic difficulties.160  Careful structuring of cooperation projects with
Chinese partners and diligent drafting of the underlying contract documents should aim at
avoiding unnecessary exposure.
One special aspect that should be considered is the possibility that Chinese entities with
overseas investments and Chinese business partners in general become insolvent.161
China has revised its insolvency system as of June 1, 2007 when the new PRC Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law entered into force.162  The new PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law unifies the
previously applicable separate regimes for SOEs and other entities163 and now covers all
mainland business entities with legal person status.164  It was one of the main goals of the
reform of China’s insolvency system to provide a practicable set of rules to address the
155. See id. (describing the problem in terms of per capita GDP); Jerome A. Cohen, Happy Returns?, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 21, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.usasialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/06/2011.06.22-SCMP-Cohen-Happy-returns.pdf.
156. Press Release, Economic and Social Council, Anti-Poverty Experts in Commission for Social Develop-
ment Offer Ways to Keep Ranks of People Without Adequate Food, Clothing, Shelter From Swelling; Dis-
connect Between Reality of Poverty—Actions of Governments Explored, as Panelists, Delegates Alike Call
for Alternative Poverty-Eradication Paradigm, U.N. Press Release SOC/4772 (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/soc4772.doc.htm.
157. See, e.g., Mimi Lau, Strikers Dragged Off as Police and Bosses Get Tough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
24, 2011, at A7; see also Cohen, supra note 155.
158. See Minxin Pei, Spilling Over, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 20, 2011, at A13; see also generally Co-
hen, supra note 155, at A13.
159. See Barboza, supra note 140, at 17 (opining that “any significant slowdown . . . would have international
repercussions”).
160. See May Chan, S.M.E. Credit Crisis “Could Sweep China” After a Wave of Businesses Failures in Wenzhou
Caused by Firms Forced to Borrow at Steep Rates, Economists Fear the Problem Will Be Contagious, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 2011, at A1.
161. See id.
162. See generally P.R.C. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Congress, Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007).
163. Lutz-Christian Wolff, Insolvency, Dissolution, Liquidation, China Company L. Guide (CCH) 280-750
(2004).
164. Id. at 280-760.  The PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is supplemented by the “Provisions of the Su-
preme People’s Court on the Appointment of Insolvency Administrators in Enterprise Insolvency Cases,” the
“Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Determination of Insolvency Administrators’ Remunera-
tion in Trial of Insolvency Enterprise Cases,” the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several
Issues on the Applicable Laws for Enterprise Insolvency Cases Pending at the Time of Implementation of the
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situation of insolvent companies, in particular SOEs.165  While on paper the previous re-
gimes may have been sufficient in this regard, it was the implementation of related rules
that had failed.166  It is still unclear if the new PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law has really
improved the situation.167
Under China’s insolvency regime, the insolvency of legal person entities can lead to
their liquidation, reorganization, or settlement arrangements between the debtor and its
creditors.168  Proceedings are commenced on the basis of a non-mandatory application by
a creditor (or even the debtor itself) to the competent People’s Court.169  As for cross-
border insolvency, more precisely the availability of overseas assets for the distribution to
creditors of an insolvent Chinese legal entity, the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law applies
the concept of universality.170  From the perspective of Chinese law, onshore insolvency
proceedings should also cover overseas assets, including stakes in foreign business enti-
ties.171  The implementation of this rule is, of course, subject to the laws of the country
where related assets are located.172
D. GEO-POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RISKS
China’s outward investment projects, in particular China’s investments in Africa, have
sparked some discussion as to the way they were implemented and the rationale behind
the selection of particular target countries.173  As indicated above,174 a relatively large per-
centage of China’s investments overseas found its way into Asian target countries, while a
still remarkable portion ended up in Africa and Latin America.175  In contrast, cumulative
investment ratios in North America and Europe are relatively low, although this appears
PRC Insolvency Law,” all effective as of June 1, 2007, and the “Provisions on Certain Issues Regarding the
Application of the ‘PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law’ (1),” effective as of Sept. 26, 2011.
165. See Travis Hodgkins, China’s New Bankruptcy Law—First Report From the Ground, CHINA L. BLOG (June
12, 2007), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2007/06/chinas_new_bankruptcy_law_firs.html.
166. See Enoch Yiu, Liquidation Specialist Warns of Mainland Risks, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24 2011,
at B3, available at 2011 WLNR 21764870.
167. See Wolff 2004, supra note 163, at 100-281.
168. Id.
169. PRC Enterprise Insolvency Law art. VII.
170. See id. art. V.
171. See id.; Wolff 2004, supra note 163, at 281-620.
172. Id.
173. See MCGREGOR, supra note 133, at 116 (“When Iraq couldn’t raise the money it owed for arms bought
during the Iran-Iraq war, it paid in kind in 1996 by offering PetroChina a $1.2 billion oil concession in
tandem with Norinco, the state weapons manufacturer . . . .  Likewise, Chinese investment in oilfields in
Sudan was done in parallel with arms sales by a state-owned weapons firm to the Khartoum regime.”); Obey
the Rules, New Zambia Leader Tells China, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/
topNews/idAFJOE78P0EZ20110926; see also Toh Han Shih, Controversial Chinese Projects in Cambodia Bow to
Public Pressure, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 3, 2011, at B1-2, available at 2011 WLNR 17432751.
174. See supra Part II.
175. See Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3.
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to be changing176 with Chinese investments now specifically targeting companies with
advanced technology,177 global brands, and trade names.178
According to official Chinese sources, Chinese overseas investments are industry ori-
ented, i.e., they are focused on those countries where the conditions for a particular type
of investment or investments in a particular industry are the best.179  In contrast, some
foreign commentators have identified strategic interests behind many of China’s invest-
ment projects overseas.  In particular, it has been noted that China must secure its supplies
with natural resources, energy, and rare earths180 to fuel its economic growth.181  Indeed,
between 2004 and 2009 almost fifty percent of the acquisitions of Chinese investors over-
seas worth more than fifty million U.S.D. were aimed at targets in the natural resource
and energy sectors.182  According to UNCTAD, in recent years more than twenty percent
of China’s total overseas investment volume was in the extractive industries.183
Others have suggested that China’s overseas investments may be driven by attempts to
“buy” United Nations voting power through investments in developing countries, in par-
ticular in Africa and Latin America.184  According to another viewpoint, China simply
invests where other countries have yet to invest, i.e., China is picking up what has not been
targeted by non-Chinese.185  Finally, there have been reports that Chinese entities have
often found it difficult to adjust to the Western cultural environment.186  This could ex-
176. See Flanigan, supra note 30, at 54 (North America); O’Neill, supra note 14, at 16-17 (Europe); Woo,
Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 57-58 (North America).
177. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 14, at 8; Kevin Nie, Chinese Automakers’ Overseas
M&A–From the Perspective of IPR, CHINA INTELL. PROP., Apr. 2010, at 42-43, available at http://www.chinaip
magazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=591; Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
178. See Doris Li, Beijing Automobile Speeds Up Brand Development By M&A, CHINA INTELL. PROP., Apr.
2010, at 35-37, available at http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=589; Nie, supra note
177, at 42-43; Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
179. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 7-10; WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 3.
180. See Ed Zhang & Toh Han Shih, China Pays for Risky African Ventures, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
25, 2011, at A1, A6, available at 2011 WLNR 3689812; Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
181. MCGREGOR, supra note 133, at 115 (stating that in 1993 “China became a net oil importer” and
“China’s reliance on oil imports, which had been growing every year since, marked a turning point for its
economy and redefined its broader security interests for ever as well.”); Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at
55; see also Simon Parry, Chilly Reception for Icelandic Venture, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2011, at A4
(“the response to the idea of a Chinese multimillionaire buying up what amounts to 0.3 per cent of Iceland
has been decidedly chilly in parts of Reykjavik, where suspicions are rife that the project is in fact a cover for
Chinese strategic development . . .  part of a bigger move by Beijing to get access to the trans-Arctic shipping
lanes that could open as polar ice caps melt.”); the investment proposal has in the meantime been rejected by
the Internal Affairs Ministry of Iceland on the basis of various legal issues, see Stephen Chan, Nordic Ven-
tures far from Finished, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 28 2011, at A4.
182. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 14, at 13.
183. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011, supra note 19, at 47.
184. See Susan Stumme, Leaked US Cable Says China Has “No Morals” in Africa, AGENCE FR. PRESSE (Dec. 8,
2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gNV4PQJy0-vBVobjbRuITqI21wcA?docId=
CNG.c41db06392485b1ac24c577f6d55fb67.441; Prak Chan Thul, Analysis:  China Pumps Up Cambodia Econ-
omy, But At What Cost?, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2011, 3:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/busi-
nesspro-us-cambodia-china-idUSTRE73412E20110405; Beijing’s Aid “A Double-Edged Sword,” S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 7, 2011, at A14 (discussing soft loans provided through a foreign aid programme
offered by China).
185. My colleague, Professor Yu Xingzhong, brought this point to my attention.
186. See Hannah Seligson, For American Workers in China, a Culture Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at B1
(N.Y. edition), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/global/24chinawork.html.
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plain why Chinese enterprises prefer to invest in Asia rather than in Western countries.187
Adding to the difficulties of Chinese overseas investors in Western markets could be the
reluctance to take advantage of high quality but expensive legal, financial, and industry-
related consultancy services when setting up and developing business abroad.188
All the above reasons sound plausible and may have their own justifications.  In other
words, different Chinese overseas investment projects in different geographical regions
may be based on different rationales.  In this regard it must also be acknowledged that it
would be surprising if the Chinese government did not to take strategic aspects into ac-
count.  Governments of other countries must do exactly the same.
V. Final Remarks
The world order is currently undergoing fundamental changes, and it remains to be
seen where China will stand upon completion of the ongoing reshuffle.  It is clear, how-
ever, that China is a strong newcomer in the international investment arena while, at the
same time, other countries have lost much of their former power in recent years.  Success-
ful newcomers are always eyed with suspicion.189  This may explain the common reluc-
tance to accept China’s increasing overseas investment volume as what it is, namely
evidence of the globalization efforts of multi-national enterprises located in a country
which has or is about to become a political and economic mega-power.
Overseas investments of Chinese enterprises are developing rapidly despite a rather
strict domestic outward investment regime.  The increasing volume of Chinese outward
investments creates chances and risks not only for Chinese, but also for foreign parties.
Future developments must be monitored closely because China’s overseas investment
strategies have the potential to destabilize the world, whether they fail or succeed.190
187. See WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 3.
188. Dr. Markus Ederer, EU Ambassador to China, has kindly drawn my attention to this aspect.
189. See MCGREGOR, supra note 133, at 272.
190. Id.
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A Comparative Analysis of Secretariats Created
Under Select Treaty Regimes
DR. PALLAVI KISHORE*
I. Introduction
The administrative structure of most international organisations includes a secretariat
that plays an important role in the functioning of the entire regime.  Secretariats act as the
backbone of the organisations and mainly perform administrative functions.  Secretariats
originated with the League of Nations1 and continued with the United Nations (UN)
Secretariat, which has provided administrative support since 1945.2  Various secretariats
may perform common or specific functions depending on the aims of the treaty.3
What is a secretariat?  There are many definitions.  An opinion of the UN Office of
Legal Affairs of November 4, 1993 states, with respect to the Climate Change Conven-
tion, that a secretariat is a supportive structure.4  According to James R. Fox, it is a bu-
reaucracy.5  Loveday compares them with national ministries; of course, international
organisations or Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) have less power than
national governments.6  According to Sandford, secretariats are executive support systems
of treaties7 or international organisations created by the treaty parties to aid the manage-
ment and implementation of the treaty.8  Per-Olof Busch states with regard to the Cli-
mate Change Secretariat that a secretariat is an “intergovernmental bureaucracy that
* Assistant Professor and Assistant Director, Centre for International Trade and Economic Laws, Jindal
Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India.
1. Thomas G. Weiss, International Bureaucracy:  The Myth and Reality of the International Civil Service, 58
INT’L AFF. 287, 289 (1982).
2. UN Charter, Ch. XV, art. 97.
3. PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 297-98 (5th
ed. 2001).
4. Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements:  A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J. OF INT’L LAW 623, 647 (2000).
5. JAMES R. FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 285, 358 (1997).
6. PARRY AND GRANT ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 455 (John P. Grant and
J. Craig Barker eds., 2004).
7. Rosemary Sandford, International Environmental Treaty Secretariats:  A Case of Neglected Potential, 16
ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REVIEW 3, 3 (1996).
8. ROSEMARY SANDFORD, International Environmental Treaty Secretariats: Stage-Hands or Actors?, in GREEN
GLOBE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. 17
(1994).
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states created to assist them in their cooperative struggle to confront climate change.”9
For Andresen and Skjaerseth, “A secretariat is an international organization established by
the relevant parties to assist them in fulfilling the goal(s) of the treaty.”10  “Such environ-
mental treaty secretariats generally take shape as small intergovernmental bureaucracies
that are run by international civil servants under the formal control of predefined multilat-
eral governmental mechanisms.”11
The role of secretariats has long been overlooked because secretariats are not perceived
as a significant feature of the institutional setup of treaties.  The main actors are the nation
states–and the secretariats are merely at their service.  Recently, however, there has been
some research on secretariats in the field of international relations.  Secretariats are capa-
ble of influencing treaty negotiation and implementation.  In fact, treaty secretariats are
set up precisely for this purpose – to administer negotiations and to help parties in imple-
menting MEAs.12  When a treaty is created, it involves many actors such as subsidiary
bodies, nation states, and other stakeholders such as communities and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs).  Secretariats provide the link between these actors and aid their
efforts to address the policy challenge in question.  Therefore, they have an important role
to play.
Sandford has divided environmental history into three parts.13  First, there are conven-
tions such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES),14 signed in the 1970s in the aftermath of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972.  Second, there are
conventions such as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vi-
enna Convention)15 and it’s Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Montreal Protocol)16 signed in the 1980s that came into being due to the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  Finally, there are conventions such as the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),17 the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC),18 and the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa (UNCCD),19 signed in 1992 in the aftermath of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro. This article exam-
9. Per-Olof Busch, The Secretariat of the Climate Convention: Make a Living in a Straitjacket 1 (Global
Governance Working Paper No. 22, 2006), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/wp22.pdf.
10. International Conference on Synergies and Co-ordination between Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments, Tokyo, Japan, July, 14-16 (1999).
11. STEFFEN BAUER, The United Nations and the Fight against Desertification:  What Role for the UNCCD
Secretariat?, in GOVERNING GLOBAL DESERTIFICATION. LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, POV-
ERTY, AND PARTICIPATION 73 (2006).
12. Steffen Bauer, Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority of Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats 21
(Paper presented at the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Can.,
Mar. 17-20, 2004), available at http://www.ppl.nl/ebooks/files/C08-0052-Bauer-Bureaucracy.pdf.
13. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 18.
14. CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244.
15. Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324.
16. MONTREAL PROTOCOL, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29.
17. CBD, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143.
18. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
19. UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108.
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ines the secretariats of these five MEAs which were chosen because of their near-universal
membership.
II. Features of Environmental Secretariats
• Secretariats are central organs in an international organisation and are the functional
arm of the Conference of the Parties (COP) (or Meeting of the Parties (MOP) in the
case of Protocols) and of the MEA.  Their single most important characteristic is
their international character because the secretariat staff does not owe allegiance to
national governments; it does not receive instructions from any particular govern-
ment but instead owes allegiance to the treaty, which leads to impartiality.20  Despite
this independence, a secretariat’s freedom to act is largely dependent on the will of
the parties, frequently nation states.21  Secretariats actually have two masters – the
treaty and the parties.  There may, at times, be a conflict between the duty to obey
the parties and the duty to uphold the objectives of the treaty.  Because the parties
may not always follow the treaty, the secretariats’ task is even more difficult.  For
instance, the UNFCCC Secretariat has been accused of bias by certain Parties be-
cause it supported the Kyoto Protocol, which is a legal instrument of the Climate
Change regime.22
• Secretariats function under a veil of legitimacy.  This means that they do their work
and make proposals under the responsibility of the presiding officers/chairpersons
who have been elected by the parties.  Because secretariats possess expert knowledge
of the regimes they serve and chairpersons have political authority to make use of that
knowledge, the actors have a complementary relationship: the secretariats being sub-
servient to the chairpersons.23  Thus, secretariats’ activities are carried out under a
veil of legitimacy and approved by the presiding officers.  Though the presiding of-
ficers have the final say on the proposals to put forward, this veil is indispensable for
the functioning of secretariats, as they cannot openly assume the role of a leader.24
• They are modelled on the secretariats of the UN system.  Their administrative
processes such as recruitment of personnel are also close to those of the UN.25  For
example, they try to maintain geographical balance while recruiting personnel.
• They are smaller than other secretariats; for example, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Secretariats have about 640 and 400 employees respectively, whereas the Ozone and
CBD Secretariats have about 17 and 117 employees respectively.26
20. Grant & Barker, supra note 6, at 455.
21. Steffen Bauer, Per-Olof Busch & Bernd Siebenhu¨ner, Administering International Governance:  What
Role for Treaty Secretariats? 2 (Global Governance Working Paper No 29, 2007), available at http://www.glo
gov.org/images/doc/WP29.pdf.
22. JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE ORGANIZATION OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS: CONSTRUCTING THE CLI-
MATE CHANGE REGIME 65-66 (2005).
23. Joanna Depledge, A Special Relationship:  Chairpersons and the Secretariat in the Climate Change Negotia-
tions, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 45, 57 (2007).
24. DEPLEDGE, supra note 22, at 66-67.
25. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 17, 19.
26. WTO, Annual Report 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep11_chap7_e.
pdf; UNCTAD, The UNCTAD Secretariat, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1931&
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• They may be activist or passive, the former being in a position to affect treaty out-
comes.27  In reality, no secretariat is passive; they only prefer to remain in the back-
ground instead of in the limelight.  Thus even passive secretariats can be very active
behind the scenes.28
• Secretariats are stable elements in a changing international system, providing an ele-
ment of permanence.  This is a very important feature because national governments
come and go, but MEAs have long-term goals and so continuity in secretariats is
important.  They are the only active actors between sessions of the COP and subsidi-
ary bodies.  The continuity of their staff builds institutional expertise and memory.
In fact, this is the reason why parties establish secretariats.29
• Secretariats may be created by the MEA such as in the case of CITES (article XII(1))
or by the COP. In the latter case, the MEA may establish an interim secretariat and
the COP may be required to establish the permanent secretariat.  Examples are the
Vienna Convention (article 7(2)), the CBD (article 24(2)), the UNCCD (article
23(3)), and the UNFCCC (article 8(3)).  Permanent secretariats are more active than
interim ones because the institutional status of the former is assured.30
• MEAs may also make use of secretariats of existing organisations; for example, the
CBD and Ozone Secretariats are hosted by the UNEP.31  Since having their own
secretariat requires more resources, the use of established secretariats may reduce
these expenses.  Also, UNEP provides an established administrative structure.
Though the Ozone Secretariat is housed within the UNEP headquarters, it is not a
necessary condition that secretariats be located physically within the premises of the
host organisation. In the case of the UNFCCC, the interim Secretariat from which
the permanent Secretariat was derived was provided by the UN Secretariat following
UN rules and using UN resources.  Given these advantages, the COP, while consid-
ering the permanent Secretariat, agreed on a formal institutional linkage with the
UN.  This linkage extends to administrative regulations on personnel and financial
matters such as staff entitlements and financing of Convention conferences by the
UN.  Also, the Secretariat is encouraged to cooperate with other relevant agencies at
the national and international level.32  Since the UNFCCC and UNCCD Secretari-
ats serve autonomous UN Conventions, their Executive Secretaries are ex officio As-
sistant Secretary-Generals to the UN, whereas the Executive Secretaries of the CBD
and Ozone Secretariats report to the UN through the Executive Director of the
UNEP.  According to Churchill and Ulfstein, it is possible that there may be a con-
flict between the host organisation such as UNEP and the COP of a MEA such as the
Vienna Convention in regard to the work of the MEA’s secretariat.  But this is largely
theoretical, as the host organisation cannot interfere in the functioning of the MEA.
lang=1; UNEP Ozone Secretariat, About the Secretariat, http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/about_the_secre-
tariat.php; CBD, The CBD Secretariat, Staff List, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/staff.
27. ROSEMARY SANDFORD, Secretariats and International Environmental Negotiations:  Two New Models, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING 27 (1992).
28. Depledge, supra note 23, at 54.
29. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 17, 19.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 7(2).
32. Administrative and Financial Matters Institutional Linkage of the Convention Secretariat to the United Na-
tions, ¶¶ 5, 7-8, 10, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1999/7 (Apr. 16, 1999).
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The UNEP emphasises its importance in relation to the Ozone Secretariat, but the
latter is a distinct intergovernmental secretariat,33 and the UNEP can only intervene
in its administrative matters. In fact, the COP confers certain powers on the UNEP
because it hosts the MEA secretariats, but the UNEP follows the UN rules in ad-
ministering the secretariats.34  In the case of the UNFCCC, this distinction is quite
clear (i.e., the Secretariat reports to the COP for MEA work and to the UN for staff
matters).35  Moreover, in the case of the CITES Secretariat administered by UNEP,
its conflicts with the UNEP relate to staff and budget matters.36
III. Legal Personality of Environmental Secretariats
Before examining the legal status of secretariats, it is worthwhile to define the compo-
nents of legal status.  The legal status of an entity may be characterised by the following
attributes:  (1) it should have rights and privileges of a binding nature; (2) no party should
be able to alter the position of the entity in any manner or take any decision contrary to
the rights or interests of the entity without its consent; and (3) it should have the capacity
to enter into agreements or contracts with other parties.
The question of international legal personality of secretariats will benefit from a discus-
sion of two Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  In the Advisory
Opinion of April 11, 1949, on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations,37 the ICJ stated that in case an agent of the UN suffered injury while
performing his duties, the UN as an organisation had the capacity to bring an interna-
tional claim against the government of the state responsible for the injury in order to
obtain reparation for damages caused to the UN and to the victim.  This would apply in
the case of a member and non-member state that has breached its obligations towards the
UN because the members of the UN created an entity whose international legal personal-
ity is objective and therefore recognised by non-members as well.38  According to the ICJ,
the capacity to bring a claim vests with states and if organisations can bring claims, it
would mean they have international personality.  The ICJ did not say that a forum where
a claim can be brought is required to confer international legal personality on the organi-
sation.  The Court further stated that because the UN Charter conferred rights and obli-
gations on the UN, the latter had legal personality.
Additionally, according to the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of December 20, 1980 on the
question of the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World
33. Bauer, supra note 12, at 17.
34. UNEP, The Relationship between the Executive Director of UNEP and the Conventions Regarding the Admin-
istration of Their Secretariats, Fourth Meeting on Coordination of Secretariats of Environmental Conventions,
UN Doc. UNEP/DEP/Coord.4/3/COR.1 1-7 at 2, 3 (Jan. 4, 1996), in BHARAT H. DESAI, INSTITUTIONAL-
IZING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 210 (2004).
35. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 628, 635.
36. See Rosemary Sandford, Secretariats as Catalysts:  A Comparative Study of the Influence of Global
Environmental Treaty Secretariats on Treaty Implementation (June 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) at 234-35, http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28197.
37. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion:  I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 174.
38. See id. at 185, 187.
WINTER 2011
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
1056 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Health Organization (WHO) and Egypt,39 a contractual legal regime was created between
Egypt and the WHO when they entered into an agreement on March 25, 1951.  This
agreement had a legally binding character and the WHO was able to ask for an Advisory
Opinion concerning this agreement.  Could the fact that the WHO was able to enter into
an agreement with legally binding character mean that the WHO has international legal
personality?  Even if the secretariat of a MEA has rights that can be enforced against
parties there may be no forum where these can be enforced.  That does not mean, how-
ever, that the secretariat does not possess legal personality.  Applying the Reparations
Advisory Opinion, one could say an environmental secretariat can bring a claim against a
state, but in which forum?  MEAs do not contain dispute redressal forums40 such as in the
WTO.  Even if they did, it is not known if a secretariat could bring a claim against the
parties in such a forum given that these forums are generally established to resolve dis-
putes between parties to the organisation, as is the case of the WTO.  In case the secreta-
riat wanted to bring a claim against a non-party in a case similar to the Reparations
Opinion, where would it do so?  Even if one does not apply the two Advisory Opinions in
the case of secretariats because they relate to organisations and not secretariats, the fact
remains that a secretariat has rights.  The question is whether these rights are sufficient to
confer international legal personality on the secretariat.  Applying the Reparations Opin-
ion, the fact that the MEA confers rights and obligations on the secretariat may indicate
that it has international legal personality.
Another aspect of the legal personality issue is that environmental secretariats are fre-
quently linked to the UN.  Would they, as a consequence, have legal personality because
the UN has it?  For example, the Climate Change Convention Secretariat is institutionally
linked to the UN while not being fully integrated in the work programme and manage-
ment structure of any particular department or programme.41  The meaning of “institu-
tionally”  is not relevant because the legal regime enjoyed by the UN cannot be
automatically extended to the UNFCCC Secretariat.42  For the Secretariat to have legal
personality, the COP would have to confer it by means of a decision.43  But the COP still
has to consider whether the Secretariat should be given international legal personality.44
On the other hand, the host organisation, the UN in this case, may commit a breach of its
obligations if it does not provide resources to the Secretariat for its functions.45 This
would mean that the Secretariat has international legal personality.  Regarding other
MEAs, the UNEP administers the CITES Secretariat and hosts the Ozone and CBD
Secretariats (CITES, the Vienna Convention, and the Montreal Protocol were “negoti-
39. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 73.
40. The UNFCCC, the Vienna Convention, and the CBD all state that disputes can be referred to the ICJ,
which means that the Convention itself does not have a dispute redressal forum. See UNFCCC, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 14(2)(a); Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 11(3)(b); CBD,
June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, art. 27(3)(b).
41. Institutional Linkage of the Convention Secretariat to the United Nations, Climate Change COP De-
cision 14/CP.1, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, at 42, ¶ 2.
42. Institutional and Budgetary Matters:  Arrangements for Relocation of the Convention Secretariat to
Bonn, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7, ¶ 7.
43. See id. ¶ 11(5).
44. Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat, Climate Change COP Deci-
sion 15/CP.2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, at 63, ¶ 2.
45. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 635.
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ated under the auspices of UNEP”).46  The same question regarding legal personality
would arise in the case of these secretariats as well.
It is also possible to look at the Headquarters agreement to locate the secretariat in a
particular country.  For example, the Headquarters agreement between the UNFCCC
Secretariat, the UN, and the Republic of Germany to locate the Secretariat in Germany
states that the Secretariat shall have legal capacity in Germany.47  The COP has approved
this agreement.48  The Secretariat’s authority to enter into such an agreement derives
from the request of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation49 and is not conclusive of the
Secretariat’s international legal personality.  Article 6(3) of the Headquarters agreement
requires twelve months’ notice in order for the agreement to be terminated.50  Does this
mean that if this provision is not honoured, the injured party is entitled to bring a claim?
If the answer is in the affirmative, the Secretariat would have international legal personal-
ity.  But again the question arises, in which forum would the claim be settled? Moreover,
article 6(4) of the Headquarters agreement states that disputes are to be settled in accor-
dance with article 26(2) of the United Nations Volunteers Programme Headquarters
Agreement which provides that disputes are to be resolved on the basis of international
law.51  Article 6(6) of the Headquarters agreement stipulates that the agreement enters
into force after notification from Parties.52  Would this suffice to provide international
legal personality to the Secretariat which is party to the Headquarters agreement?  How-
ever, the UN Office of Legal Affairs has stated that the Secretariat is not de jure a UN
subsidiary organ.53  In the case of the CBD, the Headquarters agreement is between Ca-
nada and the UNEP; the Secretariat is not a party.54  If the Secretariat is not even in-
volved, the question of its international legal personality likely does not arise.
Article 24(1)(d) of the CBD, article 8(2)(f) of the UNFCCC, article 23(2)(e) of the
UNCCD, and article 7(1)(e) of the Vienna Convention state that Secretariats shall ensure
necessary coordination with other international bodies and enter into such administrative
and contractual arrangements as may be required for the effective discharge of their func-
tions.55  These articles are not limited to domestic arrangements.56  Can this be construed
as authorising these Secretariats to enter into binding international agreements?  Accord-
46. Id. at 630.
47. Administrative and Financial Matters Establishment of the Permanent Secretariat and Arrangements for its
Functioning, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/MISC.1, art. 4(1).
48. Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat, Climate Change COP Deci-
sion 15/CP.2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, at 63, ¶ 1.
49. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on the Work of its Second Session, held at Geneva
from 27 February to 8 March 1996, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/9, ¶ 66(c).
50. Administrative and Financial Matters Establishment of the Permanent Secretariat and Arrangements for its
Functioning, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/MISC.1, art. 6(3).
51. Id. at art. 6(4).
52. Id. at art. 6(6).
53. Institutional and Budgetary Matters:  Arrangements for Relocation of the Convention Secretariat to Bonn, UN
Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7supra note, at ¶ 11(2).
54. Location of the Secretariat, CBD COP Decision II/19, ¶ 5, available at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?
id=7092.
55. See CBD, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, art. 24(1)(d); UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165,
art. 8(2)(f); UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 23(2)(e); Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985,
1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 7(1)(e).
56. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 649.
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ing to the Handbook of the Convention on Biological Diversity Including its Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, a liaison group of the Secretariats of the three Rio conventions
(CBD, UNFCCC and UNCCD) has been established to promote complementarities
amongst the Secretariats without compromising their independent legal status.57 Does
this legal status refer only to the authority required to form such a group?  In other words,
is this an example of the aforementioned secretarial function?  Or can it be interpreted to
mean a status beyond that?  Given that one secretariat can enter into an agreement with
another one, it may seem plausible to conclude that secretariats have legal personality on
the international plane.  But in the case of the UNFCCC Secretariat, the COP still has to
consider the question of legal personality.
The CITES Secretariat has entered into memoranda of understanding with various sec-
retariats, government departments, universities, and others.58  The CBD Secretariat has
also entered into memoranda of cooperation with various other secretariats.59  One such
memorandum with the Secretariat of the Convention on Wetlands of International Im-
portance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Secretariat) is termed an “agreement”
and requires a year’s notice for termination.60  The legal personality of the Secretariats
would depend on whether they can bring a claim in case the provision is not complied
with.  In other words did the parties create a binding agreement?  The use of exhortatory
language in the memoranda indicates that they are not intended to be binding.61  This can
be distinguished from the case of the WHO Advisory Opinion wherein the agreement
between Egypt and WHO had a legally binding character.
IV. Functions of Environmental Secretariats
• All the secretariats examined here perform certain common functions.  These are
generally of an administrative nature because the work of the secretariat is to provide
services to the treaty regime.  Such functions may be (1) arranging and servicing the
sessions of COP, MOP, and subsidiary bodies; (2) preparing and transmitting reports
based on information received; (3) assisting developing country parties in compiling
and transmitting requisite information; (4) preparing activity reports for the COP; (5)
coordination with secretariats of other international bodies; (6) entering into arrange-
ments with external entities for its proper functioning; and (7) performing residual
functions as required by the Convention/Protocol or COP/MOP.  Since the advent
of the internet, secretariats also maintain the websites of MEAs.
Basically, secretariats are responsible for efficient conduct of the work of the treaty,
their main task being to ensure the smooth functioning of meetings and conferences or-
ganised under the aegis of the MEA.62  They may also prepare the provisional agenda,
57. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, HANDBOOK OF THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY INCLUDING ITS CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, at xxxiii (3rd ed. 2005).
58. See CITES, Cooperation and Partnerships, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/coop.php (last visited Nov. 18,
2011).
59. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 654.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Volker Ro¨ben, Institutional Developments under Modern International Environmental Agreements, 4
MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 363, 423-24 (2000), available at http://www.mpil.de/
shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/roeben_4.pdf.
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undertake studies, give advice on legal, technical, and procedural matters, inform the par-
ties of the meetings, and facilitate the process as a whole.63  Rule 9 of the UNFCCC Rules
of Procedure states that the Secretariat shall draft the provisional agenda of the COP
sessions in agreement with the President.64  The Climate Change and CBD Secretariats
also organise technical workshops to advance discussions in subsidiary bodies and then
summarise the results.65  Secretariats also present introductory notes on submissions of
working groups or parties.66  Given that secretariats prepare the provisional agenda and
do the preparatory work, they are “able to pre-structure the political process at the meet-
ings”67 and thus exercise some influence in the political decision-making process.  How-
ever, secretariats do not generally submit proposals in the form of recommendations to
the parties unless mandated by the latter to do so.68
Even though it is not very frequent, secretariats may provide an opinion on the inter-
pretation and application of the MEA.  For instance, the CITES Secretariat clearly
termed a COP decision as incompatible with the treaty because it did not follow the speci-
fied procedure for the transfer of a species from one Appendix to another.69
The nature of functions performed by secretariats also depends on the aims of the
MEA.  Some secretariats perform certain specific tasks related to the aforementioned
functions.  The Ozone Secretariat notifies Parties of requests for technical assistance and
informs non-Party observers as well, leading to more transparency.70  It also encourages
non-Parties to attend sessions of MOP as observers.71  The UNCCD Secretariat assists
developing members, particularly in Africa, in compiling and communicating requisite
information to the COP, thus helping them to meet the requirements of the Conven-
tion.72  The CBD Secretariat organises all meetings under the Convention, prepares doc-
uments, facilitates the flow of information, represents the Convention externally, and
promotes public awareness activities in pursuance of article 13 of the Convention.73  It
also assists the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol),74 and
if the costs of the Secretariat services for this Protocol are distinct, the costs are met by the
Parties to the Protocol (article 31(3) of the Cartagena Protocol).75  This is a unique provi-
sion and is not provided for in the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols.  The CITES Secreta-
riat publishes and distributes to the parties current editions of Appendices containing lists
of species.76  The secretariats also play a role in the compliance/implementation proce-
dure of the treaties.
63. See id. at 424, n.197.
64. See id. at 424.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 424-25.
69. See id. at 431, n. 212.
70. See MONTREAL PROTOCOL, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, art. 12(d), (f).
71. See id. at art. 12(e)-(f).
72. See UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 23(2)(c).
73. See CBD, THE CBD SECRETARIAT, ROLE, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/role.shtml (last visited July
10, 2011).
74. CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, JAN. 29,
2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 257.
75. See id. at art. 31(3).
76. See CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244, art. XII(2)(f).
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V. Role of Secretariats in Compliance/Implementation of the Treaty
The idea of negotiating a MEA is to attain the objective of protecting certain environ-
mental resources.  The parties to the MEA are required to comply with the treaty.  The
secretariats directly administer the MEA by administering the compliance and implemen-
tation mechanisms.  Indirectly, secretariats help in compliance, mainly by assisting devel-
oping parties if they so request, in compiling and communicating information required
under the conventions (article 8(2)(c) of the UNFCCC and article 23(2)(c) of the
UNCCD) and by disseminating information relating to technologies.77  Thus, this secre-
tarial function effectively has two aspects to it: compliance monitoring and
implementation.
A. ROLE OF SECRETARIATS IN MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE
Generally, all the secretariats in the sample receive factual information on compliance
from the parties and forward it to the organ that assesses and evaluates this information.
Secretariats play a bigger role in MEAs whose implementing mechanism consists of lists
of species, substances or areas controlled because parties are required to provide informa-
tion regarding regulatory action taken in respect of such lists to the secretariat to be up-
dated or maintained by the latter.78  For example, in the case of the Montreal Protocol and
the CITES, secretariats can trigger the non-compliance procedure.79
According to article 12(1), (2), (3) of the UNFCCC, Parties are required to communi-
cate to the Secretariat steps taken and policies and measures adopted or envisaged for
implementation of the Convention and other relevant information such as the effects of
the measures.80  The Secretariat transmits such information to the COP and subsidiary
bodies (article 12(6)).81  In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC Secretariat
transmits the reports prepared by the Expert Review Teams to all the Parties to the Con-
vention.82  It also lists for further consideration by the MOP any questions of implementa-
tion mentioned in these reports.  These reports contain not only an assessment of the
implementation of the commitments of Parties but also potential problems and factors
influencing compliance (article 8(3)).83  What is important is that the Secretariat does not
by itself initiate the procedure, but only transmits the reports.  Thus it facilitates flow of
information that supports the compliance regime of the Kyoto Protocol and helps in mon-
itoring implementation of the Convention.
Under article 9(1) of the UNCCD, the Secretariat receives notifications of national
action plans for implementation by the Parties.84  Article 26(1) requires the Parties to
provide to the Secretariat reports on measures taken for the implementation of the Con-
vention.  The Parties also provide information on the implementation of strategies and
77. See UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 8(2)(c); UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S.
108, art. 23(2)(c).
78. Ro¨ben, supra note 62, at 427.
79. See id. at 430-31.
80. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 12(1)-(3).
81. See id. at art. 12(6).
82. See Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 214, art. 8(3).
83. Id.
84. UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 9(1).
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programmes and may make a submission on measures taken at subregional/regional levels
as part of action programmes (article 26(2), (3), (4)).85  The Secretariat is required to com-
municate such information to the COP and subsidiary bodies (article 26(6)).86  Appended
to the Convention are four regional implementation annexes by region of the world viz.
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Northern Mediterranean.87  In the
case of the first three regions, the Secretariat may facilitate consultative processes or coor-
dination meetings for implementation if so desired by the Parties by way of providing
advice on the organisation of effective consultative/coordination arrangements, providing
information to bilateral and multilateral agencies concerning consultative/coordination
meetings or processes to encourage their active involvement, and providing other relevant
information to establish or improve consultative/coordination arrangements/processes.88
This indicates that the functions of the Secretariat of the UNCCD have a strong develop-
ing country focus.  But otherwise, the powers of the Secretariat in regard to implementa-
tion do not amount to much and can be said to be on par with those of the UNFCCC
Secretariat.  Despite this, the Secretariat has played an important role in interpreting the
meaning of “implementation” and acting accordingly as we will see further on in this
article.
According to the CBD Secretariat, it plays an important role in assisting the implemen-
tation of the Convention.89  It compiles national reports on compliance by domestic au-
thorities, synthesises these reports and information on implementation, and then forwards
the resulting synthesis to the COP.90  So the Secretariat compiles the report on compli-
ance, unlike the UNFCCC Secretariat which transmits to the Parties reports prepared by
the Expert Review Teams and the UNCCD Secretariat which transmits to the COP infor-
mation obtained from the Parties.91
According to article 5 of the Vienna Convention, the Secretariat receives information
from the Parties on measures adopted to implement the objectives of the Convention and
Protocols and transmits it to the COP.92  Here, the Ozone Secretariat acts in a manner
similar to the UNCCD Secretariat.
The Montreal Protocol has a separate non-compliance procedure giving enhanced
powers to the Secretariat.93  The Ozone Secretariat coordinates the flow of information
between the Parties and the Implementation Committee.94  Any Party can make a submis-
sion regarding its reservations as to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol by an-
other Party and the Secretariat will transmit this submission to the Party concerned who
85. Id. at art. 26(2)-(4).
86. Id. at art. 26(6).
87. See id. at Annexes I-IV.
88. See id. at Annex I, art. 18(4); Annex II, art. 8(3); Annex III, art. 7(2).
89. See CBD, THE CBD SECRETARIAT, ROLE, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/role.shtml (last visited July
10, 2011).
90. See id.
91. See Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 214, art. 8(3);UNCCD, June 17,
1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 26(6).
92. See Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 5.
93. See Montreal Protocol, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex IV.
94. See id. at Annex IV, ¶ 2.
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has to file a reply and substantiating information to the Secretariat and the Parties.95  The
Secretariat sends these documents together with the submission to the Implementation
Committee.96  If the Secretariat becomes aware of possible non-compliance by a Party
who does or does not provide information on request, the Secretariat shall inform the
MOP and the Implementation Committee.97  The Secretariat transmits to the MOP in-
formation received from Parties relating to results of non-compliance proceedings under
article 11 of the Vienna Convention.98  The Secretariat also transmits to the Implementa-
tion Committee any explanation provided by any Party as to the reasons for non-compli-
ance.99  The Implementation Committee can also request information from the
Secretariat.100  With respect to the Montreal Protocol, the Secretariat also receives statis-
tical data from Parties regarding the production, import, and export of controlled sub-
stances (article 7 of the Montreal Protocol).101  The Parties are also required to report to
the Secretariat every two years on the research and exchange of information they have
engaged in to promote awareness regarding the substances that deplete the Ozone layer
(article 9 of the Montreal Protocol).102  It then prepares and distributes to the Parties
reports based on this technical information (article 12(c) of the Montreal Protocol), thus
providing the informational basis for legislative decision-making by the latter.103  Given
that the Secretariat receives this information from the Parties, it is in a position to know
about possible non-compliance and can initiate the procedure.  This is unlike the
UNFCCC Secretariat in the case of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNCCD and CBD
Secretariats that do not inform the Implementation Committee of non-compliance and so
do not initiate the procedure.
Under article VIII(4)(c) of the CITES, if a living specimen is confiscated, the Manage-
ment Authority may consult the Secretariat to decide the future course of action.104  This
may include returning the specimen to the state or putting it in a rescue centre or other
appropriate place.105  Article VIII(7) requires Parties to transmit to the Secretariat reports
on implementation of the Convention containing details of trade in designated species as
well as legislative, administrative, and regulatory measures taken to enforce the Conven-
tion.106  The Secretariat can ask the Parties to supply further information required for the
implementation of the Convention (article XII(2)(d)) and files reports to the Parties on the
implementation of the Convention (article XII(2)(g)).107  It also undertakes technical stud-
ies on issues concerning implementation of the Convention (article XII(2)(c)) and is the
only secretariat that makes recommendations regarding implementation (article
XII(2)(h)).108  The CITES Secretariat can be said to act like the Ozone Secretariat, be-
95. See id. at Annex IV, ¶¶ 1, 2.
96. See id. ¶ 2.
97. See id. at Annex IV, ¶ 3.
98. See id. at Annex IV, ¶ 12.
99. See id. at Annex IV, ¶ 4.
100. See id. at Annex IV, ¶ 7(c).
101. See MONTREAL PROTOCOL, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, art 7.
102. See id. at art. 9.
103. See id. at art. 12(c).
104. See CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244, art. VIII(4)(c).
105. See id. at art. VIII(4)(b).
106. See id. at art. VIII(7).
107. See id. at art. XII(2)(d), (g).
108. See id. at art. XII(2)(c), (h).
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cause it has the authority to take action on its own and inform the Management Authority
of a Party in case a species is adversely affected by trade or the Convention is not being
implemented (article XIII(1)).109  In such a case, the Party concerned has to reply to the
Secretariat and propose remedial action (article XIII(2)).110  So the role of the CITES
Secretariat is more advanced than that of the UNFCCC, UNCCD, and CBD Secretariats
because it goes beyond merely transmitting information.  Like the Ozone Secretariat, the
CITES Secretariat can ask the Parties for more information and even go further as it can
make recommendations.
The CITES COP has recognised the important role played by the Secretariat in the
enforcement process.  In 2000, the CITES COP urged the Parties and external actors to
provide additional funds to the Secretariat to reinforce the enforcement mechanism.111
These funds were to be used to appoint additional officers in the Secretariat to work on
enforcement-related issues, to assist in the drafting and implementation of regional en-
forcement agreements, and to provide training and technical assistance to the Parties.
The Secretariat had also been allowed to take measures with the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol) and the World Customs Organization to facilitate
the exchange of information.112  The COP also directed the Secretariat to work closely
not only with the aforementioned actors but also with the Convention’s institutions, na-
tional enforcement agencies, and existing intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime and submit a report on enforcement matters at each meeting of the
COP.113
Moreover, its many recommendations gave the Secretariat a larger role in the enforce-
ment procedure.  These recommendations included asking the Parties to provide further
information to the Secretariat within a time limit, authorising the Secretariat to report
implementation problems to the Standing Committee in case they remain unsolved even
after provision of technical assistance to the Party concerned, and the establishment of
enforcement task forces by the Secretariat.114
The process of receiving reports and commencement of the non-compliance procedure
by the secretariats is very significant because parties are not willing to initiate such proce-
dures against each other.  Not many secretariats have been entrusted with the function of
triggering the non-compliance procedure with most being relegated to a fact-gathering
role.
B. SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTATION
Secretariats assist parties in implementing the MEA, thus complying with international
obligations.  Because secretariats receive national reports, they are in a position to know
implementation difficulties faced by members and, consequently, to know their needs.
Secretariats use their contacts and expertise to provide assistance such as legal and policy
109. See id. at art. XIII(1).
110. See id. at art. XIII(2).
111. See CITES COP, 11th Sess. (Apr. 10-20, 2000), Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP15) Compliance and
enforcement, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/11/11-03R15.php.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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advice as well as access to external funds.115  This kind of assistance is useful for the coun-
try and also for the secretariat because it enhances its credibility and influence.
The UNFCCC Secretariat is not mandated to do much in the field of implementation.
It does not disburse funds or implement projects.  It does not favour adoption of any
particular policies nor can it take decisions or impose sanctions on Parties to make them
comply.  The Secretariat only collects and processes information and coordinates reviews
of data communicated by Parties.116  However, the Secretariat tries to ensure that devel-
oped countries are mindful of the concerns of the Association of Small Island States when
they take decisions.117  In fact, this reticent attitude may be the result of the Secretariat’s
narrow mandate and the fact that Parties guard their sovereignty zealously.  Even if the
Secretariat makes an objective suggestion in favour of implementation of the treaty, it
could be misinterpreted by the Parties.
The UNCCD Secretariat has, by way of institutionalisation of the Convention, helped
in its implementation.118  It does not have the resources to fund projects but indirectly
helps capacity development within the jurisdiction of members.119  It provides documen-
tation on the Convention in UN languages and prepares informational kits for elementary
schools.120  It also helps in establishing National Action Programmes (NAPs) in affected
countries.121  It prepares the national focal points to deal with international partners and
helps international donors identify people who need training to implement the Conven-
tion locally.122  The Secretariat staff also assists the national focal points of developing
members by advising them on how to fulfil the requirements of the COP.123  The staff
sometimes holds workshops and sensitises the national focal points of the funding oppor-
tunities available but such workshops are rather rare due to a shortage of resources.124
The CBD Secretariat provides skills-oriented capacity building.125  It does this by or-
ganising courses, compiling and publishing guidelines and administrative practices, and
responding to requests on how to build capacity for implementation of the Convention.126
Practitioners in member states find these activities useful.127  These efforts are commend-
able because capacity building is not in the mandate of the Secretariat nor does it have the
resources to fund projects.128  However, the Secretariat has not been very successful in
fulfilling the monitoring obligation because states do not want to be controlled by it.  For
instance, the Secretariat developed a scheme to include quantifiable measures in national
reports filed by states to the Secretariat, but the scheme was not adopted by the Parties.129
115. See Sandford, supra note 36, at 122.
116. See Busch, supra note 9, at 7-8, 10.
117. See Sandford, supra note 36, at 123.
118. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 18.
119. BAUER, supra note 11, at 80-81.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Bernd Siebenhu¨ner, Administrator of Global Biodiversity:  The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 16 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 259, 266 (2007).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 265-66.
129. Id. at 269.
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In fact, the Parties frequently do not even provide the reports to the Secretariat, and it has
to ask for them.130
The Ozone Secretariat is not mandated to build technical and financial capacity.131  In-
stead, it has created a very efficient communication network with the National Ozone
Units and advises national bureaucrats on request.132  It also holds workshops in develop-
ing countries to prepare the staff of the National Ozone Units for sessions of MOP who
then prepare their delegates.133  This helps them link their work at the local level with the
ozone discourse at the international level.134  This is useful for developing members as it
helps them in fulfilling the implementation objectives of the regime.  This provision of
advice on implementation-related matters has an impact on the management of compli-
ance issues at the national level.135  Because the delegates of the National Ozone Units are
better informed, they can contribute better to international cooperation.  The Secretariat
also administers the reporting requirements of members, which is a complex function be-
cause the number of members in the Convention, Protocol, and its amendments is not the
same.136
The CITES Secretariat helps developing members access international scientific and
financial resources such as the CITES Trust Fund, which helps them fulfil their reporting
and performance obligations.137  The CITES Trust Fund is a financial mechanism of the
Convention itself.138  It matches external donors with a needy country to develop national
legislation and strengthen implementation of the Convention.139  The Secretariat’s close
links with NGOs help in capacity building activities such as training and technology trans-
fer.140 It holds extensive regional training programmes as part of its regional and national
capacity building initiatives.141  The CITES Secretariat and World Wide Fund for Na-
ture/Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce collaborate to oversee in-
ternational trade records and bring to light illegal trafficking in prohibited species.142
This collaboration takes the form of statistical correlation of trade reports and field work
by the NGO.143
These activities show the significant role played by secretariats in implementation.  Not
all secretariats have been granted the same powers, nor do all of them play equally impor-
tant roles (for example, the UNFCCC Secretariat has not been mandated to do much, and
as a result, does not do much).  Nevertheless, they are indispensable as “subjects of coordi-
130. Id.
131. Steffen Bauer, The Ozone Secretariat: Administering the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 8 (Global Governance Working Paper No 28, 2007), available at www.
glogov.org. http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP28.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 8-9.
135. Bauer, supra note 12, at 18.
136. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 24.
137. Sandford, supra note 36, at 117.
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nation” because they transfer information between different actors of their respective re-
gimes, which finally leads to the fulfilment of the treaty objectives.
VI. Comparative Assessment of the Actual Functioning of Secretariats
Now that we have seen the important role played by secretariats in an international
treaty system, it is worthwhile to shed light on the effects of their functions.  What has
been the impact of secretarial functions?  This is the subject to which the article now
turns.
The effects of the functions performed by secretariats can be divided into two catego-
ries: cognitive, and normative.144  Cognitive effects include processing and distributing
data to stakeholders.145  In fact, dissemination of information is a key function of secretari-
ats.146  This may affect the knowledge or belief systems of the actors because political
activity is dependent on the information received by the parties from the secretariat.147
Normative effects include norm-building processes that can also influence political activ-
ity aimed at international cooperation.148  For example, secretariats play a role at the time
of treaty negotiation and its amendment by way of protocols.149  They frame the agenda
and procedures in negotiations, thus exercising a certain amount of influence on norm
setting.150  This influence can be used by the secretariat to further the institutionalisation
and implementation of the treaty.151
A. COGNITIVE EFFECTS
Although the UNFCCC Secretariat does not really generate new knowledge, it does
process factual and descriptive information used by stakeholders, thus contributing to
public discourse.152  Different stakeholders–such as policy makers, negotiators, civil soci-
ety, and the media–interpret the information provided by the Secretariat.153  The docu-
mentation provided by the Secretariat is in great demand and a large number of visitors
visit its website frequently.154  Moreover, Parties have also requested information in lan-
guages other than English.155  But the Secretariat’s compiling and disseminating activity is
dependent on the data provided by the Parties.156  Thus, even though the Secretariat co-
ordinates the reporting obligations of the Parties, it cannot critically evaluate the data
provided by them because the Parties may perceive it as a political assessment.157  In fact,
144. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 1.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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150. Id.
151. Busch, supra note 9, at 2.
152. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 9.
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the job of the Secretariat is to remove all politically-inclined information from the docu-
ments it prepares.158
The UNCCD Secretariat has been more visible in its cognitive effects.  It has, for ex-
ample, deliberately maintained the use of the expression “desertification” as opposed to
“land degradation,” because the former has a political appeal and affects the perception of
the problem by non-experts.159  The Secretariat has also succeeded in making the deser-
tification problem appear global instead of regional.160  This has had a significant conse-
quence because the UNCCD projects are now eligible for funding from the Global
Environment Facility (GEF).161  The Secretariat has always lobbied for developing coun-
tries and kept the issue alive at the GEF Council.162  The Secretariat staff acknowledges
its role in obtaining such funding and states that because the UNCCD does not have its
own finances, funding from the GEF is necessary to implement its objectives.163
The Secretariat also prepares documents on request by the Parties and makes them
available on its website. As provided by its mandate, the UNCCD Secretariat has estab-
lished good contacts with NGOs to promote regional action plans.164  This cooperation is
a continuation of the negotiation phase of the treaty in which NGOs were very closely
involved.165  The Secretariat has also been accused of controversial financial support to
select NGOs that has led to a review of its activities by the Parties.166
The CBD Secretariat, which is also the outcome of the Rio Summit like the two previ-
ous Secretariats, has been successful in its cognitive effects even though they are not very
remarkable.167  In fact, its mandate does not prescribe scientific research.168  Despite this,
it has been quite active in bringing together and diffusing scientific knowledge.169  For
this purpose, it maintains close contact with the scientific community.170  The Secretariat
mainly collects scientific information on different ecosystems and processes it for the
member states.171  For this, it maintains a scientific and technical division.172  The Secre-
tariat prepares documents, reports, handbooks, and newsletters in addition to providing
information on its website.173  It also publishes the Global Biodiversity Outlook, a report
on the measures to implement the objectives of the Convention.174  Therefore, the Secre-
tariat has extensive expertise on biodiversity-related matters and functions as an informa-
158. Busch, supra note 9, at 3.
159. BAUER, supra note 11, at 78-79.
160. Id. at 79.
161. Id.
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164. Bauer, supra note 12, at 24.
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167. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 18.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 18-19.
170. Id. at 18.
171. Id. at 18-19.
172. CBD, The CBD Secretariat, Divisions, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/divisions/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2011).
173. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 19.
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tion hub.175  It is also involved in a review mechanism supported by governments and
NGOs.176  But the information supplied by the Secretariat is primarily used by member
states and NGOs and not generally used by the scientific and business communities.177
The Secretariat has not been able to influence public discourse in its field.178 Its activities
do not garner much attention from the media either.179  This is despite the fact that the
information it provides is viewed as credible by various stakeholders that make use of it.180
Nevertheless, this credibility coupled with the fact that the Secretariat is viewed as politi-
cally neutral leads to a relationship of trust between the Parties and the Secretariat.181
One reason for the limited (but successful) cognitive effects of the CBD Secretariat is
that biodiversity loss does not generate public interest.182  For example, the loss of species
of insects does not lead to natural disasters and therefore its redressal is not a priority for
the public.183  Hence, the activities of the Secretariat cannot generate enough public opin-
ion to impact the actions of the member states.  It has only had a limited influence on
public awareness of biodiversity but has still helped in the identification of new environ-
mental issues in national jurisdictions.184  Consequently, the Secretariat has responded by
coming up with a communication strategy to reach a wider public.185  Its aim is to educate
the media, students, governments, etc. of biodiversity conservation.186  Another reason for
the CBD Secretariat’s limited cognitive effects is that biodiversity conservation measures
involving rights of land owners are politically sensitive and therefore the Secretariat can-
not do much.187  Additionally, the objectives of the Convention are vague and do not
include any specific quantifiable targets to be achieved by member states.188  In such a
situation, the effects of the Secretariat may actually be considered remarkable.
The Ozone Secretariat, which, like the other two Secretariats in the sample, serves a
Protocol also, has had significant cognitive effects.189  This is despite the fact that it did
not develop from the UNEP Ozone Unit until after the adoption of the Montreal Proto-
col in 1987.190  It plays an important role in highlighting unsolved issues in the ozone
regime.191  Because the Montreal Protocol is considered one of the most effective envi-
ronmental treaties, governments are lackadaisical in their attitude towards it, which leads
to the exploitation of unregulated ozone depleting substances by the private sector.192  It is
precisely in this area that the Secretariat has a role to play, because it must inform the
175. Id. at 21.
176. Id. at 19.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 20.
183. Id. at 20-21.
184. Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 125, at 265.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 271.
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189. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 22.
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192. Id. at 22-23.
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Parties of what is going on.193  For creating awareness, it uses such means as information
kits and slide projections.194  The Secretariat also processes knowledge and feeds it into
the negotiation process.195  In fact, even the UNEP Ozone Unit was involved in knowl-
edge dissemination to all the stakeholders during the negotiation of the Vienna
Convention.196
The CITES Secretariat has expertise that it uses on various occasions, such as changes
of governments.197  It holds (re)training programmes for national officers every time a
government changes, especially in Africa and Latin America.198  Because formal commu-
nications can be difficult at such a time, the Secretariat uses means such as fax and tele-
phone to keep in touch with the state and non-state actors.199  Thus, the Secretariat has
the infrastructure and knowledge to guide new officials.200  Furthermore, it has regional
centres employing specialists who can disseminate expert knowledge.201  It has also rec-
ommended to governments not to change the head of the CITES Management Authority
as s/he has invaluable expertise202 that could impact the actions of stakeholders.  The Sec-
retariat also uses its technical expertise to conduct analyses of national reports to advise
and recommend actions to be taken.203
The CITES Secretariat must also convince members of the importance of conservation,
which is difficult in the case of developing countries.204  In this case, it uses an anthropo-
centric approach,205 helping the countries to develop alternatives to wildlife trading for
their locals.206  The Humane Society, an NGO, termed the CITES Secretariat as very
influential because it provides reliable data, detects infractions, and advises Parties.207
Generally, the recommendations made by the Secretariat are not ignored by the Parties.
In fact, the Secretariat enjoys authority due to its professional expertise and experience.
B. NORMATIVE EFFECTS
The UNFCCC Secretariat has not exercised much visible influence on the political
outcome of negotiations or on the adoption of specific measures by Parties.208  It did not
have much influence on the direction and content of the negotiations leading to the adop-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol either.  Despite this, one can say that the Secretariat exercised
indirect influence because it facilitated the negotiations leading to a successful outcome by
193. Id. at 23.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Sandford, supra note 36, at 232-33.
198. Id. at 232.
199. Id. n. 13.
200. Id. at 233.
201. Id. at 253.
202. Id. at 232.
203. Id. at 118.
204. Id. at 239.
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207. Id. at 239.
208. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 10.
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providing strategic advice to the COP President and respective Chairs and officers.209
This was particularly evident at the resumed COP 6 in Bonn in July 2001, where the
Secretariat drafted a text that assisted the Parties in deciding on the technical features of
the Kyoto mechanisms and then adopting the Marrakech Accords at COP 7 in Marrakech
in November 2001.210  The Secretariat did not lean one way or the other, politically, in
the text but instead it merely removed incoherence in the previous texts and provided
technical solutions.211  The Secretariat can only step in once the Parties are in political
agreement and cannot push forward questions on which Parties are in disagreement.212
This kind of support for negotiations and technical advice is highly appreciated by the
Parties.213
One of the reasons why secretariats might have a limited influence is because of the
high costs of regulation in domestic economies and the high political stakes.214  In such a
case parties monitor the activities of the secretariat to make sure they are not acting
against parties’ respective interests and are reluctant to give any latitude to the secretariat
to act.215  The Climate Secretariat, for instance, cannot take a stand in the documentation
it prepares and must reflect the positions of all Parties.216  The Secretariat can only make
technical propositions and cannot comment on politically sensitive issues.217  Even though
this may be called an exercise in impartiality, taking a stand does not necessarily amount to
partiality.
This does not mean that the Secretariat does not exercise any influence, however; as
this article has noted, its influence is limited but it does exist.218  The source of its influ-
ence is its political and technical expertise on climate change issues and its ability to pro-
vide input in a timely manner. For example, the Secretariat prepares technical papers for
subsidiary bodies.  Given that it is an authority on the climate regime, it can come up with
the requisite analysis of issues critical to the negotiations.219  Thus the Secretariat pos-
sesses expertise unmatched in national jurisdictions and prepares its documents in a politi-
cally neutral way so that such documents are acceptable to the Parties when
negotiating.220  It prepares, on request, drafts and proposals for the presiding officers that
contain options for agreement amongst Parties, advice on the conduct of negotiations,
possible outcomes, negotiating arena, procedural obstacles, and ways to overcome
them.221  In fact, the COP at The Hague failed largely due to lack of secretarial advice.222
This shows the significance of the Secretariat’s advisory function.  The Secretariat also
209. Id. at 11.
210. Id.
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212. Id. at 11-12.
213. Id. at 11.
214. Id. at 12.
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218. Id. at 14.
219. FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME:  A GUIDE
TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 484-85 (2004).
220. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 14.
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provides the logistics in the form of organising negotiations.223  This is a very important
function because climate change negotiations involve a large number of participants.224
According to a staff member, “[n]o meeting ever succeeded because the logistics were
great.  But if the logistics are bad, the negotiations can fail.”225
In the case of the UNCCD Secretariat, its staff members were involved in the negotia-
tions of the Convention, especially the former Executive Secretary, Hama Arba Diallo,
who led the interim Secretariat.226 The continuity of their presence contributed to the
institutionalisation and implementation of the Convention. Because the Convention itself
contains regional annexes, the Secretariat’s efforts, through its Regional Action
Facilitators, are oriented towards Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the affected regions.227
The Secretariat has aimed to improve cooperation between regions through Regional Co-
ordination Units (RCUs) to implement regional action plans.228  The affected countries
were receptive to the idea of institutionalisation of the Convention but donor countries
were sceptical about it.229  Another example of institutionalisation of the Convention by
the Secretariat is the creation of the Committee for the Review of the Implementation of
the Convention (CRIC).230  This idea originated from within the Secretariat just like the
idea to set up RCUs.231  The creation of the CRIC was not looked upon favourably by the
donor countries, similar to the case of the formation of RCUs.232  Additionally, there were
some irregularities regarding the election of CRIC officials, which affected the reputation
of the Secretariat.233  When the CRIC held its meetings, however, this scepticism partially
evaporated because it helped to implement the Convention’s objectives.234
Not satisfied with its previous efforts towards the institutionalisation of the Convention,
the Secretariat continued in the same direction by organising a High Level Segment of
Heads of State and Government at the Havana COP to get public attention for the Con-
vention.235  It invited Heads of State of developing countries such as Fidel Castro, Robert
Mugabe, and Hugo Cha´vez.236  In contrast, it did not invite any Heads of State from
developed countries.237  This Segment even resulted in a Havana Declaration of Heads of
States and Governments.238  All these activities show the Secretariat’s consistent support
for the developing world.  The developed countries expressed their displeasure at the ac-
tivities of the Secretariat.239  Developing countries, being at the mercy of rich donor coun-
tries, also criticised the Secretariat for holding the Segment.  This led to the Parties
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224. Id. at 6-7.
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226. Bauer, supra note 12, at 22-23.
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exercising greater control over the activities and resources of the Secretariat.240  However,
the very fact that the Segment ignited so much controversy shows the important role
secretariats are capable of playing in the sphere of intergovernmental diplomacy.
Since the UNCCD negotiations began at the Rio de Janeiro Summit in 1992, the Con-
vention has been framed as a sustainable development convention aimed at alleviating
poverty, a point highlighted by the Secretariat and developing members.241  Given that it
is supposed to be a desertification convention, this framing leads to a certain amount of
ambiguity in its objectives.242  This ambiguity gives a lot of liberty to the Secretariat,
which prefers a broad interpretation of the Convention.243  In fact, this ambiguity helped
the Secretariat to shape the current Convention process.244  Given that desertification
affects developing countries much more than developed countries, the Convention is not
of much interest to the latter.  Therefore, the developing countries perceive the Secreta-
riat’s support as a positive factor.245  On the one hand, the Secretariat could be said to be
faithful to the objectives of the treaty, but on the other hand, this pro-developing country
attitude may put a question mark on the impartial character of the Secretariat.  This is a
case of the Secretariat deciding which of the two masters it wants to serve–the treaty
(since the title of the convention refers to Africa) or the parties or both.
The CBD Secretariat has generated substantial normative effects compared with other
secretariats.246  Its effects result from international cooperation and assistance in negotia-
tions.247  In fact, because the Secretariat has expert knowledge of the biodiversity regime
(as we have seen in addressing its cognitive effects) and is neutral, it is able to generate
normative effects beyond its mandate.248  For example, the Secretariat held dialogues on
the issue of biosafety and encouraged Parties to participate in the negotiations249 despite
their conflicting priorities.  As a result, a lot of countries participated in the negotiations
on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, leading to its successful adoption.250  Also, the
Convention has an inclusive approach towards non-state actors unlike other conven-
tions.251  This inclusive approach is also the result of the efforts of the Secretariat, which
supported the inclusion of indigenous and local communities in the working group on
traditional knowledge.252  The Secretariat’s role in encouraging NGO participation in the
regime has been highlighted by a majority of stakeholders.253  Additionally, the Secretariat
prepares background documents for the meetings of the COP and other subsidiary bodies
and organises the meetings.254  It also prepares COP decisions, in which passages relating
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to technical assessments have been adopted without any changes.255  Of course, drafts
prepared by the Secretariat are frequently amended when the issue in question is politi-
cally sensitive.256  On the whole, it is clear that the Secretariat exercises bureaucratic au-
thority and is able to bring about a change in the activities of the different stakeholders.257
The Ozone Secretariat, like the Climate Secretariat, drafts reports and decisions to be
adopted by the MOP.258  Though the Executive Secretary attached little importance to
the Secretariat’s drafts, the staff admits that its legal and technical expertise helps it to
indirectly influence the members’ decisions because members view the drafts as reliable.259
Secretariat staff rephrases potentially controversial parts in drafts to make them acceptable
to delegates.260  This expertise, which results from a highly qualified, sincere, and profes-
sional staff, allows the Secretariat to command considerable authority.261  Apart from the
preparation of drafts, the Secretariat has also come up with solutions in case of collapse of
negotiations due to politically sensitive issues.262  The Secretariat also tries to convince
Parties to ratify amendments to the Montreal Protocol as the number of members to the
Convention, the Protocol, and its amendments are different thus increasing the work of
the Secretariat.263  Its mandate allows it to invite non-members to meetings.264  It also
communicates to the Parties any proposed Protocol to be adopted, at least six months
before the COP meeting for its adoption (article 8(2) of the Vienna Convention).265  It is
also required to communicate proposed amendments to the Convention or Protocol to
the Parties at least six months before the COP or MOP meeting for its adoption The
Secretariat shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to this Con-
vention for information (article 9(2) of the Vienna Convention).266  Thus, the Secretariat
plays an important role in improvements and advances in the treaty, be it the Vienna
Convention or the Montreal Protocol.  Moreover, the Secretariat is known to be impartial
and transparent and has been able to create good relations with developing and developed
members.267  This certainly helps in furthering the treaty regime.
The CITES Secretariat has had diverse normative effects.  It receives proposed amend-
ments to the Appendices from the Parties 150 days before the meeting to discuss them.  It
is then required to consult the Parties and intergovernmental bodies on the issue and
forward the response to the other Parties with its own findings and recommendations
(article XV(1)(a) and (2)(b),(c),(e)).  This is unlike the Ozone Secretariat that only com-
municates the proposed amendments to the Convention or Protocol.  In case of Parties’
replies or objections, the Secretariat shall communicate them to the other Parties (article
255. Id. at 20.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 19-21.
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XV(2)(h)).  The Secretariat is also required to notify the Parties of the result of the vote
on the proposed amendment (article XV(2)(k)).  Thus it plays a role in treaty-making.
In case of conflicts among members, the CITES Secretariat being activist sees them as
an opportunity to make use of its conflict management skills, thus enhancing its credibility
and reputation as an impartial secretariat.268  Of course the resolution of the conflict must
also result in advancing the objectives of the Convention.269  The Secretariat’s expertise in
resolving conflicts is well known because it is called upon to resolve conflicts between
member states and NGOs, for example, during the negotiation of the Lusaka Agreement
which led to a successful outcome.270  However Parties do not really acknowledge the
contribution of the Secretariat in resolving conflicts relating to the implementation of the
treaty.271
The question of ivory trade has caused much tension between the Parties and the Secre-
tariat because the latter advised the parties to enter a reservation on protection of ele-
phants until they were in a position to be protected.272  The Secretariat knew this
recommendation would be problematic because Parties do not appreciate this recommen-
dation-making power as they feel that the Secretariat has too much liberty to make rec-
ommendations.273  So the unique power to make recommendations does not always work
in favour of the Secretariat.274  However, when the Secretariat recommended to the
Standing Committee to take action against Italy for violation of CITES regulations, the
members actually imposed trade bans on Italy, making it comply.275  In case of trade in
endangered species in Thailand, the Secretariat recommended more time for implementa-
tion.  Thailand worked with the Secretariat and thus avoided sanctions.276  Thus, the
CITES Secretariat is not just a servant of the Parties.  It also helps in fulfilling the objec-
tives of the Convention.  These three examples make it clear the CITES Secretariat is
quite activist even though it may not always succeed in its efforts.  But this activism is
actually the result of a formal mandate to make recommendations.  Moreover, the Secre-
tariat prepares projects on Parties’ request and makes recommendations to the Standing
Committee about which of these should be funded and has also recommended the use of
trade bans against defaulting members.277
Relations between the Secretariat and NGOs deteriorated in the 1980s when the latter
accused the Secretary General of favouring ivory trade.278  The Secretariat reacted in a
very mature way.  It did not stop communicating with the NGOs.  This has an impact on
the achievement of the goals of the treaty.  This also explains why the Secretariat is good
at handling conflicts that ultimately leads to furthering the Convention.  The fact that
these efforts of the Secretariat bear fruit is proof of its commitment to the Convention.
268. See Sandford, supra note 36, at 165.
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The number of Parties to the CITES was twenty-one in 1973 and 134 in 1996.279  This
increase was due to the activism of the CITES Secretariat that made efforts to convince
developing and developed countries to become members of the treaty.280  These efforts
have continued and the number of Parties currently is 175.281  Additionally, the Secreta-
riat has made efforts to include plants under regulated species as the Convention is seen as
one that is too focussed on animals.282  This is a very significant contribution to the ad-
vancement of the Convention.  The Secretariat is also respected by all for being impartial.
There are many factors that affect the performance of secretariats, such as cooperation
with other entities, finances, and leadership, to name a few.  For example, if the cost of
alleviating the problem is very high or the time span between the cause and effect of the
problem is too long, governments may try to reduce the role of treaty secretariats.283
However, the authority exercised by secretariats by virtue of their institutional memory,
varied knowledge base, professional diversity, and leadership allows them to play a role in
the functioning of the treaty.284  One of the most important factors affecting the role of
secretariats is their leadership.
VII. Leadership
Leadership is a phenomenon that elicits divergent opinions.  On the one hand, scholars
like Thomas G. Weiss feel that the role of leadership in international organisations is
exaggerated because leaders function within an inherently complex structure and are not
always free to make decisions.285  On the other hand, there are scholars like Oran R.
Young who feel that the success or failure of institutional bargaining in international or-
ganisations depends on the leadership.286  He defines leadership as “the actions of individ-
uals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the
efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining.”287  It
is thus clear that leaders, in isolation, cannot determine the success of institutional bar-
gaining but good leadership can go a long way in achieving success.288  This article sub-
scribes to Oran R. Young’s view about the importance of the role of leadership.
The functions and impacts of secretariats are greatly determined by their leaders.  The
main actors in secretariats are the top executives, especially the head of the organisation
who guides the staff.  Skilful leadership allows the secretariat to have more impact.  The
personality and abilities of the head are very important when forging relationships with
the parties and other intergovernmental organisations.  S/he must maintain informal ties
with the relevant persons without sacrificing the impartiality of the secretariat.  The point
of view of the leader regarding the role of the secretariat in treaty implementation deter-
279. Id. at 224.
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287. Id. at 285.
288. Id.
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mines the role the secretariat will play in the treaty regime.  The leadership determines
the performance of the secretariat and how it is perceived by the stakeholders.  In fact, the
behaviour of the head can have an impact on the behaviour of the stakeholders in the
entire regime.
The UNFCCC Secretariat does not project itself as the leader.  Even though the Exec-
utive Secretary can provide some sort of “inspirational leadership,”289 the first Executive
Secretary of the Climate Change Secretariat, Michael Zammit Cutajar, did not want overt
involvement of the Secretariat staff in the climate regime.290  The staff does not make any
effort to influence the political activity and is aware that this would contradict its man-
date.291  Thus, the Secretariat does not exercise proactive leadership.  Staff members stay
impartial by following the instructions of the Parties and this in turn helps the Secretariat
influence the regime.292  The Secretariat enjoys the trust of the Parties.  This is due to
Michael Zammit Cutajar, who having worked in the UNCTAD previously293 had good
knowledge of UN procedures and of developing country concerns.  He served for over a
decade as Executive Secretary,294 gaining the confidence of Parties through his good rela-
tions.  He was known to be efficient, objective, intelligent, committed, professional, and
affable.  The next Executive Secretary, Joke Waller Hunter followed in his footsteps, i.e.
she managed to keep the trust of the Parties.
The UNCCD Secretariat’s leadership has been instrumental in bringing about institu-
tionalisation and implementation of the Convention.  The former Executive Secretary
Hama Arba Diallo from Burkina Faso was head of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmen-
tal Negotiating Committee on Desertification and of the interim Secretariat.  He was
popular with developing countries.295  He played an important role in the negotiation of
the Convention and was known to take a stand against developed members.296  The cur-
rent Executive Secretary is Luc Gnacadja from Benin.297  This could be symbolic as deser-
tification mainly affects Africa.298  This may also show the preference for an Executive
Secretary who comes from the affected region and so has a good grasp of the problem.
The effects of the CBD Secretariat can be explained by the functioning of its leadership.
For example, the Executive Secretary proposed a Staff Development Policy adopted by
the COP in 2002 which encourages staff to improve and evaluate its competencies.299
This obviously helps in better functioning of the Secretariat and thus of the treaty regime.
The first Executive Secretary of the CBD Secretariat, Calestous Juma, had frequent con-
flicts with the UNEP because he wanted more autonomy for the Secretariat.300  Since the
289. Depledge, supra note 23, at 54.
290. Id. at 63.
291. Busch, supra note 9, at 12.
292. Id. at 12-13.
293. Depledge, supra note 23, at 63.
294. Id.
295. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 18.
296. Id.
297. UNCCD, Secretariat, http://www.unccd.int/secretariat/menu.php?newch=l2 (last visited Jan. 20,
2012).
298. UNCCD, Fact Sheet 11, Combating Desertification in Africa, http://www.unccd.int/publicinfo/fact
sheets/showFS.php?number=11 (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
299. Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 125, at 270.
300. Id.
VOL. 45, NO. 4
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
ANALYSIS OF SECRETARIATS 1077
CBD Secretariat is hosted by the UNEP, any attempt to break away does not make sense.
As long as the Secretariat can fulfil its mandate, whether or not it is autonomous is not
really the question.  But these efforts at autonomy did bear fruit because the next Execu-
tive Secretary, Hamdallah Zedan, who was from the UNEP itself, took the reins of a
rather independent Secretariat.301  Moreover, he did not let UNEP exercise any further
control on the Secretariat and instead favoured more autonomy.302  He also favoured con-
sulting his staff when taking decisions, thus bringing about a change in the centralised
decision-making procedure that existed earlier.303  The current Executive Secretary Ah-
med Djoghlaf has emphasised capacity building and implementation as areas requiring
further action.304  Thus, it is clear that the leadership has contributed to the useful effects
of the Secretariat.
Despite the fact that all the Executive Secretaries of the UNCCD and CBD Secretariats
have been from developing countries, the difference in the stand of the two Secretariats is
obvious.  The UNCCD Secretariat is manifestly pro-developing countries whereas the
CBD Secretariat is impartial.
The role played by the Ozone Secretariat is reinforced by its leadership.  Mustafa Tolba,
Executive Director of UNEP, was very overtly involved in the ozone negotiations and is
respected for having furthered the formation of the ozone regime.305  All the stakeholders,
including staff and delegates, are unanimously appreciative of his leadership capabilities.
His successor, Madhava Sarma, the first Executive Secretary of the Ozone Secretariat, was
also respected by all the parties.306  Like Mustafa Tolba, who played an important role in
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol negotiations, Sarma also played a signifi-
cant role in resolving impasses at the sessions of the MOP to amend the Montreal Proto-
col.307  Both would consult informally with Parties before the beginning of formal
negotiations to achieve consensus.308  Marco Gonzalez, the current Executive Secretary, is
more prudent in his approach to the Parties309 but understands fully well the conse-
quences of Parties not willing to commit in negotiations.  According to him, even though
the Secretariat is meant to serve the Parties, it also reminds them of their responsibili-
ties.310  Also, the fact that the Ozone Secretariat processes knowledge that is used in infor-
mal meetings of the Parties shows not only its expertise but also the dynamism of its
leadership.  The role of the personnel and the leadership is commendable given the lim-
ited autonomy of the Secretariat being part of the UNEP.  Additionally, the Executive
Secretary has to make do with a very small staff.311
The leadership of the CITES Secretariat has had a turbulent history.  The achieve-
ments of the Secretariat, however, are a testimony of its commitment to the Convention.
In 1989, American NGOs accused the Secretariat of supporting ivory trade and its Secre-
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Depledge, supra note 23, at 63.
306. Bauer, supra note 131, at 14.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 13.
309. Id. at 14.
310. Id. at 13.
311. Id. at 10.
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tary General, Euge`ne Lapointe, of receiving payments from ivory traders, because of
which he was dismissed by Mustafa Tolba, the then Executive Director of UNEP.312  The
Secretariat staff is sympathetic to Lapointe and are now cautious in their relations with
NGOs.  In 1998, Izgrev Topkov, the then Secretary General, was also removed from his
post, along with two other officers, for awarding permits to organisations that wanted to
trade in banned plants and animals.  This was the result of an inquiry by Klaus Tpfer,
Executive Director of UNEP.
The Secretariat has also had many problems with the UNEP over common services and
costs of being located in Geneva.313  In 1995, the Secretary-General Izgrev Topkov sug-
gested that the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) that was acting as
the CITES Secretariat had not put in enough effort to make their alliance work, because
of which the parties decided to move it to the UNEP.314  But there were problems with
the UNEP too and according to Topkov, since the Secretariat had been through this with
IUCN, it knew that bowing to UNEP would spell the end of its autonomy.315  Thus, he
could be said to be like Calestous Juma, the first Executive Secretary of the CBD Secreta-
riat, who was very concerned about the independence of his Secretariat.  Given the strong
personality of its head, it is not surprising that the CITES Secretariat is quite active.
Furthermore, Topkov realised that employees were underpaid and on short-term con-
tracts.316  He therefore secured them longer contracts.317  He believed that he could not
win the loyalty of the staff if he did not take care of it.  It is curious that the CITES
Secretariat has such a bad relationship with UNEP, unlike the Ozone Secretariat.  And
Mustafa Tolba buckled under U.S. pressure to dismiss Lapointe.  Perhaps, this is just one
reason explaining the bad relationship between the UNEP and the CITES Secretariat.
What is really surprising is that the Secretariat is so active despite its controversial
leadership.
Lapointe’s generation was dedicated to the protection of the environment.  The new
generation of leaders is more concerned about the efficiency of the Secretariat,318 as is
clear by Topkov’s attitude.  But this attitude cannot be criticised per se because it must be
judged by what it achieves in terms of the Convention’s objectives.  The Secretariat has
played a role in resolving conflicts amongst members, as mentioned earlier.  Its senior
officers, such as the Secretary General, Deputy Secretary-General, and the Scientific Of-
ficer have facilitated negotiations among members.319  Therefore, they are highly re-
garded by all the stakeholders.320  Additionally, the Secretary General is also responsible
for the budget of the Secretariat.321
This overview proves that leaders of environmental secretariats have made a significant
contribution to the functioning of secretariats and, as a result, on the impact of secretariats
on the treaty regime.
312. Sandford, supra note 36, at 213, 228, 254.
313. Id. at 235.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 235-36.
316. Id. at 248.
317. Id. at 248, n. 19.
318. Id. at 255.
319. Id. at 257.
320. Id. at 391.
321. Id. at 242.
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VIII. Problems Faced by Environmental Secretariats
One problem faced by secretariats is the issue of sovereignty, i.e. the parties and not the
secretariats are the decision-makers.322  Parties can do anything in the name of sover-
eignty.  Also, different departments or ministries of the government have different priori-
ties so secretariats get different signals from the same government.323  For example, the
Ministry of Trade will promote trade, whereas the Ministry of Forests will promote con-
servation.324  Moreover, changes in national governments mean changes in national pri-
orities and new government officials must be briefed every time.325  If a new government
changes its priority from environment to education, the secretariat can only advance the
goal of the treaty within this change in priority.  Within this constraint, the secretariat has
to try to achieve the treaty objectives so it constantly communicates with parties’ govern-
ments, providing relevant information, etc.  The secretariat may also cooperate with
NGOs as they can mobilise opinion that may influence the implementation of the conven-
tion by a party.  This is certainly useful if the convention is not a priority for the new
government.  Secretariats may also build contacts with the media for this purpose.
Another problem is finances.  With the passage of time, the number of parties to trea-
ties has gone up, thus increasing the workload and financial needs of secretariats.  When
parties want to restrain the expansion of secretariats, they may use budget constraints.326
This may be the case if parties do not want the secretariat to play a role in compliance
monitoring, for example, by travelling and verifying implementation by parties.  Moreo-
ver, parties are reluctant to provide funds for implementation problems as that would
amount to admitting their existence.327  Therefore, secretariats are hesitant to ask for
funds.  The CITES Secretariat faced this problem and had to ask for funds stating that
they were for the performance of substantive tasks.328  Also, parties may not pay their
contributions in a timely manner, forcing the secretariat to do fund-raising from their
parent organisation or external sources such as NGOs, which is time consuming and may
put its neutrality at risk.  But this is not a substitute for parties’ contributions.  Addition-
ally, lack of funds may not let the secretariat employ quality staff.329  In this case the work
is outsourced to consultants or even NGOs.  But in the face of changing governments,
continuity is required in the secretariat staff.  Therefore, secretariats try to obtain contri-
butions from important members first and then persuade other members to pay.
Some parties may feel the secretariat is too active and may try to restrain its activities.
But in fact, the secretariats do not overstep their limits as they have their survival in mind.
Anyway, staff cannot be hired without COP approval.  Also, the parties are sometimes
suspicious of the activities of the secretariat.  For example, the parties to the UNFCCC
never analysed the financial activities of the Secretariat, but have started doing so now.330
Additionally, the programme budget decision for 2004-2005 requested the Executive Sec-
322. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhu¨ner, supra note 21, at 5.
323. Sandford, supra note 36, at 135.
324. Id. at 241.
325. Id. at 135-36.
326. Id. at 142-143.
327. Id. at 376.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 140-42.
330. YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra note 219, at 502-03.
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retary to specify how COP decisions on article 4(8) of the UNFCCC331 are reflected in
the work programme and to conduct an evaluation of the Secretariat’s activities and report
to the COP 11.  Moreover, Saudi Arabia, speaking for G77 and China, asked for a contin-
uing review of the functions and operations of the Secretariat.  This close supervision of
the Secretariat may be useful if it is not done for political purposes.332
Parties do not appreciate the presence of NGOs in their jurisdictions.333  For example,
there are northern NGOs which monitor trade in Asia and Africa and report to the
CITES Secretariat to identify infractions.334  Frequently, the NGOs are more interested
in making money and have little understanding of the problem or culture of the issue in
question.335  Moreover, developing countries do not always have the resources to put into
practice all the rules of the Conventions, and NGOs do not understand this.336  There-
fore, secretariats play a role in improving relations between the stakeholders.  But, because
secretariats are dependent on NGOs for fieldwork, their dislike by the parties may not
allow the secretariat to fulfil its monitoring obligation.
National governments try to exert pressure on their nationals to influence the course of
action in the secretariats.337  This means that geographical quotas may lead to interna-
tional civil servants promoting national interests within the international secretariat.338  In
fact, the very concept of geographical quotas supports the idea of national loyalties and
may lead to the non-fulfilment of the international objectives of the MEA.339  Thus, these
quotas should be eliminated.  Instead, they could be based on gender, age, length of ser-
vice, etc., or a mix of these criteria.340  Or recruitment could be done in such a way that it
is representative of all stakeholders, for example indigenous peoples, involved in the man-
agement of the resource to be protected.341  An example of geographical quotas not serv-
ing their purpose is provided by the UNFCCC Secretariat, where developing country
nationals are under-represented in the top management.342  As a result, China and G77
have questioned this and asked for equity in allocation of resources between developed
and developing members.343  If the principle of geographical quotas were not followed,
this question would not have arisen.
Secretariats may also face problems with respect to their parent organisation, like the
CITES Secretariat has had problems with UNEP.  But this conflict related to the field of
activity of the Secretariat under the purview the UNEP, i.e. administrative matters, and
331. Article 4(8) reads as follows, “In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties
shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to
funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing
country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of
response measures . . . . ”  UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 4(8).
332. YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra note 219, at 502-03.
333. Sandford, supra note 36, at 237-38.
334. Id. at 238.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 160.
338. Weiss, supra note 1, at 293.
339. See id. at 302-03.
340. Id. at 304.
341. SANDFORD, supra note 27, at 36-37.
342. See DEPLEDGE, supra note 22, at 70.
343. Id.
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not to the field of substantive operations of the Secretariat that are the domain of the
COP.  Despite this, the secretariat has to spend time dealing with it.
The location of the secretariat can also create problems.  For example, the CITES Sec-
retariat may conduct activities such as training programmes in developing countries.344
But it is located in Geneva and it may be difficult to coordinate from there.  It has regional
centres345 but this is not the case with all secretariats.  The Ozone Secretariat is located in
a developing country but then far away from the UN in Geneva or New York, so coordi-
nation is again a problem.346  Also, developing countries do not always have missions in
another developing country so they cannot send delegates, especially on short notice.  On
the other hand, they have missions in UN centres so they can attend meetings easily.
Given that most secretariats are in the North, it may be a good idea to decentralise activi-
ties by having regional centres where representatives of various secretariats may partici-
pate.  Because environmental problems are linked, a forum is needed where all the
environmental secretariats can interact, which would be beneficial to the attainment of the
goals of the various treaties involved.  Regional centres make the secretariat more accessi-
ble to stakeholders and help the secretariat to monitor compliance.  Furthermore, decen-
tralisation would make their operations more flexible and decisions could be taken faster
without the need for consulting the entire management.  In addition, decentralised offices,
being in the field, understand the problem better and can initiate useful projects that
would fulfill the aims of the MEA.  Of course, decentralisation leads to higher costs but
has many advantages too.347  The decentralised units can continue to be financed by the
main office or may generate their own finances also.  Another possibility may be to locate
secretariats, whether or not by rotation, in places where the problem to be addressed is
most acute because people there have greater understanding of the issue and need more
help.348
IX. Conclusion
This analysis of secretariats shows that they do play an important role in the treaty
regime.  Despite the fact that they lack formal power, they help in ensuring the success of
the treaty and can have a significant impact on the international environmental policy
outcomes.  They do so by impacting the behaviour of states and non-state actors.  For
example, despite criticism and accusations of lack of transparency, the UNCCD Secreta-
riat has emerged as an active player in the regime.  Of course, secretariats cannot be held
responsible for the failure or success of the regimes as they are but secretariats.  They are
not the decision-makers.  But they can lead to unpredictable results that impact the imple-
mentation of the MEA.  The principal role is played by the nation states, but secretariats
are fast becoming quite influential even if such influence is not laid down in their man-
date.  States frequently react to secretariats’ actions, as in the case of the UNCCD Secre-
tariat.  As a result, it is clear that secretariats exercise bureaucratic authority.  But, this
authority should be exercised judiciously.  For example, the blatant support of developing
344. Sandford, supra note 36, at 22.
345. Id. at 252.
346. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 22-27.
347. Weiss, supra note 1, at 302, n. 36.
348. SANDFORD, supra note 27, at 41, 45.
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members by the UNCCD Secretariat has proved counterproductive by offending power-
ful donor countries.
Secretariats offset their little formal power by acting as the information hub and provid-
ing the link between states and non-state actors.  Moreover, the influence of secretariats is
also dependent on their leadership.  Being the institutional memory of the regime and the
main expert on technical, scientific, legal, and political matters, secretariats are actually
indispensable.  Parties’ appreciation of their work is proof of this fact.
The most important function of secretariats is actually acting as the facilitator and me-
diator, especially the latter.  This means that the most important function is the one that is
not really defined in its mandate.  This once again proves their importance.  Of course,
the other functions are equally indispensable, but the effects of acting as a mediator can be
quite spectacular; for example, the adoption of the Convention or Protocol.
If secretariats are to continue their important work, their problems need to be solved.
They need to be provided with funds and basic autonomy so that they do not spend their
time searching for either or both.
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The Indian Microfinance Institutions
(Development and Regulation) Bill of 2011:
Microfinance Beginnings and Crisis and
How the Indian Government is Trying
to Protect Its People
LAMAR DOWLING*
I. Introduction
The recent microfinance crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh caught
the world’s attention and caused many to wonder who was to blame.  Sensationalized
newspaper accounts of suicides among over-indebted clients of microfinance institutions
(MFIs) brought to light the increasing debt stress across tens of thousands of clients, exac-
erbated by explosive growth of these MFIs in southern India.1  In light of these events,
India’s Ministry of Finance released a draft of the Microfinance Institutions (Development
and Regulation) Bill 2011 (MFI Bill) to address the oversight of MFIs and establish more
control over this vastly growing sector of the Indian economy.  This article will begin by
addressing the beginnings of microfinance in India and then explain the crisis in Andhra
Pradesh and its causes.  Ultimately, the Microfinance Bill will be explained and analyzed
to determine the effects it might have on Indian MFIs and the Indian people as a whole.
II. The Beginnings of Microfinance in India
Microfinance as we know it today can be defined as “the provision of a broad range of
financial services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and insurance
to poor and low-income households and, their micro enterprises.”2  Historically, unethical
moneylenders with extremely high interest rates have been the poor’s only access to capi-
* Lamar Dowling is a May 2013 J.D./M.B.A. Candidate at Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law and Cox School of Business.  He graduated from Southern Methodist University in May 2009
with a B.A. in Vocal Performance, magna cum laude, and a B.B.A. in Finance, cum laude.
1. Elisabeth Rhyne, On Microfinance:  Who’s to Blame for the Crisis in Andhra Pradesh?, HUFFINGTON POST,
Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elisabeth-rhyne/on-microfinance-whos-to-b_b_777911.html.
2. Md. Waliul Baten, Vision of Micro Financing in Bangladesh:  Success and Challenges 29 (Oct. 21,
2009) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Copenhagen Business School), available at http://studenttheses.cbs.dk/bit
stream/handle/10417/796/waliul_baten.pdf.
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tal because of larger formal banking institutions’ unwillingness to lend without some sort
of collateral backing their loans.  Thus, microfinance has sought to “bridge the gap be-
tween formal institutions and the poor by providing some intermediary mechanisms of
transaction aggregation and rationalizing transaction costs.”3
Microfinance is not necessarily a new idea.  “In the mid 1800s, individualist anarchist
Lysander Spooner wrote about the benefits of numerous small loans for entrepreneurial
activities to the poor as a way to alleviate poverty.”4  However, it was not until the end of
World War II with the Marshall Plan that the idea gained notoriety.  Historian Timothy
Guinnane began researching Freidrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen’s village bank movement in
Germany that reached two million rural farmers between 1864 and 1901.5  Still, the first
microfinance and community development bank, Shorebank, was not founded until 1974
in Chicago.6
While the true beginnings of microfinance are not traced to India, the popularity and
model used today can be attributed to Dr. Muhammad Yunus’ Grammen Bank in Ban-
gladesh.  Dr. Yunus explained his beginnings as follows:
It has been a long journey for us.  It began in 1976 with lending of $27 to forty-two
poor people in a village next to the university campus where I was teaching economics.  I
had no intention of making a wave.  Nor was I planning to create a bank for the poor.  I
had a very modest goal.  I was trying to free forty-two people from the clutches of money-
lenders by giving them the money they owed to the moneylenders, in order to repay them
and become free from exploitation.7
Gradually, Dr. Yunus’ model of giving collateral-free tiny loans for income-generating
activities of the poor caught on and he founded the formal Grameen Bank in 1983.8  The
idea spread like wildfire across India and the entire world.  Today, the Grameen Bank has
a portfolio of over $3 billion and 2.3 million members, dispersing an average of $170 to
each member, which is sixty percent of Bangladesh’s per capita GDP.9  To make these
loans, field representatives will form groups of five within the villages and will only con-
tinue to make loans to the group if all of the members repay the previous loan.  Thus,
because the ability to receive future loans and standing within the village creates a huge
incentive to repay the loans, Grameen has a ninety-eight percent repayment rate.10  In
2006, Dr. Yunus was given the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his accomplishment in
reducing poverty throughout India.11
3. M.S. Sriram, Information Asymmetry and Trust:  A Framework for Studying Microfinance in India, 30
VIKALPA 4, 78 (Dec. 2005).
4. Adnan Ali & M. Ashan Alam, Role and Performance of Microcredit 6 (Spring 2010) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, University West Trollha¨ttan Sweden 2010), available at http://hv.diva-portal.org/smash/re-
cord.jsf?pid=diva2:323460.
5. Baten, supra note 2, at 30.
6. Id.
7. Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank, Microcredit and Millennium Development Goals, 39 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 36, 4077 (Sept. 4, 2004).
8. Id.
9. Susan Wolcott, Microfinance in Colonial India 2 (Binghamton Univ. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No.
0809, 2008), available at http://www2.binghamton.edu/economics/research/working-papers/pdfs/wp08/WP
0809.pdf.
10. Id.
11. ALEX COUNTS, SMALL LOANS, BIG DREAMS:  HOW NOBEL PRIZE WINNER MUHAMMAD YUNUS AND
MICROFINANCE ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 1 (2008).
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The success of the Grameen Bank must be attributed partially to the principles on
which they were founded.  First, Grameen believes that poverty is not created by the poor
but by the institutions and policies that surround them, and thus changes are needed.12
Additionally, they believe that charity is not the answer to poverty and only perpetuates
the situation and creates dependency.13  The Grameen system is also built on the belief
that there is no difference in the ability of a poor person and any other person; the poor
merely do not get the opportunity to explore their potential.14  While conventional banks
start with the principle that the more you have the more you can get, Grameen’s credit
principle is the less a person has, the higher the priority he gets.15  Additionally, a central
assumption of the system is that while it may take a poor person longer to pay back the
loan due to circumstances beyond his or her control, the poor person will always pay
back.16  Lastly, the Grameen system believes that lending to women brings greater bene-
fits to the family than lending to men because they believe that women have greater long-
term vision and are ready to bring about changes in their lives systematically.17
With over 1.1 billion people, India constitutes one-sixth of the world’s total population
and its GDP ranks as the ninth strongest economy in the world.18  However, 27.5% of its
population lives below its poverty level.19  Thus, India is home to the largest population of
poor in the world and consequently has become a natural candidate for experimenting
with microfinance as a way to reduce poverty.20  Studies of microcredit programs have
proven that providing “easy and affordable access to credit and other financial services to
poor families can have a host of positive impacts on their livelihoods.”21  Moving out of
poverty, improved nutrition, better housing and sanitation, lower child mortality rates,
and greater empowerment of women are just a few of the proven benefits of
microfinance.22  Indeed, while other factors have attributed to this statistic as well, India’s
poverty level has continually decreased from 44.5% in 1983 to 27.5% in 2010.23
III. The 2010 Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh
While microfinance began as a way to reduce poverty, it has recently become a multi-
billion dollar industry that has stakeholders in the financial services industry, non-govern-
mental organizations, and global politics.24  Mexican MFI Banco Compartamos listed eq-
12. Yunus, supra note 7, at 4077-78.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. World Bank Data on India, http://data.worldbank.org/country/india (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
19. Id.
20. Rajesh Chakrabarti, The Indian Microfinance Experience:  Accomplishments and Challenges, in INTEGRAT-
ING THE RURAL POOR IN MARKETS 137 (Bibek Debroy & Amir Ullah Khan eds., 2005).
21. Yunus, supra note 7, at 4077.
22. Id.
23. World Bank Data on India, http://data.worldbank.org/country/india (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
24. Ashley Feasley, SKS Microfinance and For-Profit MFIs:  Unscrupulous Predators or Political Prey? Examin-
ing the Microfinance Credit Crunch in Andhra Pradesh and Assessing the Applicability of the UN Global Compact
“Protect Respect Remedy” Framework 2 (Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference
Papers, Paper 49, 2011), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/49/.
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uity shares worth an estimated $1.6 billion in 2007 and became the first ever publically
traded MFI.25  Then in August of 2010, Hyderabad-based SKS Microfinance carried out
the very successful first IPO by a MFI in India and was reportedly worth $358 million at
listing.26  Vikram Akula, founder of SKS Microfinance, stated that he wants to “end pov-
erty through profitability.”27  Many believed the successful IPO of SKS Microfinance
marked the beginning of for-profit MFIs leading the way to eradicating poverty in India
while also making a very large profit.
While microfinance has seen huge success and growth within India and around the
globe, it hit a major roadblock with the microfinance crisis of Andhra Pradesh in October
2010.  The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh accounts for almost forty percent of all
microfinance activity in India.28  Andhra Pradesh is called by many “the capital of
microfinance in India” and is by far home to the largest number of MFI giants, including
SKS Microfinance and Spandana.29  Events after the SKS Microfinance IPO intensified
criticism of for-profit MFIs; some argued that in an effort to sustain profits, for-profit
MFIs were making irresponsible investments and were abusing the very poor communities
they were supposedly trying to help.30  Numerous news agencies began running articles
on the rise of farmers in Andhra Pradesh committing suicide due to an inability to pay
back their high interest loans.31  Somewhat similar to the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis of
2007-2008, some claimed the for-profit MFIs were extending loans to the poor at ex-
tremely high interest rates without regard for their ability to pay due to their pursuit of
profits.32  With news of the sensationalized stories of over seventy suicides, politicians
began urging borrowers not to pay back what they owed, and thousands listened.  Repay-
ments on $2 billion worth of loans were halted, and less than ten percent of borrowers
made payments.33  Additionally, the Andhra Pradesh state government created “An Ordi-
nance to Protect the Women Self Help Groups from Exploitation by the Micro Finance
Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh and for the matters connected therewith or
incidental therefore” (AP Ordinance) which soon became the law regulating lending prac-
tices of MFIs in Andhra Pradesh.34
In passing the AP Ordinance, the government identified the problem as a debt trap and
over-borrowing by the poor from multiple, competing MFIs that was resulting in default
or near-default situations that were only worsened by aggressive collection practices that
helped to possibly lead to the suicides.35  The AP Ordinance laid down a heavy hand and
created many stipulations for MFIs in Andhra Pradesh.  First, it requires MFIs to register
25. Renuka Sane & Susan Thomas, A Policy Response to the Indian Micro-Finance Crisis 8 (Indira Gandhi Inst.
of Dev. Research, Mumbai, Working Paper No. 2011-007, 2011), available at http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/
publication/WP-2011-007.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Rajesh Chakrabarti & Shamika Ravi, At the Crossroads: Microfinance in India, ICRA BULLETIN:  MONEY
& FINANCE 2 (May 2011).
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Feasley, supra note 24, at 2.
31. Lydia Polgreen & Viksas Bajaj, India Microcredit Faces Collapse from Defaults, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/world/asia/18micro.html.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Feasley, supra note 24, at 3.
35. Chakrabarti & Ravi, supra note 27, at 20.
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their branches at a district level.36  As a part of the registration, MFIs are asked to report
the effective interest rates they charge, which were found to range between twenty-five
and thirty-five percent.37  Also, any MFI executive who applied or ordered coercive mea-
sures against borrowers or their families would be punishable by imprisonment for up to
three years.38  Importantly as well, MFIs were prohibited from charging interest in excess
of the principal amount of the loan.
The AP Ordinance drew a great amount of criticism.  One critic noted that the AP
Ordinance’s “largest drawback is that it only regulates the conduct and actions of MFIs
and does not attempt to regulate the Self Help Groups, (SHGs) or any other type of
microfinance organization operating in India.”39  The critic also noted that the SHGs play
a large role in microcredit activities in India and were overlooked because they are pro-
moted by the Indian government and national banking system and are in an intense com-
petition with the MFIs for loan disbursements.40  Another critic noted, “while there are
nuances in whether the Government of Andhra Pradesh has the ability and the inclination
to digest the administrative implications of the ordinance, it has once again shown its
inability to target the errant microfinance institutions, and has instead come down heavily
on the entire market.”41
The Andhra Pradesh crisis and subsequent AP Ordinance have caused many to seek to
understand the underlying causes of the crisis to better understand how to solve the
microfinance problems.  Many believe that the extremely fast growth of the microfinance
sector is at the root of the issue.42  The strong desire to grow rapidly led many MFIs to
streamline their underwriting practices through reducing personal contact with clients and
skipping essential background checks that in turn resulted in providing loans to clients
who could not repay.43  Additionally, the massive amounts of new staff MFIs employed
were not trained properly and were given responsibilities beyond their capacities, some-
times resulting in unethical collection practices.44  The extremely fast growth was fueled
by many factors.  First, MFI growth was exacerbated by the easy access to debt funds,
specifically from banks.45  From the strong competition between banks, to the high repay-
ment rates to MFIs, public and commercial banks saw MFIs as great investments.  Also,
the lack of governance that surrounded the transition of many non-profit MFIs to for-
profit MFIs helped to sustain the high growth rates.46  With shareholders now influencing
decisions, CEOs felt greater pressure to achieve higher margins and increased profits.
36. Oliver Schmidt, The Evolution of India’s Microfinance Market—Just a Crack in the Glass Ceiling? 2-3 (Mu-
nich Personal RePec Archive, MPRA Paper No. 27142, Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/27142/.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Feasley, supra note 24, at 3.
40. Id.
41. M.S. Sriram, Microfinance:  A FairyTale Turns into a Nightmare, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1, 13 (Oct. 23,
2010).
42. Pete Sparreboom, The Indian Microfinance Crisis 2010 – Lessons for China 13 (Working Group on Inclu-
sive Finance in China, China Papers on Inclusiveness No. 4, Apr. 2011), available at http://www.microfinance
gateway.org/gm/document-1.9.52004/The%20Indian%20Microfinance%20Crisis.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 14.
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The national Indian government took note of the crisis and the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) established a committee headed by Y.H. Malegam (Malegam Committee) to review
the issues and to recommend regulatory steps that would prevent the Andhra Pradesh
crisis from recurring.47  The first suggestion was to create a new institutional category
called NBFC-MFIs that would have a net worth of at least fifteen rupees (Rs.) with a
minimum of ninety percent of their assets being “qualified assets;”48 specifically, the
“qualified assets” or non-collateralized micro-loans to households with annual income be-
low Rs. 50,000 and/or total indebtedness not exceeding Rs. 25,000.  Additionally, repay-
ment should be within a month or less.  In regards to pricing and transparency, the
Malegam Committee suggested the MBFC-MIFs observe a margin cap of ten to twenty
percent and a pricing cap of twenty-four percent, and all MFIs should provide borrowers
with standard loan agreements where prices are prominently displayed.49  To reduce coer-
cive methods of recovery, it was suggested that MFIs recover loans at the group level at a
central place and not at the borrower’s residence or workplace.50  Additionally, several
provisions discouraged over-lending and suggested making it the responsibility of the
MFIs to ensure the borrower is not involved in more than one Joint Liability Group
(JLG) until another governmental agency can take over those responsibilities.51
As with the AP Ordinance, the Malegam Committee recommendations have been met
with praise and criticism.  Some have noted that the committee rightly recognized the
importance of MFIs and the need for more oversight by the RBI.52  Additionally, they
state that the recommendations recognize the need for better information and communi-
cation in order to ensure that borrowers are protected and are given transparent informa-
tion.53  Critics, however, recognize that those recommendations could likely have
unintended consequences that would greatly hurt the MFI sector.  They note “the crea-
tion of entry and operational barriers through higher net worth, capital adequacy, loan
portfolio allocation requirements and interest caps is likely to trigger consolidation within
the industry, with a possibility of some banks absorbing some of the MFIs, if facilitated by
the RBI.”54  They also warn “application of interest rate caps, borrower household income
caps and reduced loan limits will result in significant exclusion of households in remote
areas and poor households whose incomes exceed the income caps but remain
unbanked.”55
IV. The Microfinance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill 2011
In response to the Malegam Committee recommendations, India’s Ministry of Finance
released a draft of the Microfinance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill 2011
(MFI Bill) in July of 2011 that will likely reach the Indian Parliament in their coming
47. Jaideep Singh Panwar, Microfinance in India:  Mission or Misery, in ISSUES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS
5 (Lucy Carmody ed., 2011).
48. Id.
49. Sparreboom, supra note 42, at 15.
50. Id.
51. Chakrabarti & Ravi, supra note 27, at 22.
52. Sparreboom, supra note 42, at 16.
53. Id.
54. Panwar, supra note 47, at 6.
55. Id.
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Winter Session.56  The bill proposes a regulatory framework for the microfinance industry
that hopes to protect consumers by making the RBI the sole regulator of the industry.57
Micro-Credit Ratings International Limited (M-CRIL) noted that the bill “represents a
major step forward in the government’s engagement with the microfinance sector.”58
The chief features of the bill are that every institution in microfinance should register
with the regulator, transform into a company when they attain a significant size, be subject
to a variety of prudential and operational guidelines that are introduced by the regulator,
provide periodic information to the regulator and face penal action for violation of law or
any rules framed.59  As with any vast changes in the regulation of an extremely large and
important sector, the bill has drawn both praise and criticism with its methods of protect-
ing the Indian citizens and economy.
The largest change for the microfinance industry would be the delegation of all regula-
tion powers to the RBI.  The bill establishes the supremacy of the RBI as the key regulator
in hopes of resolving all political and regulatory ambiguity.60  The bill seems to dissuade
state governments from trying to replicate the AP Ordinance and notes that microfinance
will be seen as an extension of the banking sector.61  Going even farther, the MFI Bill
requires that every institution involved in microfinance must register with the RBI to help
avoid any confusion that may arise due to multiplicity of regulation.62  Srinivasan, a fore-
most scholar on Indian microfinance, argues that state involvement should not be com-
pletely taken away.63  He notes:
The State councils are a good way of involving the state governments.  But the councils
should be linked to the national council and given a role with content rather than just
creating them.  Without a significant role and participation in some manner in the activi-
ties of the national council, the state councils will become either defunct or deviant.64
Alternatively, investors view this aspect of the MFI Bill as a great change.  Investors
dislike ambiguity and the Andhra Pradesh crisis scared many investors.65  By creating a
sole regulator, ambiguity will be decreased and clarity of rules will be created, enticing
many investors to return to the microfinance market.66  Despite being the sole regulator,
M-CRIL also notes that the RBI may, with the previous approval of the Government,
delegate any of its powers with respect to any class of MFI to the National Bank for
56. Draft Microfinance Bill Gives RBI Total Control and Puts Sector under Strict Watch, ECON. TIMES, July 7,
2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-07/news/29747758_1_mfis-coercive-recovery-
finance-institutions.
57. Id.
58. Comments on the Draft Microfinance Bill:  A Major Step Forward for Financial Inclusion?, MICRO CREDIT
RATINGS INT’L LTD. 1 (July 7, 2011), http://www.m-cril.com/BackEnd/ModulesFiles/Publication/M-
CRIL’s-comments-on-the-draft-Microfinance-Bill-July-2011.pdf.
59. N. Srinivasan, India’s Microfinance Bill Answers Most Questions, CGAP MICROFINANCE BLOG (July 24,
2011), http://microfinance.cgap.org/2011/07/24/india’s-microfinance-bill-answers-most-questions.
60. Vineet Rai, India’s Microfinance Bill Offers a Mixed Bag to Investors, CGAP MICROFINANCE BLOG (Aug.
4, 2011), http:/microfinance.cgap.org/2011/08/04/india’s-microfinance-bill-offers-a-mixed-bag-to-investors.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Srinivasan, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. Rai, supra note 60.
66. Id.
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Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD).67  This of course could create some am-
biguity and dissuade investor activity.
The MFI Bill also proposes a margin cap in Section 25 that will supposedly prevent
MFIs from profiteering from the poor.68  This is welcomed by some and not by others.
Srinivasan notes that this can be positive in that absolute interest rate caps are “anti-
market and introduce rigidities.”69  However, he also notes that the MFI Bill also gives the
RBI the power to impose an APR cap but believes that margin caps will be imposed across
the sector and the APR cap will only be used in emergencies.70  Another also argues that
the margin cap could be a blessing in disguise by scaring away short-term, opportunistic
investors from the MFI sector and making it easier for long-term investors to find good
deals at reasonable prices.71  While M-CRIL agrees that there should be a limit on loan
amounts to define MFIs, they argue that the margin cap is “unnecessary micro-manage-
ment of a business relationship.”72  Additionally, it can be argued that a margin cap will
take away incentives for MFIs to rework their cost structures and use technology to bring
down their costs once they have reached a certain benchmark.73
The MFI Bill also tries to protect clients through introducing obligations and establish-
ing extensive monitoring and reporting requirements.74  Specifically, the MFI Bill creates
grievance procedures, mandatory enrollment to credit bureaus, and code of conduct en-
forcement through industry associations.75  Requiring all MFIs, regardless of form, to reg-
ister with the RBI will begin the process of simply gaining more knowledge of the MFI
sector in India.76  While some investors do understand the need to protect vulnerable
clients, they also believe that systems for implementation and cost implications have not
been taken into account.77  Nevertheless M-CRIL sees these developments as “inevitable
and necessary” in the current situation and “normal in any regulatory regime and benefi-
cial to the sector as a whole.”78
V. Conclusion
While the MFI Bill has drawn criticism and support from different groups throughout
India, most everyone agrees that it provides a step in the correct direction in preventing
another crisis from occurring like the one in Andhra Pradesh.  While it began as a way to
bring the poor from the depths of poverty, microfinance’s success has also brought grow-
ing pains that have been detrimental to some of those it was trying to help.  Through the
MFI Bill, the government seems to be striving to protect those that microfinancing was
67. Comments on the Draft Microfinance Bill, supra note 58, at 1.
68. See Srinivasan, supra note 59.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Rai, supra note 60.
72. Comments on the Draft Microfinance Bill, supra note 58, at 2.
73. Rai, supra note 60.
74. Id.
75. See Srinivasan, supra note 59.
76. Id.
77. Rai, supra note 60.
78. Comments on the Draft Microfinance Bill, supra note 58, at 2.
VOL. 45, NO. 4
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
INDIAN MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 1091
intended to help in the beginning.  The fate of the bill has yet to be determined within the
Indian Parliament and only time will be able to determine the final specific steps that will
be taken to protect India’s poor.
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